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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This research project has two interconnected goals. First, it attempts to unpack 
and redefine ‘hybrid regimes’ – a concept that has emerged from the ‘third wave’ 
democratisation literature in the late 1990s and shares with this literature its 
underlying cultural, ideological and teleological assumptions. I start with a 
critique of these dominant assumptions and point to the need to rethink hybrid 
regimes outside of these parameters. I then propose a more limited and lucid 
definition for hybrid regimes as political systems built on two contesting sources 
of legitimacy – elitist and popular – and corresponding institutions of 
guardianship and democracy. Hybrid regimes, in other words, are not 
‘diminished democracies’ or ‘competitive autocracies’, but an altogether separate 
regime type that feature clearly defined tutelary and electoral institutions. Based 
on this redefinition, I present five hypotheses regarding the dynamics of change 
in hybrid regimes, which are subsequently applied to the two case studies: the 
Islamic Republic of Iran and the Republic of Turkey.  
  
The second goal of the thesis is to present a new comparative framework to 
analyse the post-Cold War dynamics of change in the Islamic Republic of Iran and 
the Republic of Turkey, two countries with political systems that scholars have 
found difficult to categorise and observers often treated as polar opposites due 
to their seemingly inimical official ideologies, Khomeinism and Kemalism. 
Through studying their hybrid institutional characteristics and the role of 
structural factors and human agency at the critical political junctures that the 
two countries experienced in the late 1990s and the 2000s, I endeavour to 
contribute to the scholarly discussion on the dynamics of interaction and 
legitimation between popular and elite rule. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Research goals 
 
This research project has two interconnected goals. First, it attempts to unpack 
and redefine ‘hybrid regimes’ – a concept that is born out of the ‘third wave’ 
democratisation literature and shares with this literature its underlying cultural, 
ideological and teleological assumptions. Secondly, on the basis of this new 
definition, it presents a new comparative framework to analyse the post-Cold 
War dynamics of political change in the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) and the 
Republic of Turkey, two countries with political systems that scholars have 
found difficult to categorise and observers often treated as polar opposites due 
to their seemingly inimical official ideologies, Khomeinism and Kemalism.  
‘Hybrid regime’ is a useful concept to make sense of the vast ‘grey area’ 
between the theoretically perfect democracy and the theoretically absolute 
dictatorship. However, it has been based on vague and conflicting definitions and 
thus has come to mean everything and nothing at the same time. Starting with a 
critique of the dominant assumptions of the democratisation literature, I 
redefine hybrid regimes not as diminished types of autocracy or corrupted 
democracies, i.e. fragile “halfway-houses” that have stalled in their democratic 
transitions (Huntington 1991a: 598), but rather as fairly stable entities that were 
founded, legitimised and consolidated as hybrid. In other words, instead of 
presuming that they are inherently democratic or inherently authoritarian, I 
conceptualise hybrid regimes as a separate regime type altogether, 
simultaneously consisting of clearly defined and demarcated authoritarian and 
electoral institutions. 
 Hybrid regimes, to be more specific, embody two contending visions of 
government within the same institutional structure: guardianship and 
democracy. Deeply distrustful of the masses, guardianship – or rule by self-
12 
 
proclaimed philosopher kings – challenges the basic democratic idea that 
ordinary human beings are capable of understanding and defending their own 
interests. From Plato’s conceptualisation of government as a “royal art or 
science” to Lenin’s “vanguard party” shepherding the proletariat, the notion that 
only a select minority can possess the skills, virtues and knowledge necessary to 
govern on behalf of the people has been a powerful and attractive vision 
throughout history. One of the most distinguished scholars of democratic theory 
of our age, who passed away as I was concluding this thesis, Robert Dahl 
considered guardianship as the “perennial alternative” and “the most formidable 
rival” to democracy (1989: 52). 
 Dahl also described guardianship as a “fundamentally different kind of 
regime” than democracy and not just a mere modification of it (1989: 57). But 
while there are extensive studies that focus on democratic and non-democratic 
regimes separately, less attention has been devoted to modern political 
arrangements that accommodate both of these inimical visions of government. 
How do these ‘hybrid’ systems attempt to reconcile in theory and practice the 
division of sovereignty between the demos and the aristos? Does the assumed 
conflict between guardianship and democracy render the hybrid regime 
inherently unstable, prone to institutional rivalries, frequent systemic crises and 
ultimately regime change? Or can these regimes achieve a desirable equilibrium 
by weeding out the excesses of democracy’s populism and guardianship’s 
elitism? More practically, when and how does a system become/cease to be 
hybrid? These constitute my preliminary research questions. 
 
 
Methodological framework and challenges 
 
This thesis attempts to contribute to an understanding of the causes, the 
dynamics and the outcomes of processes of change in hybrid regimes through an 
in-depth comparative analysis of two case studies. As a qualitative work, it draws 
its sources from the official statements, interviews, writings and memoirs of key 
actors; news articles, governmental, intergovernmental and non-governmental 
reports; as well as from personal, journalistic and scholarly accounts of close 
contemporary observers of these processes. Indeed, a considerable number of 
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the books and academic articles that make up the extensive list of secondary 
sources used in this research also qualify as eye-witness accounts as they 
demonstrate the changing perspectives and analytical frameworks prevalent 
within the scholarly, journalistic and political circles in and outside of these 
countries during the periods under study.  
 As is often the issue with qualitative works looking at a small number of 
cases, a particular challenge for this work has been to acquire and present a 
fairly balanced and in-depth understanding of the two cases. Whereas one of 
these cases, Turkey, concerns my native country and language, my personal and 
linguistic access to Iran had been rather limited prior to this research. To offset 
this imbalance, I focused on improving my Persian both in London and in Iran, 
where I enrolled in the language department of the University of Isfahan in late 
2010. At the same time, the contemporary political scope of the thesis presented 
an altogether different challenge: that of distancing myself from the events and 
dynamics that I witnessed first-hand, in order to present a dispassionate 
scholarly account. Not surprisingly, this proved to be more difficult in the case of 
Turkey than Iran. 
 The analytical framework employed in this research draws from 
Comparative Historical Institutionalism. The question of political change is 
essentially a question of authority, and more specifically, legitimate authority. At 
its core, politics is the contestation, negotiation and legitimisation of power by 
representatives of various socio-economic and political interest groups. All 
democratic and non-democratic regimes endeavour to establish and project an 
image of popular legitimacy in the eyes of the people and other governments. 
That being said, the domestic criteria and definitions of legitimate authority tend 
to vary across the board. An act of government considered deeply illegitimate in 
one context may be perceived as legitimate in another. 
 How, then, to identify these varying criteria, analyse the process of 
contestation and negotiation of power, and determine whether or not a 
threshold of legitimacy has been crossed at a given moment? Studying 
institutions from a comparative historical perspective helps us in this endeavour. 
By institutions, I refer to “formal rules, compliance procedures, and standard 
operating practices” (Hall 1986: 19), as well as “overarching structures of state” 
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(Ikenberry, Lake and Mastaduno 1988: 226). The emergence and evolution of 
institutions reflect the impact of and the symbiotic relationship between human 
agency and structure.  
The relationship between institutions and human agency has been the 
focus of historical institutionalism. In their influential volume laying the 
groundwork of this approach, Steinmo, Thelen and Longstreth argue that 
“institutions that are at the centre of historical institutional analyses […] can 
shape and constrain political strategies in important ways, but they are 
themselves also the outcome (conscious or unintended) of deliberate political 
strategies, of political conflict, and of choice.” (1992: 10). Decisions of key 
political actors, leadership skills, individual or group choices can play a vital role 
in influencing the process and the outcome of change. Human agency, especially 
at certain critical junctures, may rapidly and decisively alter the future course of 
events, i.e. shape path dependence.1 While actor choices are not pre-ordained, 
they are influenced and informed by the prevailing institutional characteristics. 
Slow moving structural dynamics, such as cultural codes, perceptions of 
history, geopolitical, demographic and economic factors, constitute the 
underlying third dimension of change, shaping both institutions and actor 
choices. The fact that structural factors (especially culture and history) are less 
tangible, hence harder to observe, account for and quantify, has increasingly led 
students of political ‘science’ to tiptoe around the boundaries of this risky zone, 
without venturing inside. Yet despite its obvious risks and difficulties, this is a 
task that modern scholarship has to shoulder. Students of politics cannot afford 
to ignore structure entirely and avoid asking big questions, simply because some 
of these questions appear unquantifiable. Indeed as Rustow (1970: 347) argued, 
the study of transitions “will take the political scientist deeper into history than 
he has been commonly willing to go.” 
Admittedly, attaching too little or too much emphasis on structure are 
both equally problematic, as the democratisation literature has demonstrated 
                                                 
1 Path dependence implies that “crucial actor choices may establish certain directions of change 
and foreclose others in a way that shapes long-term trajectories of development.” Such choices 
have particularly profound impact during critical junctures, which Mahoney defines as “historical 
spaces, moments, arenas of change, which produce a struggle for new spatial reference points 
and in which a new segmentation of the polity becomes evident.” (2001: xi, 6) 
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time and again. As Chapter 1 will discuss in detail, both the universalism of the 
‘no preconditions’ approach and the essentialism of the ‘clash of civilisations’ 
perspective have their pitfalls. The middle ground between universalism and 
cultural relativism is often elusive, and a fine line separates cultural relativism 
from cultural essentialism. Yet it is also imperative that this middle ground is 
found and treaded.  
The key to succeeding in this pursuit may lie in recognising that history, 
culture, society and geopolitics matter, but that these are fluid and porous 
‘dynamics’ rather than static all-encompassing monoliths. In this endeavour, 
adapting Laurence Whitehead’s “floating but anchored” conceptualisation of 
democracy to our wider framework might prove useful (2002: 6). We could be 
‘floating’ in our diverse structural contexts yet ‘anchored’ in our shared 
humanity. Put in less ambiguous terms, when examining political change 
anywhere, we can be confident that in each geographic case, there will be 
popular demand for physical security and economic well-being, as well as for 
justice, fairness and an ‘honourable’ life. Specifically how these demands are 
defined, expressed, communicated, prioritised, negotiated and institutionalised, 
however, will depend in part on a complex and fluid set of historical, cultural, 
socio-economic and geopolitical factors that fluctuate across time and space.2  
History, culture, and underlying economic and geopolitical factors inform 
social perceptions of identity, authority and legitimacy, which in turn help shape 
institutions and ultimately affect agency. We have, in other words, three 
concentric layers of interdependence, in which human agency, the micro level, 
and structural dynamics, the macro level, both influence each other, with 
institutions in the middle transmitting and reflecting the outcome and thus 
serving as an ‘analytical bridge’ between the two. This understanding forms the 
basic conceptual framework of this research.  
 
                                                 
2 “Does the term ‘democracy’ carry just the same connotations after the end of the cold war as it 
used to in a bipolar world? Is the core meaning of the word really identical in Chinese, or in 
Arabic, to its meaning in English, or in Greek?” (Whitehead 2002: 8). Sen adopts a more 
universalistic approach: “The championing of pluralism, diversity, and basic liberties can be 
found in the history of many societies. The long tradition of encouraging and protecting public 
debates on political, social and cultural matters in, say, India, China, Japan, Korea, Iran, Turkey, 
the Arab world, and many parts of Africa, demand much fuller recognition in the history of 
democratic ideas.” (2003: 29 – 30). 
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Case studies 
 
Consistently defying categorisation by scholars of politics, the Republic of Turkey 
and the Islamic Republic of Iran make compelling case studies for hybrid 
regimes. Ever since the Iranian revolution in 1979, the popular tendency within 
and outside academia has been to treat these two countries as polar opposites, 
representing two irreconcilable paths to modernisation and development. On 
one side was Turkey, a secular and pro-western multiparty democracy, despite 
its various shortcomings; on the other side was Iran, a vehemently anti-western 
theocracy. Political elites in Iran and Turkey certainly contributed to this binary 
perception by demonising the other country’s ruling elite as either backward 
Islamic radicals or as godless imitators of the West, although these portrayals 
were typically meant for domestic consumption and did not constitute the basis 
of the countries’ bilateral relations.  
Still, the scholarship dealing with the two countries frequently took on 
board this dichotomisation with little scrutiny. This has been the predominant 
international relations approach to the two countries, and a large part of the 
academic work dealing with both countries has been IR-based.3  Of the handful of 
existing English language comparative works on Iran and Turkey, from both 
historical and political disciplines, only one has a full chapter devoted to the 
institutions of guardianship.4 In other words, there is an evident gap in the 
literature looking at Iran and Turkey from a comparative perspective and 
focusing on their hybrid institutional architectures. 
The Turkish Republic and the Islamic Republic of Iran are the successor 
regimes to the two imperial power centres of the Muslim Middle East, the 
Ottoman and Iranian empires, which had found themselves at the political, 
economic and cultural periphery of the West (and Russia) by the nineteenth 
century. They are the products of popular movements led by charismatic leaders, 
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and Ayatollah Khomeini, who were convinced that they 
                                                 
3 See for example, Özbudun (1990), Rubenstein and Smolansky (1995), Barkey (1996) and Olson 
(2004). 
4 This is ‘Chapter 5: The Guardians and Elections in Iran and Turkey’ in Tezcür (2010). Other 
comparative works include Atabaki and Zürcher (2004), Kamali (2006), Atabaki (2007) and 
Sohrabi (2011).  
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possessed the necessary wisdom and vision to liberate the country and 
transform society from above; arriving at parallel conclusions through markedly 
different intellectual paths. The Kemalist and Khomeinist republics embodied 
simultaneously elitist and popular characteristics from their inception, which 
became manifest following the charismatic leaders’ deaths. 
 While both republics routinely hosted competitive popular elections with 
unpredictable outcomes and direct impact on policymaking and power sharing, 
the contestation took place within the boundaries drawn by various institutions 
of regime guardianship. In Kemalist Turkey, the military and the high judiciary 
acted as the key institutions of guardianship, vigilantly preserving the regime’s 
basic principles (and their own privileged socio-political status) through staging 
periodic coups, ousting elected governments, banning parties and politicians, 
and amending and enforcing the constitution. In Iran, a full range of republican 
institutions function in the shadow of an Islamic guardianship pillar, which is 
structured upon Khomeini’s novel idea of velayat-e faqih (Guardianship of the 
Islamic Jurisprudent). This guardianship pillar is made up of institutions such as 
the Office of the Supreme Leader, the Council of Guardians and the Islamic 
Revolutionary Guards Corps. In both polities, certain policy areas (such as 
determining the main contours of foreign policy) have been traditionally outside 
the remit of elected officials and within the ‘reserved domains’ of the guardians. 
That said the expanse of these domains and the boundary between the two 
pillars have been negotiated and contested continuously and therefore have 
remained in flux. These moments of negotiation, contestation and fluctuation 
constitute a key area of this research, as they are instrumental to understanding 
the dynamics of change in hybrid regimes. 
The thesis is organised in the following order: Chapter 1 provides the 
theoretical framework and redefines hybrid regimes. Chapter 2 looks into the 
structural factors that inform social and institutional perceptions of legitimate 
and patriarchal authority in Iran and Turkey. Chapter 3 examines the agency of 
Atatürk and Khomeini; the role of their charismatic leadership, pragmatic 
politics and ideological legacy in shaping the hybrid architecture and the elite 
factions that have defined Turkish and Iranian politics after their deaths. Chapter 
4 analyses and compares the two republics’ institutional architecture and elite 
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factions as they became consolidated as hybrid regimes. Chapters 5 and 6 focus 
on the power struggles between the two pillars (and the political factions that 
cut across them) and especially on the challenges that elected governments 
mounted on conservative guardians from the late 1990s onwards in both 
countries. Finally, Chapter 7 reviews the nature and the dynamics of transition 
from, and back to, hybridity. 
I am particularly interested in why these contemporaneous challenges 
yielded highly divergent results: in Turkey, the Justice and Development Party 
(Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) government succeeded in dismantling Kemalist 
guardianship during the 2000s. In Iran, the traditionalist guardians not only 
managed to thwart and suppress reformist and neo-conservative challenges, but 
also expanded their grip over the electoral institutions to such a degree as to 
undermine the regime’s democratic legitimacy. In other words, with elected 
officials triumphant over the guardians in Turkey and the guardians having 
suppressed popular challenges to their authority in Iran, I argue that both 
regimes ceased to be hybrid at the end of the 2000s.  
While this picture would seem to imply the existence of simultaneous 
processes of democratisation in Turkey and authoritarian clampdown in Iran, a 
review of the post-hybrid dynamics of both countries exposes the shortcomings 
of this linear assumption. In Iran, the election of Hassan Rouhani in June 2013 
signalled a return to hybridity by restoring the integrity of the electoral process, 
which had been damaged after the contested 2009 presidential poll. Despite 
their bitter splits following the 2009 election, restoration of hybridity appears to 
have been favoured by all major factional leaders, at a time when the Khomeinist 
regime was facing a popular legitimacy crisis, severe economic instability and a 
volatile geopolitical environment. Meanwhile from the ruins of Kemalist 
guardianship in Turkey emerged an increasingly authoritarian one-party 
government, driven by religious nationalist patriarchal instincts and a strictly 
minimalistic interpretation of democracy. The Turkish experience demonstrates 
that it is misleading to conceptualise unelected guardians as the sole impediment 
to democratisation, which requires a more profound shift in the culture of 
government, including among elected officials.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: DEMOCRATISATION, 
GUARDIANSHIP AND THE HYBRID REGIME 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Almost all the well-known works on hybrid regimes produced in political studies 
over the past three decades are grounded in the contemporary literature on 
democracies and democratic transitions. This means, for the most part, that the 
underlying assumptions that have influenced this wider literature also define the 
parameters of the scholarly discussion on hybrid regimes. I start this chapter 
with a critique of the dominant cultural, ideological and teleological assumptions 
of the democratisation literature, and point to the need to rethink hybrid regimes 
outside of these parameters. I then propose a more limited and lucid definition 
for hybrid regimes as political systems built on two contesting sources of 
legitimacy – elitist and popular – and corresponding institutions of guardianship 
and democracy. This redefinition will also liberate us from the geographic and 
temporal limitations of the democratisation literature as well as from the 
tendency to conceptualise hybrid regimes as either corrupted democracies or 
diminished autocracies. Finally, based on this redefinition, I present five 
hypotheses regarding the dynamics of change in hybrid regimes that are applied 
to the Iranian and Turkish cases. 
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The long shadow of the ‘third wave’: Democratisation and the 
transition literature 
 
Two major debates 
 
Any work on democratisation today will be hard put not to refer to Samuel 
Huntington’s ‘third wave’ theory. Huntington argued in his same-titled 1991 
book that democratisation takes places in international waves. The so-called 
third wave of democratisation started with the collapse of military dictatorships 
in Southern Europe and Latin America in the 1970s and 80s, which was followed 
by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the transition of socialist one-party 
systems of Central and Eastern Europe into free-market economies in the early 
1990s. Huntington built his theory upon the existing literature on transitions 
from authoritarian rule, particularly drawing from Juan Linz’s earlier 
observations regarding the role of political elites in affecting the course of 
transformations (‘reforma’) or replacements (‘ruptura’) (Huntington 1991b; Linz 
2000). While other scholarly works during the same period also had significant 
impact on the current academic debate,5 the ‘third wave’ became the dominant 
conceptual framework in democratisation studies, especially in the United States, 
where in the post-Cold War euphoria of the 1990s academics and policymakers 
celebrated ‘the end of history’ and the global triumph of US-led free market 
capitalism and liberal democracy. 
Two debates have been key to studies on democracy and 
democratisation: the first revisits the classical discussion on how democracy 
should be defined and measured. Contributors to this debate draw their 
arguments from a wide range of sources, including references to the Greco-
Roman experiences of direct and representative government, as well as 
quantitative tools borrowed from econometrics and social statistics.6 Two 
general approaches can be identified here: the first is the ‘minimalist’ or 
‘procedural’ approach, typically associated with Joseph Schumpeter’s 
‘electoralist’ definition, Robert Dahl’s ‘Polyarchy’, as well as definitions by 
                                                 
5 Such as O’Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead (1986), and Diamond, Linz and Lipset (1988).  
6 A good overview and discussion can be found in O’Donnell (2010) and in Whitehead (2002). 
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Huntington and Adam Przeworksi, all of which focus on various institutional and 
procedural arrangements surrounding competitive elections.7 A second group of 
scholars have regarded these procedural criteria at once too limiting and 
insufficient, and the focus on the ballot box excessive. Instead they set out for a 
definition that is both ‘substantive’ and captures ‘the essence’ of democracy 
across time and space – a “floating but anchored” definition in the words of 
Whitehead (2002: 6). Scholars such as David Held (1996), John Rawls (1997), 
Mary Kaldor and Ivan Vejvoda (1997) and Amartya Sen (2003) have contributed 
to the view that ‘proper’ or ‘substantive’ democracy should be seen as a process 
of ‘public reasoning, discussion, and deliberation’ that is open-ended and 
continually self-reproducing, rather than just a process of conducting elections. 
The second debate within the field is concerned with the process of 
transitions to democracy. More practical in focus and closely engaged in 
international democracy promotion, the overarching goal of ‘transitology’ has 
been to identify generalisable steps or categories to explain processes of regime 
change. These works tend to be more micro in focus, mostly observing actors and 
events within specific periods of socio-political change, rather than long term 
structural dynamics. In one of the earlier attempts to construct a model for 
transitions, Dankwart Rustow (1970) identified one background condition and 
three phases of transition, “each assembled one at a time, with their separate 
protagonists.” Other influential arguments were presented by O’Donnell, 
Schmitter and Whitehead (1986), as well as Huntington (1991a; 1991b) and 
Fukuyama (1995). It is particularly (though not exclusively) within this debate, 
and especially in moments of collusion between academia and policy making, 
that the abovementioned cultural, ideological, teleological assumptions have 
been most visible and influential.  
                                                 
7 Schumpeter’s competitive election theory can be summarised as “that institutional arrangement 
for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a 
competitive struggle for the people's vote.” (Schumpeter 1943; quoted in O’Donnell 2010: 13 – 
14). Arguing that no existing system can be labelled democratic, Dahl opted for the term 
‘polyarchy’, which he defined as “relatively (but incompletely) democratized regimes,” that are 
“substantially popularized and liberalized, that is, highly inclusive and extensively open to public 
contestation.” (Dahl 1971: 8). Huntington’s definition pointed to a political system that exists “to 
the extent that its most powerful collective decision-makers are selected through fair, honest and 
periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all the 
adult population is eligible to vote.” (1991b: 7). Przeworski defines democracy as a system in 
which “incumbents lose elections and leave office if they do.” (Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub and 
Limongi 2000: 50 – 51). 
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Dominant assumptions and practical implications 
 
Is democracy culturally-specific? Does it only work in the framework of a 
particular economic model? Is democratisation an inevitable historical process? 
Have the practical applications of policy suggestions drawn from transition 
studies produced outcomes that are conducive or detrimental to the 
institutionalisation of democratic systems around the world? These questions 
have long sparked divisive and inconclusive debates within and outside 
academia. It would be both unfair and inaccurate to attribute one set of answers 
to the existing literature as a whole. That said, it is probably fair to suggest that 
among various influential proponents of the third wave argument, and their 
followers in academia and the policy-making world, there has been an enduring 
tendency to treat democracy as a cultural product of the West that is strictly 
associated with free market capitalism, and to conceptualise transitions from 
authoritarianism as inevitable phenomena occurring within one-size-fits-all 
models. 
In his influential essay declaring the ‘end of the transition paradigm’, 
Thomas Carothers argued that “the dynamism and the remarkable scope of the 
third wave buried old, deterministic, and often culturally noxious assumptions 
about democracy, such as that only countries with an American-style middle 
class or a heritage of Protestant individualism can become democratic.”8 Scholars 
of the third wave, he pointed out, “enthusiastically banished” the Cold-War idea 
that a country was not ready or lacked the preconditions for democracy (2002: 
16). Yet, conversely, the new vision also had in it perhaps less implicit cultural 
stereotypes and broad-brush assumptions, some of which harked back at an 
earlier age of the ‘enlightening mission of the West’, assuming that the Anglo-
Saxon liberal democracy, a very specific social and historical experience indeed, 
held universal appeal and applicability. In other words, one set of ‘culturally 
noxious assumptions’ was traded for another. 
                                                 
8 Carothers identifies five assumptions, which he argues had crashed by the early 2000s: that 
there is a linear path between authoritarianism and democracy; that democratisation unfolds in a 
set sequence of stages; the determinative importance of elections; that there are no underlying 
preconditions for democratisation; and that the third wave transitions are being built on 
coherent, functioning states. (2002: 8) 
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In fact, not all of these broad-brush assumptions were so implicit. For 
instance, in his 1995 essay titled “The Primacy of Culture”, Fukuyama listed four 
potential challengers to liberal democracy: paternalistic Asian authoritarianism 
(identified as the most serious challenge to liberal democracy); extreme 
nationalism or fascism (in the context of the mid-90s, a threat predominantly 
viewed as disseminating from the countries of the former Soviet Union and 
Yugoslavia); Islam (a complex and multifaceted phenomenon reduced by 
Fukuyama to a uniform geopolitical threat to democracy); and a revived neo-
Bolshevism (former Soviet Union and Latin America). In other words, having 
divided the globe into monolithic cultural zones, Fukuyama identified each 
region outside the western world as the source of one type of anti-democratic 
model or another.9  
Not alien to designating civilisational boundaries, Huntington’s evolving 
relationship with culture presents an even more compelling story. Advising US 
governments to support modernising authoritarian rulers in the interest of 
security and stability and thus leading the ‘not ready for democracy’ front during 
the Cold War (1968), Huntington became an avid supporter of US-sponsored 
democratisation projects in the early 1990s, issuing step-by-step ‘guidelines’ to 
democratisers for reforming or overthrowing authoritarian regimes (1991b: 601 
– 616). It was perhaps his gradual disillusionment with the fate of the third wave 
that pushed Huntington to publish his popular and controversial “Clash of 
Civilizations” thesis in 1996.10 Indeed, Carothers notes that during the course of 
the 1990s, the ‘no preconditions’ assumption of the third wave literature had 
become sufficiently questioned by scholars who brought “economic welfare, 
social class, institutional legacies and other structural factors” back into the field. 
Even so, “it has been hard for the democracy-promotion community to take this 
work on board”, largely because of the difficulty or the inconvenience of 
reforming policies and organisations built upon this process-focused 
methodology (2002: 16).  
                                                 
9 Fukuyama’s generalisations often pushed the boundaries of vulgar cultural caricaturisation. 
“Obviously,” he wrote, “Asian authoritarianism is a ‘regional’ phenomenon no less than fascism or 
Islam.” Casually switching between Islam and Islamic fundamentalism, he declared political Islam 
as unappealing for anyone not ‘culturally Islamic’ to begin with (1995:10 – 11). 
10 The term was originally used by Bernard Lewis in his 1990 article titled “The Roots of Muslim 
Rage”. 
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The same observation stands for the prevailing ideological bias of the so-
called ‘democracy-promotion community’. When US President Ronald Reagan 
and UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher heralded and were celebrated for 
leading a ‘global democratic revolution’ in the 1980s, this was in part a reference 
to the inclusion of new free-market economies into the capitalist ‘free world’, at 
times through violent and undemocratic methods, rather than the establishment 
of meaningful and popularly-rooted democratic institutions and practices.11 
When, among others, Fukuyama traces the birth of the third wave to “the coming 
to power of free-market finance ministers in Latin America” in the 1970s and the 
80s, he effectively crowns as democratisers the ‘Chicago Boys’, a group of US-
educated economists who oversaw sweeping market liberalisation and 
privatisation programmes under the right-wing military dictatorships of Chile 
and Argentina, both backed by Washington against the left, despite their 
systematic human rights abuses (1995: 8). The link between democratisation 
and free market reforms in Latin America remains contested to say the least 
(Panizza 2009). 
The ideological bias for economic liberalisation did not wane with the end 
of the Cold War; if anything it became ubiquitous, with free-market reforms and 
privatisation projects widely perceived and promoted as the institutional 
requisite of transitions to democracy in the developing world.12 Yet although the 
correlation between economic liberalism and democratisation in the age of 
globalisation is tenuous at best (and inverse, at worst), the widespread 
assumption that free market reforms and democratisation are interlinked has 
led to skewed conclusions about the merits and shortcomings of various systems 
of governance.13 Whitehead notes that “leading Western democracies attempt to 
celebrate the progress achieved in the countries closest to their control, and to 
castigate the political deficiencies of those regimes they disapprove for other 
                                                 
11 See Ronald Reagan’s State of the Union address, 25 January 1988. For a retrospective 
celebration of this “worldwide democratic revolution” see Ledeen (1996). 
12 “The deft implicit insertion of liberal into many current accepted uses of democracy suggests a 
struggle – unsuccessful to date – over granting ineliminable‐component status to a new, tacitly 
implied notion.” (Whitehead 2002: 14). Also see Freeden (1994: 140 – 164). 
13 One evidence to this tenuous link may be the resurgence since the late 1990s of a wide range of 
leftist political movements in Latin America within a democratic framework but largely in 
reaction to the perceived social injustices and inequalities attributed to neoliberal policies of the 
previous 25 years. See Panizza (2005) and Cleary (2006). 
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reasons.” (2009: 234). Turkey and Iran are two cases in point. As long as Turkey 
remained a western-oriented free-market economy, the popular tendency within 
government, media and academic circles in the West has been to downplay the 
illiberal character and the human rights violations of the Turkish state and its 
Kemalist guardians, while at the same time emphasising these in Iran, even when 
the state of the Turkish democracy appeared bleaker than its Iranian 
counterpart, such as in the late 1990s. 
Finally, enthusiasts of the third wave inherited another Cold War relic, 
albeit this time from their defeated Marxist counterparts: historical dialectics 
and a utopian belief in the end of time. The triumph of the West and the 
proliferation of pro-market electoral regimes in the late 1980s and the early 90s 
led to the conviction that history progressed in a linear fashion from 
authoritarianism towards liberal democracy.14 This teleological assumption, in 
turn, infused a new type of messianic faith into politics, especially in the US and 
the UK, and encouraged interventions across the world for the sake of the liberal 
democratic utopia. Although the excitement in the imminent ‘end of history’ 
somewhat lost its appeal as the third wave gradually lost steam and 
authoritarian governments with liberal façades appeared increasingly 
consolidated, the teleological undertone of transitology has remained firmly in 
place.15 
Considered in unison, these prevalent cultural, ideological and 
teleological assumptions have effectively reduced the field of democratisation (at 
least its most visible mainstream) into a propaganda platform for the millenarian 
strand of western (neo)liberalism. They also led the scholarship to shoot wide off 
the mark time and again, as non-democracies were declared democracies and 
stable systems labelled as transitional. But it is in the practical application of this 
                                                 
14 “Tough its origins are in trends in thought and policy that developed earlier, rightwing 
utopianism was massively boosted by the collapse of communism. The communist regimes were 
meant to be an advance guard of a new type of society that would replace all earlier models. The 
western states that emerged as victors in the Cold War embarked on a similar project. With a 
triumphal America in the lead they committed themselves to building a worldwide economic 
system. Having rendered every other economic system obsolete, global capitalism would bring 
about the end of history. […] In fact, as could be foreseen, history resumed on traditional lines.” 
(Gray 2007: 41) 
15 Carothers opines that this persistence, particularly among US democracy-promotion circles, “of 
using transitional language to characterize countries that in no way conform to any 
democratization paradigm borders in some cases on the surreal.” (2002: 14) 
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strand that we come across some of its most disastrous consequences. Rwanda 
in the early 1990s serves as an example of how imposing one-size-fits-all 
transition models, built upon the basis of a minimalist understanding of 
democracy and imposed without regard to prevailing structural conditions, can 
go terribly wrong (Mann 2005). Likewise, the ‘shock therapy’ market 
liberalisation and privatisation reforms promoted in Russia during the 1990s did 
not only bring about socio-economic disaster in that country, but also largely 
delegitimised its nascent democratisation project.16 Overall, the idea that a global 
liberal democratic order could be established by a combination of aid agencies, 
economic incentives and military threats has been found wanting. 
Even if one could attribute the ‘mishaps’ of liberal interventionism and 
democracy promotion of the 1990s to post-Cold War triumphalism, naïve 
idealism and inexperience, it is harder to justify the picture that emerged in the 
2000s. That the US-led ‘war on terror’ was carried out under the banner of 
defending liberty at home and spreading democracy abroad has discredited both 
democracy and liberalism. As liberties were systematically curtailed in the USA 
and the UK for the sake of national security, the governments of these countries 
manipulated their own citizens, eschewed international law and committed 
systematic human rights abuses abroad in the name of democracy and freedom.  
Embarrassingly for the field, few mainstream observers in the English speaking 
world sounded the alarm about the deteriorating state of democracy in the West 
during this period, as they were either caught up in or discouraged by the wave 
of patriotism surrounding the ‘global war on terror’, or too preoccupied with the 
unfolding ‘colour revolutions’ in Ukraine, Georgia and Lebanon and the ‘coercive 
democratisation’ of Iraq after 2003. 
The extensive human toll and social dislocation that followed the US 
occupation of Iraq, along with the flat-out western rejection of the outcome of 
the 2006 Palestinian election – one of the fairest and most transparent polls to 
take place in the Arab world to that date – have reduced the meaning of 
democracy, especially when coming from western officials, to a cover-up word 
for geopolitical opportunism in the eyes of many of its reluctant recipients.17 
                                                 
16 See “Chapter 5: Who Lost Russia?” in Stiglitz (2002). 
17 The Iraqi debacle even prompted Fukuyama to detect from the neo-conservative camp (2006). 
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Unfortunately, despite early hopes for the contrary, such scepticism appeared to 
be vindicated by the reaction of many of the world’s leading democracies to the 
Arab uprisings in 2011, judging by the strategic manner in which some anti-
government protests (such as those in Libya and Syria) were much more readily 
portrayed as ‘pro-democracy’ than others (such as in Bahrain or Yemen), and the 
selective policy outcomes of these portrayals. 
 
 
Unpacking and rethinking hybrid regimes  
  
 Steering clear of the ‘terminological Babel’  
 
By the mid-to-late 1990s, as the pace and the extent of political transitions 
appeared to lose steam across the world, the enthusiasm surrounding the third 
wave democratisations also started to disappear. The assumption that 
democratisation was the inevitable outcome of historical progress came under 
increasing scrutiny (Diamond 1996). A large number of authoritarian regimes 
had taken some liberalising steps but had stopped short of meaningful 
democratisation. Contrary to earlier expectations, it became apparent that these 
‘halfway houses’ could stand after all.18 Realising that they could no longer be 
considered in a state of transition, observers pointed to the need to come up with 
new categorisation to describe those political systems located in the so-called 
‘grey zone’ between authoritarianism and democracy. The hybrid regime 
literature emerged out of this realisation. 
As early as in 1971, Dahl observed the existence of a “large space in the 
middle” that was neither named nor subdivided. “The absence of names,” he 
suggested, “partly reflects the historic tendency to classify regimes in terms of 
extreme types. […] The lack of nomenclature does not mean a lack of regimes; in 
fact, perhaps the preponderant number of national regimes in the world today 
                                                 
18 It was Huntington who argued that “the experience of the third wave strongly suggests that 
liberalized authoritarianism is not a stable equilibrium; the halfway house does not stand.” 
(1991b; 598) 
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would fall into the mid-area.”19 In order to refer to regimes in this large grey 
area, Dahl resorted to the terms ‘near’ and ‘nearly’, i.e. a ‘nearly hegemonic 
regime’ or ‘near-polyarchy’. In 1988, Diamond, Linz and Lipset acknowledged 
that “the boundary between democratic and nondemocratic is sometimes a 
blurred and imperfect one, and beyond it lies a much broader range of variation 
in political systems” (xvii). The term ‘hybrid regime’ came into use during the 
mid-1990s to denote this broad, unnamed and undivided space in the middle.  
Looking at the political systems of Central America, Terry Karl introduced 
the term in 1995 and defined it as “a certain functional and territorial mix”, 
which represented “a genuine advance from the [authoritarian] past and a 
significant step in the long-range process of building democracy.” (1995: 74). In 
the beginning the very concept of hybrid regime also had a vague and elusive 
definition, just as the space it was meant to describe.20 Then gradually the 
scholarship engaged in an attempt to define, distinguish, measure, rank and 
categorise different types of hybrid regimes. This led to the proliferation of new 
subcategories, or ‘regimes with adjectives’, creating in effect a “terminological 
Babel” in transition studies (Armony and Schamis 2005).  
During the second half of the 1990s, hybrid regimes were increasingly 
considered as types of diminished democracies, i.e. regimes that fulfilled some of 
the basic or minimal requirements of democratic governance (typically, they 
held reasonably competitive elections) but suffered from other democratic 
deficits, such as limitations on freedom of expression and access to alternative 
information sources, existence of unelected tutelary bodies imposing limitations 
on elected officials, low levels of citizens’ participation in the political process, 
and/or various other coercive factors that tilted the playing field in the favour of 
the incumbents. A plethora of new subtypes emerged in order to define these 
diminished democracies, including O’Donnell’s “delegative democracy” (1994), 
Diamond, Linz and Lipset’s “semi-democracy” (1995), and Zakaria’s “illiberal 
                                                 
19 Dahl also acknowledged that “the arbitrariness of the boundaries between ‘full’ and ‘near’ 
testifies to the inadequacy of any classification” (1971: 8, 9). 
20 Some of the more recent works in the field continued this trend, keeping the definition a 
‘hybrid regime’ vague and somewhat impractically broad. McMann, for example, categorised 
“nearly half of all countries worldwide” as hybrid regimes (2006: 174).  
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democracy” (1997).21 This approach reflected the lingering albeit waning 
optimism in the prospects of the third wave, as the terms’ democratic root still 
assumed a linear, if stalled, transition from authoritarianism to democracy.  
With the new millennium, this democratising bias gave way to a more 
pessimistic approach, which took a rather cynical view of the prospects for 
further democratisation in hybrid regimes, as well as the ability and commitment 
of those in charge of these regimes to deliver democratic reforms. The result was 
the rise of a new set of ‘regimes with adjectives’, only this time with an 
authoritarian root instead of a democratic one. Earlier works, the proponents of 
this new approach suggested, were mistaken to portray hybrid regimes as 
imperfect democracies, while in reality they were partly liberalised authoritarian 
regimes. Among the better known and more widely used labels conjured to 
explain these diminished types of autocracies are Levitsky and Way’s 
“competitive authoritarianism” (2002), Ottaway’s “semi-authoritarianism” 
(2003) and Schedler’s “electoral authoritarianism” (2006). 
Ultimately, instead of defining and clarifying the grey area between 
democracy and authoritarianism, the proliferation of so many regime types with 
adjectives has led to more empirical confusion and conceptual ambiguity, “for 
the resulting palette of qualified, yet improperly specified, regimes not only 
hinders differentiation among the cases but also clouds the basic distinction 
between democracy and autocracy.” Furthermore, “this terminological Babel has 
served to conceal fundamental traits of all democracies, old and new, Western 
and non-Western”, ignoring the idea that democratisation is a dynamic and 
continuous process everywhere and older western democracies are just as 
susceptible to “delegation, illiberalism, and other suboptimal outcomes” as the 
newer democracies (Armony and Schamis 2005: 114).  
The shortcomings of the scholarship on hybrid regimes go beyond 
problems of taxonomy. As the concept itself is born out of the third wave 
democratisation and transition literature, it shares with this literature not only 
its core cultural, ideological and teleological assumptions, but also its rather 
particularistic geographic and historical scope. The normative framework and 
                                                 
21 Other terms include ‘weak democracy’, ‘partial democracy’, ‘electoral democracy’, ‘façade 
democracy’, and ‘pseudo-democracy’. (Carothers 2002: 10; Collier and Levitsky 1997). 
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theories of the democratisation literature are predominantly built upon 
observations drawn from a specific set and type of empirical cases, and then 
applied, at times problematically, in a universal context.22 One observation-
turned-normative assumption is the existence of a clear-cut rupture between an 
old and supposedly plainly authoritarian system, and a new and supposedly 
democratic arrangement. This is largely based on the experience of the collapse 
of military dictatorships in Southern Europe and Latin America in the 1970s and 
the 80s, and socialist one-party regimes in Central and Eastern Europe in the 
1990s.  
The idea of rupture presents numerous challenges when taken as a 
framework for analysing transitions: it conceals potential continuities between 
and complexities within the old and the new regimes, running the risk of 
assigning potentially undue democratic credentials to the new regime just 
because it replaced the old one. Secondly, it lays the groundwork for 
conceptualising democratisation as a linear and unidirectional process from a 
starting point (authoritarianism) to a reachable end goal (democracy), thus 
reinforcing the teleological assumption. Finally, it provides no proper tool for 
detecting and analysing important episodes of socio-political change that do not 
include a clear-cut division between an old and a new regime. 
Alongside this geographic (or contextual) limitation of the literature, a 
second (historical or temporal) limitation stems from the tendency to cluster 
episodes of political change into waves and counter-waves. By 
compartmentalising history in dichotomous grand narratives, the wave theory 
selectively magnifies one set of developments while trivialising others in any 
given time period. It plays down, for example, authoritarian tendencies during a 
wave of democratisation, and largely ignores attempts at democratic reform or 
consolidation during authoritarian counter-waves. At the same time, the 
scholarship’s disproportionate preoccupation with the third wave 
democratisations means that those episodes of socio-political change predating 
the start of the third wave in the 1970s are rarely given enough attention or 
often inadequately investigated, even though these episodes may have had direct 
                                                 
22 This applies to some of the major works in the field including Linz (1975); O’Donnell, Schmitter 
and Whitehead (1986); Diamond, Linz and Lipset (1988); Huntington (1991); and Linz and 
Stepan (1996). 
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impact on more recent processes of change. Furthermore, since within the 
already limited time scale of the third wave much of the research is concentrated 
on post-Cold War transitions, political change is examined almost exclusively in a 
short-to-medium term view, i.e. within the framework of a few years to one or 
two decades.23 The application of rigid transition models becomes all the more 
complicated as much can depend in the short term on external factors, such as an 
oil shock, environmental disasters or economic boom/bust cycles. 
To return to my original point, as a product of the third wave and 
transition literature, much of the existing scholarship on hybrid regimes has 
inherited its limitations. Morlino’s definition of hybrid regimes is a case in point, 
as it reflects both the linear perspective and the limited time scale of the larger 
literature, as well as the expectation of a rupture. A hybrid regime according to 
Morlino is:  
 
a set of institutions that have been persistent, be they stable 
or unstable, for about a decade, have been preceded by 
authoritarianism, a traditional regime (possibly with 
colonial characteristics), or even a minimal democracy and 
are characterized by the break-up of limited pluralism and 
forms of independent, autonomous participation, but the 
absence of at least one of the four aspects of a minimal 
democracy. (2009: 282) 
 
Turkey and Iran are two countries that expose these limitations and the 
shortcomings of the existing literature in explaining cases that do not fit into the 
empirical context of the third wave democratisations. Both regimes were hybrid 
before the end of the Cold War and do not owe their hybridity to any clear-cut 
rupture associated with the third wave or the triumph of western liberal 
democracy.24 Likewise, the processes of socio-political change that the two 
countries have been going through since the late 1990s have been taking place 
without explicit regime change. Looking for a clear-cut rupture makes it harder 
to identify these subtle processes of change that occur within the boundaries and 
                                                 
23 See, for example, the first of Tilly’s (2000) six assumptions on democratisation. 
24 Although one could easily argue that Iran’s 1979 revolution represents a clear-cut rupture and 
a departure from an authoritarian system into a hybrid one, transitologists have been reluctant 
to include the ‘Islamic Revolution’ among the third wave democratisations.  
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the rhetoric of the existing regimes, but nonetheless alter the very character of 
these regimes in a profound way.  
As a result, scholars have often struggled with categorising outlier 
countries such as Turkey and Iran and treated them as exceptions or anomalies 
to the rule. In the Third Wave, Huntington placed Iran “elsewhere” (1991a: 141). 
Linz admitted in his Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes that it was “difficult 
to fit the Iranian regime into the existing typology” (2000: 36). Houchang 
Chehabi admitted “the comparativist has literally no previously developed tools 
for analysing [Iran’s] political system” (2001: 48). Similarly, Diamond 
categorised Turkey as an “ambiguous regime”, lying somewhere between 
competitive authoritarianism and electoral democracy. The majority of the 
countries that also found themselves in this awkward category had either 
recently experienced regime change as a result of popular uprisings (Indonesia), 
coups d’état (Fiji) or civil war (Sierra Leone), or were former Soviet states 
(Armenia, Georgia, Ukraine) that were still considered in a process of unfinished 
transition. Turkey, on the other hand, had been consistently ambiguous for a 
long time (Diamond 2006: 30 – 31). 
For all its existing limitations, ambiguities and underlying assumptions, 
hybrid regime is a useful concept with considerable explanatory potential. It is 
also a necessary tool to overcome the dichotomisation of the world’s existing 
regimes between purely democratic and purely authoritarian. Such a division is 
hardly more realistic or objective than a Manichean division of the political space 
between good and evil, cowboys and Indians, etc. The grey area exists and it is a 
crowded space. Yet, for the hybrid regime concept to serve as a useful analytical 
tool, it needs to be redefined in a way that dispels existing conceptual 
ambiguities. 
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Neither authoritarian nor democratic: Hybrid regime redefined 
 
The concept of hybrid regimes can become more useful if taken as a category 
separate from both democratic and authoritarian systems of governance 
(including their diminished versions).25 In other words, a hybrid regime needs 
not be thought of as a diminished type of autocracy or a corrupted democracy. 
Dropping the democratic and authoritarian labels altogether would serve 
practical as well theoretical purposes. First, as Gilbert and Mohseni (2011: 273) 
point out, it would help move the discussion away from one of the main 
conceptual bottlenecks in the literature over defining the line that separates 
diminished types of authoritarianism from diminished democracies, which tends 
to be blurry and the labelling subjective.26 
Secondly, it could bridge the gap between the normative and empirical 
understandings of democracy. The idea of a diminished democracy implies that 
non-diminished, or perfect, democracies also exist. Indeed the current hybrid 
regime literature leads one to assume a sense of perfection in those regimes that 
are categorised as democratic, instead of hybrid. Looking from a Dahlian 
perspective, however, we could argue that a perfect democracy does not (and 
perhaps could not) exist, and in one way or another, all existing democratic 
systems are diminished types. Yet, of course, it would be highly impractical to 
simply label all democracies as hybrid regimes; this would also render both 
concepts meaningless. On the other hand, we would find ourselves thrown into 
the same conceptual bottleneck if we were to engage in an attempt to draw a line 
between democracies that are diminished enough to be labelled hybrid and the 
not-so-diminished democracies. Dealing with hybrid regimes not as diminished 
democracies (or autocracies) but as a separate regime type altogether would 
address the criticism voiced by Armony and Schamis that the transitional Babel 
conceals “fundamental traits of all democracies, old and new, Western and non-
Western”, and also treat democratisation as a dynamic and continuous process. 
                                                 
25 Diamond (2002) and Ottaway (2003) have suggested that hybrid regime concept might be 
better understood as neither democratic nor authoritarian. Others, including Bogaards (2009) 
and Gilbert and Mohseni (2011) have built on this suggestion. 
26 In his essay “Thinking About Hybrid Regimes”, Diamond labelled 17 regimes as ‘ambiguous’ 
because, “they fall on the blurry boundary between electoral democracy and competitive 
authoritarianism, with independent observers disagreeing on how to classify them.” (2002: 26) 
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Finally, and related to this last point, taking the hybrid regime concept 
outside the bipolar and linear framework that has dominated the literature could 
dispel some of its core assumptions and limitations, particularly with regards to 
historical progress. A hybrid regime, in other words, is not necessarily a regime 
that became stalled in transition; a half-finished or half-hearted attempt at 
democratisation. Regimes, as the cases of Turkey and Iran will demonstrate, can 
be established and consolidated as hybrid, with institutions reflecting the 
coexistence of conflicting interest groups and ideologies, as well as competing 
sources of sovereignty and legitimacy. Hybridity need not imply a fleeting 
moment; it could be an intrinsic and fairly stable feature. A similar approach has 
been put forth by Gilbert and Mohseni (2011: 272), who rather than placing 
regimes “on a single continuum from authoritarianism to democracy” have 
instead opted for a “configurative approach” that highlights the multiple 
dimensions of regimes and places greater attention on “a variety of institutional 
features that distinguish regimes from one another rather than the more 
common underlying dimension of competitiveness.”  
The term ‘hybrid regime’ then, stands for those political systems which 
can be labelled neither as democratic nor authoritarian, despite embodying both 
democratic and authoritarian institutional elements. Here, the word 
‘institutional’ plays a central role in differentiating the hybrid regime from the 
logic of a diminished democracy. Put more clearly, in light of the second point 
above, what makes a regime hybrid in the first instance is not the ‘quality’ of its 
democracy, but rather the existence of formal non-democratic institutions 
alongside, and often in conflict with democratic ones. Likewise, this 
conceptualisation of the hybrid regime differs from that of a competitive 
authoritarian regime, as the former presumes not an inherently authoritarian 
nature, but a Janus-faced (perhaps schizophrenic) nature that is both inherently 
authoritarian and inherently democratic. The idea of competitive 
authoritarianism, like diminished democracies, has been understood as a matter 
of quality or scale of democracy, rather than institutional architecture. According 
to Levitsky and Way (2002: 52), in competitive authoritarian regimes, “formal 
democratic institutions are widely viewed as the principal means of obtaining 
and exercising political authority. Incumbents violate those rules so often and to 
35 
 
such an extent, however, that the regime fails to meet conventional minimum 
standards for democracy.”27  
The emphasis on the differentiation between institutions and practice is 
in essence an issue of legitimacy. Levitsky and Way’s definition implies that by 
systematically violating the rules of democratic institutions, which are “widely 
viewed as the principal means of obtaining and exercising political authority”, 
power holders knowingly engage in acts that are broadly perceived as unlawful 
or illegitimate, even if the incumbents, the opposition and a majority of the 
public have become habituated to these violations and acquiesced to the status 
quo. Hence, both diminished democracies and competitive authoritarian systems 
suffer, at least in theory, from a legitimacy gap resulting from the difference 
between purported norms and actual practice. Power holders in these countries, 
similar to the guardians in hybrid regimes, often attempt to bridge this 
democratic deficit using ‘defensive semi-ideologies’ with references to 
nationalism, geopolitical threats, and historical and cultural exceptionalism. With 
their powerful elected leaders frequently undermining, circumventing, violating 
and modifying the rules of their purportedly democratic institutions, Russia 
under Putin and Venezuela under Chavez can be thought as examples of 
diminished electoral systems with a legitimacy gap. 
In hybrid regimes, on the other hand, such a gap might also exist but 
could be narrower, as the presence of formally recognised non-democratic 
institutions tends to provide a degree of legitimacy to non-democratic actors and 
their actions, certainly in the eyes of those who control these institutions, but 
also quite possibly among opposition groups and parts of the populace. These 
non-democratic institutions, in turn, also justify their existence by and derive 
their legitimacy from history (traditional or revolutionary) and/or ideology 
(secular or religious). Thailand with its monarchy and Ghana with its system of 
chieftaincy are two examples of hybrid regimes where traditionally legitimised 
institutions share sovereignty and negotiate authority with formal democratic 
                                                 
27 Italics are mine. While Levitsky and Way consider competitive authoritarianism as a type of 
hybrid regime, they argue that it “must be distinguished from other types of hybrid regimes”, 
including “tutelary” or “guided” democracies (2002: 54). I argue that hybrid regimes should be 
distinguished altogether from diminished types of regimes, either authoritarian or democratic, 
and that tutelary and guided democracies are examples of hybrid regimes. 
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institutions (Ray 1996). The institutions of guardianship in Khomeinist Iran and 
Kemalist Turkey, on the other hand, combine traditional, revolutionary and 
ideological legitimation. Indeed, one could argue that far from being fragile 
‘halfway houses’, the institutional legitimacy of non-democratic elements, 
combined with their democratic counterparts, provides a level of flexibility and 
endurance to hybrid regimes that many authoritarian or diminished democratic 
regimes might lack. 
In their configurative approach, Gilbert and Mohseni outline three 
dimensions to assess whether a regime falls into the democratic, hybrid or 
authoritarian category: competitiveness, civil liberties and tutelary interference 
(2011: 284). What separates hybrid regimes from authoritarian regimes is that 
the former hold competitive multiparty elections, albeit under conditions 
circumscribed by non-democratic factors.28 “Although the electoral process may 
be characterized by large-scale abuses of state power, biased media coverage, 
(often violent) harassment of opposition candidates and activists, and an overall 
lack of transparency,” write Levitsky and Way, “elections are regularly held, 
competitive (in that major opposition parties and candidates usually 
participate), and generally free of massive fraud.” (2002: 55). This fits in with my 
conceptualisation of hybrid regimes, as long as the non-democratic context in 
question is a result and reflection of specific institutional arrangements, and not 
just bad practice.  
The second dimension, civil liberties, determines the nature of 
competition and the levelness of the electoral playing field, which can vary 
among different regime types, within a particular regime type, and also fluctuate 
in a given regime over time (Gilbert and Mohseni 2011: 285).29 While both 
competitiveness and civil liberties serve as important indicators in categorising 
regimes and gauging the ‘quality’ of a democracy, it is the third dimension – 
tutelary interference, or guardianship – that is at the heart of my 
conceptualisation of hybrid regimes, as it deals directly with the existence of 
                                                 
28 “Competitive elections are those in which more than one center of power with different socio-
economic interests can participate and ‘present a serious electoral challenge to incumbents”. 
(Levitsky and Way 2002: 55) 
29 Dahl’s basic conception of civil liberties includes freedom to form and join organisations, 
freedom of expression, the right to vote, eligibility for public office, the right of political leaders to 
compete for support, alternative sources of information, and free and fair elections. (1971: 3) 
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formal non-democratic institutions within an otherwise democratic 
arrangement, or vice versa. The next section will elaborate on this dimension. 
 
 
Guardianship and the hybrid regime 
 
 Who are the guardians and what do they guard? 
 
Guardianship is a political arrangement where the state is governed by 
“meritorious rulers who consist of a minority of adults, quite likely a very small 
minority, and who are not subject to the democratic process.” (Dahl 1989: 57). It 
is, in other words, rule by self-described philosopher kings, or a benevolent 
dictatorship. Deeply distrustful of the masses, guardianship challenges the basic 
democratic idea that human beings are capable of understanding and defending 
their own and society’s interests. From Plato’s treatment of government as a 
“royal art or science” in The Republic to the epistemic elitism and paternalism 
prevalent in Confucianism, from Gustave Le Bon’s virtuous, rational and skilful 
elite to Lenin’s ‘vanguard party’ shepherding the proletariat, the idea that only a 
small minority can possess the necessary knowledge, virtue and skills to govern 
on behalf of the people has been a powerful and attractive vision throughout 
history. It has been prominent in the East and the West, in classical, medieval and 
modern societies and endorsed by monarchists and republicans, conservatives 
and revolutionaries alike. 
In whatever socio-political context and geography it appears and whoever 
promotes it, the idea of guardianship entails an inherently paternalistic view and 
hierarchical organisation of society, based on the assumption that ‘objective 
truth’ – or at least a superior wisdom – exists, but can only be attained by a select 
few. In the spirit of Rousseau’s ‘Legislator’, the guardians believe they are in 
possession of “a superior intelligence beholding all the passions of men without 
experiencing any of them.” “Far above the range of the common herd,” the 
guardian is “the engineer who invents the machine” (Rousseau 2008: 44 – 47). 
Like Weber’s charismatic leader, to which I will return in Chapter 3 when 
discussing Atatürk and Khomeini, the legislator refers to an individual – rather 
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than a social class or an institution – who, as a gifted politician, orator and leader, 
plays the role of the founding father. It is often the case in revolutionary polities 
that institutions of guardianship derive their legitimacy, charisma and 
ideological vision from such charismatic leaders. 
In Plato’s ideal republic, the guardians are the aristos, selected from 
among the populace for their skills, intelligence and moral virtue, and rigorously 
trained for the task of governing. In this meritocratic utopia, the demos give the 
guardians their implicit or explicit consent to govern. But since the people are 
not fully aware of their interests, they may oppose to the stewardship of a 
professional ruling class. Plato suggests that the guardians produce a “noble lie” 
– also interpreted as “magnificent myth” or a founding religion – to win over the 
society’s consent (1987: 122); an advice that autocratic regimes everywhere 
have taken to heart. It has often been the case in tutelary systems that at least a 
minority within the population does share the guardians’ worldview and 
supports their socio-political role, out of ideological conviction, a shared distrust 
of the masses and/or because the guardians represent and serve their interests. 
Needless to say, there is a direct correlation between popular support for the 
guardians and the stability and perceived legitimacy of these regimes.  
Has anything resembling Plato’s utopia existed in history? Perhaps one 
could point to the Roman emperor Marcus Aurelius, who was born into an 
aristocratic family and strove as a ruler to remain true to the Stoic philosophy he 
was educated in, as the personification of Plato’s philosopher king. Another 
historical contender would be Cyrus the Great. China with its enlightened 
emperors and meritocratic bureaucracy and, as the next chapter will elaborate, 
the Ottoman Empire at its height during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 
could be said to have devised sophisticated administrative formulas that 
generated considerable cohesion, stability and prosperity in complex societies. 
Venice for nearly eight centuries and Florence under the Medici were highly 
successful examples of republican city-states governed by aristocracies.  
While there may have been no perfect guardianship – and for that matter, 
no perfect democracy – we can argue that monarchism, which has provided the 
majority of political regimes until modern times and represents the traditional 
type of guardianship, could not have survived as long as it did if it rested solely 
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on divine legitimation and brute force, without meeting at least some of the 
practical interests of the societies it ruled. This is not to deny the existence of a 
vast number of dictatorial governments, both ancient and modern, that have 
used the idea of guardianship “in its most vulgar form” to justify their “corrupt, 
brutal and inept” regimes. Even so, as Dahl notes, the argument for guardianship 
does not collapse simply because it has been badly abused: 
  
When we apply the same harsh test to democratic ideas, 
they too are often found wanting in practice. For both 
democracy and hierarchy, their worst failures are relevant 
to a judgment about these two alternatives. But so too are 
the more successful instances of each, as well as the relative 
feasibility and desirability of the ideal standards of 
democracy and guardianship. (1989: 52) 
 
Dahl contests guardianship on the basis of its two theoretical premises: 
that there is ‘a single truth’ that is objective and attainable and that this can only 
be attained by a very small minority of adults in society. It is questionable, of 
course, whether guardians throughout history have viewed ‘truth’ as a single, 
absolute and exclusive phenomenon. The idea of ‘superior wisdom’ or 
intelligence, as stated by Rousseau, may be strictly hierarchical and elitist, but 
perhaps not equally absolute in its view of the truth and exclusive in its 
possession. Either way, as Dahl too concedes, guardianship has always been “the 
perennial alternative” and “the most formidable rival” to democracy and remains 
so today (1989: 64). 
 
 
Guardianship and democracy in hybrid regimes 
 
Guardianship, Dahl notes, is not a mere modification of a democratic regime; “it’s 
an alternative to democracy, a fundamentally different kind of regime” (1989: 
57). What, then, are we to make of those political arrangements, which 
accommodate both of these apparently inimical visions of government? Let me 
emphasise at this point that my interest is not in authoritarian systems with 
democratic façades, where elections are thoroughly rigged and inconsequential 
and rulers unconvincingly paint themselves as the guardians of the people. Nor 
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am I primarily interested in “quasi-guardianship” institutions that may exist 
within modern democratic systems, such as the US Supreme Court, even though 
the discussion on guardianship and hybridity is increasingly relevant to modern 
representative democracies, where expertise, specialisation and delegation of 
authority are the norm (Dahl 1989: 155, 187 – 191). Instead, I focus on 
arrangements where full-fledged guardianship structures, established on the 
basis of an elitist view of society and often (though not necessarily) a utopian 
founding ideology, share political authority with reasonably independent and 
influential popular electoral institutions. 
In the context of modern hybrid regimes, guardianship institutions refer 
to those tutelary bodies that coexist with, apply pressure on, and limit the legal 
and political jurisdiction of elected offices. Guardians are powerful unelected 
actors, such as the military, clerical bodies, bureaucratic, judicial and intelligence 
enclaves, as well as hereditary institutions such as monarchy or nobility, which 
“exercise broad oversight of the government and its policy decisions while 
claiming to represent vaguely formulated fundamental and enduring interests of 
the nation-state.” (Valenzuela 1992: 67). We can think of a hybrid system as a 
mutual compromise between guardianship and democracy, where political 
sovereignty is shared between the institutions representing the two visions. This 
rarely works out as an equitable division, as the guardians typically manipulate 
the playing field to their own advantage. Despite being constrained by the 
guardians, however, elected officials in hybrid regimes are not mere puppets: 
their impact on the socio-political life of the country can be decisive. 
In hybrid regimes, guardians may exert their influence through formal 
and informal channels. In other words, guardians tend to hold “constitutionally 
defined final decision-making power in crucial policy areas that normally would 
fall under democratic control.” (Wigell 2008: 238). This is also called “reserved 
domains” (Valenzuela 1992: 36 – 50). In addition, they may act through 
“informal channels or through the inauguration of ‘control-commissions’ that 
exercise broad, but vaguely defined, control over the conduct of elected 
governments.” (Wigell 2008: 239). Such informal channels could include the use 
of political parties, the media, civil society organisations or a range of clandestine 
agencies as proxies to manipulate public opinion and political decisions. In many 
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hybrid cases formal and informal arrangements go hand in hand: guardians seek 
to formalise their positions of influence through legal/constitutional means. Yet 
even when this is achieved, they may maintain informal methods of interference 
in socio-political life. 
Based on this understanding, we can argue that a large number of pre-
1914 European political systems were hybrid regimes, with elected parliaments 
growing in influence alongside traditional institutions of guardianship, namely 
the monarchy and aristocracy. The German Empire in the late nineteenth century 
and Imperial Russia on the eve of World War I are two cases in point. Likewise, 
despite losing much of its political clout over the past century, the British House 
of Lords still theoretically embodies many of the essential characteristics of 
guardianship. As an institution that derives its legitimacy from history and 
tradition, whose appointed members (some of them still hereditary peers) come 
from the nobility and the clergy, which serves as a check on the elected 
government (could veto legislation outright until 1911 and can still delay and 
defeat bills), and which until very recently enjoyed significant legislative powers 
(1997) and functioned as a type of supreme court (2009), the House of Lords 
historically had much in common with the Guardian Council in the Islamic 
Republic of Iran. As I noted above, the US Supreme Court can be thought of as a 
‘quasi-guardianship’ institute within a democratic polity. The brief periods of 
constitutionalism in the Ottoman and Qajar empires in the early twentieth 
century constitute the earliest versions of hybridity in Turkey and Iran. 
Wigell cautions us not to confuse tutelary powers with “specialised bodies 
like constitutional courts, accounting offices, ombudsmen or human rights 
commissions that perform as institutions of horizontal accountability, and 
therefore may be indispensable to liberal democracy” (2008: 239). This 
statement is hard to refute given that modern democracies are not solely made 
up of directly elected legislative councils. Yet the line separating non-democratic 
tutelage from the vital organs of democratic checks and balances may not always 
be so clear – not least because the guardians of hybrid regimes often perceive 
and portray themselves as indispensable to, among other things, the 
preservation of democracy. The ongoing debate about reforming the House of 
Lords in the United Kingdom suggests that the existence of such an institution 
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remains controversial in an established democracy.30 A similar debate has been 
raging in Israel regarding the role of the Israeli Supreme Court.31 
It might be easier to pass verdict from the outset when the tutelary 
institutions in question are armed organisations, such as the military in Thailand 
or Turkey. Protecting democracy by the barrel of a gun appears to be an 
oxymoron, especially if this ‘protection’ becomes a permanent role. The long 
history of praetorian militaries tell us that the notion of a patriarchal, 
hierarchical and authoritarian institution that monopolises violence and has 
exclusive membership acting as the guardian of a democratic regime, ideology or 
nation and thereby regularly intervening in the socio-political life of a country is 
inimical to the idea of public deliberation and consensus.32 The duty of the armed 
forces in a substantive democracy should be limited to defending the country 
against external armed aggression under the authority of democratically elected 
civilian lawmakers. This is not to suggest that because of their non-democratic 
internal make-up, militaries are necessarily anti-democratic institutions. Nor 
does it imply that military interventions can never be justified. There may be 
plausible grounds for a military intervention, for instance to prevent a civil war 
or a dictatorial seizure of power.33 Yet it tends to be more often the case that 
politicised militaries exploit (or even provoke) the spectre of civil war and/or 
manipulate public opinion against elected governments to justify an 
intervention.  
This point leads me to the necessity of avoiding simplistic generalisations: 
while I explain hybrid regimes as made up of two theoretically/institutionally 
                                                 
30 When British MPs voted for a fully elected House of Lords in 2007 – a proposal subsequently 
rejected by the Lords – The Telegraph asked its readers: “Was the old House of Lords an 
undemocratic anachronism? Or was it rather a guarantor of our constitutional liberties and a link 
with our past?” In 2011, when the Liberal Democrats failed to get their Conservative coalition 
partners to agree to a full elected Lords, George Eaton of the New Statesman bemoaned, “we will 
remain the only semi-theocracy in the western world.” See “Would a wholly elected House of 
Lords strengthen British democracy?” The Telegraph, 7 March 2007, and “Clegg backs down on 
House of Lords Reform” New Statesman, 4 April 2011. 
31 See “MKs, ministers are delegitimizing Supreme Court”, Jerusalem Post, 12 January 2011; 
“Supreme Court is danger to Israeli democracy”, Jerusalem Post, 12 April 2011; “Who is 
undermining Israeli democracy?” Jerusalem Post, 12 September 2011. 
32 For a definition of praetorianism, see Moran (1999). 
33 Constitutional law scholar Ozan Varol (2012) argues “Some coups are distinctly more 
democratic than others because they respond to a popular uprising against an authoritarian or 
totalitarian regime and topple that regime for the limited purpose of holding the free and fair 
elections of civilian leaders.” 
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distinctive pillars for purposes of analytical clarity, neither the institutions in 
question nor their specific components should be understood as monolithic 
entities. Depicting political change in hybrid regimes as a romantic struggle 
between clearly delineated binary forces – autocratic guardians and democratic 
politicians – might be tempting, but would be misleading. Just as elected officials 
can display authoritarian tendencies, there may be democratic-minded 
guardians in positions of influence. Guardians may, and often do, maintain 
unofficial representatives among elected politicians, while democratic norms 
and values could permeate institutions of guardianship. Different interpretations 
of the state ideology and the evolving structural dynamics may create and 
reshape factions within both pillars, opening up avenues for factional 
cooperation and competition across pillars, with informal socio-political 
alliances being formed and dissolved on a continual basis. Indeed, it is this 
complex and fluid dynamic that best reflects the causes, the essence and the 
course of political change in hybrid regimes, and that is partly what this research 
aims to capture. 
In this vein, let me emphasise that where I talk about democracy in an 
institutional context – i.e. the democratic pillar of a hybrid regime – I do so in a 
minimalist sense, referring to the institutions of elected officials. But when I refer 
to democracy as an ideal, I do so in its broader, ‘substantive’ sense, implying the 
“opportunity for citizens to participate in political discussions and so to be in a 
position to influence public choice”; in short, public deliberation (Sen 2003: 29). 
Likewise, instead of a goal that is reached once and for all upon inaugurating a 
list of institutions, democratisation is understood as a complex and open-ended 
process that has to be questioned and reproduced publicly and institutionally on 
a continuous basis (Whitehead 2002: 27). 
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Political change in hybrid regimes: Five hypotheses 
 
In an attempt to address the preliminary research questions that I presented in 
the Introduction to the thesis, I will outline five hypotheses concerning the 
dynamics of change in hybrid regimes, which I will apply to the Turkish and 
Iranian cases in the upcoming chapters. The first hypothesis deals with the 
stability of hybrid regimes, particularly in times of socio-political crisis. I have 
already argued that hybrid regimes are not the fragile halfway houses once 
assumed by most transitologists. On the one hand, the existence of democratic 
institutions grants popular legitimacy to hybrid regimes, which most modern 
authoritarian systems appear to lack. On the other hand, non-democratic norms 
and practices are legitimised by traditionally, ideologically or religiously 
sanctioned – and often, constitutionally endorsed – institutions of guardianship. 
Hence, hybrid regimes might be less exposed to legitimacy gaps compared to 
diminished democracies or competitive authoritarian systems and indeed prove 
more stable and enduring than both. 
The very hybrid character of these regimes suggests that the guardians 
have at their disposal both authoritarian and democratic tools that they can 
effectively utilise to absorb challenges to their authority and survive crises. 
Public negotiation need not open floodgates, as is usually the risk in 
authoritarian regimes. The guardians can take advantage of the extant political 
platform to settle differences with democratic challengers to their authority 
without recourse to violence. As long as this political platform remains 
sufficiently open to challengers, the guardians can project themselves as 
upholding the regime’s democratic pillar, while cutting deals with ‘moderates’ 
behind the curtain to marginalise ‘radical’ elements within the opposition. Once 
the opposition is labelled as ‘radical’ it may be easier to legitimise the use of non-
democratic measures to suppress it.34 
There is admittedly a flip side to all this. The existence of a democratic 
pillar means that guardians have to be more restrained than plain dictatorships 
in the use of non-democratic measures. They cannot shut down the democratic 
process completely, at least not without having a vestige of public support for 
                                                 
34 Of course, this strategy applies to democratic and authoritarian regimes as well. 
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such drastic action (such as a military coup). Even then, they may face popular 
resistance, which tends to grow the longer the democratic process remains 
closed. Shutting down democratic institutions and suppressing prolonged 
dissent would effectively dismantle the hybrid architecture of the regime, 
rendering it plainly authoritarian. This is a scenario that guardians generally 
wish to avoid: the history of military coups in Turkey and Thailand demonstrates 
that direct intervention by guardians tends to be short term, with a return to 
hybridity following a process of socio-political ‘fine-tuning’. Yet as the case of 
Iran post-2009 election suggests, confrontation can also reach a level of intensity 
or pass a tipping point beyond which the guardians cannot (or do not) avoid a 
decline into authoritarianism. 
This brings us to the second hypothesis: a quick historical survey of 
hybrid regimes would lead us to assume with some conviction that the nature of 
the relationship between guardianship and democracy is indeed one of rivalry 
and conflict. Furthermore, the dividing line between the authoritarian and 
democratic pillars tends to be dynamic as a result of being continually 
negotiated. As such, even though hybrid regimes might be better equipped to 
survive crises, their divided and internally conflicted nature might mean that 
they are more prone to experiencing frequent existential crises than democracies 
and autocracies. Between 1960 and 1997, Turkey experienced four military 
coups; one in each decade. In Thailand, the number of attempted coups during 
the past 80 years stands at a staggering 18. Although direct military coups are 
rare in Iran, the entire political history of the Islamic Republic could be 
interpreted as a continuous crisis between the Islamic and republican pillars of 
the regime. 
The third hypothesis follows from this paradox. If hybrid systems can 
endure but cannot prevent periodic political crises, this would indicate frequent 
swings between authoritarianism and democracy in the political playing field. It 
should be emphasised, however, that these swings do not indicate the 
democratisation (or otherwise) of hybrid regimes unless they result in decisive 
institutional changes that render either the authoritarian or the democratic pillar 
obsolete. A particular challenge for this thesis is to understand whether the 
institutional shifts that occurred in Turkey and Iran during the first decade of the 
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twenty-first century mean that these regimes subsequently lost their hybrid 
character, or were these shifts merely swings within the hybrid structure. 
Rapid movements between authoritarianism and democracy within the 
hybrid system can be deceptive and difficult to predict. In 1997, having 
overwhelmingly elected reformist President Mohammad Khatami, Iran seemed 
to hold more democratic promise than Turkey, where the military-bureaucratic 
guardians had just ousted another democratically-elected government. Yet in 
late 2009, when I began researching for this thesis, it was Turkey that appeared 
to be on course towards democratic consolidation, while the regime in Iran was 
descending into authoritarianism. The direction of change seemed to have 
changed yet again by the summer of 2013, with the election of President Hassan 
Rouhani in Iran and the outbreak of mass protests in Turkey against the elected 
government’s perceived slide towards authoritarianism.  
The nature of these swings and changes tend to perplex transitologists. 
Turkey, for example, has been categorised (justifiably) as an authoritarian 
regime during periods of direct military rule, but (misleadingly) as a democracy 
when the military was back in the barracks.35 The latter categorisation 
overlooked the fact that the institutional structure that allowed the military 
guardians to influence Turkish politics behind the scenes was actually 
strengthened during periods of direct military rule and remained firmly in place 
when the guardians took a backseat to elected officials. These changes can be 
better explained as internal swings within the hybrid system, rather than 
systemic transitions between authoritarianism and democracy.  
This brings me to my fourth hypothesis, concerning the difficult task of 
determining what constitutes a ‘decisive’ institutional change that renders one of 
the two pillars of the hybrid regime – hence the hybrid regime itself – obsolete. 
The clearest indication of such change would be the disappearance of an 
institution of guardianship or democracy, such as the outright and permanent 
banning of elections by a dictatorship, or the abrogation of monarchy. But 
decisive change does not always have to be – in fact, often is not – so explicit and 
radical. A more subtle yet still decisive indication would be the loss of practical 
authority of the institution in question, despite its continued existence in name 
                                                 
35 See for example Brownlee (2009). 
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and ceremonial nature. In the case of guardianship institutions, the 
measurement would be the extent to which a non-elected body can, through 
formal and informal channels, influence and manipulate the electoral process, 
curtail civil liberties and limit the political jurisdiction of popularly elected 
officials (i.e. the first two dimensions of hybridity).  
This is what sets Iran’s Guardian Council apart from the British House of 
Lords, or the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic from the Queen of England. 
In other words, had the House of Lords possessed the authority to vet and 
disqualify candidates standing for popular election or to veto all legislation 
approved by the Commons, or if British monarchs still enjoyed extensive control 
over the kingdom’s foreign and security policies then they would be labelled as 
institutions of guardianship and the United Kingdom a hybrid regime. 
Admittedly, the existence of the debate over the nature and the existing powers 
of the House of Lords suggests that we cannot avoid the ‘grey area’. At least in 
our case, it appears smaller and more manageable than in the existing hybrid 
regime literature. 
It might be more difficult to gauge just when electoral institutions become 
‘obsolete’. This is because parliaments can continue to function and create policy 
and elections to deliver results, but these policies and results may have very little 
or no practical bearing on government, or they can be simply dictated by 
guardians behind closed doors. In such cases, the democratic pillar becomes 
merely a façade. Yet while it is easier to spot autocratic regimes where the 
dictator is routinely ‘re-elected’ with upwards of 90% support, it becomes less 
straightforward to tell whether the democratic pillar still stands when there is a 
semblance of competition and autonomy, but also extensive evidence of 
manipulation by the guardians, so that the outcome routinely favours the 
guardians. One way of overcoming this ambiguity would be by looking directly at 
the source of the democratic pillar – the demos – and observe changes in popular 
perceptions and attitudes regarding the integrity and legitimacy of the 
democratic pillar. As is also the case in democratic systems, widespread 
discontent, expressed either in the form of popular unrest or extreme apathy, 
signals problems of integrity of the democratic pillar in hybrid regimes. 
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The final hypothesis is concerned with transitions from, as well as back 
to, hybrid regimes. It might be rather moot, but still necessary, to point out that 
once a regime ceases to be hybrid because it has either lost its democratic or 
guardianship pillar, it does not automatically become democratic or 
authoritarian. Indeed, we should hold the successor systems against the same 
robust test of competitiveness, civil liberties and tutelary interference, before 
labelling them democratic or authoritarian. This goes back to my earlier point 
about these pillars not being monolithic and the outcome of transitions not 
preordained. A victory of the democratic pillar over the guardians does not 
guarantee – although could well lead to – improvements in civil liberties and 
competitiveness. A new tutelary system can replace the old one. It is also 
possible that a system returns to hybridity by reviving its lost pillar. This can 
either be when guardians find direct rule too risky and opt for a degree of 
democratic legitimacy or when an electoral system fails to be consolidated and 
the guardians re-enter the political arena upon the perceived failure of 
democracy. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This first chapter has provided an overview of the democratisation and 
transition literatures and the dominant assumptions associated with the field 
since the early 1990s. The hybrid regime concept is a product of this literature 
and emerged as a response to the slowing pace of third wave democratisations in 
the late 1990s. While it is a potentially useful and necessary concept, it has been 
mired in taxonomical complexities and also shares with the wider 
democratisation literature its various limitations and core assumptions. I have 
redefined hybrid regimes as political systems that can be categorised as neither 
diminished type of democracies nor diminished types of authoritarianism, but a 
separate arrangement that embodies elements of both. Crucially, what makes a 
regime hybrid is not only the quality (or lack thereof) of its democracy, but also 
the coexistence of formal or informal democratic and authoritarian institutional 
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structures. Guardianship is a central tenet of hybrid systems, manipulating the 
electoral playing field, limiting the jurisdiction of elected politicians and 
regularly intervening in the social and political life of the people.  
While the existence of historically or ideologically sanctioned institutions 
of guardianship alongside democratic institutions provides the hybrid regime 
with a diverse set of tools to deal with and survive political crises, conversely, 
their very institutional double headedness means such crises could occur 
relatively frequently. Crises can generate swings between democracy and 
authoritarianism, but the regime only ceases to be hybrid when its dual 
institutional structure is decisively altered. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
OF POWER AND RESISTANCE: STRUCTURAL ROOTS OF 
AUTHORITY AND LEGITIMACY IN IRAN AND TURKEY 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The question of political change, as I suggested in Introduction, is also a question 
of the contestation, negotiation and legitimation of power. Moving from this 
premise, this chapter attempts to build a comparative historical framework upon 
which an analysis of the political change in the modern Turkish and Iranian 
republics can be carried out. It is my contention that historically rooted 
perceptions of authority and legitimacy, as subjective, retrospective and 
continually re-interpreted in response to changing dynamics as they are, play a 
key role in ascribing normative characteristics to political institutions. Key 
institutional characteristic, in turn, help explain both wider socio-political 
change patterns and individual actor choices. 
What does the state (dowlat in Farsi and devlet in Turkish) represent in 
Iran and Turkey in relation to society? How come does it appear to exist 
autonomously from society in both polities and needs to ‘survive’ challenges 
posed against it not only from other states, but also from the society itself? 
Consequently, what makes political authority legitimate (or illegitimate) in the 
eyes of both those who govern and those who are governed? In an attempt to 
answer these questions, this chapter will examine the historically rooted 
perceptions of legitimate authority in Iran and Turkey in light of key 
cultural/religious and geopolitical references.  
In particular I wish to emphasise what Homa Katouzian refers to as the 
“dialectic of state and society” in Iran, in contrast to the hierarchical unison of the 
state with society in Turkey. The supra-dynastic character of Iran as a 
civilisational concept, reflected in pre-Islamic and Shi’a notions of justice-based 
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divine sanction, has worked to legitimise two conflicting forces here: 
authoritarian rule and popular revolt. The popular association of political 
authority with externally imposed tyranny justifies dissent against political 
authority in Iran. In contrast, the state has been a major player and remained a 
central aspect of identity-building in Turkey. Here, the institutional experiences 
of the rise and fall of the Ottoman state, along with the impact of Turco-Persian, 
Byzantine and Sunni Islamic traditions loom large. 
 
 
On ‘Iran’ and ‘Turkey’: What is in a name? 
 
What is ‘Iran’ and what is ‘Turkey’? Two countries and two modern-nation 
states, of course; yet the terms have markedly different historical and cultural 
connotations which determine the way we conceptualise our two case studies. 
Beyond the modern construct of a nation-state, Iran refers to both a geographic 
and, more importantly, ‘civilisational’ concept that has been in more or less 
continuous use on location for over three millennia. While its literal meaning is 
‘the land of the Aryans’, it does not imply an overtly ethnic character. The 
‘Aryanness’ of the people of Iran has been emphasised at various points in 
modern history, in the West as well as in Iran, particularly during the rise and 
height of ethno-nationalism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
and for much of the reign of the Pahlavi shahs.36 But we cannot define Iran as the 
exclusive domain of any single tribe or ethnic group. The Iranian plateau 
constitutes a narrow corridor along the ancient Silk Road between the Alborz 
and Zagros mountains that has seen a continuous flow of goods, ideas, migrants 
as well as invaders. In contrast to the persistent attachment of an ethnic 
undertone to the concept of ‘Persia’ in western political thinking, being Iranian 
has first and foremost a linguistic connotation, referring to the lands dominated 
                                                 
36 In the words of Mohammad Reza Shah: “Certainly no one can doubt that our culture is more 
akin to that of the West than is either the Chinese or that of our neighbours the Arabs. Iran was 
an early home of Aryans from whom most Americans and Europeans are descended, and we are 
racially quite separate from the Semitic stock of the Arabs.” (Pahlavi 1960: 18; quoted in Shakibi 
2010: 53). 
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by speakers of the Persian language, which covers a wider area than the Iranian 
plateau.  
Nor does Iran singularly refer to a political regime or dynasty. Iranian 
history, both ancient and modern, is awash with dynasties that have come and 
gone, of local as well as foreign origins, some fleeting others more enduring in 
impact and influence. Yet Iran is not exclusively defined by the Achaemenid, 
Sassanid or Safavid empires – or the Islamic Republic for that matter. Conversely, 
all of these regimes and dynasties are considered Iranian and part of the history 
of Iran. In this sense, Iran is more analogous to China than its immediate 
neighbours as a ‘civilisational’ notion, in that it has a supra-dynastic quality. Both 
China and Iran have been subjected to foreign conquest and rule at various 
points in history. Yet on numerous occasions, a degree of assimilation of the 
conquering peoples, through partial or full adoption of the language and 
traditions, has allowed for distinctly Iranian and Chinese cultures to survive and 
even flourish under ‘foreign’ domination. Today it is commonplace to count the 
Turkic Seljuk, the Mongol Ilkhanid and the Azeri Safavid states as Iranian 
dynasties, just as it is not unusual to list the Manchu Qing or the Mongol Yuan 
dynasties as among Chinese (or at least Sinicised) dynasties.37 
The idea of cultural continuity nonetheless begs further clarification. It 
certainly should not be taken to mean that there is a single Iranian identity that 
has remained unchanged since the dawn of civilisation. The imagination of a 
monolithic Iranian national identity has served as a political tool in modern 
Iranian history, either in the hands of westernised intellectuals as part of a 
nation-building process, or dynasties aiming at self-legitimisation.38 The vast 
number of dynasties, regimes and ideologies that have dominated Iran alone is a 
testament to the presence of a plurality of diverse, often clashing, identities. The 
                                                 
37 This was of course not a one-way exchange. As Mitchell wrote, “[t]he conquests of  Chingiz 
Khan and Timur, along with the resulting suzerain states in eastern Anatolia, Iran, and Central 
Asia, had fused Chingizid and Chaghata’i elements into the Persian bureaucratic culture as well as 
its use of terminology, seals, and symbols. […] Anatolian and western Iranian bureaucratic 
practices experienced further changes under the Turkmen dynasties of the Karakoyunlu and 
Akkoyunlu.” (Mitchell 2009: 199) 
38 See Vaziri (1993) and Tavakoli-Targhi (2001). For examples of western attempts to legitimise 
the Pahlavi dynasty by emphasising its place in the continuous tradition of Iranian kingship, see 
Bayne (1969) and Lenczowski (1978). 
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idea of Iran promoted by the Pahlavis is clearly at odds with the one narrated by 
Ayatollah Khomeini.   
We should however distinguish between nationalist propaganda and 
social history. Regardless of its fluid or even mythical nature, the enduring 
reference to a concept of Iran, which at least one group of people consciously 
identified with at a given point for nearly three millennia, allows us to speak of a 
sense of historical continuity, evidenced by the existence of a set of institutions 
and traditions whose evolution can be traced within the confines of an Iranian 
cultural sphere. In this respect, Iran stands apart from other nation-states in its 
neighbourhood, such as Iraq or Pakistan, which are more easily categorised as 
purely modern constructs (Gellner 1964: 169). As Anthony D. Smith argues in his 
critique of the modernist view of nationalism, Iran embodies certain 
“participants’ primordialism”: the persistent notion of a homeland, names, 
symbols and memories (however flawed or selective) at a collective level despite 
conquest and colonisation (1995: 34 – 35). 
Turkey shares few of these characteristics. In contrast to Iran, Turkey as a 
political or geographic term does not evoke a similar sense of historical 
continuity. For centuries, the term was used almost exclusively in Europe in 
reference to the Ottoman Empire. Prior to the founding of the Republic of Turkey 
in 1923, it meant little or nothing to the inhabitants of the geographic area that 
the republic comprises today. In fact, as historian Metin Kunt pointed out, a 
corresponding term did not exist in most languages spoken within the Ottoman 
borders, including in Turkish. This was a rather inaccurate way of 
conceptualising the Ottoman Empire, as there was little that was exclusively 
Turkish about the vast realm. The Ottoman Empire was a multi-ethnic, multi-
religious and multi-lingual empire that in no clear way constituted a land of 
Turks or even a ‘Turkish empire’ (Kunt and Woodhead 1995: 4). 
In Europe, the term ‘Turk’ was widely used to refer to all Muslims within 
Ottoman lands, often with derogatory and racist implications (Akarlı 2006). But 
the term had a similarly negative connotation among the Ottoman elite as well, 
where it was typically used to describe someone as uncouth, backward or 
uncivilised, typified by the Turkmen nomads of the Anatolian highlands. As the 
Ottoman polity transformed from a local principality into a vast empire, the 
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Ottoman elite became more hesitant to emphasise the dynasty’s Turkic lineage 
and instead identified themselves on the basis of their religious affiliation, or 
later, as Ottomans (Kushner 1997). It was not until the traditional millet system 
faced collapse in the late nineteenth century, and following failed attempts to 
create an Ottoman identity encompassing all faiths and religions represented 
within the realm, that Muslim nationalists rehabilitated ‘the Turk’ and used it to 
refer to the diverse Muslim societies of the fast shrinking empire (with the 
exception of Arabs). This configuration, which Turkish nationalists ironically 
adopted from European Orientalists, ultimately formed the social basis of the 
republic.  
For centuries, the Ottoman Empire was known to its subjects as ‘Devlet-i 
Âliye-yi Osmâniyye’, or the domains of the House of Osman. (In contrast the Qajar 
state was called Dowlat-e ‘Ali-ye Iran, emphasising its Iranian identity). In the 
sense that the state was at the centre of the definition of both the political and 
the geographic entity, the Ottoman Empire was probably most similar to the 
polity it had supplanted: Byzantium. But whereas in the case of Byzantium 
dynasties replaced one another while the state lived on, “in the Ottoman case the 
dynasty was the state throughout its 622-year career.” (Kunt and Woodhead 
1995: 4). The dynasty meant the state, while the state – as it evolved into the 
complex administrative machinery overseeing the affairs of a domain spanning 
three continents – became analogous with the empire.  
Systematic nationalist propaganda during the republican era sought to 
construct a purely Turkish historical identity by claiming an unbroken link 
between early Turkic tribal confederations of Central Asia and modern Turkey. 
One of the intended effects of this effort was to diminish the role played by the 
Ottoman dynasty – portrayed by their nationalist successors as an initially pure 
and heroic, but ultimately corrupted and decayed establishment – in the 
evolution of key institutions that also constituted the central pillars of the new 
republic: the military and the bureaucracy. Certain pre-Ottoman Turkic 
administrative and military traditions indeed survived into the Ottoman and 
republican periods. Yet as the following pages will try to demonstrate, it would 
be impossible to get a clear picture of the role of the state and perceptions of 
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authority and legitimacy in modern Turkey, without taking into account how 
these concepts were constructed and evolved within the Ottoman context.  
The state, both as an abstract entity and in terms of the physical 
institutions it comprises, is at the heart of modern Turkey’s national identity. 
This point cannot be overemphasised. Since the nineteenth century, the state has 
remained the only constant force, while the entity’s geographic borders, 
demographic composition and socio-economic infrastructure have fluctuated 
wildly and repeatedly. Indeed the Ottoman state’s resilience was a remarkable 
feat that has been surpassed by few others in history, and none in the history of 
Iran. As many as twelve different dynasties ruled Iran in part or in whole during 
the reign of the Ottoman dynasty, which spans over six centuries. Yet despite the 
frequent turnover of political authority, the idea of Iran as a linguistic and 
geographic entity has endured. Nor did Iran experience such a profoundly 
traumatising demographic transformation as the Ottoman Empire and Turkey 
did between the late nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries, when entire 
populations were uprooted, exchanged or annihilated. “Present-day Iranians live 
more or less within the same borders as their great-grandparents,” notes 
Abrahamian (2008: 1). This is not the case for many citizens of modern Turkey, 
or the grandchildren of non-Muslim subjects of the Ottoman Empire. 
In short, as a building block of modern Turkish national identity, we can 
speak of a tendency (amongst power holders as well as significant portions in 
society) to view and revere the state as a patriarchal entity that is inalienable 
from, but also elevated above, society in Turkey. Such a patriarchal predilection 
is very much present in Iran as well. However here, it is counteracted by the long 
standing tradition that pits political authority, often seen as fleeting and ‘foreign’, 
against society. As this overview demonstrates, we are bound to have different 
reference points when looking at the historical roots of authority and legitimacy 
in Iran and Turkey. In the Turkish case, references to the ideational and 
institutional evolution of the state will loom large, whereas in Iran the emphasis 
will inevitably be on the more elusive turf of culture and tradition, which have 
shaped institutions across a much longer time span and countless governments.  
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From Farr to Shi’ism: Divine sanction in Iran 
 
The right to rule is one of the most enduring and controversial themes running 
through the history of Iran. References to ‘divine sanction’ (farr-e izadi, 
henceforth farr) are traced to the early Median populations and feature 
prominently in Achaemenid and Sassanid era inscriptions and symbolisms (Root 
1979). Farr indicates the qualities a king must possess in order to obtain God’s 
grace, without which his rule would be illegitimate. In Zoroastrian imagery, the 
possession of farr was marked by a mystical aura, or halo, around the sovereign’s 
head; a symbolism later adopted by Abrahamic religions to denote sainthood 
(Filippani-Ronconi 1978: 52). 
Divinely obtained legitimacy constitutes the basis of Weber’s concept of 
patriarchal patrimonialism.39 In patriarchal patrimonial systems, kings are not 
bound by an earthly contract; they are “above society and not just at the head of 
it” (Katouzian 2000: 8). Yet unlike the European concept of divine right of kings, 
which Weber’s analysis is based on, the Iranian idea of farr embodies distinct 
secular and practical provisions concerning the conduct of rulers, very much 
akin to the Confucian concept of the Mandate of Heaven. According to these 
provisions, farr could not be inherited or obtained by brute force. It was invested 
according to one’s personal worth, judged not only by his success as a military 
commander, but also his commitment to Mazdaism, the highly moralistic 
precepts of which emphasised personal choice and responsibility (Filippani-
Ronconi 1978: 62).40  
                                                 
39 Weber identifies three types of legitimacy based on the virtues attributed to governments by 
their subjects or citizens: traditional, charismatic and rational-legal. Within the traditional type, 
Weber pinpoints ‘patriarchal patrimonialism’ – where the entire domain is considered the 
household of the ruler (the patriarch) and legitimacy is derived from tradition – as a pre-
bureaucratic system of domination most distant to idea of the modern (rational-legal) state. In 
contrast to feudalism, which Weber calls the ‘estate-type patrimonialism’, in patriarchal 
patrimonialism society is essentially divided between the ruler and the ruled, with only the 
administrators (or servants) in the middle, leaving no room for a formal class structure to take 
root and develop. According to this contentious normative framework, feudalism is the European 
form of patrimonialism, and precursor to constitutional monarchism, while patriarchal 
patrimonialism is the ‘Oriental’ version. See “Patriarchalism and Patrimonialism” in Weber 
(1968: 1006 – 1070). For a detailed discussion of the “belief theory” and the subjectivist 
standpoint see Merquior (1979). 
40 For a discussion of the enduring relevance of farr in legitimation of authority in Iran see 
Katouzian (2003). 
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According to the Zoroastrian book of Zadspram, a king’s legitimacy 
depended on three qualities: his attachment to the faith, his efforts to fight his 
personal evil (namely pride, conceit and falsehood), and fulfilling of his ‘duty’ 
towards the people, which is understood as delivering justice, charity and good 
fortune.41 Another Zoroastrian scripture, Zamyad Yasht, explains that “the Glory 
that cannot be forcibly seized” is bestowed upon those who endeavour to 
improve the world of Ahura Mazda through “good thought, good word and good 
deed”.42 Ferdowsi’s eleventh century epic Shahnameh, which has over 450 
references to farr, recounts the legend of the Turanian king Afrasiab, who tries 
three times to seize the kingly glory by force, and fails each time due to his 
tyrannical and deceitful nature (Bashiri 1994). 
Divine sanction was also conditional and non-permanent: a king could 
lose his farr if he became unjust or unable to maintain peace and security within 
his realm. In such a case, farr would be bestowed upon someone else, the figure 
of a divinely ordained saviour. Crucially, the new recipient of farr did not need to 
belong to the ruling dynasty (as it could not simply be inherited) or have any 
noble credentials at all, which meant the top post within the realm was 
theoretically open to all mortals. In theory, this was a rather meritocratic way to 
ensure just rule (Soudavar 2003: 122).  In practice, however, the fluctuating 
nature of farr and its dependence on the personality and achievements of the 
ruler made continuous dynastical legitimacy an elusive ambition. Similar to the 
Chinese concept of the Mandate of Heaven, the idea that a ruler could lose his 
legitimacy meant that revolt against an illegitimate ruler was not only 
considered justified, but also a duty. In Katouzian’s view, this condition led to 
frequent crises of succession and made revolts a central character of Iranian 
politics and history. The “dialectic of state and society” chronically destabilised 
Iran, rendering it a “short-term society” (jame-ye kutah moddat) (Katouzian 
2000: 6). 
                                                 
41 This formulation appears to stem from a practical need to “propagate a unifying and quasi-
universal concept of just authority over a vast empire.” The concept of a divinely sanctioned, just 
and benevolent king was the most easily translatable attribute for the empire’s diverse 
constituencies. (Filippani-Ronconi 1978: 59; Soudavar 2003: 89 – 92). 
42 For a translation of Zamyad Yasht (“Hymn to the Earth”) see 
http://www.avesta.org/ka/yt19sbe.htm 
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Another point that needs emphasis is the availability of divine sanction to 
all human beings. According to the ninth century Zoroastrian text Denkard, 
legitimate authority was originally bestowed in its entirety on one ruler, King 
Yima (Jamshid in Shahnameh) who ruled all of humanity for three hundred years, 
until he became proud and conceited. Upon his eventual fall from God’s grace, it 
was divided into three parts reflecting the three classes of people: the warriors 
(including kings and princes), the priests, and “the producers of material wealth” 
– or the bulk of Iran’s working population (Filippani-Ronconi 1978: 61 – 63).43 
This division put the common people (understood interchangeably as the 
masses, the workers or merchants and traders, i.e. bazaaris) on the political map 
of Iran.  
Here, the universalistic dualism between good and evil enshrined in 
Mazdaism – one of the earliest faiths to move beyond cult and totemism to 
address moral issues, with great influence on all three Abrahamic religions – 
plays a governing role (Axworthy 2007: 11). Mazdaism places currency on the 
individual’s responsibility to shape his own destiny by committing to ‘the truth’ 
(formulated in the principle of ‘good thought, good word, good deed’) and 
refraining from evil. Thus the goal of every person should be to attain ‘perfection’ 
that is symbolised by the possession of farr. This notion leaves ample room for 
any individual to strive for greatness and prepares the ground for a vast 
literature on heroism, leadership and martyrdom.  
One of the most cherished heroes of the Shahnameh is the blacksmith 
Kaveh, who leads a mass revolution and helps the rightful king-to-be Fereydun in 
his mission to dethrone the despotic ruler Zahhak. Their legend embodies some 
of the central themes that are frequently invoked in traditional as well as modern 
Iranian politics: the loss of legitimacy, the rightful struggle against injustice, and 
resistance to foreign rule (the tyranny of Zahhak, a Babylonian king, has been 
understood as a metaphor for Arab oppression in Ferdowsi’s epic). To this day, 
Kaveh and Fereydun remain popular symbols in Iran, frequently invoked in 
reference to modern-day politics. Indeed, the historical importance of Ferdowsi’s 
Shahnameh is based not only on its role in preserving Persian language at a time 
of Arabic domination, but also in bridging Muslim Iran with its pre-Islamic past 
                                                 
43 For Denkard see http://www.avesta.org/denkard/dk3s.html  
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in the popular consciousness. Like a number of other Zoroastrian traditions, such 
as Nowruz and Mihragan, the idea of justice-based divine sanction survived the 
Arab conquest and the spread of Islam and regained its institutional prominence 
when the Safavids declared Ithna Ashari (Twelver) Shi’ism as the official faith of 
Iran in the sixteenth century.  
The myth of Imam Hossein’s marriage to Shahrbanu, the daughter of the 
last Sassanid emperor Yazdegerd III, although highly dubious as a historical fact, 
nonetheless facilitated a psychological reconciliation between Islam (Shi’ism in 
particular) and Iran’s pre-Islamic traditions (Momen 1987). “Shi’sm,” wrote Reza 
Behnam, “essentially mitigated Arab encroachment in the minds of the 
vanquished.” (1986: 54). With its emphasis on the perfection and divine 
legitimacy of the Imamate, and the ideas of justice and struggle against tyranny 
characterised by the tragic martyrdom of Hossein bin Ali in Karbala, Shi’ism 
eventually came to represent both a distinct Islamic identity for Iran, and an 
unmistakable Iranian mark on Islam.  
The traditional understanding of political legitimacy as outlined above 
has given rise to a built-in tension between the ruler and the ruled in Iran. The 
universal availability of divine sanction granted the common man a remarkable 
voice. It also legitimised two conflicting forces at the same time: patriarchal rule 
and rebellion. This dichotomy resonates in modern Iran. Reza Shah Pahlavi, for 
instance, was widely perceived as Iran’s long-awaited saviour when he emerged 
out of virtual obscurity to impose order on a chaotic country and resist foreign 
encroachment (epitomised by his refusal to ratify the 1919 treaty that would 
expand oil concessions to Britain). That he was also an iron-fisted dictator did 
not seem to put his legitimacy into question at least until the latter half of his 
reign (Katouzian 2000: 14 – 15; Abrahamian 2008: 63 – 97). His successor, 
Mohammad Reza Shah, was very much aware of the traditional significance of 
divine sanction. He wanted to project an image of himself as a visionary reformer 
and a patriotic leader, fulfilling the modern requirements of farr. He was more 
successful, however, in convincing his immediate entourage and western 
supporters than the people of Iran, who had found a new Fereydun in the 
charismatic leadership of the exiled Ayatollah Khomeini and new Kavehs in the 
supporters of the revolution.  
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Justice lies at the heart of the Iranian concept of legitimacy, but what 
exactly constitutes a ‘just ruler’ remains ambiguous and subjective in practice. 
On balance, much appears to depend on the ruler’s personal success – or rather, 
the perception of success – as a military commander and a skilful administrator. 
Darius, Khosrow I and Abbas I were such figures, and they personify the idea of 
the just ruler. The verdict is less clear on Reza Shah, who lost much of his 
popularity due not only to his increasingly autocratic personal rule but also his 
failure to prevent the Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran in 1941, which culminated in 
his dethronement. Success, to a notable extent, depends on conditions and 
circumstances beyond one’s immediate control, such as the availability of 
resources and the presence of powerful external rivals, internal power struggles 
and political intrigues. Does failure, then, automatically imply illegitimacy, and 
conversely, does the legitimacy of a rebellion rest largely on its popularity and 
success?  
The answer may not be a straightforward ‘yes’ as some scholars argue.44 
Another modern Iranian leader, Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq, was 
ultimately unsuccessful in his attempt to nationalise the Anglo-Iranian Oil 
Company and ended his days in relative obscurity under house arrest. Yet even 
when the details of the coup that toppled him in 1953 were little known and the 
shah’s regime made a concerted effort to portray the old man as an obstinate 
fanatic, Mosaddeq remained widely popular among Iranians, many of whom saw 
him as a legitimate champion of Iran’s national interests; a secular martyr of 
sorts (Kinzer 2003). What appears clear instead, and therefore worthy of 
repeated emphasis, is the power of the ‘popular’ in Iran. In other words, it is the 
social perception of justice, shaped by tradition and the circumstances, that plays 
the governing role in ascribing legitimacy to regimes and governments, as well as 
to rebellions and revolutions, in Iran. 
 
 
  
                                                 
44 See “Arbitrary Rule: A Theory of State, Politics and Society in Iran” in Katouzian (2000: 1 – 25). 
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From beylik to empire: The Ottoman idea of statehood 
 
In contrast to Iran, the popular featured less prominently in the Ottoman concept 
of legitimacy. The dynasty did assert a divine ‘aura of sanctity’ to emphasise the 
justness of its claim over a vast territory and its diverse populations, the 
leadership of Islam and patronage of the Orthodox Church. Nonetheless, as 
Karateke notes, the Ottoman production of legitimacy bore “a distinctly elitist 
character. At least in its written texts it did not address the general public and 
was meant to serve philosophical and one might even say aesthetic demands.” 
(Karateke and Reinkowski 2005: 7). This is not to suggest that the Ottoman state 
was cut off from society. On the contrary, part of the explanation for the empire’s 
impressive longevity rests in its ability to devise an efficient administrative 
system that was able to accommodate diversity, take into account local customs 
and permit decentralisation, at least until it entered irreversible decline by the 
eighteenth century. 
Even so, the pyramid-shaped structure of the Ottoman state, with the 
monarch sitting alone at the top, reflects a hierarchical conception of power and 
state-society relationship. In theory at least, Ottoman sovereigns appeared less 
constrained than their Iranian counterparts to negotiate their personal 
legitimacy with the Muslim clergy (ulama) or their subjects. What explains this 
difference? The answer to this question appears to lie at the geopolitics of the 
fourteenth and fifteenth century Anatolia, where the Ottoman polity emerged 
and replaced the thousand-year-old Byzantine Empire.  
The early Ottoman state was among two-dozen tribal principalities 
(beylik, from ‘bey’ or lord) that gained independence after the demise of the 
Seljuk Sultanate of Rûm in the thirteenth century. The political structure in the 
early Ottoman polity was feudal. Reflective of the traditions of nomadic Turkmen 
tribes, Ottoman rulers until Mehmed II, the conqueror of Constantinople, were 
not so much absolute monarchs, but rather ‘first among equals’ in a frontier state 
at the border of Islamic and Christian realms. Warlords who led the expansion 
into the Christian Balkans held significant sway over the early Ottoman sultans. 
These aristocrats, in turn, were dependent on their overlord who, with his access 
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to the Anatolian hinterland, provided them with a market for ‘frontier booty’ and 
a steady flow of holy warriors (Kunt and Woodhead 1995: 12 – 19).45  
This feudal arrangement gave way to a more centralised structure after 
the mid-fourteenth century as Ottoman rulers relied increasingly on non-Muslim 
converts carefully recruited from the newly conquered territories and trained to 
serve in the state’s elite military and bureaucratic posts. The introduction of the 
devşirme (convert) system and the creation of a highly disciplined central 
military apparatus (the janissary) took place at the expense of the peripheral 
warlords, whose status and power gradually waned. The new arrangement gave 
the Ottomans a distinct military advantage over their decentralised adversaries 
on both frontiers: the Muslim principalities of Anatolia and the tribal 
confederations of Iran on the East and the feudal Balkan princedoms on the 
West. A comparable central military structure, with the gholam (slave) army at 
its core, was only established in Iran during the reign of Shah Abbas I in the early 
seventeenth century. 
The great leap from sultanate to empire and the reformulation of the 
Ottoman concept of statehood occurred as a consequence of this military 
superiority, which culminated in the conquest of Constantinople in 1453. The 
inclusion of ‘the city’ to the Islamic realm, an ambitious dream first articulated by 
Prophet Mohammad, not only contributed enormously to the prestige and 
charisma of the Ottoman sultans (and hence to their legitimacy in the eyes of 
their Muslim subjects). It also transformed the Ottoman state from a regional 
sultanate into a cosmopolitan empire with a claim to global leadership. In the 
process, the Ottoman state adopted several key institutional features of the 
empire it had supplanted. One example is the assumption of the title ‘Kayser-i 
Rûm’, or Caesar of the Romans, by Sultan Mehmed II. In the words of Kunt, 
Mehmed “regarded himself as a sultan in the Islamic tradition and a great khan in 
the Inner Asian mould as well as a ‘kaiser’ of the Romans or the Rumi, Byzantine 
and Turkish.” (Kunt and Woodhead 1995: 21). 
                                                 
45 Ghaza, or the expansion of the Islamic realm through conquest, was a politically expedient and 
economically lucrative enterprise accommodating religious diversity from the very beginning. 
According to Kafadar, “the culture of Anatolian Muslim frontier society allowed the coexistence of 
religious syncretism and militancy, adventurism and idealism.” (1995: 89). Some of the warlords 
that led the expansion were not even Muslims. Mihail, for example, was a renegade Byzantine 
governor. 
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Exactly how much the Ottomans borrowed from Byzantium was a 
polemical debate during the first half of the twentieth century, an authoritative 
account of which can be found in Kafadar’s Between Two Worlds (1995). That 
debate saw European Orientalists argue that ‘uncivilised Turks’ owed much of 
their state tradition to Greeks, and Turkish nationalists retort, in a bid to assert 
modern Turkey’s right to nationhood, that the Ottoman idea of statehood had its 
roots in Turco-Persian traditions.46 Beyond the polemic, it is safe to suggest that 
both the Persian and Byzantine modes of administration greatly shaped the 
Ottoman state architecture (Kafadar 1995: 140). In the sense that the 
overwhelming authority of the central government became the most obvious 
characteristic of the empire, with the ruler standing at the pinnacle of legitimate 
secular authority, and the church remaining throughout a department of the 
state, the post-1453 Ottoman Empire certainly resembled Byzantium (Mango  
1980: 31; Whittow 1996: 299). 
The sultans’ expansive legal remit became manifest in a series of imperial 
laws and investitures (kanun and berat) promulgated between the late fifteenth 
and the late sixteenth centuries. Starting with the reforms of Mehmed II, these 
laws and investitures institutionalised the authority of the central government, 
formalised the organisation of religious communities into autonomous socio-
political clusters (millets) and regulated provincial administration, finances and 
land tenure within the empire. In an attempt to assert the state’s claim to the 
absolute ownership of all arable land and to raise funds for the janissary corps, 
Mehmed II confiscated land that was controlled by local aristocrats and 
independent religious foundations (vakıf).47 His legal code (kanunname) of 1475 
sought to bring these foundations and artisans’ guilds (ahi), which had formed 
the basis of civil society in Anatolia since the Seljuk era, under the supervision of 
the central government, albeit with limited success (Karpat 2008: 47 – 48). 
The imperial laws and decrees issued during the reign of Mehmed II 
defined the basic institutions of the Ottoman state, which were elaborated and 
                                                 
46 For the main academic debate see Gibbons (1916), Wittek (1938), and Köprülü (1931; 1992). 
47 For most of its history, the state was “the only legitimate power to organise land and labor in 
the Ottoman Empire.” The state leased the land as freehold either directly to peasants, to 
cavalrymen (sipahi) on a non-hereditary basis (timar) in exchange for tax returns and support 
during the sultan’s military campaigns, or to religious endowments (vakıf). For a discussion on 
the origins and the outcomes of Mehmed II’s land reforms, see Özel (1999). 
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refined under his successors, Bayezid II, Selim I and Suleyman I, and survived 
more or less intact until the nineteenth century. With the sultan at the top, the 
central administrative mechanism represented the ‘eternal state’ (devlet-i ebed 
müddet) responsible for preserving the ‘world order’ (nizam-ı alem), a concept 
further supported by the implementation of Sunni legalism in the late sixteenth 
century. The administrative formula for preserving the world order was the 
‘circle of equity’ (da’ire-i adliye), articulated by the sixteenth century Ottoman 
theologian Hasan Kafi as follows:  
 
Kingship and sultanate can exist only with men, that is, with 
troops. There can be no troops except with wealth. There can be 
no wealth except if the country is prosperous. The country can 
be prosperous only through justice and good government. 
(Hegen 2005: 65) 
 
Ottoman administrators understood that order could not be maintained 
simply by brute force. Legitimacy in the eyes of the empire’s diverse group of 
subjects was essentially maintained through a number of measurable ways, 
including the provision of welfare, order and a reliable justice system, along with 
the perpetuation of an image of the sultan as victorious, magnanimous and 
religious (Karateke and Reinkowski 2005: 39 – 52). Akarlı notes that despite its 
extensive legal and political remit, the central state in the Ottoman Empire opted 
to delegate its authority. The Ottoman legal system allowed a considerable 
degree of autonomy to “relatively organized segments of the population in 
handling their affairs and internal differences according to their own custom” as 
long as public peace and order were retained. “These segments ranged from 
tribes, villages, residents of the same urban quarters, and artisanal groups (esnaf 
or ta'ife) in the marketplace to religious communities (ta'ife or cemaat jama'a) 
and provinces at large.” (Akarlı 2010: 72). 
The central state’s legitimacy in the eyes of its subjects and its practical 
authority over the vast domain began to deteriorate when this ‘circle of equity’ 
became dysfunctional largely as a result of growing financial burdens and 
military and economic encroachment from Europe. From the late eighteenth 
century onwards, peripheral forces, including a new class of local notables 
(ayans), became resurgent as central authority gradually weakened. This set off a 
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series of attempts throughout the nineteenth century by Ottoman administrators 
to build a modern centralised state apparatus in the European image to restore 
‘public peace and order’ and the state’s authority over society. During this 
process, however, as resources diminished and the practical links between state 
and society became severed, the state’s rule over the populace became 
increasingly arbitrary. 
Another notable transformation to the Ottoman idea of statehood was 
what Weber refers to as the “routinisation of charisma” of the sultans from the 
late sixteenth century onwards. Unlike their illustrious ancestors, many of the 
latter-day Ottoman sultans became figureheads, withdrawn from the affairs of 
the state. Over time, the empire’s administration passed into the hands of viziers, 
and later, westernised bureaucrats and military officers.48 Bound by tradition 
and the state’s bureaucratic rituals, the personal charisma of Ottoman sultans 
was gradually attributed to an abstract notion of the state, which was seen as the 
provider of order (Heper 1980). As the fate of eleven sultans would prove, they 
could even be deposed or assassinated, and replaced with a more favoured 
candidate from within the same dynasty, in the interest of the state. 
 
 
State vs. Clergy: Institutionalisation of religious orthodoxy in 
Iran and Turkey 
 
The institutionalisation of Sunni legalism in the Ottoman Empire and Ithna 
Ashari Shi’ism in Safavid Iran as state doctrine in the sixteenth century occurred 
as a result of two interrelated motivations on both sides: an effort to de-
legitimise each other’s claim to moral authority as part of a mounting power 
struggle over Eastern Anatolia; and the need to formulate an institutional 
rationale to accommodate the transformation towards urban-based, 
bureaucratic empire (Dressler 2005: Mitchell 2009; 19 – 58). However, these 
contemporaneous processes yielded markedly different results for the two 
polities in terms of state organisation.  
                                                 
48 Notable exceptions include the reigns of Murad IV, Mahmud II and Abdulhamid II. 
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In the Ottoman case, the gradual move away from heterodox Turco-
Islamic traditions into canonical Sunni Islam, hastened by conquests in the 
Muslim Middle East and the transfer of the caliphate to the Ottoman dynasty, 
further legitimised and consolidated the supreme position of the sultan. 
Conversely in Iran, the marginalisation of the millenarian Sufism adhered to by 
the early Turkmen nomad followers of the Safavid Shah Ismail and the 
subsequent restoration of Persian bureaucratic traditions under Tahmasp 
eventually undermined the authority of the ruler and placed the legitimacy of 
secular governments on uncertain ground. The reasons for this divergence can 
be found in the different interpretations of legitimate authority in Sunni and 
Shi’a Islam.  
Ayat 59 of surah an-Nisa in the Quran instructs believers to obey Allah 
and the Prophet, as well as “those charged with authority among you”. Early 
Sunni scholars interpreted this surah in a way that allowed caliphs, sultans or 
other able administrators – in short, powerful men that rose from among the 
Muslim community (umma) and worked to protect it – to be considered as 
legitimate authorities. Pragmatism and survival instincts explained this 
interpretation: the Prophet had left no clear guideline for succession, allowing 
early scholars of Islam “the freedom to contemplate and experiment” with 
different ways of state organisation (Behnam 1986: 63). In a bid to legitimise the 
authority of the Abbasid rulers as well as the Umayyads before them, who had 
seized the caliphate through political strife, influential eleventh century 
theologians like al-Ghazali and al-Mawali emphasised stability, even if it was 
authoritarian, over anarchy (Lambton 1981: 124; Kedourie 1992: 7 - 9). In other 
words, de facto power, as long as it served the interest of the Islamic community 
and maintained public peace and order was seen as legitimate. This principle is 
known as maslahat, translated roughly as expediency, or the pragmatic 
prioritisation of public welfare in an otherwise hostile world. 
The principle of maslahat was rejected by the Shi’a, who did not recognise 
as legitimate the first three Rashidun caliphs and particularly the Umayyads, 
whose reign for the followers of Ali became synonymous to tyranny and 
injustice; central themes in the Shi’a theology. Legitimate political and religious 
authority rested exclusively with the divinely sanctioned Imams who were direct 
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descendants of Mohammad and Ali and were considered, both as private men 
and as rulers, to be infallible; a criterion notably absent for the legitimate ruler in 
the Sunni tradition. All other ‘earthly’ claims to absolute authority were 
considered oppressive and unjust.  
According to the Ithna Ashari Shi’a doctrine, the twelfth Imam 
disappeared (or went into occultation) in 872 AD and will eventually reappear as 
Mahdi, or saviour, to restore peace and justice to the world. In his absence, it is 
considered the duty of the learned men of religion, the ulama, to guide and 
preserve the community of the faithful; a role firmly engrained in the 
institutional genes of Shi’ism during centuries of existence as a stateless 
protestant minority sect trying to survive under hostile Sunni governments 
(Kedourie 1992: 78). Thus when Ismail endorsed Twelver Shi’ism as the official 
religion of his dynasty, he also reintroduced the institutional double-headedness 
between the temporal (the secular government) and the sacred (the ulama), 
which had been a part of Iranian state tradition before the Arab conquests.  
The ulama in the Ottoman Empire was subservient to the state to a 
notable degree. The position of the şeyhülislam, the highest ranking religious 
official, was elevated considerably during the rule of Suleyman I, and some 
şeyhülislams had decisive influence on the development of Ottoman and Islamic 
legal traditions. Yet even then the şeyhülislam remained a servant of the sultan 
and could not interfere directly in government affairs, unless consulted 
(Karateke and Reinkowski 2005: 27). There are accounts of when şeyhülislams 
refrained from expressing opinion in order not to contradict the authority of the 
state. Likewise, although seldom practiced, the sultan could replace a şeyhülislam 
if the two disagreed on key policy issues. Not all the religious clerics in the 
Ottoman Empire were on the government payroll: medreses produced many 
scholars who did not work for the sultan. But these scholars also benefited from 
the numerous state endowments that sustained the medreses and zawiyas 
(religious schools and monasteries), mosques and libraries. While it would be 
misleading to present either the Ottoman or the Iranian ulama as homogenous 
groups, it is safe to argue that the latter was more autonomous from the 
government than the former.  
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While the Ottoman government closely monitored the private funding of 
the office of the şeyhülislam and local religious judges (qadi), in Iran the ulama 
enjoyed extensive financial freedoms. Funded directly by public endowments, 
they were able to operate an expansive network of religious schools and 
foundations that commanded significant socio-political influence under limited 
government interference. The loss of Najaf and Karbala, the traditional centres of 
Shi’a scholarship in modern day Iraq, to the Ottomans in the sixteenth century, 
further limited Iranian shahs’ control over the clergy, granting popular religious 
figures a valuable refuge in times of dispute with the central government. For 
instance, Grand Ayatollah Mirza Hassan Shirazi triggered the Tobacco Protests of 
1891 from Samarra in Iraq, and it was during his 16-year exile in Najaf that 
Ayatollah Khomeini devised a radical political agenda for Shi’ism and led the 
mounting opposition against Mohammad Reza Shah (Keddie 2003: 170 – 214).  
The institutionalisation of Sunni and Shi’a legalism further defined the 
legal remit of Ottoman and Iranian rulers. The idea of maslahat reinforced the 
Ottoman concept of ‘world order’. The acceptance of the dynasty’s authority as 
legitimate by the Sunni ulama allowed Ottoman rulers to promulgate secular 
laws (kanun) and justify them in the name of religiously provisioned order. It 
was in the keeping with maslahat that the Ottoman ulama sanctioned Mehmed 
II’s kanunname, which included the highly controversial legalisation of fratricide 
in order to prevent a succession crisis. Suleyman I was known to his subjects as 
‘Kanunî’, or lawmaker, on the basis of his legal reforms. The modernising and 
secularising reform edicts of 1839 and 1856 were similarly justified by religious 
edicts (fatwa) even though they were widely unpopular among the empire’s 
Muslim community. In 1826, Sultan Mahmud II dismissed his şeyhülislam, who 
would refuse to issue an edict supporting the abolition of the janissary corps, and 
replaced him with a more compliant one. 
In contrast, according to the Shi’a tradition only a divinely sanctioned 
Imam could make laws. In the absence of the Mahdi, the task of interpreting the 
divine law to reach a legal decision (ijtihad) was vested in the mojtahed, or 
qualified scholars of Islam, instead of the temporal ruler – another practical 
consequence of centuries of stateless existence for the Shi’a. The basic tenet of 
administrative organisation in Shi’a Iran from the Safavids until the Islamic 
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Revolution can be understood as a trade-off between protection provided by the 
political establishment in exchange for religious endorsement from the clergy.  
This is not to suggest that the Shi’a clergy was actively and continuously 
involved in government affairs from the beginning. In fact, a strong quietist 
tradition that decreed political inactivity until the return of the Mahdi remained 
prevalent among the ulama until the faith became politicised in the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries (Keddie 1984). Coupled with a growing practical 
predilection towards stability, the religious institution often struck the same 
chord with the political establishment, particularly during those periods when 
the central government appeared strong and the ruler popular. But from the 
nineteenth century onwards, the mojtahed, either in reaction to perceived 
injustice or in an attempt to preserve the traditional social structures, did not 
refrain from using their legal influence to challenge the government. 
The subservient position of the ulama in the Ottoman Empire and the 
autonomous role of their Iranian counterparts were highlighted under the 
republican regimes. In Kemalist Turkey, the office of the şeyhülislam was 
replaced with the Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet); a state department 
controlled by the secularising military-bureaucratic guardians. Islam, however, 
has remained a powerful societal force and consistently wielded influence on 
modern Turkish politics. In Iran, invasion, regime change and constant political 
instability of the eighteenth century, followed by a century of weak, 
decentralised government under Qajar rule, with an increasingly aggressive 
European imperialism in the backdrop, cemented the ulama’s status as the 
country’s most stable and influential institution; an image the Pahlavi shahs both 
acknowledged and fought hard to undermine (Shakibi 2010: 38 – 42). In the 
aftermath of Nadir Shah’s tumultuous reign and by the Qajar era, shah’s 
legitimacy came to rely not only on “how well he provided for his subjects’ 
welfare and defended them”, but also now on “how he supported the Shi’i clerical 
hierarchy as it developed more and more autonomous power and status.” 
(Tucker 2005: 1 – 16). 
The 1907 supplements to the Iranian Constitution, establishing a 
committee of mojtahed to oversee the Islamic legality of legislation proposed by 
the parliament (Majlis), were manifestation of the ulama’s growing involvement 
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in state affairs. Although never fully implemented, the Supplementary 
Fundamental Laws served as a precursor to Khomeini’s velayet-e faqih theory 
and the influential Council of Guardians in the Islamic Republic (Kedourie 1992: 
88; Afary 1994: 36 – 37; Katouzian 2000: 43). 
 
 
Change and continuity in the age of reform and revolution 
 
The nineteenth and the twentieth centuries were defined by turbulent and often 
traumatising change impacting both the Ottoman/Turkish and Iranian states and 
societies. Long convinced that they occupied the centre of the world, the 
Ottomans and the Iranians slowly awoke to the reality that they now inhabited 
the periphery of a new world order, defined by the economic and territorial 
ambitions of European (and Russian) imperialism. In the context of increasing 
geopolitical and psychological marginalisation, nostalgia for bygone glory days, 
coupled with a realisation of the bankruptcy (both economic and social) of the 
old system created fertile ground for new and radical ideas to emerge. Crucially, 
in both polities, the ideas that had the most profound impact were those that 
successfully infused elements of modern European political thought into 
traditional concepts of authority and legitimacy.  
Two common external factors contributed to this sense of 
marginalisation: the Ottomans by the eighteenth century and the Qajars by the 
nineteenth had become engulfed in lengthy, costly and mostly unsuccessful 
defensive wars against ambitious imperial rivals, particularly Russia. At the same 
time, both were being integrated into the emerging global economy. Flung 
unprotected into competition with industrialising western powers and their 
manufactured goods, the predominantly agrarian pre-industrial Ottoman and 
Qajar economies experienced radical shifts in production patterns and trade 
volumes, resulting in rising inflation, excessive taxation, mounting foreign debt 
and the institutionalisation of a culture of corruption (Issawi 1971; Pamuk 
2001). As their political and economic fortunes declined, the Ottoman and Qajar 
states assumed an increasingly arbitrary character with state officials being seen 
as “plunderers of their own society” (Katouzian 2000: 175). 
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The Ottoman case 
 
Socio-economic change, and reaction to it from the state, occurred earlier in the 
Ottoman Empire than in Qajar Iran, partly due to the former’s geopolitical 
proximity to Europe and the existence within its boundaries of large non-Muslim 
communities that had direct access to western goods and ideas. By the late 
eighteenth century, the ‘circle of equity’ that had defined classical Ottoman 
administration was largely broken as a result of growing economic and financial 
problems. With land turning into a source of revenue rather than military 
retinue, a tax-farming scheme was introduced, leading to the rise of a new class 
of local notables (ayans) who collected taxes on behalf of the imperial 
government and served as an intermediary between the ‘Sublime Porte’ and the 
population in the provinces. Increasing tax burden without a corresponding rise 
in productivity led to popular unrest among agricultural workers, who still 
formed the backbone of the Ottoman economy in the nineteenth century. 
Rebellions proliferated among the non-Muslim millets, who were now armed 
with the revolutionary ideal of nationalism, as well as the empire’s increasingly 
disgruntled Muslim subjects.49 
In response, throughout the nineteenth century the Ottoman state carried 
out an ambitious project of modernisation and reform, whose main aim was to 
restore the authority and the legitimacy of the central government and its ability 
to maintain order throughout the realm (Heper 1980: 39). This was a process 
characterised by two simultaneous power struggles with lasting impacts on 
modern Turkey’s institutional character: one between the centre and the 
provinces, and the other within the state, between the sultan and an increasingly 
influential class of westernised bureaucrats and officers. 
Sultan Mahmud II (r. 1808 – 1839) and his grandson Abdulhamid II (r. 
1876 – 1909) were both ambitious modernisers and ardent believers in the 
absolute authority of the central state. Both rose to power at a time when their 
personal positions, the institutional authority of the crown and the political 
sovereignty of their domains were being threatened by numerous domestic and 
foreign challenges. Mahmud II owed the throne to the powerful governor (ayan) 
                                                 
49 For the causes of Ottoman decline, see Göçek (1996), Pamuk (2001) and Ortaylı (2008). 
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of Ruscuk province, Alemdar Mustafa Pasha, who marched into the Ottoman 
capital to suppress a janissary rebellion that had killed Mahmud II’s reformist 
predecessor, Selim III. In exchange for this support, the new sultan agreed to sign 
a pact of alliance, known as Sened-i Ittifak, in which the state guaranteed land 
ownership and hereditary rights to the ayans.50 In his early years in throne, 
Mahmud II had to contend with restive janissaries as well as ambitious 
provincial governors. One such governor, Mohammad Ali of Egypt, threatened 
the empire with full scale invasion, which was only averted after a desperate 
Mahmud II appealed for Russian help.  
Abdulhamid II rose to power on the shoulders of the powerful 
bureaucrats of the Tanzimat (Reform) era of 1836 – 1876, who had previously 
deposed both his uncle and his brother and forced the young monarch to 
promulgate the empire’s first constitution. The empire that Abdulhamid 
inherited was losing territory and facing disintegration as a result of financial 
bankruptcy, military defeat (most heavily inflicted by the forces of Tsar 
Alexander II in the war of 1877-78) and growing nationalist uprisings across its 
Christian communities. Labelled by the Russian tsar as ‘the sick man of Europe’, 
the Ottoman state’s inevitable collapse and partitioning was anticipated both by 
the Great Powers and smaller nationalist aspirants.  
Both men were thus convinced that the only way to ensure their personal 
safety, the authority of their office and the integrity of their domain was through 
building a thoroughly modern central state apparatus in the European model 
that would monopolise decision-making. Consequently, they invested heavily in 
creating a full-fledged bureaucracy to oversee the complex management of the 
state machinery, a schooling system expanding into the provinces modelled after 
Western examples, modern military institutions as well as improved 
transportation and communication infrastructure across their domain. In 1826, 
having consolidated his position, Mahmud II abolished the janissary corps and 
replaced it with a European-style conscript army. He also nullified the agreement 
with the ayans and executed headstrong provincial notables, like Ali Pasha of 
Tepelena. The authority of the centre over the periphery was further asserted 
                                                 
50 Reflecting the aforementioned “routinisation of charisma” the wording of the Sened confirmed 
that this was an agreement between the notables and “the state” – not the sultan. 
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during the Tanzimat era in the Land Code of 1858 and the Provincial 
Administration Law of 1864 (Heper 1980: 41 – 42). 
Abdulhamid II suspended the constitution and the parliament within a 
year of his reign. His rejection of the Tanzimat-era attempt to forge a civic 
Ottoman identity on the basis of equal rights for all religious communities and 
embrace of pan-Islamism won him the label of ‘Oriental despot’ in the 
contemporary European and the Turkish republican historiographies.51 But 
despite the change in the political rhetoric, and the growing paranoia that led 
him to establish a repressive police state against which the Constitutional 
Revolution of 1908 took place, Abdulhamid’s ambitious modernisation projects 
were very much a continuation of both the policies of the westernising Tanzimat 
pashas, and his centralising grandfather, Mahmud II. These included the opening 
of the University of Istanbul in 1900 and 51 new secondary schools, mostly in the 
provinces, between 1882 and 1884, the connection of Istanbul with Vienna and 
Baghdad by railroads, and the expansion of modern military academies across 
the empire. 52 
Ironically, the greatest opposition to the sultans’ authority – as well as the 
ultimate demise of their dynasty – emerged from among these new classes of 
westernised (and westernising) bureaucrats and soldiers trained in Hamidian 
schools and serving in Mahmud’s modern army. These bureaucrats and officers 
differed with the sultans on how to reform the legal and the administrative 
system, but not on the importance of re-establishing the state’s authority and 
capacity to maintain public peace and order. Both the Tanzimat bureaucrats and 
the ‘Young Turk’ officers who led the 1908 revolution saw themselves foremost 
as servants of the state. 
Crucially, when these bureaucrats and officers seized the reins of power, 
the patriarchal tendency they displayed was not particularly different from that 
of the two sultans. Namık Kemal, a prominent ‘Young Ottoman’ critic of Hamidian 
authoritarianism, described the Ottoman government under the Tanzimat 
                                                 
51 This view has been persuasively challenged by scholars who argue that Abdulhamid’s pan-
Islamism was not so much a product of his personal dislike of the West, but rather a highly 
pragmatic reading of the geopolitics of the time. See for example, Akarlı (1993) and (2006). 
52 The state-controlled curricula of these schools utilised “European pedagogical techniques to 
teach modern sciences while at the same time inculcating students with the principles of Islamic 
morality, Ottoman identity, and loyalty to the sultan”. (Cleveland 2004: 121) 
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pashas as “the system of many sultans”. The Young Turk officers that rose to 
prominence with the Constitutional Revolution of 1908 were initially in a 
coalition with the empire’s cosmopolitan urban intelligentsia, who embraced the 
slogan ‘liberty, equality and justice’ (hürriyet, müsavaat, adalet). But the group’s 
militaristic impulses led them to eliminate rivals (and allies) by force, 
culminating in the coup d’état by the Committee of Union and Progress (İttihat ve 
Terakki Fırkası, CUP) led by Enver and Talaat pashas against the elected 
government in 1913. In their secular western image, the Unionist Young Turk 
officers combined the autocratic statism of French Jacobins and Prussian officers 
with the Ottoman tradition of guardianship that considered the government “the 
prerogative of a properly trained elite”; a belief upheld both by the Tanzimat 
pashas and the centralising sultans before them (Akarlı 2006: 356). The military-
bureaucratic coalition led by Mustafa Kemal, himself a Young Turk and Unionist, 
carried this tradition over to the Turkish Republic.  
In his review of the changes in the Ottoman judicial system in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Akarlı demonstrates that as the Ottomans 
grappled with the intractable challenges of decline, the interactive judicial 
processes “that helped connect the formulations of common good or public 
interest to the ‘public’ to which it applied” became gradually marginalised and 
forgotten. “Administrative decisions began to define public interest, which 
became increasingly hard to distinguish from the interests of the state as defined 
by the people in charge of it. Thus, the concept of maslahat lost its connection to 
a set of basic rights and conditions that made civic life possible. Rather, it became 
associated with raison d’état.” (2010: 77 – 78) 
Ottoman (and later, Turkish) modernisers, in other words, were armed 
with the self-legitimising philosophy of patriarchal authority that put the state at 
the centre of the world as the provider of peace and order. But while their 
predecessors were primarily interested in maintaining a functioning order and 
thus content with interfering minimally in the public’s affairs as long as taxes 
were collected, order maintained and symbols of the state respected, the 
modernising successors were in pursuit of establishing a new order in a 
changing world. This turned the state into a mechanism of social coercion, 
transformation and control in the hands of officers, bureaucrats and politicians 
75 
 
with contending ideologies (secular nationalist, Islamist, leftist, etc.) but a shared 
veneration of the state’s supreme authority over society.  
 
The Iranian case 
 
Unlike their Ottoman neighbours, the Qajar rulers of Iran, who only came to 
power in the late eighteenth century, ending decades of internal strife, lacked the 
political infrastructure and the resources to carry out a similarly ambitious 
reform project. The Qajar state was highly decentralised and the central 
government had little direct control beyond the new capital, Tehran. As such, the 
Qajar shahs were forced to rely to a great extent on local notables such as tribal 
leaders, merchants and senior clerics to administer the provinces (Abrahamian 
2008: 9). Even at the centre, the state had “few government institutions worthy 
of the name”, including less than a dozen underfunded ministries of limited 
practical authority, some of which had been controlled by the same families since 
the early Safavid era (Sheikholislami 1997: 191; Ashraf and Banuazizi 1999: 667 
– 677). Despite assuming farr-invoking titles such as King of Kings (Shahanshah) 
and Shadow of God (Zillallah), the Qajar shahs hardly fulfilled Wittfogel’s 
definition of Oriental despotism as “a political arrangement in which the state is 
stronger than society”. In the twentieth century, Mohammad Reza Shah 
commanded a much more formidable central state apparatus and adopted 
similarly grandiose titles including Shahanshah and Aryamehr (Light of the 
Aryans). Yet in both instances, the rulers’ actual authority was checked by 
powerful and persistent societal forces.  
 With a feeble central state structure and a poorly armed and trained 
military, consisting in large part of tribal contingents, Iran under the Qajars could 
provide scant resistance against the imperial ambitions of Russia and Britain. 
Throughout the nineteenth century and in the early twentieth, Russia motivated 
by territorial expansion and Britain by securing trade routes to India, and later 
by oil, played an increasingly ruthless game of domination over Iran, leading to 
the 1907 Anglo-Russian agreement that partitioned the country into three zones 
of influence (Russian north, British south and a ‘neutral’ centre). The modern 
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roots of Iranian suspicion of foreign manipulation can be found in the nineteenth 
century.53  
 Humiliating defeats by Russia in 1813 and 1828 on the one hand, and the 
example of the Ottoman Tanzimat on the other, prompted Qajar shahs to attempt 
at administrative and military reform in the 1830s and then in the 1870s under 
Naser al-Din Shah, who established the Russian-trained Cossack Brigade; Iran’s 
first organised military in the modern sense.54  On the whole, however, these 
reforms remained intermittent and superficial, largely due to the state’s inability 
to raise the necessary funds. As a result, Qajar rulers came to rely on granting 
lucrative concessions to foreigners as a means of income; a policy widely 
despised for its impact on the local economy and for increasing western imperial 
manipulation and/or cultural influence. The impression that whatever revenue 
the state managed to accumulate was squandered by corrupt officials and on 
lavish royal trips to Europe added to the growing popular resentment against the 
state. Thus by the late nineteenth century, the Qajar state appeared to possess all 
the typical characteristics of a temporal government that had lost its farr: self-
interested, corrupt and inept, it had failed to provide for the people’s well-being 
and security, and defend the realm against foreign intervention. Rejecting its 
authority was justified.  
 The ulama’s prominent role in the Iranian Constitutional Revolution has 
been widely noted.55 We should also remember that for the greater part of the 
struggle, the ulama acted in a coalition with a diverse range of societal actors, 
including disgruntled notables, merchants of the bazaar, westernised 
intellectuals, as well as a number of social democrats, socialists and radicals who 
were mostly inspired and organised by contemporaneous movements in 
Russian-controlled Armenia and Azerbaijan. Afary argues that the emphasis the 
ideologues of the 1960s and the 70s placed on the ulama – bazaari alliance as a 
guideline for their struggle against the Pahlavi regime undermined the key role 
played by this group of socialists and radicals during the Constitutional 
                                                 
53 For a popular satirical depiction of this persistent suspicion, see Iraj Pezeshkzad’s classic novel 
My Uncle Napoleon.  
54 Mirza Hossein Khan Sipah Salar, a diplomat and later Naser-al Din Shah’s chief minister spent 
twelve years in Istanbul observing the Tanzimat reforms. 
55 For a detailed comparison of the Iranian and Ottoman constitutional movements see Sohrabi 
(2011). 
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Revolution (1994: 21 – 25). Instead, both Afary and Keddie point to the 
importance of the ‘radical-religious’ alliance, and particularly the radicals’ 
conscious decision to reach out to the ‘progressive’ members of the ulama, as the 
decisive factor behind the initial success of the movement (Keddie 1980: 53 – 65; 
Afary 1994: 32 – 33). Such an alliance, of course, was possible to the extent that 
the radicals and the ulama shared the same goals and principles, namely the 
struggle against foreign imperialist influence and arbitrary and oppressive 
government – central themes in revolutionary left, Shi’ism as well as the pre-
Islamic Iranian tradition of divine sanction.  
 In bridging the gap between the secular and the sacred, and in politicising 
the Shi’a ulama as well as the pious masses towards militant action against 
political authority, the role of influential ideologue/activist Jamal ad-Din al-
Afghani should not be ignored. Downplaying his Shi’a background and 
propagating a pan-Islamic philosophy, al-Afghani offered a lucid way of justifying 
political activism and modernity within the context of Islamic tradition (Keddie 
1972). A contemporary of Garibaldi, Mazzini and Bakunin, al-Afghani and his 
followers were attracted to the “millenarian and revolutionary strand” that was 
prominent in Europe during the nineteenth century (Kedourie 1992: 82). He in 
turn influenced new generations of Muslim activists, from Muhammad Abduh, 
his student in Egypt, to Ali Shariati, who assumed an inspirational role in the 
Iranian opposition to Mohammad Reza Shah in the 1960s and 70s.  
 The radical-religious alliance, a marriage of convenience from the outset, 
quickly collapsed after the immediate goals of the struggle had been reached. 
The split became manifest in dramatic fashion when a key clerical supporter of 
the movement, Sheikh Fazlollah Nuri, switched to the royalist side and issued a 
fatwa condemning the constitutionalists as “atheists” and “secret Bahai’s” 
(Abrahamian 2008: 50 – 51). In reaction to his support of Mohammad Ali Shah’s 
1908 coup against the parliament, Nuri was branded a traitor and executed by 
the constitutionalist forces that reclaimed Tehran the following year. Following 
the 1979 revolution, the Khomeinist government rehabilitated Nuri as a martyr 
who had given his life in defence of the faith; a testament to the enduring rupture 
not only between the ulama and secular left-wing Iranians, but also within the 
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ulama itself, as well as the emphasis of the ‘Islamic’ over the ‘Republic’ in post-
1979 Iran (Molavi 2002: 193).  
 Abrahamian attributes both the success of the Constitutional Revolution 
and the eventual collapse of the system it put in place to the lack of a viable 
central state. This view was undoubtedly shared by Reza Shah Pahlavi, a former 
officer in the Cossack Brigade whose 1921 coup put an end to the constitutional 
era and set out to westernise and modernise Iran from above. Reza Shah is often 
compared to his contemporary and fellow authoritarian moderniser, Mustafa 
Kemal Atatürk.56 It is true that the Iranian ruler found inspiration in his Turkish 
counterpart’s westernising and secularising reforms. But unlike Atatürk, who 
inherited a strong state with a functioning bureaucracy and a standing army that 
was able to impose its will with relative success on a ‘weak’ population, whose 
traditional social fabric had been utterly destroyed after decades of war, ethnic 
cleansing and population exchanges, Reza Shah inherited a weak central state 
that had to contend with powerful and well-entrenched societal forces. Indeed, 
as the absolutist architects of the modern Iranian state, the historical role and 
the ironic fate of the Pahlavi monarchs appear to have more in common with the 
modernising Ottoman sultans of the nineteenth century, Mahmud II and 
Abdulhamid II. 
 Like their Ottoman counterparts, the Pahlavis were firm believers in the 
divinely ordained traditional authority of the office of the monarch over politics 
and society, although by then the rationalisation of authority had become secular 
in theory and modernising in practice. And like the Ottoman sultans, both men 
assumed power in precarious external and domestic conditions, which 
convinced them of the need to build a powerful central state apparatus that 
would empower the crown against social challenges and the country against 
foreign encroachment. Reza Shah’s primary concern and main accomplishment 
was to establish this absent authority by building railways, nationalising and 
expanding the telegraph and postal systems, modernising the military and 
enforcing conscription, crushing tribal dissent and imposing a rigid central tax-
collection system. His efforts to impose the state’s authority on the ulama turned 
out less successful and fleeting.  
                                                 
56 See for example Cronin (1997: 1 – 17), Atabaki and Zürcher (2004). 
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 During the reign of his son, Mohammad Reza Shah, the central state 
apparatus evolved into a behemoth standing firmly on the triple pillars of 
bureaucracy, military and extensive court patronage (Farazmand 1989). Yet 
crucially, like the Qajar state, the Pahlavi regime also failed to maintain a sound 
social basis. The ‘White Revolution’ that the shah launched in 1963 was an 
ambitious social engineering project aimed at weakening the power of provincial 
landlords and the ulama through a mixture of a land redistribution programme, 
secularising reforms and a series of nationalisation/privatisation and 
industrialisation initiatives.57 But it ended up benefiting a small circle of already 
privileged Iranians, while creating a large number of independent farmers with 
too little land and no particular sympathy for the monarchy, and a new urban 
underclass made up of landless labourers, providing popular ammunition for the 
brewing uprising.  
 Although the state did gain significant powers and greater autonomy as a 
result of the White Revolution, this happened at the expense of its links to the 
civil society. Growing state repression further alienated the intelligentsia and 
brought it into coalition with other disgruntled societal forces. In the end, the 
monarchy was left with a powerful hierarchical state apparatus that fatefully 
lacked public support. The dynasty’s eventual fall in another revolution that 
followed the pattern of 1905-06 in terms of its root causes and shifting alliances 
suggests that a regime’s political survival in Iran depends to a great extent on its 
popular legitimacy, rather than only the material strength of its institutions.  
 
 
  
                                                 
57 See Pahlavi (1967) for the shah’s personal account on the needs for and aims of the White 
Revolution. 
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Conclusion 
  
This chapter has surveyed various structural factors that have been influential in 
shaping social and institutional perceptions of authority and legitimacy in Iran 
and Turkey. I pointed out that the idea of Iran embodies a supra-political quality, 
which has allowed it to survive as a cultural, linguistic and geographic entity 
despite centuries of foreign invasion and occupation. Iran, in other words, has 
been remarkably stable as a socio-cultural and geographic concept, but highly 
volatile as a political entity, as evidenced by the frequency of episodes of regime 
change in Iranian history. This has created an antagonistic dualism between 
state and society, which has become manifest in the numerous popular 
revolutions targeting sources of political authority that are deemed illegitimate.  
In contrast, it is the political authority that has remained fairly constant in 
what became Turkey in the twentieth century, while everything from borders to 
languages, demographics to socio-economic infrastructure changed radically 
after the nineteenth century. The Ottoman state (and dynasty) owed its 
resilience to a series of unique geopolitical factors as well as to a powerful 
institutional structure, self-legitimating ideology built upon Turco-Persian, 
Byzantine and Sunni traditions, and, at least until the late eighteenth century, a 
practical ability to accommodate diversity and local customs. This discrepancy is 
evident in the character of the defining moments of political change in both 
polities during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries: while Iranian revolutions 
pitted the state directly against entrenched societal forces, in Turkey, revolution 
and reform primarily featured a clash within the state among different 
stakeholders with contrasting recipes for change. 
In light of these structural dynamics outlined above, the next chapter will 
discuss the founding episodes of the Turkish and Iranian republics. At the same 
time, it will look at the impact of agency in these episodes by examining the 
policies and ideas of the charismatic founding fathers, Atatürk and Khomeini. 
The tumultuous founding episodes of the Turkish and Iranian republics and the 
role played by the charismatic leaders show how structural dynamics and human 
agency come together in shaping institutions; in this case the hybrid regimes of 
Kemalist Turkey and Khomeinist Iran.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
ATATÜRK AND KHOMEINI: CHARISMATIC, POLITICAL AND 
IDEOLOGICAL ROOTS OF THE HYBRID REGIMES 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter examines the charismatic leadership, pragmatic politics and the 
ideological legacy of the Turkish and Iranian republics’ founding fathers, Mustafa 
Kemal Atatürk and Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, and questions their role in 
shaping the hybrid nature of the two republics, the institutions of guardianship 
and the elite factions that would define Turkish and Iranian politics after the 
leaders’ deaths. Atatürk and Khomeini are products of different times and 
conditions. They are also commonly considered as the antitheses of one another, 
both in terms of their personality and the development models they advocated 
for their countries:58 a westernised military officer, Atatürk represented the 
radical but potent belief among the Ottoman and Iranian political elites at the 
turn of the twentieth century that the only path to modernity was through a 
complete socio-political transformation that entailed the shedding of ‘backward’ 
elements of tradition and religion and a wholesale adoption of western culture 
and civilisation. His ambitious project inspired many of his contemporaries, 
including Reza Shah Pahlavi in Iran, whose dynasty was ultimately overthrown 
by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. 
In many ways, Ayatollah Khomeini characterises the ideological 
opposition to Kemalist-style westernisation from above: Khomeini rejected 
westernisation as a cultural and development model as forcefully as Atatürk 
embraced it. He saw in the West the root cause of all the maladies that the 
Muslim world suffered from. Instead, he proposed an ‘authentic modernity’ that 
                                                 
58 See for example Barkey (1995: 151). 
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entailed an even more ambitious transformation of state and society within an 
Islamic framework, which also had to be imposed from above. Khomeini made no 
secret of his abhorrence of the secular order put in place by Atatürk, whom he 
considered a pharaonic tyrant and “the destroyer of Islam”. 59 Atatürk, of course, 
did not live to see Khomeini’s rise as a revolutionary leader in Iran. But Volkan 
and Itzkowitz are probably justified in speculating in their psychobiography of 
the Turkish leader that in the charismatic Shi’a cleric Atatürk would find “a 
Muslim fundamentalist of the sort that would have thrown him into a blind 
range.” (1984: 324) 
Yet for all these differences, the two men also shared important 
characteristics. Emerging from those institutions that historically negotiated 
power with the Ottoman and Iranian monarchs, both men became the 
charismatic leaders of broad-based popular movements that abolished the 
monarchy and established the Turkish and Iranian republics. They were also 
pragmatic political strategists, who after leading their movements into victory, 
ruthlessly consolidated power in their hands and went on to implement radical 
socio-political engineering projects from above. These tumultuous processes of 
forging and dissolving coalitions in turn determined the political divisions within 
and against the new regimes, shaping the threat perception of the Kemalist and 
Khomeinist elites and prompting them to establish a system of guardianship to 
protect their political and ideological hegemony.  
Atatürk and Khomeini also resembled each other in the way they viewed 
the world from a dichotomous perspective based on broad cultural divisions. 
They were essentially motivated by a desire to cure that deep-running feeling of 
inferiority among the Muslims of the Ottoman and Iranian empires vis-à-vis the 
West (including Russia) and end what they saw as the foreign imperialist 
subjugation of a once great people. While the ingredients of their medicines were 
markedly opposite, their tactics were not: both involved an attempt to create a 
                                                 
59 Khomeini said in a speech on 24 August 1986: “In the Islamic world, the ulama were led to 
believe that they had to obey the tyrants, oppressors, and the holders of naked power. Certain 
lackeys preferred to obey Atatürk, who destroyed the rule of Islam, instead of obeying the orders 
of the prophet. […] Today, the ulama [in Turkey] who are the puppets of the pharaonic forces, 
teach the people the orders of God and the prophet, but at the same time call on them to obey 
Atatürk. […] How can one argue that this is consistent with the notion of [Islamic rulers] whom 
God ordered us to obey?” Quoted in Özbudun (1990 : 244 – 245). 
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‘new people’ and a ‘new society’ through ideological indoctrination led by a new 
class of guardians.  
Combining the populism of charisma with the elitism of guardianship that 
assumed objective knowledge of ‘the truth’, the two men laid the groundwork for 
what were to transform into hybrid political systems after their deaths. While 
they ruled as undisputed leaders and enjoyed a supra-political position during 
their lifetime, their passing brought a host of new challenges to surface that 
created elite factions and defined the parameters of the political and institutional 
fissures within the Turkish and Iranian republics in the decades that followed. 
 
 
Charismatic leaders of popular movements 
 
Critically engaging with the legacies of Atatürk and Khomeini has been a difficult 
endeavour in Turkey and Iran. Official historiographies in these countries tend to 
portray their respective founding fathers as “makers of history” who were 
“unaffected by the world around [them] and who singlehandedly wrought a 
miracle” by creating modern Turkey and Iran; philosopher-kings “who strove to 
lay down laws de omni scibili” (Hanioğlu 2012: 3 – 6). Yet, while they clearly 
played hugely important roles in the processes that led to the rise of the Turkish 
and Islamic republics, the two men were very much products of their time, and 
their worldviews were shaped by the intellectual, social and political conditions 
around them. 
Mustafa Kemal and Ayatollah Khomeini both reached their political 
maturity during the periods of authoritarian modernisation and state building in 
the Ottoman and Pahlavi empires. Furthermore, they were members of those key 
institutions (the Ottoman military and the Shi’a clergy) that had transitioned into 
distinct political classes and come to play an active role in negotiating power 
with the patriarchs during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Finally, 
within these institutions the two men became identified with activist strands 
that, often in opposition to the more cautious and conservative mainstream, 
openly confronted the ruling monarchs and sought a more central role in 
government. In other words, while their political views were shaped by their 
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experiences within these institutions, their charismatic authority was built upon 
the institutions’ accumulated prestige, or ‘office charisma’. 
Yet the two men clearly possessed leadership skills and a level of 
charisma that few of their contemporaries could match. Mustafa Kemal rose to 
fame as a master tactician during the Battle of Gallipoli (1915 – 1916) and 
Khomeini as a gifted orator and unapologetic critic of the Iranian shah during his 
long exile in Iraq. Weber defines charismatic leadership as an innately 
revolutionary type of authority, which, in contrast to the bureaucratic and 
patriarchal authorities, “knows no abstract laws and regulations and no formal 
adjudication.” Charismatic authority “always results from unusual, especially 
political or economic situations, or from extraordinary psychic, particularly 
religious states, or from both together. It arises from collective excitement 
produced by extraordinary events and from surrender to heroism of any kind” 
(1968: 1115 – 1121). Both men emerged as leaders amidst extraordinary 
circumstances and a sense collective excitement.  
In Iran, Khomeini gradually established himself as a major oppositional 
voice in exile as the shah’s White Revolution exacerbated existing social tensions, 
and together with his repressive and arbitrary style of governance, alienated a 
significant part of the Iranian population. In the Turkish case, the occupation and 
the planned partitioning of the defeated Ottoman Empire after World War I 
under the Treaty of Sèvres of August 1920 posed an existential threat to those 
who still identified themselves with the six-hundred-year-old Ottoman order. 
Under the leadership of former CUP officers, provincial notables and a nascent 
Muslim bourgeoisie, Muslim communities across Thrace and Anatolia rejected 
the treaty’s terms and started forming armed resistance groups known as 
Defence of Rights Associations (Müdafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyetleri) (Zürcher 1984). 
United under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal and his fellow patriotic officers, 
these associations provided the popular basis and legitimacy of the Grand 
National Assembly (Büyük Millet Meclisi, GNA) founded in opposition to the 
occupying powers and the British-controlled Ottoman government in Ankara in 
April 1920. 
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 Both republics were thus borne out of elite-led popular movements that 
united their future aristos and demos under a common purpose.60 The 
circumstances and the goals of the two movements, however, were markedly 
different: The Iranian revolution of 1978 – 79 was the outcome of a mass 
uprising against the Pahlavi regime by a domestic coalition of socio-political 
interest groups disenfranchised by the regime. Like the Constitutional 
Revolution of 1905 - 06, this was a manifestation of the ‘dialectic of state and 
society’ in Iran, as well as a modern urban revolution, where subordinate groups 
openly aimed to overthrow the monarchical regime and seize control of the state. 
The Anatolian resistance movement of 1919 – 1923, in contrast, was a mass 
mobilisation campaign led by major stakeholders of the Ottoman state to protect 
and save the state, the religion and the country from foreign occupation and 
disintegration. Symbols of state (still associated with the Ottoman dynasty), 
religion (represented by the caliphate) and ‘the fatherland’ (vatan) served as a 
common bond between the Ottoman elite and those disparate Muslim 
communities of the empire who, unlike their non-Muslim counterparts, had not 
yet constructed modern national identities in opposition to the imperial regime. 
 
 
Coalition building and power consolidation 
 
The first major success of the elite leaderships of both movements was uniting 
independent interest groups and popular initiatives under a central command 
and around a common cause. It is at this stage that Ayatollah Khomeini and 
Mustafa Kemal emerged as pragmatic tacticians and shrewd political strategists. 
In striving to build and maintain broad-based popular coalitions, both leaders 
propagated simple and positive agenda that were acceptable to all parties 
participating in the movements. These did not include, certainly not explicitly, 
                                                 
60 I refer to these movements as the ‘Anatolian resistance movement of 1919 – 23’ and the 
‘Iranian revolution of 1978 – 79’, because as the following pages will elaborate, the commonly 
used terms ‘Kemalist/Turkish nationalist movement’ and ‘the Islamic revolution’ are more 
reflective of the post-victory ideologies and political arrangements of the Turkish and IRI 
republics than the movements’ diverse composition and articulated goals at the time of 
mobilisation. When I do refer to the ‘Kemalist revolution’ or ‘Islamic revolution’ it is in the 
context of post-victory politics of the two republics. 
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the radical socio-political reform projects that the leaders would initiate once 
they came to power.  
Hence, the periods before and after victory stand in stark contrast with each 
other: if the popular movements were in essence participatory, relatively 
egalitarian and inclusive on the basis of shared interests, post-victory years were 
defined by vicious power struggles and schisms based on clashing interests and 
visions, resulting in a more exclusive and homogenous political space, ultimately 
dominated by the charismatic leaders and their loyal disciples. It was in this 
process of making and tearing apart coalitions that the new guardians, the 
‘people’ and the ‘enemies’ of the Khomeinist and Kemalist regimes took their 
shape. 
 
Pragmatic coalition building 
 
Khomeini first publicised his theory of velayat-e faqih (Guardianship of the 
Islamic Jurist) in a series of lectures in 1971 while in exile in the Iraqi city of 
Najaf. During these lectures, which were later complied under the title of 
Hokumat-e Islami (Islamic Government), he declared Islam to be incompatible 
with monarchy and argued that “in order to attain the unity and freedom of the 
Muslim peoples, we must overthrow the oppressive governments installed by 
the imperialists and bring into existence an Islamic government of justice that 
will be in the service of the people.”61 Only under the guidance of the wisest and 
the most learned Islamic scholars (fuqaha) could such a just government be 
established and maintained. 
Although Hokumat-e Islami would serve as the blueprint of the system of 
guardianship that Khomeini established after 1979, his early formulation of the 
concept, particularly the precise institutional character and socio-political role of 
guardianship, was vague and theoretical. In the years leading to the overthrow of 
the Pahlavi regime, Khomeini and his disciples carefully downplayed the divisive 
doctrinal issues surrounding velayat-e faqih, and instead emphasised the anti-
                                                 
61 “Islam proclaims monarchy and hereditary succession wrong and invalid. When Islam first 
appeared in Iran, the Byzantine Empire, Egypt, and the Yemen, the entire institution of monarchy 
was abolished.” (Khomeini 1971) 
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monarchical, anti-imperialist, revolutionary and justice-seeking aspects of 
‘Islamic governance’.62 Ultimately, it was his unflinching opposition both to 
Pahlavi authoritarianism and to its military, financial and political sponsors in 
the West that had transformed the aging cleric into an icon of resistance for 
many Iranians – not the relatively obscure theory he put forth a decade 
previously (and was criticised heavily for by the leading Shi’a clerics of the 
time).63  
During the 1970s, Khomeini generally confined his statements regarding 
the Islamic character of the political system he envisioned to the “need for the 
clergy to play a supervisory role” to government. Only in the last stage of his 
exile in Paris in 1978, did he start speaking about an ‘Islamic republic’ (jomhoori-
ye Islami) rather than an Islamic government. This was in part an effort to appeal 
to the various opposition groups that were “against the Shah and […] not content 
with just reforming the monarchy” and also to paint a favourable picture of his 
movement in the western public opinion (Shakibi 2010: 90). In the popular 
revolutionary slogan of ‘liberty, freedom, Islamic republic’ (esteqlal, azadi, 
jomhoori-ye Islami) the idea of Islamic government was paired with the yearning 
for a republican system that had its roots in the Constitutional Revolution of 
1905 – 06. Even at this late stage, however, Khomeini’s descriptions of what an 
‘Islamic Republic’ would look like remained ambiguous. In an interview with Le 
Monde, dated 13 November 1978, he said: 
 
By “republic” it is meant the same types of republicanism as 
they are at work in other countries. However, this republic is 
based on a constitution which is Islamic. The reason we call 
it the Islamic Republic is that all conditions for the 
candidates as well as rules, are based on Islam […] The 
regime will be a republic just like anywhere else. 
 
While in Paris, Khomeini and his entourage often stressed that the future 
government of Iran would respect the rights of minorities, the rights of women, 
                                                 
62 This point remains contested. Abrahamian (1993: 30) notes, “some of [Khomeini’s] lay allies 
later complained that this avoidance had been part of a devious clerical scheme to dupe the 
public. Khomeini’s disciples countered that it was the liberals and leftists who had conspired to 
supress the book Velayat-e Faqih.” 
63 Grand Ayatollah Kho’i, the leading Shi’a marja-e taqlid (‘object of emulation’; the highest 
position of leadership in the Shi’a ulama) of his time, was among numerous senior critics of 
Khomeini’s thesis. 
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and basic principles of democracy. “Islamic Republic will be founded on the 
freedom of expression and combat against all kinds of censorship”, Khomeini 
said.64 He argued that “an Islamic Republic is a democratic state in the true sense 
of the word […] the Islamic state will respond with logic to all arguments put 
forward” (Moin 2010: 219). There were also references to ‘progressive Islam’ 
where it would even be possible for a woman to become president (Ibid: 195). 
This was a period during which the leader was surrounded by liberal-
minded or left-leaning Islamist political activists and intellectuals, such as 
Ebrahim Yazdi, Abol Hassan Bani Sadr and Sadeq Qotbzadeh, who served as the 
link between the secular and religious wings of the revolutionary movement, as 
well as between the movement and the outside world. Sorbonne-educated Bani 
Sadr also advocated an Islamic republic, but one which opposed clerical 
involvement in politics and guaranteed the individual rights of citizens (Bani 
Sadr 1981). MIT-educated Yazdi, who maintained the movement’s relationship 
with Iranian student activists abroad, and Qotbzadeh, Khomeini’s spokesperson 
while in France, had set up the international branch of the Freedom Movement of 
Iran, a revolutionary Islamist pro-democracy movement, founded, among others, 
by Ayatollah Mahmoud Taleqani and former Mosaddeqist Mehdi Bazargan.  
During this time, Khomeini met with representatives of secular leftist 
Iranian groups, who attended “his evening consultations, and came away with 
the feeling that there would be room for them, too, in the Iran he was fighting 
for” (Benard and Khalilzad 1984: 39). A unity of purpose brought militant groups 
with wide-ranging agenda like the People’s Mojahedin of Iran (Mojahedin-e 
Khalq-e Iran, MEK), which espoused a Marxist interpretation of Shi’ism, the 
communist People’s Feda’iyan Organisation (Sazmen-e Feda’iyan-e Khalq), and 
the right wing anti-Bahai Hojjatieh Society under the leadership of Ayatollah 
Khomeini. His rainbow coalition, which included members of the Shi’a clergy, the 
bazaar merchants, students, teachers, workers, peasants, women, liberal and 
leftist intellectuals, radical and moderate Islamists, communists and 
constitutionalists, was held together by two basic objectives: the removal of the 
Pahlavi regime and the establishment of a free, independent and just political 
system. While the first objective was uncontroversial to all and the most urgent, 
                                                 
64 Interview, Reuters, 26 October 1978 
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defining and establishing a government that was ‘free, independent and just’ 
would prove lethally divisive. 
Mustafa Kemal, too, offered a seemingly straight-forward set of objectives 
to the disparate groups that united under his command in the Anatolian 
resistance movement: the liberation of the fatherland from foreign occupation, 
the restoration of the state’s sovereignty and the Muslim nation’s independence. 
The territorial boundaries of ‘the fatherland’ were determined on the basis of a 
set of decisions adopted by the last Ottoman parliament and endorsed in the 
formative congresses of the movement in Erzurum and Sivas in 1919 and 1920.65 
With the exception of the Ottoman province of Kirkuk, these correspond to the 
present-day borders of the Turkish Republic. The pre- and post-victory notions 
of ‘state’ and ‘nation’, on the other hand, exhibit striking contrasts. If Khomeini 
was ambiguous about his post-revolutionary plans for Iran, Mustafa Kemal was 
almost completely silent. Until military victory was achieved and his charismatic 
authority firmly established, he did not publicise any plans to establish a republic 
or to impose radical westernising and secularising reforms.  
The Anatolian resistance movement was a religiously defined project, 
whose leaders professed no overt desire for regime change until after its initial 
objectives were achieved. During the coalition-building stage, Mustafa Kemal 
frequently referred to the “liberation of the sacred office of the caliphate” as one 
of the main goals of the resistance (Atay 2009: 245, 321). In his memoires, 
General Kazım Karabekir, who was later attacked by the Kemalists as a 
traditionalist, expressed his disapproval of the heavily religious symbolism used 
in the opening ceremony of the GNA in Ankara on 23 April 1920.66 Mustafa 
Kemal’s own speeches during this early period frequently emphasised and 
glorified Islam as a bond that united people. Likewise, his early references to the 
‘nation’ (millet) corresponded to an ethnically and culturally diverse religious 
community in the original meaning of the term in the Ottoman administrative 
lexicon, and not to the modern western idea of a homogenous society built upon 
                                                 
65 The ‘National Pact’ (Misak-ı Milli) laid claim to those parts of the empire with a majority 
Muslim population, excluding Arab provinces, but including the Kurdish provinces of Anatolia 
and northern Iraq. With the exception of the Ottoman province of Kirkuk, this corresponds 
largely to the current borders of the Turkish Republic. 
66 “Never in our history has an assembly been inaugurated with such a deeply fanatical religious 
ceremony.” (Karabekir 2008: 735) 
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a reconstructed history, culture and language. In a speech to the GNA on 1 May 
1920, Mustafa Kemal recognised this unity in diversity: 
 
The people who constitute this great Assembly of ours are 
not only Turks, not only Circassians, not only Kurds, not only 
the Laz, but the community of Muslims that comprises them 
all. […] Thus, the nation that we endeavour to preserve and 
defend naturally does not consist of a single component. It 
consists of diverse components of Islam. They are 
compatriots who have mutual respect for each other, and 
[…] will always respect each other’s ethnic, social and 
geographic rights. (Arsan 1989a: 74 – 75) 
 
The movement’s leaders stressed this historic Islamic unity particularly in 
their effort to win the support of Kurdish notables. Kurds were given the 
prospect of a separate homeland in Sèvres, and for this purpose a delegation of 
Kurdish leaders had participated in the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. In his 
correspondences with Kurdish tribal leaders, Mustafa Kemal often emphasised 
the brotherly and religious bond between the Turks and the Kurds, as well as the 
long-standing service of the Kurds to the Ottoman state.67 In a telegraph to the 
notables of Malatya province, who had agreed to support the resistance, he 
wrote:  
 
It is without a doubt that as long as we have religious and 
noble grandees like you, the Turk and the Kurd will continue 
to live as inseparable brothers and as one unshakable body 
will form an iron fortification around the caliphate against 
our internal and external enemies. (Akyol 2008: 164) 
 
Finally, this language was imbued with anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist 
rhetoric, even though the movement’s leaders did not profess a class-conscious 
ideology. Nonetheless on the eve of the Bolshevik revolution in Russia, and when 
socialist movements were energised in Europe, the defiant slogans of 
revolutionary socialism held certain appeal for the inheritors of a defunct empire 
now resisting the great imperial powers of the West. The revolution in Russia 
had been a welcome development for the Ottomans during World War I, as Lenin 
                                                 
67 For the official correspondence between Ankara and the Kurdish notables during the 
resistance movement, see Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi (1991: 105, 149). 
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denounced the tsarist government’s territorial claims and withdrew Russia out 
of the war. For the Anatolian movement, it also presented a practical 
opportunity. Days after the inauguration of the GNA, Mustafa Kemal wrote to 
Lenin for financial and military assistance as part of a ‘joint struggle against 
imperialism’ (Dmytryshyn 1987). In an effort to appease the Bolsheviks, who 
were sceptical of Mustafa Kemal’s revolutionary credentials, the Turkish leader 
allowed a group of leftist Ottoman intellectuals to establish an official 
Communist Party in Anatolia (Tunçay 2009). A declaration adopted in November 
1920, while a GNA delegation prepared to visit Moscow, summarised the anti-
imperialist, religious and pro-state goals of the resistance movement with the 
following words: 
 
The Turkish Grand National Assembly has been established 
with a pledge to safeguard life and independence within 
national borders and rescue the offices of the caliphate and 
the sultanate. Consequently it is firm in its belief that it will 
succeed in liberating the people of Turkey, whose life and 
independence it considers its sole and sacred purpose, from 
the tyranny and oppression of imperialism and capitalism, 
and make it the master of its own will and sovereignty.68 
 
 Based on these promises, Mustafa Kemal assumed the leadership of a 
popular Muslim resistance movement that brought together westernised 
Ottoman bureaucrats and former Unionist officers, an emerging Muslim middle 
class and intelligentsia with royalist, liberal, nationalist or leftist political 
dispositions, as well as provincial notables and tribal leaders of various ethnic 
and geographic backgrounds, united in defence of the fatherland, the state and 
the religion. 
 
  
                                                 
68 Minutes of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, Year 1, Meeting 99, 18 November 1920, p. 
414, http://global.tbmm.gov.tr/index.php/EN/yd/icerik/43.  
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Consolidation of power 
 
As is the case with many heterogeneous popular movements, the coalitions led 
by the two leaders fractured soon after fulfilling their primary goal. Whether by 
pre-meditated design or in spontaneous reaction to the ensuing period of 
political chaos, uncertainty and openness, Ayatollah Khomeini and Mustafa 
Kemal emerged as ruthless consolidators of power and pressed on with 
implementing their radical socio-political agendas. In Iran, the purges of the 
Pahlavi-era elite went underway immediately after the fall of the dynasty and 
continued in a violent manner for several years.69 Next, Khomeini turned against 
secular, nationalist and leftist groups and moderate Islamists that had lent 
various degrees of support to the revolution but objected in part or in full to the 
unfolding political domination of the clergy. 
 Khomeini set out to establish a constitution and system that would serve 
as the mechanism to transform the Iranian society into the ideal Islamic 
community. In 1980, he announced the beginning of a ‘Cultural Revolution’ 
aimed at cleansing the Iranian society of un-Islamic (thus impure) elements such 
as secularism, westernism, imperialism, capitalism and communism. Growing 
impatient with the rising secular opposition to this single-minded pursuit of his 
revolutionary vision, he branded his critics “xenomaniacs, people infuriated with 
the West, empty people with no content”, questioning their loyalty to the 
revolution and ability to grasp its urgent needs and the truth embodied in 
Islam.70 Shortly before ordering the closure of 22 opposition newspapers, 
Khomeini stated: 
 
If we had been truly revolutionary we would never have 
allowed them [the opposition parties] to be established. We 
should have established one party, the party of the 
oppressed […] I will warn these corrupt groups all over the 
country that if they do not stop we will deal with them 
differently […] It is the duty of the revolutionary court to ban 
all these newspapers and magazines which do not reflect the 
                                                 
69 At the beginning of the Iran – Iraq war, the manpower in the Iranian military had fallen from 
about 240,000 to 180,000 as a result of purges and desertions. The list of purges at the time 
included 250 generals. “War in the Persian Gulf”, Time, 6 October 1980.  
70 From the speech marking the anniversary of the 15 Khordad uprising, 5 June 1979. (Khomeini 
2002: 270) 
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path of the nation and to arrest their writers and put them 
on trial.71 
  
 The fate of the liberal Islamist intellectuals who surrounded the leader 
during his final months in exile portrays the brutal course that the revolution 
took in its foundational years. Within a few years all of the men who served in 
influential positions in the immediate aftermath of the revolution were ousted, 
marginalised or eliminated: Bazargan, Taleqani, Bani Sadr and Yazdi were 
members of the Revolutionary Council (Shura-ye Enghelab) that Khomeini set up 
shortly before returning to Iran (which also included leading revolutionary 
clerics like Hashemi Rafsanjani, Ali Khamenei, Ayatollahs Beheshti and 
Motahhari). Bazargan became the prime minister of the provisional government, 
and Yazdi served as his deputy and minister of foreign affairs. Both men resigned 
in November 1979 in protest over the provisional government’s inability to 
control the arbitrary justice dished out against the regime’s opponents by the 
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Khomeinist vigilante groups, and the 
creation of an ulama-dominated Assembly of Experts instead of a pluralistic and 
non-clerical constituent assembly to draft the constitution. The first elected 
president of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI), Bani Sadr clashed with Khomeini 
over the role of the clergy in government and the radicalisation of the revolution. 
Having been branded a liberal and an imperialist lackey by the left and the 
Khomeinists, he was impeached and fled the country in June 1981. Finally, in 
1982, Qotbzadeh was accused of plotting to assassinate Khomeini and executed. 
The split between the Khomeinists and the leftist groups (both secular 
and Islamic) that the leader branded as ‘hypocrites’ (monafeqin) was more 
violent. Between 1979 and 1981, tensions between the People’s Mojahedin and 
the Khomeinists transformed from street battles into a bloody struggle for the 
reins of the regime. Khomeini blamed the MEK for collaborating with foreign 
intelligence agencies. Following a bomb attack at the headquarters of the ruling 
Islamic Republic Party (Hezb-e Jomhoori-ye Islami, IRP) in June 1981, which 
killed more than 70 high-ranking officials, the regime resorted to mass execution 
of all those perceived as real or potential opponents to the leader’s authority. “In 
                                                 
71 Speech, 17 August 1979. Quoted in Rajaee (1983: 100). 
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six short weeks,” wrote Abrahamian, “the Islamic Republic shot over one 
thousand prisoners. The victims included not only members of the MEK but also 
royalists, Bahais, Jews, Kurds, Baluchis, Arabs, Qashqayis, Turkomans, National 
Frontists, Maoists, anti-Stalinist Marxists, and even apolitical teenage girls who 
happened to be in the wrong street at the wrong time” (Abrahamian 1993: 131). 
The Tudeh Party, which continued to back Khomeini until as late as 1983, was 
accused of spying for the Soviet Union and destroyed almost overnight when it 
opposed Khomeini’s decision to continue the war with Iraq (Moin 2000: 255). 
Tudeh’s fate was shared by the members of Feda’iyan-e Khalq, which too 
supported Khomeini until 1983. 
The period of power consolidation also saw the forced marginalisation of 
right-wing and religious interest groups, such as the anti-Bahai Hojjatieh Society 
which was disbanded in 1983, as well as powerful clerics who were critical of the 
institutionalisation of velayat-e faqih and the politicisation of the clergy. Chief 
among these dissident clerics was Grand Ayatollah Mohammad Kazem 
Shariatmadari of Tabriz. Throughout 1979, Shariatmadari’s mainly Azeri 
supporters clashed with pro-Khomeini factions. By early 1980, his supporters 
were suppressed, the political party he was associated with (Muslim People’s 
Republican Party) accused of being infiltrated by ‘anti-Islamic foreign agents’ 
and disbanded, and Shariatmadari himself was put under house arrest (Moin 
2000: 230). In 1982, the aged cleric was accused of conspiring with Qotbzadeh to 
assassinate the leader, and in an unprecedented move that shook the clerical 
establishment to its core, Khomeini had this pre-eminent Shi’a scholar defrocked. 
His message to the clergy was that the revolution was more important than 
tradition. 
Finally, the leader was no more lenient towards those within his closest 
circle of followers, who dared to publicly criticise the basic policies of the Islamic 
Republic, as evidenced in the case of Grand Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri. A 
firm believer in velayat-e faqih and a dedicated disciple of Khomeini since the 
early 1960s, whom the charismatic leader had referred to as “the fruit of my life’s 
labour”, Montazeri was the designated successor to the leader until he was 
dismissed in 1989 for speaking out against the course of the revolution in the 
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midst of a final round of mass executions following the end of the Iraq war.72 
Condemning the executions, Montazeri publicly argued that the Islamic 
government had taken a path in the wrong direction and betrayed the 
revolution’s core “values and principles”.73 In a message commemorating the 
tenth anniversary of the Islamic revolution, he called for greater political 
openness, foreign trade, and popular participation in government. “The people of 
the world,” he said, “thought our only task here in Iran was to kill”.74 Overnight, 
he was demoted from his position as the leader’s heir-designate, had his clerical 
title and portraits across the country removed, and was forced into political 
obscurity in virtual house arrest in Qom. 
In tightening their grip over politics and society and crushing various 
forms of opposition, which, in addition to those discussed above, also included 
numerous armed uprisings by ethnic minorities across the country demanding 
greater political and cultural rights, the Khomeinists made use of two basic tools 
of coercion that supplemented Ayatollah Khomeini’s unmatched charisma and 
prestige: armed militia groups and organisations loyal to the leader went on to 
form the backbone of the regime’s security establishment. These included the 
Islamic revolutionary committees (Komiteh), the Hezbollahi vigilantes, and the 
Revolutionary Guards. Secondly, the Revolutionary Courts (Dadgahha-ye 
Enqelab) oversaw the incarceration and execution of thousands of perceived 
‘enemies of Islam and the revolution’. 
The authority of the Kemalist regime too was established by means of 
coercive measures, namely through the ‘Independence Tribunals’ (İstiklal 
Mahkemeleri) and the military. As the unifying rhetoric Mustafa Kemal used 
during the resistance movement gradually gave way to a project of systematic 
socio-political and cultural transformation, resistance to his increasingly 
authoritarian personal rule intensified. As in the Iranian case, dissent came in 
many different forms and directions. Among those who were purged, 
                                                 
72 The split between Montazeri and other prominent Khomeinists, particularly Hashemi 
Rafsanjani, dates back to the Iran-Contra Affair of 1986 (Keddie and Richard 2003: 260). For the 
1987 - 88 mass executions see Amnesty International (1990). 
73 In an August 1988 letter to Khomeini, Montazeri wrote, “These mass executions […] violate the 
fundamental principles of Islam, of the Holy Prophet, and of our Imam Ali.” (Abrahamian 1999: 
209) 
74 Tehran Times, 11 February 1989 
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marginalised or suppressed by the Kemalists were Ottoman loyalists, liberals, 
socialists, Unionist officers, conservative Muslims, Kurds, as well as fellow 
nationalist leaders of the resistance movement who fell out with the leader for 
political or ideological reasons. 
Initially set up to maintain order and discipline and prevent desertions 
from the army during the resistance movement, the Independence Tribunals 
were equipped with extraordinary legal powers. They gradually became a 
vehicle to suppress opposition and consolidate power in the hands of the 
Kemalists. Socialists were among the first to be discarded: three months after 
being founded on the orders of Mustafa Kemal, the Turkish Communist Party 
was shut down in January 1921. Socialist deputies in the GNA and several 
members of the Communist Party were tried and found guilty of treason, and a 
number of leftist newspapers were closed down. Seventeen leading independent 
Turkish communists were rounded up and thrown to their deaths off a fishing 
boat off the Black Sea coast (Tunçay 2009: 252 – 253). 
 Mustafa Kemal personally vetted all candidates standing for the second 
GNA elections in April 1923, barring standing deputies that were deemed 
Islamist, Kurdish nationalist, communist, or simply too independent. This 
included an entire opposition bloc, known as the ‘Second Group’, which had 
resisted the concentration of political power in the hands of one man and his 
increasingly tightknit entourage (Demirel 1993; Koçak 1998). As a result, the 
impressive diversity of social, professional and political backgrounds reflecting 
the combined will of the Anatolian resistance movement in the First Assembly 
gave way to the much more homogenous Second Assembly that was dominated 
by loyal followers of the leader, organised under a new ruling party: the 
Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP). It was this Second 
Assembly that declared Turkey a republic and Mustafa Kemal its president, 
abolished the caliphate and implemented strict social reforms such as the 
banning of Islamic sects and orders and the imposition of western-style dress 
code. 
 When the reforms sparked protests and uprisings, the military and the 
Independence Tribunals were dispatched “to all four corners of the land […] to 
suppress the ‘reactionaries’ by means of terror” (Tunçay 1989: 77). One such 
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revolt against the central government in 1925 by the Sunni Kurdish tribes of 
Eastern Anatolia, led by Sheikh Said, gave the Kemalists the pretext to declare 
nationwide emergency laws to decisively quash all types of opposition to what 
had now become ‘the Kemalist revolution’. Tens of local and national 
newspapers were ordered closed, having been branded by Recep Peker, a 
prominent Kemalist and sympathiser of European fascism, as “poisonous dens of 
snakes” (Topuz 1996). Also shut down by the law was the only opposition party 
at the GNA at the time, the Progressive Republican Party (Terakkiperver 
Cumhuriyet Fırkası, PRP) established by prominent leaders of the resistance 
movement, such as Rauf Orbay, Kazım Karabekir, Refet Bele and Ali Fuat 
Cebesoy. Mustafa Kemal described the PRP in his ‘Great Speech’ (Nutuk) as “the 
product of most treacherous minds”. “This party,” the leader declared, “has 
harboured and supported murderers and reactionaries; assisted the plans of 
foreign enemies who wish to destroy the Turkish state, the young Turkish 
Republic” (Atatürk 1995).75   
 In fact, the PRP leaders’ predicament may be comparable to that of Bani 
Sadr, Shariatmadari or even Montazeri in Iran: their opposition was chiefly 
against what they saw as the monopolisation of power in the hands of a single 
man and his limited entourage, and the radical and authoritarian nature of the 
Kemalist reforms. This won them the popular backing of a diverse range of socio-
political groups, both within and outside the regime.76 “The PRP,” explains 
Zürcher, “was not an organisation of outside opposition to the policies of the 
nationalists”: 
 
The party had a real political programme and ideological 
stance, but it was not, as has been said so often, a 
reactionary or religious one. Its programme was a 
moderately liberal one with a distinct Western European 
flavour [...] less centralising, authoritarian, nationalist and 
                                                 
75 The ‘Great Speech’ was delivered at the Grand National Assembly between 15 – 20 October 
1927 and consists of Mustafa Kemal’s own version of the events from the end of World War I to 
the Anatolian movement and the early years of the Turkish Republic. For decades it was 
considered the official history of the republic and was a part of the national education curricula. 
76 According to Zürcher, “we do not have definitive analysis of the popular support of the PRP, 
which has been variously described as Unionists, religious reactionaries, supporters of the 
Second Group, democrats, conservatives, cosmopolitans, the press and sectors of the armed 
forces.” (1991: 113, footnote 3) 
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radical [than the ruling Republican People’s Party]. 
(1991:114) 
 
A final round of purges took place after a plot to assassinate Mustafa 
Kemal in Izmir was foiled in June 1926. The ensuing trial was used as an 
opportunity to deal with political rivals, including former leaders of the 
disbanded PRP and prominent former Unionist officers, who had supported 
Mustafa Kemal during the resistance movement. While the PRP leaders, who still 
commanded prestige and loyalty within the military, were acquitted (albeit 
marginalised from public life), the Unionists were executed. “Sadly,” wrote Atay 
in his memoir, “the regime held on to power on the execution tables of Izmir and 
Ankara. This definitive elimination discouraged all types of opposition and 
reaction. It allowed Mustafa Kemal to complete the revolution he had started.” 
(2009: 470) 
 Indeed, within four years of establishing the Turkish and Iranian 
republics, Mustafa Kemal by 1927 and Ayatollah Khomeini by 1983 had 
effectively dealt with the major domestic challenges to their charismatic 
authority and established themselves at the top of a mighty central state 
apparatus inherited from the monarchical predecessors they had toppled. During 
this power struggle, both men relied on a small but fiercely loyal team of 
followers, who subscribed and contributed to their leaders’ vision and occupied 
the top administrative posts in the young republics. The Kemalist and 
Khomeinist projects were overseen by these core teams of dedicated operatives, 
many of whom owed their political careers to the leader. They were aided by the 
leaders’ unmatched charisma, prestige and supra-political position, their 
growing monopoly over the state’s coercive institutions and the judiciary, and 
finally, a sustained state of national emergency on the pretext of continuous 
domestic and foreign threats to the regime. This last one allowed the young 
regimes to securitise the political sphere, frame open criticism of their policies in 
the dichotomous language of revolution and counter-revolution, patriotism and 
treason, and suppress dissent in a heavy-handed and often arbitrary manner. 
The process of making and breaking coalitions ultimately created layers 
of entrenched opposition within and towards the new regimes and potential 
challengers to the hegemonic ideologies they imposed. Resistance to the 
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Kemalist and Khomeinist projects – particularly from various groups that had 
participated in the popular movements and felt betrayed in its aftermath – 
continued in various forms and intensity during and beyond the lifetime of the 
charismatic leaders. It also made the Kemalist and Khomeinist elites inherently 
suspicious of popular dynamics in society and insecure in their positions of 
power. At different periods over the following decades, the Kemalist elite viewed 
Kurds, political Islamists, traditional conservatives, socialists, communists and 
liberal democrats as potential threats to the regime. Communists, social 
democrats and liberals (secular or Islamic) that remained outside the core 
Khomeinist political elite, ethnic and religious minorities, nationalists of different 
backgrounds, as well as the Iranian diaspora as a whole have been depicted in a 
similar light by the Islamic Republic. The systems of guardianship that the 
Kemalists and Khomeinists established to protect the resultant power balance 
were therefore not only products of a pre-determined ideological blueprint, but 
also the natural outcome of these foundational experiences and elite worldviews 
that were shaped in the process.  
 
 
Kemalism and Khomeinism: Ideological foundations of the 
hybrid regimes 
 
The ideological frameworks that the founding fathers of the Turkish and Iranian 
republics promoted embodied many internal ambiguities and contradictions 
(some intentional, others perhaps unavoidable), which allowed them to be 
interpreted selectively by their successors. Nonetheless, it is possible to pinpoint 
a number of basic characteristics that Kemalism and Khomeinism seem to 
converge and diverge on. Essentially, both men were preoccupied with achieving 
sovereignty and modernity by re-engineering society on the basis of their strictly 
Manichean worldviews. The state, as in any revolutionary polity, became the 
central mechanism to carry out these social engineering projects. Where they 
diverged most notably was on their views of the international order and the 
scope of their revolution. 
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Sovereignty  
 
The gradual loss of sovereignty and the sense of ‘marginalisation’ weighed 
heavily in both Mustafa Kemal’s and Khomeini’s thinking and reflected the 
intense distress felt within Iranian and Ottoman societies resulting from the 
polities’ cultural, economic and political decline and subjugation by foreign 
imperial powers. The popular slogans of the Anatolian resistance movement and 
the Iranian revolution – ‘Independence or death!’ (Ya istiklal ya ölüm!) and 
‘Independence, Freedom, Islamic Republic” (Esteqlal, azadi, jomhooriye Islami) – 
captured these sentiments. 
  “If a state,” argued Mustafa Kemal, “cannot practice its right to try 
foreigners in its own courts, if a nation is prohibited from taxing foreigners the 
same way it taxes its own people, if a state is prohibited from taking measures 
against internal elements that corrode its very being, can we believe such a state 
is independent and sovereign?”77 In the same vein, Ayatollah Khomeini protested 
the extension of legal immunity to Americans inside Iran in 1964, which he 
called “a shattering blow to the foundations of our national independence”.78 In a 
famous speech that helped transform him into a champion of Iran’s national 
rights, Khomeini said: 
 
If some American servant, some American cook, 
assassinates your marja in the middle of the bazaar, or runs 
over him, the Iranian police do not have the right to 
apprehend him! Iranian courts do not have the right to judge 
him! […]The government has sold our independence, 
reduced us to the level of a colony, and made the Muslim 
nation of Iran appear more backward than the savages in 
the eyes of the world! 79  
 
The charismatic authority of Mustafa Kemal and Ayatollah Khomeini and 
the legitimacy of the republics they founded very much rest on the popular 
recognition that it was these leaders who finally righted a long-standing wrong, 
ended the injustice being done upon their nation and corrected their inferior 
                                                 
77 Speech delivered at the Izmir Economic Congress, 17 February 1923, quoted in Akalın (2008: 
26).  
78 Open letter to Prime Minister Hoveyda, Najaf, 16 April 1967. (Khomeini 2002: 189) 
79 Speech delivered in Qom, 27 October 1964. (Ibid: 181 – 182) 
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status vis-à-vis the West. This is also the basis on which the guardians of the 
Kemalist and Khomeinist regimes have come to justify their privileged socio-
political status in the two countries. “Whereas Khomeini,” writes Abrahamian, 
“used holy texts to support the clergy’s right to rule, the Islamic Republic claims 
the same right on the grounds that the clergy have valiantly saved the country 
from imperialism, feudalism, and despotism. This is legitimacy based not so 
much on divine right as on the secular function of preserving national 
independence.” (1993: 92). The same goes for Mustafa Kemal and the military, 
which is credited for saving the state and the country from imperialism, foreign 
occupation, and the ‘debilitating backwardness’ of tradition. 
 Achieving and maintaining independence necessitated not only 
confronting foreign powers directly but also defeating their domestic extensions. 
In Hokumat-e Islami, Khomeini (1971) claimed that “foreigners through their 
propaganda and their agents” inside Iran aim to “alienate the people from Islam 
[…] in the path of their materialistic ambitions.” He frequently pointed a finger at 
the monarchists, non-Muslims (Jews in particular), Zionists and the Baha’is for 
acting as the agents of foreign imperialists, thus making official a deep running 
popular paranoia of social and religious minorities (Ibid). 
 Like their Unionist predecessors, the Turkish republican elite viewed non-
Muslim communities, with their relatively prosperous bourgeois status within 
the old empire, dubious loyalty to the state, their own nationalist aspirations and 
strong socio-economic ties with the West, as inassimilable into the new Turkish 
nation.80 Achieving sovereignty necessitated creating a Muslim middle class, 
which would serve as the socio-economic backbone of the new nation. Already 
underway since the Unionist era, the ‘Turkification’ project was pursued through 
mass deportations and ethnic cleansing (of Armenians and Assyrians during 
World War I), legalised population exchanges (with Greece in 1923), 
discriminatory taxing (the ‘Wealth Tax’ of 1942) and state-sponsored violence 
(such as the Istanbul pogroms of 6 – 7 September 1955). These policies further 
                                                 
80 From Atay’s memoir: “The Greeks were being uprooted and thrown out; and with them the 
entire economy of Izmir and Western Anatolia. […] From small craftsmanship to trade and 
lucrative agriculture, the entire national economy was in the hands of the Christians” (2009: 
383). “During the First World War, the Armenian tragedy took place. How sad that if it wasn’t for 
this tragedy, the [nationalist] movement would not have succeeded. […] Outside the walls of 
Istanbul, all of Turkey became a land of pure Muslim Turkishness” (2009: 520). 
102 
 
marginalised the already diminished and impoverished non-Muslim 
communities throughout the republican era. 
Once the ‘corrosive internal elements’ were uprooted, the new elites set 
out to educate and enlighten the masses on the basis of the ‘objective truths’ they 
claimed to possess either on the basis of scientific positivism (Kemalism) or neo-
Platonic Shi’a mysticism (Khomeinism). The aim was to create an entirely ‘new 
person’ that the two leaders envisioned and personified. Despite attempting to 
achieve modernity through different routes, both campaigns were based on 
dualistic worldviews that divided the universe into civilised and uncivilised, and 
a paternalistic view of society that claimed to know what is best for the people. 
 
Dualist worldview and paternalism 
 
In his intellectual biography of Atatürk, historian Şükrü Hanioğlu (2012) 
identifies four ideological strands popular among the French and German 
educated Ottoman officers at the turn of the twentieth century, which also 
influenced Mustafa Kemal’s worldview: ‘scientism’ combining nineteenth 
century German popular materialism, positivism and Darwinism; ‘elitism’ based 
on Gustave Le Bon’s theories of mass psychology; a physical anthropology-based 
idea of ‘nationalism’; and ‘republicanism’ inspired by Rousseau and the 
experience of the French Third Republic. For Mustafa Kemal a clear and absolute 
line divided those nations who were placed above the level of contemporary 
civilisation and those below it. He set the primary task of the guardians of the 
young republic as “elevating the national culture to the level of contemporary 
civilisation”. He argued in a 1923 interview: 
 
There are many countries, but a single civilisation. A nation 
has to participate in this only civilisation in order to 
progress. Turks have followed but one destination over the 
centuries. We have always walked from the East towards the 
West. We want to modernise our country. Our whole effort 
is to establish a modern, and therefore, western government 
in Turkey. What nation desires to enter civilisation but does 
not turn towards the West? (Arsan 1989c: 91) 
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 ‘Entering civilisation’ was a national as well as a cultural matter. A people 
could not be civilised unless they possessed a national consciousness and 
accepted the cultural precepts of the West. To this end, guided by the Kemalist 
dictum “Happy is he who calls himself a Turk”, the guardians of the young 
republic set out to mould the ethnically and culturally diverse Muslim 
communities of the new republic into a homogenous ‘Turkish’ national identity. 
Cultural westernisation was a social and political endeavour. Thus, besides 
adopting a secular civil code styled after the Swiss and a penal code inspired by 
fascist Italy, for example, the young regime also enforced a strict western dress 
code.81 The western Gregorian calendar was adopted in the place of the Islamic 
hijri calendar. Art, literature and music also had to be westernised, with 
traditional forms being expelled from the public sphere. The state radio, for 
example, was only allowed to play western music during the first decade of the 
republic. According to Atay, who was a member of the leader’s closest entourage, 
Mustafa Kemal “loved classical Turkish music, but believed in western music.” 
(2009: 476) 
It was the replacement of the Arabic script with the Latin script that 
arguably had the most profound socio-cultural consequences. “With the alphabet 
revolution we are totally breaking away from the Eastern-Islamic culture,” wrote 
Yaşar Nabi, an early republican-era linguist, in his book The Only Way: Atatürk’s 
Way: 
 
In order to truly establish our national culture inside the 
western civilisation, and move from being an umma to being 
a nation, we had to get rid of the influence of the Arab’s 
religious philosophy […] Now as easy as it is for new 
generations to connect with the West in, say, sciences or fine 
arts, it has become that much harder for them to understand 
and digest the East. (1974: 16) 
 
 Kemalist ideologues inherited a world of dualisms from European 
positivism – West vs. East, science vs. religion, progress vs. backwardness, light 
vs. darkness – and took pains to establish that the Turks in fact belonged to the 
                                                 
81 Launching the ‘hat reform’ in the city Kastamonu, Mustafa Kemal said of traditional and 
religious attires: “Would a civilised person wear these strange clothes and become the laughing 
stock of the world?” (Arsan 1989b: 226). 
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‘civilised’ camp. In a reconstructed national history that depicted the late 
Ottoman ancien régime as corrupt and bankrupt and harked back at an imagined 
past of greatness and purity, ancient Turks were credited for inventing culture 
and writing. Atatürk himself conjured up (and later abandoned) a pseudo-theory 
which claimed that Turks were the founders of language (Aytürk 2004). “East,” 
wrote novelist Peyami Safa in an exemplary piece of Kemalist-era westernism, “is 
not aware of the direction where it is going and whence it is coming.” 
 
Neither science nor criticism therefore exists in the east. So, 
one cannot speak of an intellectual life or even of 
intelligence […] East is religious but not a philosopher. 
When compelled to describe objects, its mental ability stops. 
The metaphysics of India and the Far East are a play of 
words and have no value whatsoever. East always affirms 
things that cannot be proved. Its effect on nature is 
witchcraft. (1999: 88) 
 
 Safa then went on to explain how Turks in fact possessed a ‘European 
mind’. This was a deliberate campaign to restore pride and inspire confidence, 
albeit through falsification, in a people that had experienced continuous defeat 
and humiliation for centuries. It was also the type of mindset that Ayatollah 
Khomeini and nativist scholars like Ali Shariati and Jalal al-e Ahmed identified as 
‘westoxification’ and deplored for perpetuating the very feeling of inferiority and 
humiliation that it sought to cure in the first place. When Khomeini rejected the 
Kemalist and Pahlavi arguments that attaining national sovereignty entailed 
westernisation, he was equally preoccupied with restoring the people’s pride 
and establishing Iranian (and Muslim) sovereignty in the eyes of the world. “As 
long as you do not put aside these imitations,” he argued, “you cannot be a 
human being and independent. If you want to be independent and have them 
recognize you as a nation, you must desist from imitating the West.”82 
The rebuttals of the Khomeinist ideologues reveal a similarly 
dichotomous worldview to that of the Kemalists. Ayatollah Motahhari, one of the 
chief ideologues of the revolution and a disciple of Ayatollah Khomeini, argued 
not only that philosophy had been in decline in the West since the sixth century 
                                                 
82 Message to Faiziyeh School, 8 September 1979. (Khomeini 2002: 29) 
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AD, but that even at its height in ancient Greece, western thought owed “the 
origin of its principal achievements to the East.” (Dabashi 2006: 151). For 
Khomeini, the West’s interpretation of human rights was bigoted, its democracy 
flawed and materialistic, its freedoms delusory. When adopted by Muslims, it led 
to a “colonialistic freedom”, which created slavery. The Iranian leader spoke of 
“deserting the West and finding the East”, of leaving darkness to find light and of 
choosing the divine path (rah-e khoda) over the path of tyranny (rah-e taghut) 
(2002: 27 - 30). 
At the centre of Khomeini’s philosophical and political universe was the 
neo-Platonic idea of creating the ‘perfect man’ and the belief that with proper 
Islamic education human beings could be taken out of their primitive conditions 
and achieve ‘awareness’ (erfan, or gnosis). Khomeini was deeply affected by the 
gnostic strand in Shi’ism and Sufi mysticism, which clashed with the conformism 
and pragmatism of the orthodox Shi’a clergy. He was particularly influenced by 
medieval Sufi mystic Ibn al-Arabi’s ‘metaphysical and cosmological doctrine’ of 
the perfect man (al-insan al-kamal) and the idea of the evolution of human spirit 
put forth by seventeenth century Persian philosopher Mulla Sadra (Khomeini 
1978: 163; Khomeini 2002: 330; Moin 2000: 274 – 276). 
 Hence, like the Kemalists, the Khomeinists embarked on a project to 
‘enlighten the masses’ and create that ideal citizen from above – a common goal 
of revolutions. A Sharia-inspired legal system replaced the European-inspired 
civil code put in place by Reza Shah and strengthened during the White 
Revolution. A dress code conforming to Islamic morality was enforced. Western-
style arts, literature and music – and those who practiced them – were removed 
from public life, if not outright banned. As part of Khomeini’s ‘Cultural 
Revolution’, universities were closed down for three years from 1980, during 
which period ‘westoxicated’ and ‘imperialist-minded’ academics and students 
(including supporters of left wing groups who had backed the revolution) were 
purged and secular curricula rewritten according to an Islamic framework.83 
Khomeini insisted that his project was not against ‘modernity’ but rather 
against the western understanding of it. Its declared aim was to create an 
authentically Islamic alternative to western modernity. “We are not rejecting 
                                                 
83 Speech delivered in Tehran, 26 April 1980 (Khomeini 2002: 295 – 296). 
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modern science,” Khomeini declared, “nor are we saying that science exists in 
two varieties, one Islamic and the other non-Islamic.” (Khomeini 2002: 296). The 
charismatic leader often derided as old-fashioned (kohaniperest) and reactionary 
(ertejai) those clerics who disapproved the use of modern technology in the 
creation of an authentic Islamic modernity. Khomeini emphasised this point in 
his last will and testament: 
  
The claim that Islam is against modern [technical] 
innovations is the same claim made by the deposed 
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi that these people [Islamic 
revolutionaries] want to travel with four-legged animals, 
and this is nothing but an idiotic accusation. For, if by 
manifestations of civilisation it is meant technical 
innovations, new products, new inventions, and advanced 
industrial techniques which aid in the progress of mankind, 
then never has Islam, or any other monotheist religion, 
opposed their adoption. On the contrary, Islam and the Holy 
Quran emphasise science and industry. (Ansari 2006: 66) 
 
Finally, the Khomeinist project went beyond merely re-organising public 
life and ventured deeper into the private sphere of the citizenry than its 
secularising predecessors had dared or managed. The Islamic guardians dictated 
how people were expected to behave and socialise, what they were allowed to 
eat and drink, in the private as well as the public sphere. 
A key feature of these re-education campaigns was the role of the 
republican elites as ‘guardians’ and ‘teachers’ to the masses. The clergy in Iran 
and the military in Turkey, aided by cadres of revolutionary youth high in 
ideological fervour, were expected to both guide the masses along the leader’s 
path and act as a role model to society. “The Turkish people love their military,” 
Atatürk declared, “and consider it the protector of their own ideals.” (Kocatürk 
1999: 335). He described the military as “not only the guardian of the fatherland 
and the regime, but also […] an education and teaching hearth in the widest and 
truest sense.” (Arsan 1989b: 331). One of the most controversial aspects of 
Khomeini’s ideology in terms of Shi’a legal tradition was its politicisation of the 
concept of guardianship (velayat), which in traditional Shi’ism was understood 
as the protection of minors and the needy by the clergy. “With respect to duty 
and position,” wrote Khomeini in Hokumat-e Islami, “there is indeed no 
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difference between the guardian of a nation and the guardian of a minor.”84 
Khomeini thus defined the correct function of the religious leaders and scholars 
as “to guide the people in all matters.” (2002: 341) 
With his immense charisma, Ayatollah Khomeini became the guide of all 
guides, the ultimate guardian of the revolution; a position that became 
institutionalised in the 1979 Constitution under the personal office of vali-ye 
faqih, the Guardian Jurist, or Supreme Leader. In introducing his modernising 
reforms to the new Turkish Republic – wearing for the first time the western 
‘hat’ in public, teaching the public the Latin alphabet, or organising ballroom 
dancing – Atatürk too was guiding ‘his people’ along the revolutionary road by 
example; one of his enduring epithets being Başöğretmen, or ‘Head Teacher’. “We 
need to hold the nation by the hand,” the Turkish leader said, “and finish the 
revolution we have started” (Kocatürk 1999: 97). Thus the paternalistic 
relationship inherent in the charismatic leader–follower bond was engrained in 
the socio-political character of the Turkish and Iranian republics. The 
charismatic leaders assumed the role of benevolent patriarchs – similar to the 
Ottoman and Pahlavi monarchs they came to supplant – whom the people loved 
and embraced.  
While this elitist view of society would seem to clash with the populist 
dictums of the two republics, arguably the two reinforced each other. Much like 
other populisms, Khomeinism “elevated its leader into a demigod towering 
above the people and embodying their historical roots, future destiny, and 
revolutionary martyrs. Despite all the talk about the people, power emanated 
down from the leader, not up from the masses” (Abrahamian 1993: 38). 
Furthermore, by associating ‘the people’ with the charismatic leader through a 
supposedly unbreakable paternalistic bond, the Kemalist and Khomeinist 
guardians not only sought to claim popular legitimacy, but also defined who 
would be included and excluded among the people: opponents of the regime, 
critics of the leader and his reforms, and those who resisted or deviated from the 
leaders’ path could not represent the will of the people. It was the task of the 
guardians to protect ‘the people’ and the regime against the ‘enemies of the 
people’. 
                                                 
84 See “The Necessity for Islamic Government” in Khomeini (1971). 
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State and religion  
 
Like in all revolutionary polities, the state played a central role in the Kemalist 
and Khomeinist projects of socio-political engineering. Both Atatürk and 
Khomeini saw the existence of a powerful and all-encompassing central state 
apparatus, controlled by the charismatic leader and his loyal followers, as vital 
for the manufacture of their ideal citizens and the preservation of Kemalism and 
Khomeinism as hegemonic ideologies. Initially perceived as a means to reach a 
higher ideological end, however, controlling the state soon became an end in 
itself, as the Kemalist and Khomeinist elites faced continuous political opposition 
and resistance from various societal forces and grew increasingly disillusioned 
with their ability to create the utopian society they had envisioned. With 
gradually rising apathy towards revolutionary idealism and an underlying 
feeling of regime insecurity, Kemalists and Khomeinists upheld the state as a 
symbol of authority, power and the conservation of the status quo. State 
veneration, imbued with a leadership cult, became the defining feature of both 
regimes. 
 Mustafa Kemal’s secularisation programme did not alter the basic nature 
of the state’s control over religion, but rather accelerated a process that had 
started with the nineteenth century Ottoman reforms. By closing down and 
banning religious orders, which under the Ottoman Empire had enjoyed a degree 
of autonomy despite being nominally bound to the sultan, the Kemalist regime 
reaffirmed the state’s theoretical authority and strengthened its actual grip on 
power. Meanwhile, the position of the Sunni clergy did not fundamentally 
change: they were by and large subordinate to the Ottoman government; they 
remained by and large subordinate to the Kemalist government. Nor did the 
reforms make the state equidistant to all religions. Founded in 1924, the 
Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) continued to serve the interests and 
promote the teachings of the Hanefi school of Sunni Islam. 
 Far from a separation of religion and politics, in other words, Kemalist 
secularism came to represent tightening state control over religion. Regardless 
of the pressures on it, Sunni Islam remained the unofficial religion of the ‘secular’ 
Turkish state and the building block of Turkish nationalism. This was a 
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confirmation of the state’s patriarchal relationship with society, as well as a 
manifestation of the changing attitudes within the state towards religion, parallel 
to the evolving profile of those in positions of power. Severely pushed out of the 
public sphere in the 1930s and 40s, religion was elevated to a position of greater 
prominence under the Demokrat Parti (DP) government in the 1950s, again after 
the military coup of 1980, and finally, under the ‘Islamist-rooted’ Justice and 
Development Party government (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) after 2002. 
 It was Ayatollah Khomeini who carried out a real and profound revolution 
in the way state–religion relationship has been organised in Iran. Khomeini long 
argued, based on historical precedent and an unorthodox reading of the holy 
texts, that the Shi’a clergy not only could engage in political activities, but that it 
was obliged to do so. “Islam,” he declared, “is a political religion” (Khomeini 
2002: 22). He claimed that the “separation of religion from politics” was 
imperialist propaganda subscribed to only “by the irreligious”: “No one can 
doubt that the Imam designated the fuqaha (experts of Islamic jurisprudence) to 
exercise the functions of both government and judgeship” (Khomeini 1971). By 
uniting the clergy and the secular offices of the government within the 
framework of an Islamic Republic, the Iranian leader effectively put an end to the 
institutional double-headedness that had been a hallmark of Iran’s socio-political 
arrangement for centuries. His accomplishment would have been envied by a 
long list of Iranian rulers whose authority was challenged and compromised by 
the independent-minded ulama, not least the last Pahlavi shah who repeatedly 
expressed his yearning for a more docile clergy, like in Turkey.85 
 Not only did Ayatollah Khomeini unite religion and politics, but ultimately 
he subordinated religion to politics. For Khomeini, urgent matters of government 
in an Islamic state had to come before the daily necessities of religion. As early as 
in 1971, he derided the quietist clergy and their followers for not taking a stance 
against the shah and western imperialism. “Pray as much as you like;” he said, “it 
is your oil they are after – why should they worry about your prayers?” 
(Khomeini 1971). In 1988, Khomeini took a leaf out of the Sunni rulebook of 
pragmatic politics, when he decreed that the government, given that it was an 
                                                 
85 Mohammad Reza Shah: “The Iranian clergy should learn from the Sunnis who publicly 
remember the king at the end of each prayer and pray for him. Of our clergy the less said the 
better.” (Moin, 2000: 84) 
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Islamic one, could suspend any law, including religious laws, on the grounds of 
public interest (maslahat).86 He had introduced a novelty to Iranian politics in 
defiance of Shi’a tradition. 
 For his part, Atatürk was pushing the limits of maslahat when he 
attempted to justify tightening state controls over religion as in the public’s 
interests. He sought clerical backing to legitimise the abolishment of the 
caliphate. His followers often referred to the Turkish leader as “the great 
reformer of Islam”, while those who despised his reforms saw him as the 
religion’s destroyer (Atay 2009: 503). Yet even some of those who were directly 
targeted by these reforms, including the influential Sufi order established by 
Sunni Kurdish cleric Said Nursi, whose followers would play a major role in 
dismantling the Kemalist guardianship in the 2000s, refrained from challenging 
the state on the basis of their own consideration of maslahat (Kara 2011). It was 
Khomeini, and not Mustafa Kemal, who decreed that “government can destroy a 
mosque in order to build a highway”. In their patrimonial approach to society 
and veneration of the state, the Kemalists and the Khomeinists shared more than 
either group would be happy to admit. 
 
Mission, scope and view of the global order 
 
One theme that was central to Ayatollah Khomeini’s socio-political rhetoric and 
dominated the IRI’s interpretation of the international order, especially in its 
revolutionary heyday, is the antagonistic relationship between the oppressors 
(mostakbaran) and the oppressed (mostazafan), which was much less 
pronounced in the Kemalist world of dualisms. Here lies a crucial difference 
between the two hegemonic ideologies. Khomeini’s understanding of revolution 
was totalistic and universalistic: it had to start in the individual’s mind and 
spread beyond national borders, across the globe, and in particular, the Muslim 
world. It was revisionist in its mission and global in scope. “We must strive to 
export our revolution throughout the world,” the Iranian leader said in 1980, 
“and must abandon all ideas of not doing so, for not only does Islam refuse to 
                                                 
86 “The government of Islam is a primary rule having precedence over secondary rulings such as 
praying, fasting and performing the hajj. To preserve Islam the government can suspend any or 
all secondary rulings.” Kayhan-e Hava’e, 19 January 1988, quoted in Abrahamian (2008: 163). 
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recognise any difference between Muslim countries, it is the champion of all 
oppressed people.”87 
 The relationship between the oppressors and the oppressed underpinned 
Ayatollah Khomeini’s dichotomous view of society and the international order 
throughout the 1970s and much of the 1980s. This theme was largely absent 
from the cleric’s earlier political pronouncements until popular nativist 
ideologues like Ali Shariati and Marxist Islamist groups like the MEK established 
the intellectual link between modern anti-imperialist literature and the historical 
Shi’a theme of resistance to tyranny. 88 Increasingly during the 1970s, Khomeini 
described society as made up of a wealthy, powerful, corrupt and degenerated 
capitalist upper class (tabaqeh-e bala) and an oppressed, disenfranchised and 
impoverished labouring lower class (tabaqeh-e payin) (Abrahamian 1993: 47 – 
51). Likewise, the international order was dominated by imperialist 
superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, which exploited the 
resources and corrupted the societies of Muslim countries. This view was 
embodied in the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy mantra ‘neither East nor West’ 
(na sharq na gharb) in the 1980s, during which time the regime expressed 
solidarity with and lent support to liberation movements across the world, from 
Palestine to South Africa, Lebanon to Afghanistan and the Philippines.89 This was 
in line with the Third World revisionism that emerged in opposition to the 
bipolar arrangement of the Cold War and shared parallels with the populist 
language of the leftist, anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist movements of the 
Middle East, Africa and Latin America. 
 The Kemalist revolution, in contrast, was neither revisionist nor global in 
its mission and scope. The Kemalists did not seek to challenge the existing 
international status quo, but rather to conform to the system and acquire a more 
                                                 
87 New Year’s message, 21 March 1980 (Khomeini 2002: 286). We should note, however, that the 
revolution’s ‘Islamic’ nature and the fact that its ideological appeal has been largely limited to 
Shi’a groups have been paradoxical to this ‘universalistic’ message. In the words of Ehteshami 
(1995: 218) “it could be maintained therefore that the revolution is on its own admission 
exclusivist and not universalist.”  
88 It was Shariati who in the 1960s had translated Franz Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth into 
Persian as Mostazafan-e Zamin.  
89 “I declare my support for all movements and groups that are fighting to gain liberation from 
the superpowers of the left and right. I declare my support for the people of Occupied Palestine 
and Lebanon. I vehemently condemn once more the savage occupation of Afghanistan by the 
aggressive plunderers of the East.” New Year’s message, 21 March 1980. (Khomeini 2002: 286) 
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respectable position in its pecking order. Except for one successful claim over the 
province of Alexandretta, which was ceded to Turkey in 1939 by French-
controlled Syria, minor border skirmishes with Pahlavi Iran and a failed claim 
over the British-controlled oil-rich Iraqi towns of Mosul and Kirkuk, the new 
republic did not seek an expansionist foreign policy. Mustafa Kemal had no 
desire to lead a revolution without borders. As early as in 1921, he called on to 
the GNA to abandon any unrealistic dreams of pan-Islamism or pan-Turkism.90 
Furthermore, unlike the ‘revisionist neutrality’ of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 
the 1980s, Turkey’s conformist neutrality, embodied in the Kemalist dictum 
‘peace at home, peace in the world’ (yurtta sulh, cihanda sulh) was decisively 
non-confrontational. In 1931, Atatürk described the basic principle of the young 
republic’s foreign policy as “a peace course that prioritises Turkey’s security and 
is not hostile to any nation.” (Kocatürk 1999: 367) 
 Kemalist Turkey’s pragmatic conformism and Khomeinist Iran’s 
ideological revisionism were most evident in the ways the two regimes sought to 
establish their national sovereignty in the international arena. The republican 
government in Ankara legitimised its independence through international 
organisations and treaties: the legal basis of its political, economic and territorial 
sovereignty was enshrined in the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. In nationalising 
the economy, it chose to purchase foreign-owned enterprises and infrastructure, 
such as railroads, factories and postal services, rather than expropriating them 
without compensation, as was the case with most foreign-owned commercial 
interests in Iran after 1979 (Ahmad 2005: 93). Even the forced population 
exchange with Greece in 1923 was carried out upon a bilateral agreement based 
on the Lausanne Treaty.91 In contrast, the process of establishing the IRI’s 
sovereign status took place in an environment of continuous confrontation and 
sustained emergency, symbolised by the hostage crisis at the US Embassy in 
Tehran and the war with Iraq. During this period Tehran adopted a revisionist 
                                                 
90 “Gentlemen, we drew the animosity, the grudge, the hatred of the entire world upon this 
country and this nation because of the grand and chimerical things we said we would do but 
didn’t. […] Instead of provoking our enemies by chasing notions that we will not and cannot 
realise, let us return to our natural and legitimate boundaries. Let us know our limits. For, 
gentlemen, we are a nation who wants life and independence. And only for this should we 
sacrifice our lives.” Mustafa Kemal’s address to the GNA, 1 December 1921 (Arsan 1989a: 216) 
91 For an in-depth social anthropological account of the population exchange see Clark (2006). 
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position in international platforms, with Khomeini frequently slamming 
intergovernmental organisations and human rights groups as propaganda tools 
of superpowers. 
Rhetoric did not always reflect actual practice: regardless of efforts to 
separate western imperialism from western civilisation, the Turkish political 
elite still harboured deep-rooted suspicions of foreign machinations, which 
surfaced during the Mosul crisis with Britain in 1926 (Safa 1999: 55; Coşar 
2006). The regime readily dropped its pretension to be peace-loving at home 
whenever it faced resistance to its forced assimilation and secularisation 
policies, as reflected in its crushing of the Sunni Kurdish insurrection of Sheikh 
Said in 1926 and the brutal suppression of an Alevi Kurdish rebellion in the 
province of Dersim in 1937 - 38.92 Kurdish rebellions continued to challenge the 
Turkish state’s authority and nationalist ideology in the following decades. 
Iran, on the other hand, did not always back its ideological stance with 
concrete action. Despite its resolutely anti-Israeli rhetoric, for example, Tehran 
did not provide any meaningful support to rejectionist Palestinian factions until 
after it was left out of US-sponsored peace talks in the early 1990s. It even 
continued to purchase arms from the Jewish state during the war with Iraq 
(Parsi 2007: 106 – 109). The ‘imposed war’ itself was a defensive campaign 
against the western-backed Iraqi army, at least until Khomeini rejected a truce 
offered by Saddam Hussein, the original belligerent, in 1982. His eventual 
acceptance of ceasefire in 1988, which he described as “drinking from the 
poisonous chalice” spelled an effective end to the IRI’s policy of ‘exporting the 
revolution.’ (Hinnebusch and Ehteshami 2002: 283 – 295) 
Nonetheless rhetoric did exacerbate or help ease existing geopolitical 
tensions. By the late 1980s, Iran had found itself largely isolated in the wider 
region, with Syria, Libya and South Yemen being its only allies. Efforts by 
successive Iranian politicians in the post-Khomeini era to steer Iranian foreign 
policy towards a more pragmatist and reconciliatory line were met by stern 
                                                 
92 Alevism is a heterodox belief system that is influenced by Sufism, Shiism and Anatolian folk 
traditions. Historically considered as heretics by the orthodox Sunni, Kurdish and Turkish Alevis 
have faced persecution, systematic suppression and marginalisation since Sunni orthodoxy 
became institutionalised within the Ottoman state in the sixteenth century. Despite the Dersim 
massacres, many Alevis went on to support the secular CHP during the republican era. Alevis 
constitute around 15 to 20% of modern Turkey’s population. 
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institutional, ideological and political resistance both at home and abroad. In 
contrast, the policy of non-confrontation adopted by the Kemalist regime led the 
young republic to enjoy stable relations with nearly all of its neighbours during 
the late 1920s and 1930s. Meanwhile, its conformist approach to the 
international order and general western-orientation allowed future Turkish 
governments to justify participating in a hegemonic organisation like NATO or 
seek membership of the European Union, even at the expense of compromising 
on the country’s much cherished international sovereignty. 
 
 
Immortal leader: Succession and institutionalisation of 
charisma 
 
Turkey and Iran were authoritarian regimes during the rule of Atatürk and 
Khomeini, as the two leaders’ immense charisma elevated them to a position 
above politics and beyond the scrutiny of other revolutionary leaders and the 
general public. Both men preferred to stay outside the tedium of daily politics, 
delegating most duties to their trusted lieutenants. Yet as the ultimate authority 
in all matters, they were frequently asked to weigh in on political debates and 
arbitrate disputes between various political factions that began to take shape 
soon after victory was achieved. As a result, they were often forced to make 
decisions on a case-by-case basis, balancing between opposing factions, finding 
practical solutions to impasses and, in the process, constantly reshaping ideology 
to justify the pragmatic steps taken to respond to the everyday issues. The 
leaders, in other words, were overseeing the ‘routinisation’ and 
institutionalisation of their charisma, as extraordinary times gradually gave way 
to the demands of everyday governance (Weber 1968: 1121). 
Atay wrote that Atatürk was fond of “ventilating the parliament” 
occasionally, meaning he would appoint and remove prime ministers and favour 
contesting factions interchangeably (2009: 533). Two political factions emerged 
within the ruling CHP in the late 1920s and 30s: statist officers and bureaucrats 
headed by İsmet İnönü favoured a central role for the state in social and 
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economic life, while the liberal free entrepreneurs preferred a smaller and more 
indirect socio-economic role. Led by Celal Bayar, a banker by profession, the 
latter group was mainly supported by the landlords and the nascent bourgeoisie 
(Ahmad 2005: 90 – 99). Atatürk mediated between the two groups, appointing 
statist İnönü as prime minister in place of a liberal predecessor at the height of 
the Kurdish revolt of Sheikh Said in 1925, then replacing him with Celal Bayar 
towards the end of his life in 1937. As the next chapter will discuss in more 
detail, Khomeini too found himself having to manage the increasingly bitter 
clashes between the Islamic left, whose representatives advocated a statist 
economic policy, land reform and an anti-imperialist foreign policy, and the right 
(conservative) faction, which represented the ulama-bazaar alliance that 
favoured free trade, private property rights, limited state intervention in 
economic life and the imposition of strict religiosity in social life. 
Idolised while alive, the charismatic leaders were immortalised in death. 
Decades after their death, their piercing gaze continued to watch over the 
Turkish and Iranian people through portraits hung on the walls of government 
buildings, classrooms, private offices and grocery stores. Their faces still appear 
on postage stamps, paper bills and the first page of every schoolbook. Largest 
boulevards, biggest stadiums and most prominent airports are named after 
them. Every town centre and schoolyard in Turkey has a bust of Atatürk, while 
the murals of Khomeini adorn the façades of prominent buildings in Iranian 
cities. Their maxims about virtually every subject, including some that are falsely 
attributed to them, are inscribed on public monuments for the inspiration of all. 
Their mausoleums are places of pilgrimage for their dedicated followers.  
Through immortalising the leaders, the Kemalist and Khomeinist regimes 
attempted to ensure their longevity and durability by inheriting and 
institutionalising their founders’ charisma and legitimacy. While the transition of 
power from the leaders to their successors was carried out in a relatively smooth 
fashion – thereby proving wrong expectations that the regimes would implode 
once the leaders were dead – attempts by the successors to imitate their 
predecessors’ stature proved much more difficult and ultimately less fruitful. 
Loyal followers of the leaders before and after victory, İsmet İnönü and Ali 
Khamenei had a keen instinct for power politics and considerable influence over 
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the political machinery of the two regimes; yet neither possessed the popularity 
and the charismatic aura of Atatürk and Khomeini. Nor did they boast similarly 
illustrious military or religious credentials, making them vulnerable to 
challenges from senior military officials or clerics. Finally, unlike Atatürk and 
Khomeini, they were considered human and fallible, and therefore open to 
criticism. 
The death of the charismatic leaders further exacerbated underlying 
factional rivalries within both regimes, with political groups competing to 
dominate key political institutions, while claiming to be the true representatives 
of the leader’s legacy. While the guardians declared the basic tenets of Kemalism 
and Khomeinism as timeless and unchangeable, the Turkish and Iranian societies 
and the world around them continued to change rapidly and profoundly. 
Consequently, different factions interpreted the leaders’ words and deeds 
according to their own evolving worldview, emphasising certain aspects and 
downplaying others to justify their political stance and discredit that of their 
rivals.  
A different Mustafa Kemal and Khomeini exists for almost every faction in 
the colourful political spectrum that emerged in Turkey and Iran after the 
leaders passed away and were placed at the top of the Turkish and Iranian 
republican pantheons. Some remember Mustafa Kemal as the anti-imperialist 
revolutionary, the ally of Lenin, who fought western imperialists in the name of 
the emancipation of subjugated eastern peoples. For others, he is Atatürk, the 
single-minded westerniser and moderniser, the saviour of Turkey from the yoke 
of religion and oriental backwardness. For yet others, he is the gifted statesman 
in the true Ottoman-Turkish tradition, who masterfully prioritised Turkey’s 
territorial integrity and security and its economic development over ideology. 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the leader of the Islamist-rooted political movement that 
disassembled Kemalist guardianship in the 2000s, mostly refers to him as ghazi, 
or holy warrior – the honorific title the GNA bestowed upon Mustafa Kemal to 
embellish his religious legitimacy during the resistance movement – but rarely as 
Atatürk.  
In Iran, competing factions used Khomeinism to represent a different 
promise of the Iranian revolution. For Khamenei and the traditional right faction 
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(also known as the Principalists, or Osulgara) Khomeinism stood for the 
preservation of the velayat-e faqih system. For Rafsanjani and the modern right 
(or pragmatists) it meant economic development; for Khatami and the 
reformists, the rule of law and the strengthening of the republican pillar; and for 
Ahmadinejad and the neo-conservatives (also known as the neo-principalists or 
neo-fundamentalists) social justice. During the mass demonstrations that 
followed the disputed presidential election of 2009, the protestors that chanted 
‘Death to the dictator, death to Khamenei’ also carried portraits of Khomeini. The 
security forces that suppressed them were determined to protect Khomeini’s 
legacy and Khamenei’s leadership from foreign imperialists and their 
‘westoxicated’ agents at home.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter attempted to demonstrate that with their ruthlessly pragmatic 
approach to crisis management and politics, and changing rhetoric before and 
after victory, the leaders themselves contributed to the existence of entrenched 
opposition to their regimes, as well as to the proliferation of contradictory 
interpretations of their message within the regimes. I have also argued that 
despite emerging in very different socio-cultural, historical and geopolitical 
contexts, which contributed to their popular depiction as the ideological nemesis 
of each other, they also shared important similarities that help us explain the 
structural parallels between the secular Turkish Republic and the Islamic 
Republic of Iran. Moving from this basis, the following chapter will outline and 
examine the institutions of the hybrid regimes as they took shape after the 
leaders’ death: the republican institutions that embody the will of the ‘people’ 
and the institutions of Kemalist and Khomeinist guardianship designed to keep 
the people in their appropriate place.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
INSTITUTIONS OF THE HYBRID REGIME 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter will survey the institutional architecture of the Iranian and Turkish 
hybrid regimes and the contradictions, dichotomies and rivalries they embody. 
The demise of the charismatic founding fathers exacerbated the simmering 
rivalry among various institutions and political factions within the Kemalist and 
Khomeinist establishments over claiming the monopoly right to interpret the 
leaders’ message and the reigns to shape the socio-political fate of the two 
countries. With no single individual or institution fully able to inherit the leaders’ 
charisma, underlying ideological contradictions, foundational dichotomies and 
political rivalries came to the fore, as post-Atatürk Turkey and post-Khomeini 
Iran became gradually institutionalised as hybrid regimes. 
The Iranian and Turkish political systems, like their founding fathers, are 
products of different times and geopolitical, socio-economic and ideological 
contexts. Furthermore, the Kemalist regime has been institutionally hybrid since 
the military coup in 1960, two decades before the Khomeinist regime came into 
existence, and thus experienced a longer period of evolution and 
institutionalisation than its Iranian counterpart. These factors help explain the 
various institutional differences between the two regimes. However, the two 
regimes share one basic characteristic that is essential to this research: the 
dualistic structure that pits institutions of guardianship against electoral (or 
republican) institutions and attempts to divide sovereign power ambiguously 
and rather unequally between the aristos and the demos.  
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Institutional duality in the Islamic Republic of Iran  
 
Popular depictions of the Iranian regime, particularly in the West, often involve a 
totalitarian picture where a strictly hierarchical clerical establishment enjoys 
near absolute authority over society and politics. This is a misinformed 
caricature that ignores not only the relatively decentralised and heterogeneous 
nature of the Shi’a clergy in Iran, but also the intricate system of checks and 
balances and institutionalised rivalries that render the Khomeinist regime more 
competitive and pluralistic than presumed. Indeed, scholars more familiar with 
the Iranian political system highlight the complexity of its institutional 
architecture. Lafer and Stein describe it as a “system with myriad overlapping 
centres of power” (Buchta 2000: ix). Buchta points at the “multitude of often 
loosely connected and fiercely competitive centers, both formal and informal” 
(2000: 2). Chehabi notes, “the comparativist has literally no previously 
developed tools for analysing [Iran’s] political system” (2001: 48). 
 Institutional duality is the basic character of the IRI political system on 
which this complex and multifaceted power structure has been built. The system 
embodies at once the elitist and the populist characteristics of legitimate 
authority that have been prominent in Iranian history for centuries. It reflects 
both the tradition of authoritarian rule with ‘divine sanction’ and the struggle for 
democratic government on the basis of constitutionalism and rule of law since 
the late nineteenth century. This duality is visible in the name ‘Islamic Republic’, 
which reflects the inherent tension and ambiguity over the revolution’s meaning 
and purpose: the pursuit of a modern Islamic utopia for society based on the 
interpretation of religious sources by expert clerics (fuqaha) versus the pursuit 
of constitutional government based on popular will. It is also enshrined in the 
Constitution of the IRI, which was put to popular vote in 1979 and amended in 
1989.  
The Constitution is ambiguous as to where ultimate sovereignty lies: 
while Article 2 defines the Islamic republican system as based on the belief in 
“the One God, his exclusive sovereignty and the right to legislate, and the 
necessity of submission to His commands”, Article 6 stipulates that “the affairs of 
the country must be administered on the basis of public opinion expressed by 
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the means of elections”. Article 56 combines these two sources and describes 
popular sovereignty as a product of divine sovereignty, rendering the former 
subordinate to the latter: “Absolute sovereignty over the world and man belongs 
to God, and it is He who has made man master of his own social destiny. No one 
can deprive man of this divine right, nor subordinate it to the vested interests of 
a particular individual or group.”93  
The IRI political system juxtaposes Islamic revolutionary institutions (i.e. 
the institutions of guardianship) next to, or above, republican (i.e. popular 
electoral) institutions. Indeed, for nearly every major institution associated with 
the republican pillar there is a parallel institution of guardianship that is not only 
autonomous from direct and meaningful public oversight, but also exercises 
significant influence over republican offices and defines the limits of popular 
sovereignty. At the executive level, duality is represented by the offices of the 
elected president and vali-ye faqih (Guardian Jurist, also known as Rahbar-e 
Moazam-e Enqelab, or the Great Leader of the Revolution, henceforth the 
Leader). In the legislative, it is the Majles (Parliament) against the Guardian 
Council (Shora-ye Negahban-e Qanun-e Assasi, GC). The dichotomy of pillars is 
also visible at the levels of the judiciary and the security sector: the Special Court 
of the Clergy (Dadgah-e Vizheh-ye Rouhaniyat, SCC) functions separately from the 
regular court system, while the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (Sepah-e 
Pasdaran-e Enqelab-e Islami, IRGC) constitutes a parallel armed force alongside 
the regular military (Artesh).  
Supreme Leader Khamenei defines this double-headed structure as 
“religious democracy” (mardomsalari dini), the essence of which, he argues, 
“requires that the political system of a society should be managed through divine 
guidance and the will of the people. In Islam, the people are only one pillar of 
legitimacy, not the only pillar.”94 We should note the deliberate use of the Persian 
word mardomsalari (‘rule by the people’) instead of the more commonly used 
                                                 
93 An English version of the IRI constitution is available at:  
http://www.iranchamber.com/government/laws/constitution.php 
94 “The Supreme Leader’s View of Democracy and Religious Democracy”, Official website of the 
Supreme Leader of the IRI, 20 March 2011, 
 http://english.khamenei.ir//index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1435&Itemid=12  
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demokrasi, which is a subtle yet revealing effort to promote an authentic notion 
of democracy, instead of one borrowed from the West (Zibakalam 2004). 
The relationship among and within various guardianship and republican 
institutions remains, as already noted, more complex and multi-layered than this 
neatly dichotomous picture would suggest at first glance. In particular, fluid and 
informal factional divisions and personal networks cut across both pillars of the 
regime (Buchta 2000; Rakel 2009). It is mostly at these informal levels that 
political alliances are forged and dissolved, strategies are designed and crucial 
decisions are made. Nonetheless, it is the formal institutional structure of the IRI, 
which favours the guardianship institutions over the republican pillar, that 
determines the playing field on which these factional rivalries play out and policy 
battles are fought. 
 
 
Institutions of guardianship in the IRI 
 
The Office of the Supreme Leader 
 
The concept of velayat-e faqih constitutes the backbone of the guardianship 
structure of the IRI. The existence of a clerical leadership office at the apex of the 
political establishment was enshrined in the Article 5 of the 1979 Constitution, 
which called for a just and pious faqih (expert of Islamic law) “who is fully aware 
of the circumstances of his age; courageous, resourceful, and possessed of 
administrative ability” to assume the responsibilities of the Hidden Imam, until 
the latter’s reappearance. The criteria for being chosen vali-ye faqih changed 
significantly following Khomeini’s death. The 1979 Constitution originally 
stipulated that the Leader had to be a marja (a grand ayatollah) as well as a 
revolutionary leader recognised and supported by the majority of the people. 
This was, in reality, a role tailored for the person of Khomeini. Until 1988 the 
only viable candidate to fulfil the necessary requirements was considered to be 
Ayatollah Montazeri, Khomeini’s disciple and designated successor. Montazeri’s 
public falling out with Khomeini and his subsequent marginalisation 
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necessitated a revision in the selection criteria in order to avoid a succession 
crisis.  
The constitutional referendum in July 1989 saw articles 5 and 109 
amended and removed the requirement for the leader to be a marja, thus 
opening the way for the rise of Khamenei, then a mid-ranking cleric, to the post. 
The changes emphasised political acumen over piety and popularity over 
scholarship. Although a pragmatic move to ensure the smooth transition of 
power, the new arrangement undermined the undisputed political and religious 
authority of vali-ye faqih (Ehteshami 1995: 38 – 9; Moin 2000: 294; Shakibi 
2010: 122). In an attempt to make up for this loss of authority, the 1989 changes 
articulated the powers of the Leader for the first time and also significantly 
expanded them. While Khomeini’s powers were unwritten and based on his 
tremendous charisma, Khamenei’s authority had to be constitutionally protected. 
Article 110 outlined these powers as determining the general policies of the 
Islamic Republic, assuming the supreme command of the armed forces, 
approving the outcome of elections, dismissing the president, appointing and 
dismissing the head of the judiciary, the clerical members of the Guardian 
Council, the head of the radio and television network, and the senior 
commanders of the security sector. 
The constitutional changes confirmed the dominant position of the Leader 
within the IRI political structure, moving it further away from a supra-political 
advisory body towards an instrument of direct rule, or velayat-e motlaq-e faqih 
(absolute guardianship of the jurisprudent). Some scholars point to Khomeini’s 
1988 fatwa, giving precedence to decrees issued by the Leader over those of 
other marjas, as the beginning of this move towards absolute guardianship 
(Behrooz 1996). In any case, under Khamenei, the traditional right faction and 
the Leader’s supporters within the security establishment emerged as foremost 
supporters of velayat-e motlaq-e faqih. In 1994, the clerical establishment 
promoted Khamenei to the rank of ayatollah, even though he lacked the 
necessary scholarly credentials. 
Despite the legalisation and expansion of the Leader’s powers, Khamenei 
was aware that his practical authority was far from absolute and that it was 
highly dependent on the support of guardianship institutions. Thus, immediately 
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upon his assent, he set out to consolidate his position through a series of tactical 
moves and by building a network of loyalists inside both pillars of the regime 
(Keddie 2006: 263; Tezcür 2012: 94). Not satisfied with his constitutional 
powers, he worked to enhance his oversight of the political establishment, the 
security sector and the country’s socio-economic life through his expanding 
army of representatives, control over Friday prayer leaders and the Supreme 
Court of the Clergy as well as his patronage over the powerful bonyads 
(foundations).  
Dubbed the ‘clerical commissars’, the Leader’s personal representatives 
(nemayandegan-e rahbar) are strategically placed in every important state 
institution, including government ministries run by elected officials, and serve as 
the Leader’s eyes and hands in these institutions (Shakibi 2010; Buchta 2000: 
47). Within the military, the representatives have an office of their own, known 
as the Ideological and Political Bureau. In universities, they supervise curricula 
and monitor student activities to ensure their adherence to the moral, religious 
and ideological guidelines prescribed by the Office of the Leader (Daftar-e 
Maqam-e Moazam-e Rahbari). While this office consisted of several dozen 
confidants under Khomeini, under Khamenei it became a vast bureaucratic body 
with thousands of representatives. 
The appointment of Friday prayer leaders is another tool at the Leader’s 
disposal. In the IRI, Friday sermons serve as political propaganda platforms used 
by prayer leaders to expound the virtues of the velayat-e faqih system and garner 
support for government policies. Although Majles provides the budget for Friday 
prayers, the elected house has no effective control over the contents of the 
sermons. The Leader appoints prayer leaders for every city and these leaders 
often wield greater authority than local representatives of the state, such as 
governors or mayors (Shakibi: 122). Khamenei himself serves as the main prayer 
leader for Tehran and uses this forum to publicise his position on foreign and 
domestic issues or to arbitrate inter-factional disputes. However, Khamenei has 
not monopolised this institution: leading clerical figures from the revolutionary 
era, such as Hashemi Rafsanjani and Abdul-Karim Mousavi Ardebili, also served 
as prayer leaders in the capital and within this strategic role, they were able to 
assert their positions in moments of internal division. 
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The Leader uses the Supreme Court of the Clergy to deal with clerical 
dissent. The SCC functions as a parallel court alongside the judiciary. Founded in 
the early days of the revolution in an effort to unite the clerical establishment 
under Khomeini, it remains an extra-constitutional institution with no civilian 
oversight or accountability. Although its formal function was to investigate acts 
of criminality by the clergy, Khamenei expanded the SCC’s legal and political 
remit in the 1990s. Running an independent budget and its own security and 
prison system, and functioning behind closed doors, the court has been a key 
mechanism to suppress clerical opposition to the Leader (Künkler 2012).  
Finally, the Leader’s long arm extends into the politico-economic sphere 
through his control of the powerful foundations, or bonyads. Based on the 
tradition of clerically run religious charities, the bonyads have become the 
symbol of the politicisation of Islam and the unification of the religious 
establishment with the state. As the Shi’a clergy moved from being the guardians 
of the socially dispossessed to become the guardians of the political regime, their 
charities also experienced a parallel transformation (Saeidi: 479 – 88). Over time, 
these religious foundations evolved into an extensive patronage network 
designed to ensure the loyalty of the economic elite as well as the working class 
to the regime by acting as privileged business conglomerates on the one hand 
and as mass charities on the other.  Having taken over the confiscated assets of 
Iran’s leading Pahlavi-era industrialists, enjoying tax-exempt status and 
receiving state subsidies and foreign exchange at favourable rates, the bonyads 
operate as diversified holding companies, employ hundreds of thousands of 
people and manage hundreds of subsidiaries in every strategic sector of the 
economy (Kamrava and Hassan-Yari 2004). Answerable only to the Leader, who 
appoints their heads, and subject to no meaningful parliamentary oversight, the 
bonyads function as alternative power centres to governmental institutions, 
participating in domestic policy making by influencing and at times directly 
confronting elected officials. 
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The Guardian Council and the Expediency Council 
 
The Guardian Council is the upper house of the legislative branch, which serves 
primarily as a check on the elected lower house. Of its twelve members, six are 
clerics appointed directly by the Leader while the non-clerical members are 
appointed by the Majles upon the recommendation of the head of the judiciary, 
who is also appointed by the Leader. With its influence over policy making and 
elections, the GC is the “first line of defence” of the institutions of regime 
guardianship against the republican institutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran 
(Shakibi 2010: 123). According to the 1989 Constitution, the Guardian Council 
reviews legislature for its conformity to the principles and commandments (usul 
and ahkam) of religion and the constitution (Article 72). It also supervises “the 
elections of the Assembly of Experts for Leadership, the President of the 
Republic, the Islamic Consultative Assembly, and the direct recourse to popular 
opinion and referenda” (Article 99). Articles 4 and 98 provide further 
constitutional powers and legitimacy to the GC: Article 4 calls for all laws and 
regulations to be based on “Islamic criteria”, and designates “the fuqaha of the 
Guardian Council” as “judges in this matter”. Article 98 stipulates, “The authority 
of the interpretation of the Constitution is vested with the Guardian Council, 
which is to be done with the consent of three-fourths of its members”.  
 The GC’s supervisory role over the republican pillar was expanded under 
both Khomeini and, especially, Khamenei. Under Khomeini, the criteria for 
running for office in IRI were tightened so as to require an active religious and 
political commitment to velayat-e faqih, rather than just a lack of expressed 
opposition to it. Under Khamenei, in 1991, the GC’s ‘supervisory role’ over the 
elections was redefined in a manner that gave the GC the power to vet and 
qualify all candidates running for election to the Majles, the presidency and the 
Assembly of Experts. The 1991 revision was a crucial blow to the independence 
of electoral institutions. The ability to control and manipulate elections and block 
legislation gave the conservatives, who dominated the GC after Khomeini’s death, 
a clear advantage in dealing with more popular factions that controlled the 
presidency or the Majles. Between 1980 and 1988, for example, the GC vetoed 
more than a third of the bills proposed by the lower house (Shakibi 2010: 123). It 
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disqualified more than a third and nearly half of the candidates running for 
Majles elections in 1992 and 1996 respectively, mostly from the Islamist left 
faction (Arjomand 2009: 63). In 2000, only 8% of the candidates were barred 
from running for election, leading to a resounding victory for Khatami’s reform 
movement. In contrast in 2004, more than half of the reformist candidates were 
banned and the traditionalists regained control of the Majles. Finally, the GC has 
also routinely disqualified hundreds of applicants aspiring to run for presidency, 
allowing no more than a handful of individuals who represent the tolerated 
political factions within the IRI establishment. 
Frequent clashes between the Guardian Council and the Majles during the 
1980s led Ayatollah Khomeini to establish a third legislative organ in 1988: the 
Expediency Discernment Council of the Order (Majma'-e Tashkhis-e Maslahat-e 
Nezam, or Expediency Council, EC). A manifestation of the institutionalisation of 
the maslahat principle, the Expediency Council was tasked with settling disputes 
between the lower and upper chambers. Its authority was formally recognised 
with the 1989 amendments to the constitution. Article 110/1 defined it as an 
advisory body for the Leader in determining “the general policies of the Islamic 
Republic”. Article 112 tasked the Leader with appointing the permanent and 
temporary members of the EC. 
Khamenei added a further 27 members out of loyalists to the Council, 
which was initially composed of 13 members and included the president, head of 
the judiciary, the speaker of the parliament and the clerical members of the GC. 
In an attempt to stem the reformist surge within the republican institutions, 
Khamenei departed from the previous practice of appointing sitting presidents 
as chairman of the EC and re-appointed former president Rafsanjani in 1998, 
instead of Khatami. 
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The Assembly of Experts 
 
The Assembly of Experts (Majles-e Khobregan) embodies elements of both the 
Islamic and the republican character of the IRI hybrid regime. It was established 
in 1982 to uphold the popular legitimacy of velayat-e faqih and to prevent it from 
evolving into personal dictatorship. The Assembly has been tasked with 
monitoring the activities of the Leader, dismissing him should he be deemed 
incapable of fulfilling his constitutional duties, acting in his place during the 
period of transition and appointing a new leader upon the death or dismissal of 
the previous one (Articles 107 and 111). It was this body that had designated 
Ayatollah Montazeri as Khomeini’s successor in 1983, and then following his 
downfall, replaced him with Khamenei in 1989.  
The Assembly is the sole body that functions as a theoretical democratic 
check on the guardians. All of its 86 members, who have to be qualified fuqaha, 
are elected for eight-year terms through popular vote. However, since the GC 
filters those clerics that may pose a credible threat to the Leader, the Assembly’s 
actual impact on politics has been negligible. To date, it has not publicly 
challenged the Leader or questioned his authority. Nonetheless, the Assembly 
remains a critical institution for the future course of the IRI, as it is this body that 
will determine Khamenei’s successor. For this reason, it has long been regarded 
as a prized institution by the major factions, which have competed to establish 
and maintain their influence in it. 
 
 
The Security Sector: The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps and the Basij 
 
The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC or Pasdaran) was established as a 
popular militia shortly after the initial triumph of the Iranian revolution in 1979, 
in an effort to watch over the distrusted elements of the shah’s military, defend 
Khomeini’s nascent regime against counterrevolution and suppress opposition 
to the charismatic leader. It has evolved over time to become one of the key 
institutions of the guardianship pillar, playing an increasingly assertive role in 
the Iranian economy and politics. Ayatollah Montazeri described the IRGC as “the 
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popular organ […] which would protect [the revolution] and its purity and act as 
the powerful arm of the Islamic revolution and the protector of the oppressed 
the world over.”95 Khomeini declared in 1987 that “the Guards were born of the 
revolution, grew with the revolution and will stay with it.”96  
The IRGC’s foray into the politico-economic realm occurred in three 
phases: the loosely organised militia became a key component of the security 
sector during the war with Iraq. Their sacrifice in the ‘sacred defence’ against 
Iraq – through mobilising the masses in paramilitary units known as the Basij 
that served as human shields against Saddam Hussein’s well-equipped army – 
provided the IRGC with institutional legitimacy and guardianship status. The 
‘sacred defence’ provided the Islamic revolution with its ultimate heroes. The 
army of selfless believers who, in line with the Shi’a tradition of martyrdom, 
willingly gave their lives to defend the faith, the country and the revolution 
against the mechanical onslaught of a foreign invader backed by western 
imperialism found a place at the heart of the IRI’s founding mythology (Farhi 
2004).  
After the war, the political leadership encouraged the Guards to assume a 
leading role in reconstruction efforts. During this period, Khatam al-Anbiya, the 
engineering arm of the IRGC, grew into one of Iran’s largest contractors in 
industrial and development projects, with subsidiaries in construction, mining, 
transport, manufacturing and energy sectors, receiving preferential treatment 
from the government (Wehrey: 59 – 64).  At the same time, the Basij militia 
transformed from being a wartime mobilisation unit into a major socio-economic 
entity with extensive ties to the bazaar and presence in the construction, 
banking, real estate and telecommunication sectors. Providing employment and 
social benefits to its members and their families, the Basij has come to command 
an extensive popular base concentrated mainly in the rural provinces and urban 
working class neighbourhoods (Golkar: 625 – 648). Finally, from the late 1990s 
onwards, the IRGC started playing a growing role in Iran’s factional politics. Not 
only did former guardsmen such as Mohsen Rezaei, Ali Larijani and Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad emerge as prominent political figures, but the institution itself 
                                                 
95 Kayhan, 27 April 1982, quoted in Omid, p. 106.  
96 Kayhan, 17 December 1987; quoted in Ibid, p. 110. 
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became a direct contributor to the ideological clashes between rival factions 
despite claims of neutrality. Ahmadinejad’s election as the mayor of Tehran in 
2003 and the president of the IRI in 2005 confirmed the Guards’ entry into their 
third – political – phase. 
Despite the constitutional reference to the “brotherly cooperation and 
harmony” between the IRGC and the regular military (Artesh), their relationship 
has been mired with tension. This is due to the IRGC’s ambiguously defined duty 
of “guarding the revolution and its achievements” (Article 150) and its 
emergence as a parallel military force engaged in domestic and foreign 
operations. Although smaller in size and more limited in function than those of 
the regular military, the IRGC possesses its own naval and air forces. Its elite unit, 
the Qods Force, specialises in covert overseas operations. The Guards’ 
responsibilities also clash with those of the civilian ministries. Their intelligence 
arm functions independently from the Ministry of Intelligence and Security and 
operates its own prisons. The law enforcement duties carried out by the Basij, 
especially in dealing with protests and demonstrations, overlap with those of the 
police force, which is controlled by the Ministry of the Interior (Wehrey: 8 – 13). 
With these intentional overlaps and rivalries, the IRGC effectively acts as a 
check on the elected government and the Artesh, which the guardians consider 
ideologically less fervent and therefore less reliable. Furthermore, this complex 
architecture becomes simpler at the very top. As the commander-in-chief, the 
Leader appoints senior commanders of both the Artesh and the IRGC, and has the 
final word in the Supreme National Security Council (Shora-ye Ali-ye Amniat-e 
Melli, SNSC), composed of the highest-ranking civilian, clerical and military 
officials. Unlike the Majles, which has no oversight capability over the IRGC, the 
Leader monitors and controls the entire security sector through his 
representatives. 
Despite this institutional supremacy, the extent of the Leader’s practical 
authority over the IRGC has fluctuated based on the changing balance of powers 
in factional politics of the IRI. By the same token, however, it is not true that the 
IRGC has become the dominant guardianship institution within the regime; a 
praetorian guard that has supplanted the clerical institution behind closed 
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doors.97 Rather, both the Leader and the IRGC have come to rely on each other 
for political and institutional support (Safshekan and Sabet 2010; Hen-Tov and 
Gonzalez 2011). It is important to emphasise that the IRGC is not a monolithic 
institution representing a single political agenda (Harris 2013). Wider socio-
economic and factional divisions have influenced the Guards; a point that will 
come through in more detail in the next chapter. While the political role that the 
IRGC might play after Khamenei is open to speculation, as long as the Leader is 
alive and controls the Guards’ senior cadre, the IRGC’s independence should not 
be overstated. 
 
 
Republican institutions of the IRI 
 
The Presidency 
 
The President of the IRI, elected every four years by popular vote amongst 
candidates approved by the Guardian Council, represents the second highest 
office in the Islamic Republic, after that of the Leader. Whereas the Leader is 
considered the representative of God in the IRI, the President is the 
representative of the People. According to Article 113 of the constitution, the 
president is responsible “for implementing the Constitution and acting as the 
head of the executive, except in matters directly concerned with the Leadership.” 
The president’s powers include appointing and dismissing ministers, controlling 
the Planning and Budget Organisation (Sazman-e Barname va Budje), appointing 
the head of the Central Bank, and chairing the Supreme National Security 
Council. On the other hand, he has limited authority over defence, security and 
foreign policy issues, which fall within the exclusive domain of the Leader. 
Under Khomeini, the executive office was split between the president and 
the prime minister. The presidency, held by Khamenei after Bani Sadr’s 
impeachment until 1989, was a more ceremonial office. The main executive 
                                                 
97 Voiced most prominently by Vali Nasr in the mid-2000s, this view gained traction in the West 
after the 2009 presidential election. Most notably, then US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton 
argued the Guards were “supplanting the government of Iran”. See Nasr and Gheissari (2004); 
“Clinton: Iran moving toward military dictatorship”, Reuters, 15 February 2010. 
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office was the prime ministry, held by Mir Hossein Mousavi during the same 
period. The charismatic leader personally mediated the frequent clashes 
between the two men, who represented the interests of the conservative (right) 
and Islamic left factions. After Khomeini, Khamenei and Rafsanjani entered into 
an alliance to marginalise the Islamic left. They pushed through the 
constitutional referendum of 1989, which also combined the powers of the two 
executive bodies in a single presidency. Rafsanjani orchestrated Khamenei’s 
selection as Leader, and Khamenei supported Rafsanjani’s virtually uncontested 
bid for the presidency.  
Despite systematic encroachments by the guardians of the powers of 
elected officials, Iranian presidents since 1989 have been more than mere 
figureheads. As charismatic individuals with popular support, presidents of the 
post-Khomeini era have wielded varying degrees of influence over the political 
and economic trajectory of the IRI. Each presidency from Rafsanjani to Rouhani 
came to represent the popular expression of discontent with the regime’s failure 
to deliver on the Iranian revolution’s numerous promises. Consequently, the 
nature of the relationship between the head of the Islamic pillar and the head of 
the republican pillar has by and large determined the stability of the political 
establishment in post-Khomeini Iran. Prolonged periods of discord between the 
two men jeopardised this stability and threatened to alter the regime’s core 
hybrid structure. Not one to shy away from confrontation, Khamenei’s response 
to the reformist and neo-conservative challenges to the institutional domination 
of the traditionalist guardians have been crucial in shaping the institutional 
architecture of the hybrid regime. I will discuss these critical episodes of discord 
and negotiation in detail in Chapters 5 and 7. 
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The Islamic Consultative Assembly 
 
The Islamic Consultative Assembly, or the Majles, is the lower house of the 
legislative and the main institution that embodies the popular will of the 
electorate to the extent this is permitted by the guardians. It also symbolises the 
pursuit of democratic and constitutional government in Iran that dates back to 
the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-6. The Majles drafts legislation (Article 
71), approves international treaties, protocols, contracts and agreements (Article 
77), authorises imposition of emergency laws (Article 79), approves domestic 
and foreign loans (Article 80), and has the power to question the president and 
ministers and remove them from office. Its 290 members (increased from 272 in 
2000) are elected every four years.  
In the words of Ayatollah Khomeini, the Majles is “the sole centre which 
all must obey. It is the starting point for everything that happens in the state. 
Submission to the Majles means submission to Islam and stands above all other 
institutions” (Shakibi 2010: 127). Although it never quite enjoyed such supreme 
authority in the hybrid architecture of the IRI, during his lifetime Khomeini often 
used his charismatic authority in support of the Majles, then controlled by the 
Islamic left faction, against the conservative dominated GC. In 1981, in the midst 
of a row between the two bodies over land reform, Khomeini designated the 
Majles as the competent institution to decide on issues of necessity (zarurat), 
whereby it could ignore the objections of the GC (Khadija and Frings-Hessami 
2001: 145). But given the ambiguous and contested meaning of the religiously-
rooted concept of zarurat, this intervention led to further clashes between the 
two bodies. In 1984, Khomeini ordered that if a bill had two-thirds majority, the 
Majles could override the GC’s veto in the interest of expediency (maslahat). 
Between 1984 and 1988, this decree emboldened the Majles considerably vis-à-
vis the GC. However, the arrangement was overshadowed by another decree by 
the charismatic leader, who, in his continued effort to stem factional and 
institutional disagreements, established the Expediency Council in 1988. 
Following Khomeini’s death, conservatives who controlled the 
guardianship institutions set out to constrain the authority of the leftist 
dominated Majles. The 1989 amendments, which expanded the Leader’s powers 
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and formally institutionalised the EC, were followed by the 1991 revision to the 
GC’s supervisory role over elections. Yet despite these limitations, the Majles 
elections in the IRI - like the presidential ones – often included an element of 
unpredictability and competition and fielded genuine choice, admittedly within 
tolerated and pre-determined limits. They have also featured lively debates 
where rival interpretations of Khomeini’s legacy and visions for the future of the 
regime and the country clashed in public. 
In other words, despite taking place in the long shadow of the 
guardianship institutions, elections have been a crucial legitimising force for the 
IRI hybrid regime. For years, they were the preferred method for “managing 
popular participation, socializing the newer generations into the Islamic 
Republic, and regulating, and ultimately, negotiating intraelite competition” 
(Farhi 2012: 3). The guardians consistently present voter turnout in the Majles 
and presidential elections as evidence of continued popular support for the 
regime. And at least until the presidential election of 2009, they sought to strike 
a delicate balance between accommodating the will of the electorate without 
jeopardising their positions of power and institutional supremacy or 
compromising from the dominant ideological strand within the guardian state. 
When that balance became impossible to maintain, or the popular tendency 
appeared to challenge the socio-political status quo, the guardians have typically 
chosen to constrain the electoral space. 
 
 
Factional politics in the IRI 
 
Despite the repeated emphasis on the popular legitimacy of the regime, 
government has been by and large an elite occupation in Khomeinist Iran. Three 
decades after the revolution, the core cadre of the leadership elite in the IRI still 
consisted of an exclusive group of individuals that were united in their shared 
experiences of opposition to the Pahlavi regime and the war with Iraq, as well as 
a declared loyalty to the person and teachings of Ayatollah Khomeini. But in their 
interpretations of the revolution’s goals and the charismatic leader’s legacy, 
these people were sharply divided. As I noted in Chapter 3, some of these 
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divisions resulted from the ambiguities and contradictions in Khomeini’s words 
and deeds during his ten years in charge of a modern state apparatus much more 
complex than the simple planning body he had envisioned in Hokumat-e Islami. 
According to Moslem:  
 
Although Khomeini’s concept of the Islamic government 
emphasised the Islamicity of the post-revolutionary regime, 
he did not provide specific guidelines about what this 
Islamicity meant in terms of governing principles of 
particular policies in different spheres of government. 
Moreover, by repeatedly oscillating and changing his views 
on major issues during the ten years of his leadership, 
Khomeini offered differing and at times conflicting readings 
on what constituted a ‘true’ Islamic republic. (2002: 4) 
 
These contradictions were theoretical as well as practical in nature. With 
regards to religious scholarship, the charismatic leader attempted to 
accommodate and use interchangeably two opposing interpretations of Islamic 
jurisprudence: traditional vs. dynamic (fiqh-e sonnati vs. fiqh-e pooya).98 
Although Khomeini defended traditional jurisprudence, he also called for 
religious scholars to maintain a flexible attitude in interpreting Islamic law.99 
Indeed, his revolutionary programme and his frequent resort to ijtihad 
(independent reasoning) and maslahat during his final years were exercises in 
dynamic jurisprudence. Factional divisions in Iran reflect Khomeini’s oscillations 
in policy and jurisprudence as well as the conflicting goals of the Iranian 
revolution. Typically, the conservative clerics that dominate the Society of the 
Militant Clergy (Jame’e-ye Rouhaniyat-e Mobarez, JRM), the umbrella 
organisation founded in 1977 in opposition to the Pahlavi regime, have 
supported traditional jurisprudence, while the Association of Combatant Clerics 
                                                 
98 Proponents of traditional fiqh hold that primary sources of Islam – Quran and the Sunnah (the 
prophet’s teachings) – are sufficient to govern an Islamic society and that religious judges should 
avoid resorting to secondary sources (ahkam-e sanaviyeh) as much as possible in everyday 
governance. In contrast, supporters of dynamic fiqh argue that although primary sources 
constitute the necessary base for Islamic government, changing times and needs of modern 
society necessitate greater dependence on secondary sources, namely ijma (consensus), qiyas 
(analogy) and especially ijtihad (independent reasoning). 
99 “I believe in the traditional jurisprudence […] and do not consider its violation to be 
permissible. This is the only correct way of ijtihad. But it does not mean that there is no room for 
further development in the Islamic Jurisprudence. In ijtihad, time and place occupy a 
fundamental position.” (Khomeini 2006: 189) 
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(Majma'-e Rowhaniyun-e Mobarez, MRM), composed of leftists that split from the 
JRM in 1988, advocate dynamic jurisprudence. 
The early political factions in the IRI should not be understood as mass-
based political parties. At least until the rise of the reform movement in the late 
1990s, these were informal coalitions that lacked explicitly stated programmes 
and hierarchical organisational structures, and relied extensively on the personal 
charisma and intra-elite networks of the leading figures (Moslem 2002: 91). 
Frequent clashes between the right (conservative) and the Islamic left factions 
dominated politics during the 1980s and eventually led Ayatollah Khomeini to 
abolish the official party of the regime, the Islamic Republican Party in 1987. The 
disbanding of the IRP was an important decision that further highlighted factions 
as the basic vehicle of political activity in the IRI, cutting across both pillars of the 
regime.  
A consequence of this arrangement was the relatively weak 
organisational link between the regime elite and the socio-political 
constituencies they sought to represent in the absence of institutionalised party 
mechanisms (Khosrokhavar 2000: 2 – 29; Tuğal 2009: 256). Until the late 1990s, 
mass participation in politics took place mainly around the mosques and 
religious organisations. During the 1990s, the ideologues of the reform 
movement, which emerged from the marginalised Islamic left without its 
uncompromising anti-imperialism and economic statism, realised the need (and 
the opportunity) for the institutionalisation of a formal party mechanism that 
would resist the traditionalist right’s emasculation of the republican pillar by 
strengthening civil society (jame’e-ye madani) and energise a fast growing young 
generation who were not necessarily drawn to the mosque and lacked political 
representation (Razavi 2010). 
Organised mass mobilisation brought the reformists victories in two 
consecutive presidential elections and one Majles election at the turn of the 
millennium. This also led other factions to put greater emphasis on mass 
participation as well. Ultimately, however, the reformist leadership did not 
succeed in institutionalising party politics within the movement, let alone in the 
IRI. Shakibi (2010: 321) notes that while President Khatami’s senior advisor 
Saeed Hajjarian insisted on building a party mechanism, Khatami relied too 
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much on civil society, the power of rhetoric and public opinion, all of which could 
be suppressed, as they eventually were. The fluctuating dynamics between major 
factions and the Leader, and their impact on the institutional architecture of the 
hybrid regime, will be the focus of the next chapter on Iran. Let me conclude by 
saying that the charisma and personality of leading factional figures and 
interpersonal relations between them, including kinship and marriage ties, have 
continued to be a defining feature of politics in the IRI.100 
 
 
Institutionalisation of the hybrid regime in Turkey 
 
Electoral politics and transition to multiparty democracy 
 
The hybrid regime in Turkey was institutionalised over a longer time span and 
less overtly than in the Islamic Republic of Iran. The death of the charismatic 
leader in 1938 did not immediately alter the basic institutional character of the 
Turkish Republic. Until 1950, the year of the first competitive multiparty general 
election in Turkey, the Republican People’s Party continued to rule the country 
without formal opposition. Under the presidency of İsmet İnönü, the statist 
military-bureaucratic wing of the leadership elite came to dominate the ruling 
CHP, while the CHP dominated socio-political life in the young republic. Inspired 
by the totalitarian currents of interwar Europe, Kemalist ideologues went on to 
pursue state-driven industrialisation schemes on the one hand and imposed the 
socio-cultural programme of secularisation/Turkification that had begun under 
Atatürk on the other. It was the Allied victory in the Second World War and the 
subsequent resurgence of the historically rooted Turkish fear of Russian 
expansionism that convinced İnönü, who had proven himself as a skilful 
pragmatist by keeping Turkey out of the war, to start navigating Turkey’s 
strategic alignment with the emerging western axis. 
                                                 
100 A vivid example is the case of Mohsen Rafiqdoost, who once served as the head of the 
powerful Mostazafan bonyad. Rafiqdoost was Khomeini’s driver and is also related by marriage 
to Rafsanjani. Mousavi and his long time rival, Khamenei, are distant cousins. The tradition has 
continued with the new generation of political elites as well: Ahmadinejad’s son is married to the 
daughter of his advisor, close confidant and former vice-president, Rahim Mashaei. See 
Ehteshami (1995: 48) and Theler (2010: 37 – 74).  
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 While İnönü and the proponents of alignment with the West sought to 
legitimise this move as compliant with Atatürk’s ideal of participating in 
‘contemporary civilisation’, its critics within the military-bureaucratic 
establishment saw it as a compromise on the country’s hard won national 
sovereignty. Indeed, the strategic rapprochement also entailed ideological re-
alignment and politico-economic commitments. In exchange for military aid, 
economic assistance and a security guarantee from the US against Soviet 
expansionism, as part of newly formulated Truman Doctrine, the İnönü 
government put in place a series of economic and political liberalisation reforms, 
which included the transition to a free market economy and a multiparty 
political system. The first truly competitive multiparty election brought back to 
power the alliance of landowners and entrepreneurs, which had been 
outmuscled by the military-bureaucratic alliance following the charismatic 
leader’s death.  
Founded by prominent former CHP deputies Celal Bayar, Adnan 
Menderes, Fuat Köprülü and Refik Koraltan, the Demokrat Parti promised to 
relax the state’s social policies and to pursue a liberal economic agenda. This 
appealed to large portions of the electorate who had grown weary under decades 
of CHP rule and felt repressed and alienated by its forced secularisation and 
nationalist assimilation programme. Securing 53% the vote in 1950, the DP 
became the first popularly elected party in the history of the Turkish Republic 
and the first opposition party to take over the government from an incumbent 
through elections. It was also to become the first in a series of centre-right 
parties that would achieve overwhelming electoral success in Turkish politics in 
the decades to come: following on the political tradition of the DP, the Justice 
Party (Adalet Partisi, AP) of Süleyman Demirel in the late 1960s, the Motherland 
Party (Anavatan Partisi, ANAP) of Turgut Özal in the 1980s, and the AKP of Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan in the 2000s all succeeded in forming single-party governments 
carrying significant majorities. During its one decade in power spanning three 
general election victories, the DP government led by Prime Minister Adnan 
Menderes, anchored Turkey firmly in the western geopolitical camp, where it 
would remain during and after the Cold War. Turkey committed troops to the 
Korean War on the US side in 1950 and became full member of NATO in 1952. At 
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home, the DP carried out a robust capitalist development programme – 
benefiting both from the industrial foundations laid previously by the CHP and 
the financial and military assistance provided by the US Marshall Fund – and also 
relaxed restrictions on the expression of religious identity in public sphere 
(Ahmad 2005: 104 – 115). 
Equally important as the Demokrat Parti’s victory in 1950 was İnönü’s 
recognition of the outcome of the poll and his peaceful handover of power to his 
rivals, which set three important precedents for Turkish politics: in accepting 
defeat and consequently stepping down from the presidency, İnönü publicly 
acknowledged that neither he – the most powerful figure within the Kemalist 
establishment, whom GNA had declared as the ‘National Chief’ of Turkey in 1938 
– nor the office of the president, had inherited the full charisma of Atatürk. From 
this point on, no single individual, including presidents and military chiefs, could 
claim a supra-political position as that of the charismatic leader.101 But, in 
contrast to the Iranian case, İnönü’s move seems appropriate in the wider 
context of the gradual bureaucratisation of personal authority in the 
Ottoman/Turkish state dating, arguably, as far back as the seventeenth century. 
As an officer and statesman, İnönü was a product of this long-term transition.  
Secondly, with the introduction of a multiparty system within a 
parliamentary framework, centralised and hierarchically structured political 
parties became the main vehicle of Turkish politics. Unlike the Iranian factions, 
these parties were “bureaucratic mass organisations” characterised by patron-
client networks (Tuğal 2009: 257; Tezcür 2010: 108). In this arrangement, party 
mechanisms, which are formally linked to their socio-political constituencies, 
produce their own leaders from among these constituencies. Although powerful 
patriarchal figures loom large in Turkish politics and dominate party affairs, with 
the exception of a select few, these figures tend to be bound to the party 
mechanism, rather than the party mechanisms to them.102 
                                                 
101 For two Turkish eye-witness accounts of this era, see Aydemir (1975) and Arcayürek (1983).  
102 Patriarchal party leaders like Deniz Baykal of the CHP (1992 – 2010) or Devlet Bahçeli of the 
Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetci Hareket Partisi, MHP) (1997 to present) are two recent cases 
in point. Popular and charismatic figures like Turgut Özal and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who 
personalised politics in Turkey, go against this rule. 
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Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the smooth transition of power 
between two political parties created democratic path dependence. Ever since 
this first competitive vote, Turkish people have frequently expressed their will at 
the ballot box, rewarding or punishing political parties in largely free and fair 
elections. Election results have been generally trusted by the public and 
respected by victors and losers alike. 
 
 
Coups d’état and the consolidation of military-bureaucratic guardianship 
 
Despite its decades of experience with multiparty politics, it is not possible to 
categorise Turkey as a consolidated democracy. Przeworksi (1991: 23) argues 
that democracy is consolidated when it becomes “the only game in town; when 
no one can imagine acting outside the democratic institutions, when all losers 
want to do is to try again within the same institutions under which they have just 
lost.” In Turkey, periodic interference in the democratic process by extra-
political actors has meant that transitions often took place via non-democratic 
means. 
‘Extra-political’ interference in electoral politics has meant primarily a 
military intervention in Turkey, the first of which was the coup d’état of 27 May 
1960. The Demokrat Parti dominated Turkish politics for a decade in part thanks 
to a winner-takes-all electoral system, the 1924 Constitution that vested 
excessive power in the hands of the executive at the expense of the legislative 
and the judiciary, and an opposition that was in institutional and ideological 
disarray. Lacking a system of democratic checks and balances, the DP gradually 
succumbed to the trappings of growing power and became increasingly 
authoritarian. It was at this point that a group of left-leaning junior officers broke 
the chain of command and overthrew the government, outlawed the DP and 
executed three of its leaders to ‘restore democracy and the Kemalist revolution’. 
We should note that the DP was as much at pains to promote its policies 
in Kemalist terms as its predecessor. Many senior DP figures had close personal 
relations with Atatürk during his lifetime. Indeed, it was the DP government that 
criminalised “insulting the memory and legacy of Atatürk and damaging his 
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statues” in 1951 (Göktepe 2000: 142). Regardless, the supporters of the 1960 
coup viewed the DP government as ‘counterrevolutionary’, and for decades to 
come referred to the intervention as ‘the May 27 revolution’.103 In reality, the 
coup was neither democratic, regardless of the abuses of power under the DP 
government, nor mass based. Belge notes that among the statist officers and 
bureaucrats, there was a strong belief that the transition to multi-party politics 
was a critical mistake that would sabotage the modernising project by giving 
power to the people prematurely (2011: 617 – 18). 
The conviction that the masses were not mature enough to govern 
themselves and thus needed constant supervision and occasional intervention in 
their affairs led the Turkish Armed Forces (Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri, TSK) to justify 
every successive intervention as an unfortunate albeit necessary act to protect 
the Kemalist revolution, the democratic system and the people – from the 
people.104 Like the 1950 election, the coup d’état of 1960 also set an important 
precedent as it established the TSK as the foremost institution of Kemalist 
guardianship and opened the way for future interventions in civilian politics. 
Henceforth it was up to the military to watch over political institutions in the 
country and protect the legacy of the charismatic leader, however that legacy 
was interpreted at any given period. After the 1960 coup, the TSK overthrew 
elected governments three more times, in 1971, 1980 and 1997. This meant that 
the personal charisma of the leader had been more or less transformed into the 
“office charisma” of the military-as-institution.  
That charisma was no longer in possession of an individual – like İnönü – 
or personal office – such as the presidency – but rather an armed institution 
meant that, as the ‘top guardians’ of the Kemalist regime, the military could force 
the president to step down (as in 1960) or prompt the judiciary to outlaw 
political parties, including the CHP (as was the case after the 1980 coup). In fact, 
the military officers also could even defy their own superiors, including chiefs of 
the general staff. The junta that carried out the 1960 coup arrested Rüştü 
Erdelhun, the TSK chief who had opposed the officers’ political activism, and 
sentenced him to death alongside the DP leaders for collaborating with the 
                                                 
103 See for example, Kili (1969). 
104 “Turkey’s Military Leader Vows to Restore Democracy”, New York Times, 6 January 1981. 
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government.105 Likewise, in the early 2000s, senior generals frustrated with 
Chief of Staff Hilmi Özkök planned to outmanoeuvre him and intervene against 
the AKP government. 
Various historical, social, religious and geopolitical arguments have been 
invoked to justify the TSK’s self-appointed role as the guardian of the Kemalist 
regime. The Turkish military’s carefully cultivated nationalist image depicts an 
institution with a glorious past dating from the Hunnish invasions of China to the 
heroic defence at the Battle of Gallipoli in WWI. The TSK credits itself as the 
institution that produced Mustafa Kemal, served as the engine of the Anatolian 
resistance movement and built a sovereign nation from the ruins of the defeated 
empire.106 For decades the TSK enjoyed a popular reputation as the most 
professional, meritocratic and ‘trustworthy’ institution in Turkey, in contrast to 
the self-serving and corrupt image of civilian politicians. Furthermore, despite 
the strictly secularist ideology that its professional officer corps have been 
trained to uphold, the TSK continued to command respect and loyalty through 
deep rooted religious symbols of patriarchal authority in a society that refers to 
the military as ‘the Prophet’s hearth’ (Peygamber Ocağı) and considers soldiering 
not only as a sacred duty towards the state, religion and the nation, but also a 
necessary sacrifice for attaining manhood (Heper 2002: 58; Akkoyunlu 2007: 21 
– 25).  
Finally, the military guardians have consistently upheld a perception of 
existential ideological threats to the regime and the country emanating from 
Turkey’s sensitive geopolitical position to justify the existence of a guardianship 
structure, limitations on civil liberties and occasional interventions in the 
electoral process. This threat perception has evolved over time. Reflecting 
Turkey’s role as a frontier country during the Cold War and the TSK’s 
institutional ties to NATO, the military guardians depicted communism as the 
most serious security and ideological threat to the Kemalist regime. 
Consequently, both the 1971 and 1980 coups primarily targeted the wide 
spectrum of leftist movements across the country. In the aftermath of the 1980 
coup, the ruling junta openly promoted a range of Islamist movements along 
                                                 
105 Erdelhun’s sentence was subsequently commuted to life imprisonment. He was granted 
presidential amnesty in 1964 and forced into retirement. 
106 See “History” in the official website of the Turkish General Staff, http://www.tsk.tr.  
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with neo-liberal economic policies as antidote to the left. Conversely, in the 
1990s, political Islam and Kurdish separatism replaced communism at the top of 
the list of existential threats to the regime (İnsel and Bayramoğlu 2004). 
However, despite these justification attempts, the guardianship role of the 
military was never fully legitimised. As I noted in Chapter 3, Atatürk did bestow 
upon the military the duty of guiding the nation and guarding the revolution. But 
unlike Khomeini during the 1980s, he did not design the institutional 
arrangement that gradually came into place following the 1960 coup. Nor did he 
articulate an overt political role for the military. In fact, as early as in 1924, the 
Turkish parliament passed a law preventing acting officers from involvement in 
politics.107 The law did not have much practical significance at the time, given 
that the top cadres of the CHP and the state bureaucracy were already populated 
by former officers and that the TSK was loyal to the charismatic leader. But it did 
force future military guardians to limit their day-to-day involvement in politics 
to a behind-the-scenes role, except during those periods of direct intervention.  
This had two contradictory outcomes for the Turkish guardians: on the 
one hand, by avoiding overt engagement in politics, the military successfully 
managed to present itself as uninvolved and uninterested in government affairs, 
hence conveniently placing responsibility for the country’s socio-economic 
problems on the shoulders of civilian politicians. Yet on the other hand, it meant 
that whenever the military did intervene in politics, they were committing an act 
that was not explicitly sanctioned by the founding father; an act that could be 
interpreted, in and of itself, as illegitimate. Consequently, the institutional 
arrangement that was established as a result of the coups d’état was also built 
upon shaky legal and ideological grounds and needed constant justification. This 
made the Turkish guardians more vulnerable to changes in public opinion than 
their Iranian counterparts, whose constitutionally enshrined guardianship role 
had a visible stamp of the charismatic leader on it. 
In contrast to the constitutions of the IRI, there is no direct reference to 
military guardianship in Turkey’s constitutions, including the highly 
authoritarian 1982 Constitution. The Kemalist guardians have sought to justify 
                                                 
107 Despite this legislation, Mustafa Kemal wore his uniform and maintained his military titles 
until 1927. See Özdağ (1991). 
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the legality of military interventions on the basis of Article 35 of the TSK’s 
Internal Service Law, added after the 1960 coup, which read: “The duty of the 
TSK is to protect and watch over the Turkish motherland and the Turkish 
Republic as delineated by the Constitution.” Although this article did not 
explicitly validate the TSK’s political guardianship role, it was used as the legal 
basis of all coups d’état. 
 
 
Institutions of Kemalist guardianship 
 
What appears to distinguish the Turkish military from many of its politicised 
counterparts in Southern Europe, Latin America or Southeast Asia has been its 
general reluctance to govern Turkey directly. Indeed, after every intervention 
the TSK eventually returned power to civilian politicians and allowed 
competitive elections to be organised.108 This transfer of power has led some 
scholars of political transitions to assume, rather inaccurately, that Turkey was 
on the path to democratisation following a spell of authoritarian rule as if the 
Turkish military actually had little interest in being involved in political affairs.109  
In fact, impact of the coups was not merely limited to those periods of direct 
military rule. All of the four major coups that the TSK carried out between 1960 
and 1997 resulted in profound changes in Turkey’s political and constitutional 
landscape that tilted the civil-military balance in favour of the latter. A new 
constitution was drafted by the ruling juntas following two direct interventions 
in 1960 and 1980, while the 1971 and 1997 interventions led to critical 
amendments to the exiting constitutions.  
Every coup and subsequent constitutional change expanded the 
legal/institutional remit and influence of the military guardians, and their 
associates in civil society, politics and the bureaucracy, over Turkish politics and 
society at the expense of the civilian political authority. Consequently, even when 
                                                 
108 After the 1960 coup, the military allowed an elected government to reassume authority in 
1961. After the 1971 intervention, the junta returned power to civilian authorities in 1973. The 
longest period of direct rule by a military junta was between the coup of 12 September 1980 and 
the general elections that took place on 6 November 1983. 
109 See for example Brownlee (2009: 515 – 532). 
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the military guardians returned to the barracks, they were able to influence 
events through the institutions they had put in place as well as through their 
associates within the state bureaucracy, the judiciary, civil society as well as 
civilian politics. The resultant hybrid structure demarcated the affairs of the 
state (devlet) from the affairs of government (hükümet). Government came to 
indicate the realm of everyday politics; issues that could be entrusted to elected 
politicians and discussed publicly within ‘permissible’ boundaries drawn by the 
guardians. Beyond these boundaries started the realm of state affairs, 
understood as the exclusive domain of the guardians, who were deemed to 
possess the necessary personal, ideological and institutional credentials to make 
decisions on matters of national security, foreign policy orientation or the 
general socio-economic direction of the country. 
The establishment of the National Security Council (Milli Güvenlik Kurulu, 
NSC) after the 1960 coup had the most profound impact on Turkey’s institutional 
landscape. Described by Ümit Cizre (1997: 157 – 58) as “the embodiment of the 
bureaucracy’s primacy over the popularly elected parliament”, the NSC was 
founded as a governmental advisory body that brought together cabinet 
ministers and the prime minister, the president and the military high command 
on regular intervals to exchange views on developments. With every 
intervention the Council’s influence over the elected government and the 
parliament increased noticeably, as did the clout and the number of its military 
members over its civilian wing. The 1982 Constitution expanded the authority of 
the NSC general secretary, who was always a military officer until 2004, and 
ensured that its ‘recommendations’ to the elected government were given 
“special consideration”, making them in effect equivalent to official edicts 
(Articles 118 – 120). 
Through its influence over the NSC, the military guardians also came to 
control the drafting of the National Security Policy Document (Milli Güvenlik 
Siyaseti Belgesi, NSPD). Dubbed Turkey’s ‘secret constitution’, the NSPD is a 
classified document that outlines Turkey’s national security policy, identifies 
internal and external threats and thus determines the permissible boundaries of 
public politics. The definition of national security, meanwhile, was redefined in a 
1983 law in such broad and ambiguous terms that it could be interpreted to 
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cover any policy field.110 The NSPD is prepared by the NSC general secretariat 
and submitted to the NSC for approval without any parliamentary oversight of 
the drafting process (Cizre 2006: 59). Illustrating the importance of the 
document, former TSK Chief of Staff Doğan Güreş once described it as “the god of 
all policies, the mother of all constitutions: it is unthinkable to act against it.” 
(İnsel and Bayramoğlu 2004: 92). 
The 1982 Constitution also equipped the presidency, largely a symbolic 
office after İnönü, with veto wielding powers over the GNA. Until a referendum in 
2007 introduced direct presidential elections, Turkey’s presidents were elected 
by the GNA and were either former military generals, bureaucrats with solid 
Kemalist credentials or civilian politicians whom the generals thought they could 
control. These changes allowed the guardians to keep the government in check 
without appearing to be directly handling civilian politics. But in case the 
guardians needed more direct control of government affairs, the National 
Security Council also provided them with the relevant legal and constitutional 
justifications. Through its authority over the cabinet, the NSC was able to force 
the government to declare emergency law in parts or the whole of the country in 
the name of national security. Most of the country was under effective martial 
law from 1978 until 1983. In the Kurdish provinces emergency laws remained in 
place until 2002, suspending the democratic process and giving senior generals 
and centrally appointed bureaucrats a free hand in governing the region with 
very little parliamentary scrutiny, under the pretext of fighting terrorism.  
The military’s control of the NSC and the NSPD also limited the civilian 
bodies’ ability to monitor the TSK’s economic activities. Institutions that were 
nominally charged with overseeing military procurements and the defence 
budget – i.e. the National Defence Commission and the Parliamentary Planning 
and Budget Commission and the Court of Accounts (Sayıştay) – were legally 
constrained by constitutional amendments and also lacked the will/clout to 
carry out their responsibilities. Meanwhile, the TSK made significant forays into 
the business world through the Armed Forces Pension Fund (Ordu Yardımlaşma 
                                                 
110 Article 2a of Law Number 2945 on the NSC defines national security as “the protection of the 
constitutional order of the state, its nation and integrity, all of its interests in the international 
sphere including political, social, cultural and economic interests, as well as the protection of its 
treaty rights against all threats both internal and external” (EC 2005: 14).  
146 
 
Kurumu, OYAK). Another product of the 1960 coup, OYAK grew over the decades 
– benefiting in particular from the privatisation schemes of the 1990s – to 
become a giant conglomerate with more than 60 affiliated companies involved in 
strategic sectors of the economy, from banking to energy, car manufacturing to 
construction. By the 2000s it had become one of Turkey’s top three holding 
companies (Akça 2010). It enjoyed tax exempt status while its properties, 
revenues and debts benefited from all the rights and privileges of ‘state 
properties' as outlined in the 1961 OYAK Law.111 
The judiciary, too, reflected the uneven relationship between the military-
bureaucratic guardians and their civilian counterparts. The 1961 Constitution 
established the military courts. With the 1973 amendments and the 1982 
Constitution these acquired the power to try civilians, while at the same time the 
civilian courts’ jurisdiction over military personnel was restricted (Akay 2010: 
15 – 17). Military coups also gradually shaped the structure of civilian courts. 
Also established by the 1961 Constitution, the Constitutional Court (Anayasa 
Mahkemesi) was tasked with reviewing the constitutionality of legislature 
enacted by the parliament and was equipped with the power to dissolve political 
parties and ban or imprison politicians on the grounds of acting against the 
constitution.  
According to 1961 Constitution, military and civilian high judiciary, the 
president, the parliament and the senate (which was established in 1961 and 
abolished in 1980) each appointed a fixed number of members to the 
Constitutional Court. The 1982 Constitution transferred the power of 
appointment exclusively to the president, who chose from candidates presented 
to him by various state institutions. While between 1963 and 1980 the 
Constitutional Court outlawed six political parties, 19 parties were banned 
between 1980 and 2008.112 Outlawed parties were almost exclusively from the 
leftist, Kurdish or Islamist backgrounds (Hakyemez 2008). The 1982 
Constitution also re-established the State Security Courts (Devlet Güvenlik 
Mahkemeleri, SSC), which were first created in 1973 but abolished by the 
Constitutional Court in 1975. Charged with overseeing cases that include crimes 
                                                 
111 OYAK Law, No. 205. 
112 ‘Anayasa Mahkemesi 44 Yılda 24 Parti Kapattı’, Bianet, 21 November 2007, 
http://www.bianet.org/bianet/siyaset/103054-anayasa-mahkemesi-44-yilda-24-parti-kapatti.  
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against state security (a highly ambiguous and expansive jurisdiction), and 
characterised by weak defendant rights, long detention periods (lasting in some 
cases over a decade), systematic torture under detention and heavy prison 
sentences, the SSCs became the embodiment of the military’s dominance over 
the state and the state’s authoritarian grip over society in the post-1980 era.113 
They were the main judicial instrument through which the state attempted to 
suppress the left in the 1980s and the Kurdish rebellion in the 1990s. Based on a 
law that was in effect from 1991 until 1999, a military judge had to be included 
amongst the panel of three judges in every case. 
Finally, the 1973 amendments and the 1982 Constitution took away many 
of the civil liberties and fundamental freedoms that were enshrined in the 1961 
Constitution. Limitations came in place under the pretext of safeguarding 
“national sovereignty, the republic, national security, public order, general peace, 
the public interest, public morals and public health”.114 For instance, widening 
the scope of earlier restrictions placed on labour unions, Article 52 of the 1982 
Constitution made it illegal for unions to “pursue a political cause, engage in 
political activity, receive support from political parties or give support to them”. 
In part as an attempt to curtail the parliamentary representation of smaller but 
vocal left-wing parties, a 10% election threshold was put in place, which remains 
the highest in Europe. With the two regulatory institutions set up under the 1982 
Constitution and controlled by the NSC – the Council of Higher Education (Yüksek 
Öğretim Kurulu, YÖK) and the Higher Council of Radio and Television (Radyo 
Televizyon Üst Kurulu, RTÜK) – universities and the media came under the 
guardians’ control. 
 
 
  
                                                 
113 Article 143 of the 1982 Constitution established the SSCs "to deal with security offenses 
against the indivisible integrity of the State with its territory and nation, the free democratic 
order, or against the Republic whose characteristics are defined in the Constitution, and offenses 
directly involving the internal and external security of the State." 
114 Amendment to Article 11 of 1961 Constitution. See 
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/anayasa/anayasa61.htm  
For a comparison of the two constitutions, see Parla (2007). 
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Geopolitics of guardianship: Turkey as NATO member 
 
As I noted, the military-bureaucratic guardians of the Kemalist regime have 
presented Turkey’s sensitive geopolitical location as justification for the 
existence of the guardianship institutions. Crucially, the audience for this 
justification was not only the people of Turkey, but also the country’s western 
allies in NATO. Throughout the Cold War and in the 1990s, Turkey’s ‘geostrategic 
indispensability’ for the West prompted the western security establishment to 
actively support the Kemalist guardians’ efforts to keep society and politics in 
check. As maintaining Turkey’s pro-western orientation proved to be a higher 
priority than maintaining its democracy, Turkey’s NATO allies, the US in 
particular, either tacitly approved or directly backed the military’s interventions 
and turned a blind eye to the state’s violations of civil liberties and human 
rights.115  
The military junta that replaced the DP government declared in its first 
official communiqué its commitment to NATO and CENTO.116 The junta-led 
government was officially recognised by the British and American governments 
within three days of the coup. The 1971 intervention took place in the midst of 
intensifying societal tensions between left and right wing popular movements 
and organisations. The intervention was carried out by senior generals 
committed to the NATO structure, three days after a failed coup by a group of left 
leaning junior officials (TBMM 2012). Finally, the CIA’s knowledge and 
Washington’s support of the 1980 coup was acknowledged by the agency’s then 
Ankara chief, Paul Henze (Birand 1987). The US support for the pro-NATO coup 
was part of a geopolitical effort to keep Turkey anchored in the western security 
establishment shortly after the Iranian revolution and the Soviet occupation of 
Afghanistan. 
The end of the Cold War did not immediately alter the core dynamics of 
this strategic cooperation between the Turkish military and the western security 
establishment. During the 1990s, Turkey continued to provide military and 
                                                 
115 Needless to say, Turkey’s case was not exceptional within the Cold War framework. 
116 CENTO, or the Central Eastern Treaty Organisation, also known as the Baghdad Pact, was a 
security cooperation agreement between Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey and the United Kingdom 
that remained in place between 1955 and 1979. 
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logistical assistance to US and NATO-led operations, including the Gulf War, 
Somalia, Yugoslavia and, in the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 attacks in 
the US, against the Taliban in Afghanistan. For its part, Washington increased 
security coordination with Turkey, which included subsidised arms sales to the 
Turkish military in support of its campaign against the Kurdish insurgents.117 In 
doing so, Washington turned a blind eye to the atrocities committed by the 
military during the ‘dirty war’. Likewise, both the US and the European Union 
quietly approved the guardians’ last successful intervention against a civilian 
government in 1997 (Akkoyunlu, Nicolaidis and Öktem 2013: 44 – 51). 
 But the role of Turkey’s allies in the western security establishment in 
institutionalising the guardianship structure goes beyond expressing support for 
military coups.  More importantly, the establishment was instrumental in laying 
the foundations of an underground and extra-legal network of security sector 
actors, bureaucrats and civilians, often referred to in Turkey as the ‘deep state’. 
Within the framework of a US-led initiative to set up anti-communist ‘stay 
behind’ paramilitary groups and sleeper cells across NATO member states in 
Europe, a secretive ‘Special Warfare Department’ (Özel Harp Dairesi) was 
founded inside the Turkish military in cooperation with the American 
intelligence services (TBMM 2012: 115 – 132).  
The department was set up in September 1952, but for over two decades 
neither the Turkish public nor elected politicians had any knowledge of its 
existence.118 Finding out about it almost accidentally in 1974, Prime Minister 
Bülent Ecevit was the first elected official to question publicly the presence of a 
mysterious counter-guerrilla organisation within the state.119 Trained in 
unconventional warfare methods and drawing their recruits mainly from 
members of far-right nationalist groups, the counter-guerrilla units attached to 
this department were ‘invisible’ to the law or to parliamentary scrutiny. During 
the Cold War, they functioned as assassination squads, targeting ‘subversives’, 
and were widely suspected of orchestrating some of the most critical (and 
                                                 
117 Turkey’s weapons purchases from the US exceeded USD 6 billion in worth between 1992 and 
1999. In 1997 alone, the US delivered more arms to the Turkish military than the entire period 
between 1950 and 1983 (Gabelnick, Hartung and Washburn 1999). 
118 The original name of the department was ‘The Mobilisation Monitoring Council’ (Seferberlik 
Tetkik Kurulu).  
119 Interview with Ecevit, Sabah, 11 April 2005. 
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unresolved) episodes of political violence in Turkey, such as the Taksim Square 
massacre on Labour Day 1977 or the sectarian killings in the city of Maraş in 
1978, which were in turn used to justify the 1980 coup. 
While the demise of the left in Turkey following the 1980 coup and the 
collapse of the Soviet Union a decade later stripped the Turkish counter-guerrilla 
of its original raison d'être, institutions of the ‘deep state’ did not abrogate 
themselves. Nor were they exposed and disassembled by the elected political 
authority of the day. There was, in other words, no public trial in Turkey similar 
to Italy’s ‘Operation Gladio’ in the 1990s (Ganser 2005). Instead, the ‘dirty war’ 
in the Kurdish provinces during this decade provided the extra-legal extension of 
the guardians with a new raison d'être, a new public enemy to legitimise their 
existence, as well as a new terrain on which they could operate in relative 
freedom. In the atmosphere of legal and political impunity created by the 
emergency laws and the SSCs that governed life in the Kurdish provinces in the 
1990s, the underground counter-guerrilla organisation, along with quasi-official 
intelligence units and members of the special police forces, carried out 
systematic detainment, torture and assassination of civilians in the region.120 It 
was also at this shadowy intersection that the politico-economic interests of 
these security sector actors became increasingly embroiled with those of civilian 
politicians, big business and organised crime under a thin ultra-nationalist cover. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has surveyed the institutional architecture and the evolution of the 
Iranian and Turkish hybrid regimes following the death of the charismatic 
leaders. Both the Khomeinist and Kemalist regimes were consolidated as hybrid, 
featuring a dualistic institutional arrangement where guardianship institutions 
co-existed with electoral institutions, constraining their authority and 
determining the tolerated limits of socio-political activity in the name of 
Kemalism and Khomeinism. In the IRI, the Office of the Supreme Leader, the 
                                                 
120 For more on the most notorious of these secretive units, the intelligence and counter-
terrorism cell of the gendarmerie (known as JITEM) see ‘The Intelligence Issue and JITEM’ in 
(İnsel and Ali Bayramoğlu 2010: 178). 
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Guardian Council and the Expediency Council act as the core guardianship 
institutions. Controlled by the Leader, the judiciary, bonyads and the IRGC also 
serve important guardianship roles. The IRGC’s growing presence in Iranian 
politics and economy is likely to influence the future course of the IRI, especially 
after Khamenei. The presidency and the Majles constitute the republican pillar of 
the IRI. Devised to serve as a bridge between the dual pillars, the Assembly of 
Experts displays a hybrid characteristic itself. 
Guardianship has been less direct in Turkey. With a claim for the 
charismatic legacy of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and an emphasis on its central role 
in the foundational period of the republic, the Turkish military branded itself the 
guardian of the Kemalist regime, supported by the high judiciary and the 
bureaucracy. With every direct intervention, which took place with the implicit 
approval or support of the West, the military guardians deepened and expanded 
their influence over society and politics, through constitutional changes and 
institutions like the National Security Council. The impersonal nature of 
guardianship and electoral politics in Turkey also stands in contrast with the 
relatively informal, decentralised and individual-focussed nature of factional 
politics in Iran. 
The next three chapters will investigate the core socio-political dynamics 
within these regimes in the post-Cold War period, and their impact on the 
trajectory of institutional change in the Iranian and Turkish hybrid regimes. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
THE FALL OF THE HYBRID REGIME IN  
THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The end of the Cold War significantly altered the geopolitical and ideological 
environment in which the Islamic Republic of Iran endeavoured to survive 
during the first decade of its existence. But the critical turning point for the IRI 
had already come with the end of the war with Iraq in 1988 and the death of 
Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989. The war with Iraq served as an excuse to delay 
some of the unfulfilled promises of the revolution, namely, social justice, 
economic development and the rule of law. Its end brought these expectations 
back to the top of the agenda, increasing the popular pressure on the regime. In 
addition, in the absence of a charismatic leader who could act as the ultimate 
arbiter in political conflicts, factional disputes became sharper and more visible. 
The constitutional amendments of 1989 were in anticipation of the new era that 
was unfolding. The 1989 Constitution sought to institutionalise Khomeini’s 
charisma, expanded his powers and essentially divided it between the Leader 
and the President, albeit heavily favouring the former, as I discussed in Chapter 
4. These posts were subsequently taken up by two of the charismatic leader’s 
most senior lieutenants: Ali Khamenei and Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. 
 While succession took place in a relatively smooth manner, hybridity 
immediately became the most prevalent political characteristic of the post-
Khomeini Iran. Clashing claims over sovereignty, ambiguously divided between 
the Islamic and republican institutions, created consistent systemic tensions 
between the Leader and every elected president since 1989. Every presidential 
era saw factional rivalries intensify and represented a major challenge to the 
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regime’s guardians on the basis of the main debates and promises of the 
revolution: the Rafsanjani presidency was about the IRI’s economic direction in 
the post-Khomeini/post-Cold War environment, as much as the personal rivalry 
between the regime’s two most prominent figures. The main theme of the 
Khatami presidency was establishing the rule of law and strengthening the 
republican pillar of the IRI. During this period, institutional duality was not only 
a key characteristic of the IRI regime, but also one of its central political issues. 
Finally, Ahmadinejad’s presidency brought to the fore the issue of socio-
economic injustice and the IRI’s unfulfilled promise of eradicating inequality 
between the regime elites and the populace.  
Starting their relationship cordially and with expressions of mutual 
respect, all three presidents eventually clashed with the Leader and had fallen 
out of favour by the end of their respective second terms. These processes 
exposed the highly personalised nature of political leadership in the IRI, which 
fuelled the various factional and institutional tensions inherent in the regime’s 
hybrid structure. This chapter will look into the core dynamics, major debates 
and key moments of tension in the IRI during the Rafsanjani, Khatami and 
Ahmadinejad presidencies. I argue that the regime lost its hybrid character with 
the collapse of the electoral system as a mechanism of popular legitimation and 
factional management following the disputed presidential vote in 2009. The 
election of Hassan Rouhani and the apparent return to hybridity in 2013 will be 
covered in Chapter 7. 
 
 
Politics of reconstruction: The Rafsanjani presidency 
 
The Iranian Thermidor and the Leader-President coalition 
 
Numerous observers of the IRI suggested that following the end of the war with 
Iraq, the death of Ayatollah Khomeini, the constitutional changes of 1989 and the 
election of Hashemi Rafsanjani as president, Iran had entered the ‘Thermidor’, 
i.e. the closing stages of the revolution where charismatic authority is 
bureaucratised and political and economic pragmatism prevails over 
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revolutionary fervour.121 Indeed, all these events symbolised important turning 
points for the IRI. But the anticipation of the Thermidor, which grew with 
Khatami’s victory in 1997 (Rajaee 1999; Wells 1999), was dampened by the 
early 2000s, with the Leader having thwarted the reformist challenges to his 
authority with the help of his allies and loyalists in the Guardian Council, the 
Expediency Council, the judiciary and the IRGC. 
The power struggle between Khamenei and Rafsanjani that defined the 
second term of Rafsanjani’s presidency (1993 – 1997) was in the first place a 
personal one – i.e. the clash of two powerful and ambitious regime insiders – 
rather than an ideological or institutional one. Yet, at the beginning of his first 
term (1989 – 1993), little ideological or even institutional discord existed 
between the two men. The Rafsanjani presidency did not, in and of itself, 
constitute a challenge to the Leader, much less to the system of velayat-e faqih. 
After all, the trusted right hand man of Ayatollah Khomeini, Rafsanjani was the 
ultimate regime insider. Following the charismatic leader’s death, he became the 
chief engineer of the conservative initiative to marginalise the Islamic left 
faction, orchestrating the constitutional amendments that enabled his ally, Ali 
Khamenei to become Leader and created a single executive office in the 
strengthened presidency, which he subsequently assumed. Two of the most 
powerful men in the IRI at the time, occupying the regime’s two most important 
posts, divided Khomeini’s charisma and authority into two parts and started 
governing Iran as a ‘duumvirate’.   
Khamenei and Rafsanjani also shared similar politico-religious views: 
both were political pragmatists and proponents of dynamic fiqh (Arjomand 
2009: 37). By the late 1980s, they were largely in agreement over the direction 
that the IRI needed to take. This involved, first and foremost, addressing the 
profound economic devastation and social dislocation caused by a decade of 
revolution and war; and secondly, a revision of the regime’s foreign policy 
priorities. The eight-year war claimed nearly a million lives in total and left 
millions more permanently disabled and psychologically traumatised.122 The war 
                                                 
121 See for example Jean-François Bayart (1991); Ehteshami (1995); “Thermidor at Last: 
Hashemi-Rafsanjani’s Presidency and the Economy” in Arjomand (2009: 56 – 71).  
122 Estimates of war casualties range from the Iranian government figure of 300,000 to over a 
million. See Hiro (1991: 205) and Abrahamian (2008: 171 – 175). 
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inflicted extensive damage on the country’s physical infrastructure: its direct and 
indirect cost on the economy was calculated at USD 627 billion (Rajaee 1997: 2). 
By 1989, per capita income had fallen by nearly 45% from 1977/78 (Ehteshami 
1995: 100). To illustrate the true extent of the war’s economic burden on the two 
resource-rich neighbours, Rajaee noted that “the total cost of the war exceeds the 
oil revenue of the two states throughout the twentieth century.” (1997: 2). 
Despite such immense human and economic sacrifice, Iran’s territorial and 
geopolitical gains were modest. Ideologically, not only had Khomeini’s 
universalistic message failed to instigate new revolutions abroad, but the Islamic 
Republic found itself in growing political and economic isolation, being able to 
count only Syria as an ally, and South Yemen and Libya as friendly regimes. 
“At least a month before the Iranian acceptance of the ceasefire,” notes 
Ehteshami, “many of the high-ranking politico-religious figures in the republic 
were endorsing the realist (or pragmatist) line as the best means of confronting 
Iran’s ills.” (1995: 17). For these figures, Khomeini’s decision to agree 
unconditionally to the Security Council Resolution 598 ending the war, which he 
described as “more painful than drinking from a poisoned chalice”, signalled the 
beginning of the shift away from the revisionist policies pursued by the IRI 
during the preceding decade. In March 1989, months before his death, Khomeini 
approved Rafsanjani’s five-year economic development plan, which allowed Iran 
to seek foreign loans. Thus, having secured Khomeini’s explicit blessing, the 
Leader-President coalition gradually embarked on a process of economic 
liberalisation and industrialisation and foreign policy moderation with limited 
and piecemeal easing of social restrictions. 
Economic reconstruction became the top priority for President 
Rafsanjani, who believed that the regime could not survive without foreign 
capital, links to international markets and technical expertise. Dubbed the 
“government of construction” (dowlat-e sazandegi), his cabinets were dominated 
by technocrats, as he emphasised “expertise, technical skills and administrative 
abilities of the Ministers” over “their ‘lslamic virtues’ and revolutionary zeal” 
(Ehteshami 1995: 56). During his first term as president (1989 – 1993), 
Rafsanjani reopened the Tehran stock exchange and promoted foreign trade 
through establishing five free trade zones and an export bank, as a result of 
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which Iran’s trade volume soon surpassed the highest pre-revolutionary level.123 
His government also encouraged private sector participation in the economy by 
initiating a process of denationalisation. However, privatisation schemes lacked 
transparency and a clear legal framework. Benefiting chiefly the bonyads and 
semi-public firms with direct links to the IRGC, or the IRI’s ruling clerical 
oligarchy, they failed to make the state more efficient, while contributing to the 
growing income disparity in society. 
The drive for economic reconstruction and development also necessitated 
– and brought with it – a more pragmatic foreign policy rhetoric and diplomatic 
advances to improve (and in quite a few cases, restart) bilateral and regional 
relations. This effort gained momentum with the Second Gulf War, as Tehran’s 
support for Kuwaiti sovereignty and the US-led military operation against 
Saddam Hussein presented the Rafsanjani government with the opportunity to 
mend ties with Gulf Arab countries as well as the West. Its position in the crisis 
brought Iran benefits that had eluded it during its own war with Iraq: the UN 
recognised Iraq as the main belligerent of the eight-year war and Baghdad was 
forced to pay reparations to Tehran and agree to the full implementation of SCR 
598 as well as the 1975 Algiers Accord.124 At the end of the war, Jordan, Tunisia 
and Saudi Arabia renewed diplomatic ties with the IRI and new avenues of 
economic cooperation opened with Western Europe, with France, Germany and 
Italy once again becoming Iran’s major trade partners. 
In May 1991, addressing foreign delegates attending the “Conference on 
Oil and Gas in the 1990s: Prospects for Cooperation” in Tehran – the first high 
profile international conference organised by the Iranian government since the 
revolution – Rafsanjani declared Iran was “ready to embark on mutual 
cooperation with regional and non-regional countries to secure viable peace and 
stability within the framework of sensible policies.” His foreign minister, Ali 
Akbar Velayati, argued that in the new era economic considerations would 
overshadow political priorities.125 In the same pragmatic vein, Iran chose to side 
                                                 
123 By 1991, the total trade volume had become 3.5 times the pre-revolutionary level (St. Marie 
and Nagshpour 2011: 134). 
124 The Algiers Accord ceded to Iran the strategic Shatt al-Arab waterway, which had been a 
historic source of territorial dispute between the two countries and one of the main causes for 
the war. 
125 “Iran Declares Return to World Economy” Washington Post, 28 May 1991. 
157 
 
with the newly independent Armenia rather than Muslim Azerbaijan during the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in the early 1990s for fear of ethnic Azeri irredentism 
at home, and also turned a blind eye to the plight of Muslim minorities in Russia 
and China in order to maintain positive relations with both states. Calculations of 
national interest had replaced the universalist slogans of the Islamic revolution. 
Economic restructuring and diplomatic normalisation gained speed in the 
early 1990s in the midst of the post-Cold War international environment where 
trade liberalisation and free market policies appeared triumphant over economic 
nationalism and protectionism. We should note, however, that during this 
period, neither Khamenei nor Rafsanjani seriously contemplated accompanying 
these shifts in economic and foreign policies with a political reform programme. 
On the contrary, the institutional architecture of the IRI as it existed after 1989 
was their product and they were both determined to preserve it. Relaxations on 
social restrictions, such as the easing of censorship in the press and the arts, 
were piecemeal and driven by individual ministers, most notably Mohammad 
Khatami, the minister of culture and Islamic guidance in the first Rafsanjani 
cabinet, rather than as part of a systematic government policy. Political reform, 
which became the key issue of the Khatami presidency, had yet to enter the 
lexicon of the IRI elites in the early 1990s. Furthermore, as I emphasised in 
Chapter 4, factional politics during this period was still very much an elite 
preoccupation, driven by inter-personal relationships and without an organised 
party machine that would formally organise the masses and link them to the 
regime elite. Yet it was also during this period that both men came to appreciate 
fully the critical importance of elections, serving both as a source of popular 
legitimacy to the regime following the charismatic leader’s demise, but also as an 
unpredictable tool and potential threat to the Islamic pillar. 
Thus, even as he praised the IRI’s democratic achievements and 
encouraged the expression of popular will at the ballot box, Rafsanjani 
collaborated with Khamenei to tighten the guardians’ control over the electoral 
playing field by equipping the Guardian Council with the authority to vet and 
approve candidates running for office.126 This intervention bore its first fruit in 
                                                 
126 In early 1993, as he prepared to launch his bid for a second term in office, Rafsanjani praised 
the IRI’s democratic institutions. “During the past 14 years,” he said, “the Islamic Republic of Iran 
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the Majles election in 1992, before which the GC barred more than 1,000 of the 
3,150 candidates, mostly from the Islamic left faction, whom the Leader had 
labelled as ‘seditionists’ (fetnehgar) and called upon the people to refrain from 
supporting.127 As a result, the right came to dominate the Fourth Majles. 
However, unlike Khamenei, whose constitutional powers and position did 
not require periodic reaffirmation by the Iranian public, as the leader of the 
republican pillar, Rafsanjani was eventually forced to recognise that he needed 
popular support and could disregard the expectations of the electorate at his 
own risk. With elections becoming a central mechanism for power distribution 
among factions in post-Khomeini Iran, Rafsanjani not only worked to marginalise 
his rivals through the Guardian Council, but also made campaign promises to 
cater to the popular demand for economic welfare and prosperity and improved 
standards of living. In this regard, the relatively low turnout in the 1993 
presidential election could be seen as an indication of the general dissatisfaction 
both with the lack of genuine choice (the GC had disqualified 124 of 128 
candidates and those who were approved all belonged to the right faction) and 
the consequences of the Rafsanjani administration’s policies. Indeed, by the time 
his second term neared an end, his economic promises remained largely 
unfulfilled: bureaucratic reform had not materialised, economic growth was 
below expectations, inflation and unemployment were still high, and the gap 
between the rich and the poor had widened (Amuzegar 2001a).  
In short, from his second presidential term onwards Rafsanjani had to 
contend not only with a growing rivalry with the Leader and his supporters but 
also with the fluctuating popular judgement on his policies and what he came to 
represent within the IRI establishment. Throughout his presidency and during 
the first Khatami administration, leftist-turned-reformists frequently attacked 
Rafsanjani for institutionalising the pervasive culture of corruption and self-
                                                                                                                                            
has relied on referenda and the establishment of popular institutions as its main tools. In more 
than 12 elections with the participation of the people (men and women), the Iranians have 
elected their governmental system, President and Majles deputies and have ratified their 
constitution. They have elected in two turns the members of the Assembly of Experts whose duty 
it is to choose the Leader. The presence of representatives from religious minorities in the Majles 
with equal rights [is established] … and the guarantee of this right to the constitution signifies the 
depth and genuineness of our commitment to democracy.” Ettela’at, 21 February 1993, quoted in 
Ehteshami (1995: 72). 
127 Ettela’at, 28 March 1992. 
159 
 
enrichment within the state (Ansari 2006: 59 – 61). During the 2005 presidential 
election, his populist rival Mahmoud Ahmadinejad successfully painted 
Rafsanjani as the architect and symbol of the IRI’s wealthy and self-serving 
economic elite. Consequently, his defeat in 2005 was in part a popular 
expression of discontent with his record in his two terms as president.  
  
The split in the right and Rafsanjani’s (temporary) decline 
 
Rafsanjani’s fortunes began to decline when his coalition with the Leader began 
to break apart in the early 1990s. Personal rivalry – namely, Rafsanjani’s 
ambition to be the patrimonial chief executive of political and economic affairs in 
the IRI, and Khamenei’s determination not to remain in Rafsanjani’s shadow – 
goes a long way to explain some of the causes of this split. This personal rivalry 
was exacerbated by (and in turn exacerbated) the growing division within the 
right faction over the direction and the purpose of Rafsanjani’s economic 
policies. Rafsanjani believed in the necessity to restructure Iran’s traditional 
bazaar-based economy into an industrialised one with modern retail and 
banking systems. He was supported in this pursuit by the emerging group of 
technocrats and ‘new industrialists’, made up of former IRGC officers and 
influential bazaar merchants with personal links to the president, who were 
incentivised to make the leap to industrial production and benefited from his 
privatisation schemes. This increasingly wealthy and prominent group – “the 
mercantile bourgeoisie” – formed the ‘modernist’ (or the ‘pragmatist’) wing of 
the right faction (Ansari 2006: 52 – 79). 
 The rise of the modernists and the socio-economic worldview associated 
with them triggered a counter reaction. Members of the unreformed Islamic left 
attacked Rafsanjani for recreating the comprador bourgeoisie of the Pahlavi era; 
the so-called ‘thousand families’ who became wealthy at the expense of the 
general populace (Ansari 2006: 60). For the bulk of the conservative bazaar 
merchants, who were outside of this new circle, Rafsanjani’s policies meant a 
diversion of funds from their economic activities and a long-term threat to their 
interests (Keshavarzian 2009). The conservative clergy started to argue that 
legitimising the pursuit of material wealth was threatening the moral fabric of 
160 
 
society and exposing it dangerously to the western-promoted ideas of liberalism 
and individualism. The conservative bazaaris and the clerics were joined by lay 
intellectuals and war veterans, who had returned from the frontline not so much 
with dreams of economic self-enrichment, but an uncompromising view of social 
morality and justice. 
 In June 1991, in an open letter to the Leader published in the leading 
conservative daily Kayhan, 35 university professors warned of a “western 
cultural invasion” (tahajom-e farhangi-ye gharb).128 Rejecting the popular 
concepts of the post-Cold War liberal era, such as ‘the new world order’ and ‘the 
global village’, the academics criticised the programmes pursued by the 
government for advocating “disloyalty to tradition, family and social values”, 
encouraging a materialistic and human-centrist view of the world and mocking 
revolutionary ideals. The letter also claimed that, having failed to defeat the 
revolution through military force, the West had resorted to exporting cultural 
degeneration to corrupt it from within. 
 This argument resonated with Khamenei, who despite having initially 
sanctioned Rafsanjani’s economic programme, saw both a real threat in the 
globalisation discourse and an opportunity to strengthen his own position 
against Rafsanjani by courting the reaction to Rafsanjani’s policies (Arjomand 
2009: 179).129 The Leader was lacking a sound popular base, and the emergence 
of a traditionalist coalition of bazaaris, clerics and members of the security 
establishment within the right faction seemed to provide him with one. As 
Rafsanjani became tied to the economic interests of the IRI’s upper and middle 
classes, Khamenei refashioned himself as the guardian of its traditional 
structures and revolutionary values. In return, the traditionalists became the 
foremost supporters of the Leader and velayat-e motlaq-e faqih. Identifying and 
fighting the West’s cultural onslaught henceforth constituted the focus of the 
Leader’s pronouncements, which were compiled by the Ministry of Culture and 
Islamic Guidance in a single volume titled “Culture and Cultural Invasion” 
                                                 
128 Kayhan, 27 June 1991. 
129 In a 1992 address, for example, Khamenei publicly criticised the direction of reconstruction: 
“The enemy claims that during the period of reconstruction, revolutionary spirit and morality 
must be put aside,” he said. “Is this the meaning of reconstruction? Surely it is not. […] If we 
spend billions on development projects and ignore moral issues in the country, all the 
achievements will amount to nothing.” Ettela’at, 20 October 1992. 
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(Khamenei 1996). Resisting ‘cultural degeneration’ associated with western 
liberalism and globalisation became one of the chief slogans of the traditionalists 
(and later, the neo-conservatives) from the mid-1990s onwards, just as members 
of the increasingly marginalised Islamist left faction had started to revise their 
strict anti-imperialist stance for a programme that was less preoccupied with 
resisting external enemies and more with reforming the state.  
This apparent role reversal between the right and the left reflected the 
evolving power dynamics within the IRI: having been systematically ousted from 
the state’s decision making mechanism, the left’s attention shifted gradually to 
analysing and transforming that mechanism. The ideologues of the nascent 
reform movement saw in an active and organised civil society’s participation in 
politics a key to breaking the right’s dominance over the institutions of power. In 
the process, they did not only critically re-engage with Khomeini’s formulation of 
Islamic government within the boundaries of religion and tradition, but also 
became more receptive towards the post-Cold War debates over 
democratisation, human rights and the rule of law. Conversely, the traditional 
right acted with a defensive instinct that sought to preserve its dominant 
position within the state. The traditionalist guardians of the IRI, like their 
Turkish counterparts of the same era, perceived an existential challenge in the 
post-modern liberal utopia of the 1990s to their domestic positions within Iran 
and Iran’s sovereignty within the international order. Their increasingly vocal 
claim to preserving the nation’s morality and the regime’s institutional integrity 
was decidedly ‘modern’ and once again demonstrated Iran’s return to the nation-
state rationale after a decade of experimentation with Khomeini’s revolutionary 
Islamic utopia. 
Within the right faction, the emerging battle line between the 
traditionalists and the modernists became visible following the Fourth Majles 
election in 1992, from which the traditionalists emerged as the dominant faction. 
Shortly afterwards, Rafsanjani was forced to drop his ‘liberal’ or reform-minded 
ministers, namely Khatami, the Minister of Interior Abdollah Nuri and the 
Minister of Higher Education and Culture Mostafa Moin. Having resigned shortly 
before the Majles election, Khatami was temporarily replaced by Ali Larijani and 
then, after the election, by Mostafa Mir Salim, both traditionalists with strong ties 
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to the Leader. As the new culture minister, Mir Salim quickly set out to resist the 
‘cultural invasion’ by rolling back the relaxations on press censorship and artistic 
expression granted under Khatami (Moslem 2002: 221 – 224). Shortly after 
being appointed by the conservative-dominated Majles as its new speaker, Ali 
Akbar Nateq Nuri set the tone of the new legislative term by associating 
Rafsanjani’s platform with liberalism, which he defined as a menace that had to 
be eradicated, arguing “the building of a few roads and bridges and the 
completion of some development projects is not the same as upholding the 
values of the revolution.”130  
With his second term effectively paralysed by the traditionalist Majles, 
Rafsanjani found it increasingly difficult to pursue his economic agenda. Added 
to this was the frustration of facing an unsympathetic counterpart in the US, who 
refused to reciprocate his government’s politically risky overtures signalling a 
desire for gradual improvement of trade and diplomatic relations between the 
two countries. In 1995, the Clinton administration did not only block a major oil 
contract that Iran had awarded to the US firm Conoco, but also went on to 
impose on the Islamic Republic the most extensive economic sanctions yet with 
the Iran Libya Sanctions Act.131 Washington’s hostile approach towards Iran 
shook the tenuous political ground on which Rafsanjani had to pursue his politics 
of normalisation at home, and also emboldened the traditionalists’ conviction of 
the US as an ill-intentioned and untrustworthy counterpart, rendering future 
advances for rapprochement even more risky.132 
It was under these circumstances that several of Rafsanjani’s senior 
political allies established the Executives of the Construction of Iran Party (Hezb-
e Kargozaran-e Sazandegi-ye Iran, henceforth Kargozaran) in 1996. For the 
traditionalists, Kargozaran’s convergence with disillusioned former leftists and 
its declaration that economic development was a greater priority than 
“strengthening the value of the revolution and the regime” presented a direct 
                                                 
130 Iran, 31 March 1996, quoted in Takeyh (2009: 125). 
131 “When Iran Hedges Closer, US Pushes Away”, Christian Science Monitor, 7 April 1995, and 
Breckenridge (2000). 
132 In a 2012 interview, Rafsanjani recalled the constraints and frustrations he faced both at 
home and abroad in the foreign policy arena during his presidency: “I wanted to re-establish 
relations with Egypt, but I could not. I wanted to begin negotiations with America, based on the 
terms I had set, but I could not. Could not is not the same as did not want to.” (Editorial 2012). 
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affront to the regime.133 When his supporters’ last ditch attempt to keep 
Rafsanjani in power by amending the constitution to allow a third term as 
president failed, Rafsanjani and the Kargozaran threw their support behind 
Khatami’s campaign for the 1997 presidential election.134 Thus, the 
intensification of factional rivalries among the IRI elite during the Rafsanjani 
presidency spilled into the realm of popular politics towards the end of his term, 
as those groups that had lost varying degrees of power at the hands of the 
traditionalists – namely the modernist right and the leftists-turned-reformists – 
sought avenues to strengthen their political positions. 
Ultimately, the institutional imbalance between the Leader and the 
president had a decisive impact on the outcome of the power struggle between 
the two during the presidency of Rafsanjani. It is easier to argue with hindsight 
that “it was difficult for Khamenei not to win” given the institutional 
arrangement following the constitutional amendments of 1989, which heavily 
favoured his office over the presidency (Arjomand 2009: 37). Yet we should 
remember that at the outset of the ‘duumvirate’, many observers, including the 
president himself, had expected Rafsanjani, with his political skills, seemingly 
endless energy and extensive personal ties within the regime’s intricate web of 
elite groups and factions, to overshadow Khamenei, who was short of charisma, 
religious credentials and a popular base. In the end, Khamenei’s ambition and 
ability to overcome his various shortcomings, combined with his post-1989 
institutional powers, led to his rise as the most powerful figure in the IRI, 
proving the early calculations wrong.  
Finally, we should note that the competition between Khamenei and 
Rafsanjani – and the latter’s active participation in the IRI political scene – did 
not come to an end when Rafsanjani left the presidency. As we will see in the 
following pages, with his extensive personal and economic connections and 
status as the head of the Expediency Council, Rafsanjani remained an influential 
player and a key powerbroker, displaying a remarkable ability to survive astute 
                                                 
133 Ya Lesarat al-Hossein, a weekly journal of the Ansar-e Hezbollah, warned that the declaration 
“amounts to the death of the revolution as well as of Islamic values.” Ya Lesarat al-Hossein, 10 
February 1996, quoted in Rajaee (2007: 168). 
134 Put forth by Rafsanjani’s Deputy President Ata’ollah Mohajerani and Chief of Staff Hossein 
Marashi, the proposal was vehemently opposed by the traditionalists, “politely rejected” by the 
reformists and ultimately dismissed by Khamenei. See Moslem (2002: 240, 241). 
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political challenges, often by shifting alliances between traditionalists and 
reformists. Indeed, both his presidency and subsequent political career serve as 
a clear demonstration of the personal nature of politics in the IRI, specifically, the 
persistent emphasis on individual leadership and the complex web of 
connections within a relatively closed group of revolutionary elites. 
 
 
Politics of reform: The Khatami presidency 
 
The intellectual discourse of reform 
 
To repeat the initial observation of this chapter, all three presidents that were 
elected after the death of Khomeini clashed with and ultimately lost to Khamenei. 
This suggests both an inherent tension between the dual pillars of the Iranian 
hybrid regime and also an imbalance of power between these pillars that favours 
the Islamic pillar. This tension and imbalance was the central issue of the 
Khatami presidency. I noted above that the critical reappraisal of the velayat-e 
faqih system had already started in earnest during the early 1990s as part of the 
intellectual evolution of the left. The criticisms that formed the core of the reform 
movement’s intellectual discourse were important because they came from 
within the system – from theologians, philosophers and political activists who 
had supported the revolution and were a part of the regime during its first 
decade and thus implicitly claimed a ‘license’ to evaluate it in the absence of the 
system’s founder. For this reason, they presented an acute ideological challenge 
to the traditionalist interpretation of the institutional architecture of the IRI and 
promises of the revolution. 
 The beginning of the reform movement can be traced to the emergence in 
1991 of Kiyan, the foremost religious intellectual journal of the decade, which 
provided a platform for debate among influential philosophers like Abdolkarim 
Soroush, Mohammad Mojtahed Shabestari and Mohsen Kadivar. Kiyan itself was 
a continuation of Kayhan-e Farhangi, the first major monthly journal on culture, 
literature and philosophy in the IRI, which was banned in 1990 for publishing a 
series provocative articles written by Abdolkarim Soroush, titled “The 
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Theoretical Contraction and Expansion of Religious Knowledge”. Educated in 
Tehran and London, Soroush was a supporter of Khomeini in the 1970s and 
upon his return to Iran after the revolution, served at the seven-member 
committee overseeing the implementation of Khomeini’s Cultural Revolution.  
In his “Theory of Contraction and Expansion”, which forms the basis of his 
philosophy as well as that of religious revivalism in post-Khomeini Iran, Soroush 
(1994) tackled the dilemma of change and perfection (immutability) in religion. 
Stressing the impossibility of grasping the totality of religion (din), Soroush 
instead argued that “religious knowledge” (marifat-e dini) is a form of human 
knowledge; sincere, but fallible and therefore subject to change (Sadri 2001: 
259). He was therefore critical of the presentation of religious knowledge as 
sacred and absolute (1994: 206 – 208). Building on this premise, Soroush 
claimed that Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) constitutes only one aspect of religious 
knowledge and cannot singularly provide the basis of “just government” (1995: 
28). Identifying justice as a “metareligious concept”,135 he holds that for a 
modern administration to be just, it has to derive its sources both from within 
religion, including kalam (discursive theology) and akhlaq (ethics) alongside 
fiqh, and from without, i.e. modern sciences and secular knowledge (1993: 52; 
1995), ultimately making the case for “religious democracy” that is based on 
pluralism, human rights and the rejection of dogma (1996; 2000: 131 – 155). 
While Soroush argued that religious knowledge was variable, Shabestari’s 
main contribution to the debate was his emphasis on the essentially limited 
nature of religious knowledge and the need to seek extra-religious (secular) 
sources to complement it (Shabestari 1995). As a mojtahed who, by his own 
admission, works strictly within the boundaries of Islamic tradition, Shabestari 
presented a religious case for separating the divine from the worldly and 
challenged the legitimate authority of absolute guardianship.136 But if 
                                                 
135 See “Bavar-e dini, Davar-e dini” in Soroush (1993), and “Tolerance and Governance: A 
Discourse on Religion and Democracy” in Soroush (2000: 132). 
136 “Throughout history, the role of prophets has been that of a messenger not of a ruler […] The 
issue of man’s sovereignty over himself is in one aspect an ontological matter. In another aspect 
it is related to history and the philosophy of history. In a third aspect, it is a discursive matter 
connected to theology. Those who interpret the Quranic verse ‘God is the only one fit to judge’ 
(Enel hokm ella lellah) literally as if only God had the right to rule but that he delegated this right 
to some people or community do not take into account all three aspects of the issue.” Aban, 16 
April 2000, No. 121, p. 4. For his views on secularism, see Shabestari (1998). 
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Shabestari’s critiques were indirect and non-confrontational in style, Mohsen 
Kadivar, who is also a mojtahed, took on Khomeini’s formulation of the absolute 
guardianship of the jurisprudent directly and refuted it openly from the 
perspective of fiqh. In Government by Mandate, the second volume of his seminal 
trilogy on political theology, Kadivar launched “a frontal and unabashed attack” 
on Khomeini’s theory, concluding that it is “neither intuitively obvious, nor 
rationally necessary”: 
 
It is neither a requirement of religion, nor a necessity for 
denomination (mazhab). It is neither a part of the general 
principles of Shiism (osoul), nor a component of detailed 
observances (forou’). It is, by near consensus of Shiite ulama, 
nothing more than a jurisprudential minor hypothesis and 
its proof is contingent upon reasons adduced from the four 
categories of Quran, Traditions, Consensus and Reason. 
(Kadivar 1999: 235; quoted in Sadri 2001: 265) 
 
Besides such philosophical challenges, overtly political criticisms of the 
system and the Leader by dissident clerics, lay intellectuals and political activists 
became more vocal and commonplace following Khatami’s election. In November 
1997, Grand Ayatollah Ahmad Azari-Qomi published an open letter blaming 
Khamenei for sanctioning extra-judicial killings and torture and the pervasive 
culture of corruption and moral decadence within the regime. He went on to 
propose dividing the leadership into two departments, with Khamenei being 
responsible for political affairs and Grand Ayatollah Montazeri for religious 
affairs.137 For his part, Montazeri openly questioned the constitutionality of 
Khamenei’s extensive authority, arguing that it should be limited to a 
supervisory role, and criticised the GC’s interference in elections.138 Former IRGC 
officer-turned-dissident journalist Akbar Ganji was more blunt and provocative. 
In a public lecture shortly after Khatami’s election, Ganji labelled the 
traditionalist supporters of the regime “totalitarian Islamo-fascists”.139 
It is important to stress that Khatami typically disapproved of the tone 
and the openness of the criticisms and attacks levied against the regime and the 
                                                 
137 “Name-ye Azari-Qomi be jame-ye modaresin”, Rahesabz, 3 August 2013, 
http://www.rahesabz.net/story/73767/  
138 “Montazeri: Khamenei should have supervisory role”, Reuters, 19 November 1997 
139 Ganji was subsequently prosecuted and jailed for three months on the basis of his speech. 
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Leader. Instead, he opted for a less confrontational approach that emphasised 
the loyalty of the reform movement to velayet-e faqih and the legacy of 
Khomeini.140 Frequently stressing Khomeini’s support for republicanism and 
mass participation in politics, Khatami worked to present the goals of the reform 
movement – emphasised as establishing rule of law, strengthening civil society 
(jame’e-ye madani) and defining the limits of the “guardianship society” (jame’e-
ye velai) – as necessary for the fulfilment of the charismatic leader’s vision and 
the promises of the revolution. He summarised these goals in his inaugural 
speech in the following words: “Establishment of the rule of law is an Islamic, 
revolutionary and national obligation, and an absolute imperative, which 
requires a conducive and enabling environment as well as a legal means and 
instruments coupled with public involvement and assistance.” (Khatami 1997: 
81)141 
Shakibi notes that Khatami’s position regarding the power and the 
responsibilities of the Leader remained ambiguous throughout his presidency: 
“His public stance indicated support for the broad supervisory role that permits 
intervention on decisive and politically paralysing issues in the hope that the 
Leader would support those positions on which Khatami and the proponents of 
politics of change were attached given their electoral success. Yet, the practical 
consequences of his rhetoric and programme would result in a Leadership 
position similar to that propagated by Montazeri.” (2010: 308). This ambiguity 
may have been a result of Khatami’s expressed faith in the hybrid system as 
formulated by Khomeini; that ultimately the Islamic and republican pillars could 
co-exist and work in a harmonious fashion. For this, he believed, the constitution 
had to be fully implemented and the institutions of guardianship had to accept 
willingly institutional checks on their existing prerogatives, which, 
unsurprisingly, they did not.  
                                                 
140 This view apparently predated Khatami’s election. In the words of Abdolkarim Soroush, “I 
remember that Mr Khatami was culture minister at the time or he was the head of the Kayhan 
Institute. He criticized some of Kayhan Farhangi’s methods; quite fierce criticism. I know that Mr. 
Rokhsefat [one of the founders of Kayhan Farhangi] and Mr. Khatami had some heated 
arguments.” Official website of Abdolkarim Soroush, 
 http://www.drsoroush.com/English/Interviews/E-INT-Kian.html  
141 Note the inclusion of ‘the national’ alongside ‘Islamic’ and ‘revolutionary’ in this formulation, 
which can be seen as another subtle indication of a return from Islamic revolutionary 
universalism to nation-state rationale. 
168 
 
Khatami wanted to reform the IRI from within and above without 
breaking the system (Arjomand 2009: 92). In other words, while he did dare to 
initiate the Iranian perestroika, he did not wish to go down in history as Iran’s 
Gorbachev; the man responsible for the collapse of the system that he tried to 
improve. At those critical junctures when he suspected that the forces unleashed 
by the politics of change would challenge the core institution of the regime – 
velayat-e faqih – he consistently refrained from confronting the guardians, which 
ultimately sealed the fate of the reform movement. 
 
The reformist surge and the traditionalist backlash 
 
By the mid-1990s, as the Rafsanjani administration was grappling with the 
complexities of economic development, a growing number of observers inside 
and outside Iran noticed the increasing societal restlessness caused by the lack of 
political reforms.142 It was indeed this overwhelming demand for political 
change, expressed primarily by the country’s growing urban middle and lower-
middle classes, youth population and women, that carried Khatami into office in 
1997 with an unprecedented popular mandate. Despite the existing signs, the 
outcome took the traditionalist guardians by complete surprise: Khatami’s 
convincing defeat of Nateq-Nuri (70% against 25% of the vote) despite the 
Leader’s presumed support for the latter was compounded by the high turnout 
of 80% (up 30% from the previous election). The impact of the reformist victory 
and the extent of the desire for change soon became apparent as Khatami’s call 
for popular participation in politics found spirited response in increased civil 
society activism. NGOs began to emerge in large numbers and student 
movements were mobilised into vocal advocacy and political pressure groups 
(Mashayekhi 2001).143 Under Culture Minister Ata’ollah Mohajerani (former 
                                                 
142 One of these observers, Ehteshami noted: “The Rafsanjani government […] has been reluctant 
to legalise channels of political opposition, content with the belief that if economic channels of 
self-expression exist the need for political reform diminishes. The emergence of new class 
factions at the ruler level, or a return of the old ones, will, however, increase pressures for 
political reform. Indeed, if economic reform does not bear fruit, then pressure for change at the 
political level may become overwhelming.” (1995: 124) 
143 In the words of one student movement leader, “the fundamental role of the student movement 
is to critique power. The student movement is not a political party, an institution, or a political 
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deputy president to Rafsanjani and one of the founders of Kargozaran), reformist 
newspapers and journals proliferated, sharply criticising and thoroughly 
challenging official viewpoints represented in the traditionalist-controlled TV 
and radio.144  
 Riding on the back of this popular wave, the reformists swept the local 
council elections held in February 1999 and the Majles elections in February and 
May 2000. The 1999 elections for city, district and village councils were 
particularly significant as they were the first to be organised in the IRI despite 
being stipulated in the 1979 Constitution. Also notable was the fact that a 
parliamentary commission had handled the vetting of candidates, instead of the 
GC. With this election, the authority of appointing town mayors was transferred 
from the interior ministry to elected councils. As such, the local elections 
symbolised a key step towards realising Khatami’s vision of grassroots 
participation in political decision-making (Akbari and Aganji 2013).145 “With the 
implementation of the provision on municipal councils,” he declared, “the people 
will be given the opportunity to restore their rights. [This] will help remove the 
chronic mentality of law breaking.”146 
 Following on the success of the local elections, the victory in the elections 
for the Sixth Majles, which gave the reformist Participation Front (Moshakerat) 
189 of the 290 seats (as opposed to 54 for the traditionalist Society of the 
Militant Clergy and 42 for Kargozaran), appeared at the time as a turning point 
for the balance of power among rival factions, and potentially, between the two 
pillars of the IRI hybrid regime. It was not to be. Notably, the reformists were 
denied the veto-busting two-thirds majority they looked to have secured after 
the Guardian Council strategically annulled a number of reformist victories in 
provinces where “potential for unrest was low” or easily containable (Shakibi 
2010: 309). This signalled the beginning of an intensified backlash by the 
traditionalist guardians, who regarded the reformist surge as an internal coup 
                                                                                                                                            
actor; on the contrary, it is the antithesis of such powers. Its objective is to mobilise for 
democracy and human rights, and to reform power.” Quoted in Bayat (2007: 108).  
144 “Print media triumphs in Iranian elections”, BBC World Monitoring, 21 February 2000, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/monitoring/media_reports/651194.stm   
145 Ettela’at, 19 April 1999. 
146 “Iran prepares for first-ever local elections”, BBC World Monitoring, 10 February 1999, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/monitoring/276816.stm  
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d’état and realised the existing filters of the electoral system had failed to block 
it. 
 Let us remember at this point that the reformists were already facing 
growing resistance, obstruction and intimidation from their opponents in the 
guardianship institutions, since the traditionalists had shaken off their initial 
surprise at the outcome of the 1997 presidential election. Like Khatami, the 
Leader and his traditionalist supporters had also learned from the experience of 
Gorbachev and the Soviet perestroika the dangers of opening up the political 
system to accommodate wider opposition, and they were determined to resist. 
Consequently, while Khatami was focusing his energies on mobilising the masses 
for increased political participation, the Leader simply put his weight behind 
strengthening his personal tutelage over key state institutions through strategic 
appointments and representatives. The institution that emerged as the vanguard 
of the resistance to the reformists during Khatami’s first term was the judiciary. 
Politicised courts, populated by former Ministry of Intelligence and Security 
interrogators recruited by the head of the judiciary, Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi, 
since the mid-1990s, took upon themselves the task of suppressing the reformist 
press and harassing the leading reformists (Takeyh 2009: 190).  
Within a few years, many of the hundreds of newspapers that had opened 
after 1997 were banned. Montazeri was placed under house arrest shortly after 
challenging Khamenei. In February 1998, the Special Court of the Clergy 
sentenced former Tehran mayor and Kargozaran founder Gholamhossein 
Karbaschi to two years in prison on corruption charges. In April 1999, in a trial 
that attracted considerable international attention, the same court sentenced 
Mohsen Kadivar to 18 months in prison for spreading propaganda against the 
regime.147 In November, Abdollah Nuri was found guilty of insulting Ayatollah 
Khomeini. The attempt to suppress and intimidate the movement took a violent 
turn with the physical attacks and harassment of pro-reform students, activists 
and clerics by state-backed vigilante groups, as well as the murders of outspoken 
                                                 
147 Ironically, Kadivar was arrested not for his theological works but for a sermon in which he 
criticised the guardians for involvement in political assassination of dissidents. For the text of 
Kadivar’s defense see Kadivar (1999). 
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artists and intellectuals.148 The investigation and the ensuing trial of the 
intelligence agents, whose involvement in a spate of high-profile killings in late 
1998 was admitted to by regime officials after sustained public pressure, were 
watered down and failed to disclose the full extent of senior officials’ 
involvement in the murders.149 The assassination attempt that permanently 
disabled Saeed Hajjarian, who had worked to uncover the murders, shortly after 
the Majles election in 2000, was a clear message that those behind the campaign 
of intimidation were not daunted by the judicial process. 
The perpetrators of these acts took courage from hardliner traditionalist 
clerics who openly sanctioned the use of violence against the opposition. Most 
notably, Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi declared that the enemies of Islam “present 
principles such as tolerance and compromise as absolute values while violence is 
regarded as a non-value. […] The taboo that every act of violence is bad and 
every act of tolerance is good must be broken.”150 They would also be 
encouraged by the fact that the Leader himself did not explicitly denounce 
violence.151 For his part, aside from expressing his support for the victims of 
violence and condemning its perpetrators, Khatami was neither able to prevent 
these attacks from occurring, nor ensure that the trials were conducted in a just 
and transparent manner. In the absence of an organised party structure and 
meaningful support from inside the regime, Khatami’s faith in the ability of 
loosely coordinated civil society activism to instigate change appeared 
increasingly misplaced and excessive. 
                                                 
148 State-sanctioned assassinations targeting non-conformist individuals took place throughout 
the 1990s, resulting in “a massive emigration of the Iranian intelligentsia and the death of nearly 
100 people connected with art, letters, and literature.” (Rajaee 2007: 170 – 171). The 
assassinations reached a climax in late 1998. In November, political dissidents Dariush and 
Pervaneh Forouhar were murdered in their home, while dissident journalist Majid Sharif and 
editor Pirouz Davani ‘disappeared’ after being abducted by plainclothes intelligence agents. The 
following month saw the assassinations of authors Mohammad Jafar Pouyandeh and Mohammad 
Mokhtari. 
149 “Iranian journalist names names”, BBC News, 30 November 2000, 
 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/1048502.stm; “'Cover-up' in Iran murder trial”, 
BBC News, 7 January 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/1105447.stm; 
 “Iranian killers spared death penalty”, BBC News, 29 January 2003, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/2704023.stm. 
150 Kayhan, 5 August 1999. 
151 Intervening in the debate, Khamenei essentially stated that violence, when used by the state, 
was “good and necessary”, but “bad, ugly and criminal” when used by non-state actors. IRNA, 21 
April 2000, cited in Shakibi (2010: 323). 
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Against Hajjarian’s consistent advice to push for permanent institutional 
reform while the traditionalists had yet to figure out an effective strategy to 
thwart the reformist challenge, Khatami was reluctant to confront the 
traditionalist guardians openly. In August 2000, he missed an important 
opportunity to start a debate to define the limits of the Leader’s authority, when 
Khamenei took advantage of the legal ambiguity surrounding his powers to issue 
a governmental decree (hokm-e hokumati) ordering the newly formed Majles to 
stop deliberating a new press law. A failed initiative in early 1999 to make the 
bonyads answerable to the Ministry of Finance was the only (rather timid) 
attempt at structural reform during Khatami’s first term. By the time he finally 
came to accept in his second term that some confrontation was unavoidable and 
perhaps necessary, he was already facing a united guardianship front 
determined to contain the threat posed by the reformist-dominated republican 
pillar.  
As the threat from the reformist camp increased, the Guardian Council, 
with the Leader’s blessing, came to fulfil its role as the first line of defence 
against the bills proposed by the reformist Majles. But it was the Expediency 
Council, tasked with mediating disputes between the GC and the Majles, which 
served as the institution that ultimately tipped the scale against the reformists by 
siding with the GC at every critical juncture. At the head of the EC was Rafsanjani, 
who in the early 2000s had once again switched sides to cooperate with the 
traditionalists, after facing scathing personal attacks and criticisms from the 
reformists. Khatami did not approve of these attacks but nor did he attempt to 
contain them until Rafsanjani had moved toward the traditionalist camp. With 
the EC’s support, the GC successfully struck down two major bills aimed at 
shifting the balance of power in the republican pillar’s favour. Introduced in 
September 2002, the first of the ‘twin bills’ was attempted to roll back the 
supervisory powers that the Guardian Council had assumed after 1991. The 
second bill was intended to enhance the president’s authority as the protector of 
the constitution on the basis of the Article 113.  
Following the bills’ rejection, some reformists suggested that the 
president resign in protest and as a tactical push for national referendum. In 
response, Rahim Safavi, commander of the IRGC issued a thinly veiled threat of 
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violent reprisal.152 Withdrawing the bills from the parliament in April 2004, 
Khatami wrote a letter expressing dashed hopes of reform and frustration at the 
recalcitrance of the Guardian Council. 153 The letter was remarkable not so much 
as an admission of defeat, which had become fairly clear by that point, but rather 
as an example of Khatami’s unrealistic expectation, maintained until very late, 
that the guardians would willingly give up their power. 
The loss of hope among the reformists translated into political apathy and 
dwindling participation, depriving Khatami of the movement’s most valued asset. 
The first electoral defeat came in the local elections of 2003, in which many 
reformist councillors were replaced by traditionalists as well as members of the 
emerging neo-conservative faction, such as Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who became 
the mayor of Tehran. In January 2004, in the run up to the elections for the 
Seventh Majles, the GC disqualified 3,600 out of nearly 8,200 candidates, 
including 80 sitting reformist MPs. With an expanded budget approved by the 
EC, the GC was able to employ thousands of ‘investigators’ to produce 
incriminatory evidence against potential candidates; a capability it had lacked in 
2000 (Ehsani 2004). Khatami once again refrained from challenging the 
guardians when he failed to support the 123 reformist MPs, who had threatened 
to resign in protest and demanded rescheduling the elections. Acquiescing to the 
Leader’s wishes, Khatami “had unwillingly become complicit in the emasculation 
of the republican part of the IRI” (Shakibi 2010: 318). The subsequent defeat in 
the Majles election was followed by the presidential election in June 2005, which 
large portions of the thoroughly demoralised reformist base preferred to 
boycott, instead of voting for Rafsanjani or his populist neo-conservative rival. 
 
Behind the defeat: structure and agency 
  
In explaining the defeat of the reform movement, the institutional obstructions 
machinated by the traditionalist guardians outlined above loom large. But also 
important were the dynamics related to the wider context in which the 
reformists had to operate as well as the agency of Khatami-as-leader. The 
                                                 
152 “Iran's long power struggle nears climax”, Financial Times, 2 November 2002. 
153 Ettela’at, 13 April 2004. 
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international environment in the late 1990s and the early 2000s did not facilitate 
Khatami’s reform attempts. Given oil’s predominance in the Iranian economy, the 
historical lows in petroleum prices experienced during Khatami’s presidency 
forced the reformists to work with a contracted budget. As fallout from the 
slowdown in the world economy and especially the Asian financial crisis, Iran’s 
oil export revenues fell by nearly 20% and non-oil exports by 7% during 
1997/98 (Amuzegar 2001b). 
Despite some success in taming runaway inflation, managing an average 
annual growth of 5.6% between 2001 and 2005 and starting a programme of 
diversification from oil, the economic performance of the Khatami presidency 
was altogether underwhelming. Unemployment, partly a result of population 
growth, and underemployment remained high. The working class saw little 
tangible improvement in their lot. Khatami’s economic programme remained 
ambiguous, especially during his first term, due largely to the necessity of 
balancing between his liberal and statist supporters. The emphasis on economic 
liberalism during his second term did not make the government particularly 
popular among the working class. Ultimately, economic policies were 
overshadowed by the overriding rhetoric of political change. Although 
promoting social justice was articulated as one of the Participation Front’s goals, 
it did not constitute a major policy area or a prominent rhetorical point (Behdad 
2001; Askari 2004). Preoccupied with the philosophy of political change, the 
reformist leadership appeared distant to the day-to-day economic struggles of 
the country’s urban working class and rural population. This was a strategic 
failure that resulted in the limitation of the movement’s core base to the urban 
middle class. Putting social justice at the centre of his platform, Ahmadinejad was 
able to garner support from those classes that felt disenfranchised under both 
Rafsanjani and Khatami. 
In foreign affairs, Khatami’s policy of gradual rapprochement with the 
West, especially the US, met periodic resistance from the traditionalists at home 
and was left largely unreciprocated by Washington. Holding foreign policy firmly 
in his exclusive domain, the Leader provided Khatami with a degree of autonomy 
at the beginning of his first term, taking credit for his fleeting achievements and 
capitalising on his failures in due course. Despite the extensive intelligence 
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sharing and strategic cooperation between the US and Iran after the 11 
September 2001 attacks and during the US invasion of Afghanistan, Iran’s 
classification as part of an “axis of evil” by US President George W. Bush in 
February 2002 undermined Khatami’s position both at home and abroad (Parsi 
2007: 202 – 237). The 2003 US occupation of Iraq freed Iran of a historical rival 
in Saddam Hussein and inadvertently exposed Iraq to greater Iranian influence, 
which benefited mostly Khatami’s successor. But the heavy presence of US 
troops surrounding Iran became a cause for alarm for the regime.154 The 
heightened militaristic rhetoric against the Islamic Republic from the US and 
Israel during this period, despite Iran’s move to temporarily halt its uranium 
enrichment programme in 2003, undermined Khatami’s policy of reconciliation, 
culminating in Ahmadinejad’s policy of confrontation. 
Khatami preached ‘dialogue among civilisations’ at a time when the 
hegemonic foreign policy rhetoric in the West was shaped by the clash of 
civilisations discourse and the dichotomous worldview of the American neo-
conservatives that assigned to the US an enlightening mission in the Middle 
East.155 As I argued in Chapter 1, the Bush administration’s attempts to justify 
military occupations in the region through the rhetoric of liberty and democracy 
were detrimental to the legitimacy of local struggles for democracy and civil 
rights across the region. Moreover, the spread of pro-western ‘colour 
revolutions’ in the former Soviet republics gave the traditionalist guardians in 
the IRI an extra cause for caution and resistance to Khatami’s reform agenda. The 
Leader, IRGC commanders and the traditionalist clergy frequently spoke of the 
need to remain vigilant against foreign-backed initiatives, which Khamenei 
referred to as “soft overthrow” (barandazi-ye narm) (Arjomand 2009: 178). It 
was also in this light that the traditionalist guardians viewed and responded to 
the popular support expressed for the ‘Green Movement’ and the mass 
demonstrations that followed the presidential election in June 2009. 
Despite all the economic, geopolitical and institutional woes that the 
reformists had to contend with, it appears in hindsight that events would have 
                                                 
154 Shortly after the US invasion, former IRGC chief Mohsen Rezai expressed the widely held 
opinion that “any action against Iraq is a prelude to one against Iran.” IRNA, 16 April 2003; 
quoted in Takeyh 2009: 217). 
155 For one notable and highly influential example, see Lewis (2002). 
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taken a different turn had Khatami chosen not to retreat against his more 
determined opponents at each of the several critical junctures that he faced as 
president. As early as in 1999, at the height of the student protests that were 
triggered by the closure of the Salam newspaper and had quickly spread across 
all the major Iranian cities, one of the popular slogans alongside “Freedom of 
thought, always, always” and “Khamenei must go!” (which was also a first) was 
“Khatami, where are you?” Unable to control the slogans and the demands of the 
protestors, and in fear of being responsible for throwing the country into 
anarchy, the reformist leadership had chosen not to stand behind the students, 
even as they were being attacked by the Hezbollahi vigilantes and the Basij 
militia. During a heated exchange in a ceremony marking the student day at the 
University of Tehran in December 2004, students angry with Khatami’s failure to 
stand up for the thousands of reformist candidates banned from the Seventh 
Majles elections chanted “Khatami, Khatami, shame on you!” and “Incompetent 
Khatami”. In response, the beleaguered president admitted: 
  
If I retreated, I retreated against the system I believed in. I 
considered necessary saving the system. […] Either we had 
to hold the elections or face riots. […] I didn't consider it in 
the country's interests that riots erupt.156 
 
In the end, Khatami’s fear of civil strife and institutional collapse of the 
hybrid regime led him to grudgingly accept the systematic suppression of the 
republican pillar by the guardians. Some observers pointed out that this fear was 
exaggerated and manipulated by the traditionalists. Writing during the standoff 
over the disqualification of reformist candidates by the GC in January 2004, 
Ansari suggested that the proponents of change should resist the temptation to 
compromise and make good on their threat to resign en masse: “Only this way 
can they potentially re-energise a public hungry for genuine, decisive leadership. 
In short, they will have to call the hardliners' bluff, by ignoring the much over-
used threat that confrontation could lead to the disintegration of the Iranian 
state through civil strife.” (Ansari 2004).  
                                                 
156 “Students heckle Iranian president”, BBC News, 6 December 2004, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4072887.stm.  
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By this time, however, many former supporters of the president had given 
up not only on Khatami but also, on the possibility of reform from within the 
system. Boycotting the Majles election, the main student organisation, Daftar-e 
Tahkim-e Vahdat, argued: “Unless elections lead to systematic and fundamental 
change they will only legitimise autocracy. […] The constitution of the Islamic 
Republic in its present form, with institutions such as the Guardian Council, the 
Expediency Council and [the office of] the Leader leaves no further room for 
democratisation.” (Ehsani 2004). In an open letter titled “The Tragedy of 
Khatami”, jailed dissident Hashem Aghajari warned about the possible collapse 
of the hybrid regime: 
  
In a very short period of time, the democratic face of the 
Iranian constitution is going to be turned into an autocratic 
face. […] Alongside this comical repetition of history we are 
also witnessing a tragedy: the tragedy of Khatami. […] 
During the six years that have elapsed for the reformist 
government and the four years of the reformist parliament, 
because of a lack of will and courage great opportunities 
were missed. 157 
 
 
 
Politics of populism: The Ahmadinejad presidency 
 
Mesbah Yazdi and the neo-conservative project 
  
Despite being effectively outmanoeuvred by the Leader and the traditionalists, 
during the eight years of Khatami presidency, the reformists demonstrated that a 
popular movement could pose a significant threat to the guardians and the 
velayet-e faqih system by gaining control of the republican institutions. The 
reformists were defeated, but not without incurring considerable damage on the 
guardians, whose increasingly blatant meddling in the electoral and legislative 
processes brought the democratic legitimacy and the feasibility of the hybrid 
system under more critical scrutiny. On balance, the instability caused by 
                                                 
157 ISNA, 13 February 2004; “Iranian dissident says reforms at an end”, Al Jazeera English, 15 
February 2004, http://www.aljazeera.com/archive/2004/02/2008410162841593824.html.  
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sustained conflict between the two pillars did not seem to benefit the guardians. 
Thus, towards the end of Khatami’s second term the traditionalist guardians had 
set out to look for a successor to Khatami, who could both compete in popular 
politics and also remain loyal to the Leader.  
The most resourceful of these guardians was the hardliner Ayatollah 
Mesbah Yazdi. A founder of the influential Haqqani seminary in Qom (along with 
his ally Ahmad Jannati, the head of the Guardian Council), Mesbah Yazdi was one 
of the fiercest critics of the drive for political reform and pluralism under 
Khatami.158 A firm believer in the absolute guardianship of the jurisprudent, he 
has claimed that the Leader derives his legitimacy directly from the Twelfth 
Imam and chooses to delegate some of this divine authority to the people.159 
People, according to Mesbah Yazdi, play no role in legitimising the political 
system:  
 
In our view, the validity of the laws enacted in the Islamic 
Republic of Iran stems from the orders and the signature of 
the vali-ye fiqh. Without his approval, a matter has no 
validity. […] Had he not signed it, [the constitution] would 
have been null. Even if everyone had voted for it, it would 
have no legal or religious validity. […] [Imam] orders you to 
vote and elect a president; presidential elections derive their 
validity from his will. He saw it expedient in the current 
conditions for people to vote. 160 
 
Mesbah Yazdi openly declared his opposition to the institutional division 
of powers in the IRI, arguing that Islamic jurisprudence entitled the Leader to 
control all three branches of government: the executive, legislative and the 
judiciary.161 In his worldview, the conflict between the two pillars of the hybrid 
system had to be resolved in favour of the appointed guardians (2006: 160 – 
161; Rahnema 2011: 91). Although seeing the electoral institutions as a 
theoretical nuisance, Mesbah Yazdi was also aware of the practical importance of 
                                                 
158 Rejecting the Participation Front’s slogan “Iran for all Iranians”, Mesbah Yazdi retorted: “What 
does this slogan mean? Muslims are Iranians, but so are Baha’is. Does this mean Baha’is have the 
right to govern as well? […] It is the wish of the United States to have Baha’ism recognised as an 
official religion. […] The slogan ‘Iran for all Iranians’ is a ploy to bring minority religions into 
government.” Speech, 5 June 2001; in San’ati (2008: 734). 
159 Resalat, 6 October 1998 
160 Part-o Sokhan, 28 December 2005 
161 Speech titled “Velayat-e faqih va Khobregan”, 15 March 2006, Official website of Ayatollah 
Mesbah Yazdi, http://www.mesbahyazdi.org/farsi/speeches/lectures/lectures21.htm  
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popular politics and the necessity to devise more subtle and effective methods of 
controlling public opinion. His formula entailed promoting a populist counter-
narrative to the reformist discourse based on a sense of public nostalgia for the 
moral purity and the religious fervour of the martyrs of the revolution, a spirit 
embodied in the veterans of the war with Iraq and especially the Basij militia. 
This narrative was embodied by the neo-conservative faction that had 
emerged in the mid-1990s and grew in prominence towards the end of Khatami’s 
presidency. This faction consisted mainly of non-clerical second generation 
revolutionaries and particularly veterans of the war with Iraq, who became 
active within the security and intelligence sectors during the 1990s. Their 
worldview combined the Islamic left’s social justice-based economic agenda and 
anti-imperialist stance in foreign policy with the traditionalists’ strict views on 
religious morality and defence of traditional jurisprudence (Ehteshami and 
Zweiri 2007). A representative of this faction, a former member of the Basij and 
the mayor of Tehran since 2003, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad seemed to fit the bill of 
a true loyalist and a sincere populist. He had become a follower of Mesbah 
Yazdi’s ideas in the early 2000s as the two shared a millenarian belief in the 
imminent return of the Hidden Imam. Mesbah Yazdi was the only high profile 
cleric to endorse Ahmadinejad openly at a time when few people gave the little 
known mayor much chance in the 2005 election. Encouraging his followers to 
support the young and eccentric candidate, he declared that participating in the 
elections was a religious duty. Pointing at the Rafsanjani and Khatami 
administrations, he said, “we have not had an Islamic government yet, but we 
would like to have that government now and that means we cannot afford not 
voting.” (San’ati 2008: 858) 
Ahmadinejad’s second place showing in the first round, behind Rafsanjani 
and just ahead of reformist former Majles speaker Mehdi Karroubi, and his 
victory over Rafsanjani in the second round were therefore a surprise to many 
Iranians and foreign observers alike, but not so much to Mesbah Yazdi.162 Many 
reformists chose to boycott the election (the turnout was 63% and 59% in the 
two rounds respectively, compared to 80% in 1997) and the reformist vote that 
                                                 
162 Karroubi contested the first round results, claiming vote rigging, but was not able to push for a 
recount. 
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did come was divided between Karroubi, Mostafa Moin and Mohsen 
Mehralizadeh. It was also rumoured that the Leader, who had initially favoured 
Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, had switched his support shortly before the first 
round and put his resources behind Ahmadinejad (Takeyh 2009: 235).  
Especially ahead of the second round, when the Khamenei-Rafsanjani 
rivalry resurfaced, the traditionalist guardians mobilised the mosque networks, 
the IRGC and Basij volunteers in support of Ahmadinejad.163 Shunned by the 
reformists, the traditionalists and the neo-conservatives alike, Rafsanjani spent 
most of his campaign lobbying for alliance in Tehran and Qom. In contrast, an 
energetic Ahmadinejad visited the urban poor and toured the neglected 
countryside to deliver his message of social justice. Significantly, his campaign 
featured conspicuously few references praising the clerical leadership of the IRI, 
including Khomeini. In this sense, the victory of this modest man against the 
country’s wealthiest cleric and ultimate regime insider, securing 61% of the vote 
in the second round, was also a potent expression of discontent with the clerical 
elite.  
Ahmadinejad’s first term did not provide the type of dramatic 
institutional and ideological conflicts that had characterised the Khatami 
presidency. Behind the carefully maintained image of unity and harmony, 
however, divisions between the traditionalists and the neo-conservatives – and 
the two pillars of the regime – were growing. A key point of tension in this 
period, which would become a major cause of the breakdown of relations 
between the president and the Leader during Ahmadinejad’s second term, was 
over the appointment of cabinet ministers. Nominally within the president’s 
authority, it had become commonplace for the Leader to interfere in the 
appointment process. In a surprisingly defiant attempt to enforce his 
constitutional prerogatives, shortly after being elected Ahmadinejad fired the 
chiefs of four major public banks and went on to form his cabinet and senior 
administration without consulting the Leader. Most of his appointees were 
second generation revolutionaries: former IRGC members, Basijis, intelligence 
officials and prison administrators with little or no experience in government. He 
                                                 
163 Deputy commander of the Guards, Mohammad Baqir Zulqadr, boasted: “Traditionalist forces 
won the election thanks to the smart and multi-front plan and through massive participation of 
the basij.” Sharq, 14 July 2005; quoted in Takeyh (2009: 236). 
181 
 
also picked loyal disciples of Mesbah Yazdi from the Haqqani seminary for key 
positions.164 Faced with this unexpected affront, the traditionalists in the Majles 
allied with Rafsanjani to block four of the president’s nominees, including three 
nominations for the oil ministry.165 
In the process, it became apparent that populism – at least the type 
Ahmadinejad   presented – and loyalty to the clerical establishment did not easily 
go together. The president’s sharp attacks against Iran’s ‘oil mafia’ and ‘economic 
aristocrats’ (targeting in particular Rafsanjani), together with his redistributive 
policies that included heavy injection of oil funds into the economy, increased 
subsidies and cash hand-outs for lower income families, drew the ire of the 
traditionalists, the pragmatists as well as some of his own followers.166 Nor were 
these factions particularly pleased with Ahmadinejad’s confrontational anti-
western rhetoric, finding his conduct of foreign policy imprudent and too 
independently driven. The Leader’s distrust in the president’s policies and his 
instinct to protect and control the clerical establishment became visible in 
October 2005, when he issued a decree to expand the supervisory powers of the 
Expediency Council over the judiciary, the executive and the legislative 
branches.167 He also instructed the EC to prepare an economic programme 
parallel to that of the president’s. Furthermore, the establishment of the Strategic 
Council for Foreign Relations (Shora-ye Rahbordi-ye Ravabet-e Khareji, SCFR) in 
2006 with another decree from the Leader was meant as a check on the 
president’s ambitious forays into foreign policy.168 
 Another controversial aspect of Ahmadinejad’s presidency for the clerical 
establishment, leading to his eventual confrontation with the Leader, was the 
millenarian propaganda spread by the president’s circle about the purported link 
between Ahmadinejad and the Twelfth Imam. In contrast to Khatami, who had 
                                                 
164 Morteza Agha-Tehrani was appointed as the cabinet’s “ethics advisor”. Gholamhossein 
Mohseni-Ejei became the minister of intelligence, Manoucher Mohammadi the deputy foreign 
minister and Mohammad Naser Saghaye Biriya a senior advisor to the president. Gholam-Hossein 
Elham, also a member of the GC whose journalist wife Fatameh Rajabi wrote a book titled 
Ahmadinejad: Miracle of the Third Millennium, was first appointed as spokesperson to the 
president then the minister of justice. 
165 “Ahmadinejad embarrassed again”, Economist, 23 November 2005 
166 Mohammad Khoshchehreh, who was an economic adviser to Ahmadinejad but quit within 
three months of his election, became an outspoken critic of his economic policies. Ettela’at, 14 
September 2006 
167 “Iran Moves to Curb Hard-Liners”, Washington Post, 8 October 2005 
168 “Iran: New Foreign Policy Council Could Curtail Ahmadinejad's Power”, RFE/RL, 29 June 2006. 
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shunned superstitious religious dogma and emphasised reason (aql) (1997: 26 – 
27), Ahmadinejad and his mentor Mesbah Yazdi passionately embraced it. 
Mesbah Yazdi declared Ahmadinejad’s 2005 victory a miraculous event and part 
of a divine plan.169 Another cleric close to Mesbah Yazdi, Ayatollah Meshkini 
claimed that all members of the Seventh Majles were approved by the Twelfth 
Imam (Rakel 2009: 58). Ahmadinejad often suggested that his presidency had 
ushered in a new “wave of spirituality” (mowj-e manaviyat) across the region.170 
He stirred controversy after his address to the UN General Assembly in 
September 2005 when he claimed that he was surrounded by a halo of light – a 
clear reference to divine legitimacy, or farr – and that an invisible force had 
fixated the delegates’ attention on him. He paid frequent visits to an obscure 
shrine in Jamkaran, south Tehran, where, according to popular legend, the 
Hidden Imam would reappear.171 Finally he made no secret of his conviction that 
the reappearance was imminent and that the main duty of his government was 
to prepare for his arrival.172 
For all its bizarre and superstitious characteristics, the neo-conservatives’ 
emphasis on miraculous occurrences and prophetic expectations had distinct 
populist and pragmatic elements. By suggesting a link between himself and the 
Twelfth Imam, Ahmadinejad was effectively circumventing the clerical guardians 
to lay direct claim on divinely ordained guardianship. The elevation of Jamkaran 
as an alternative pilgrimage site to the traditional Shi’a shrines in Qom and 
Mashhad was one way in which the neo-conservatives attempted to popularise a 
messianic version of Shiism that was deeply mystical and occultist. Naturally, the 
‘Jamkaranisation of Shiism’ (as reformist cleric Majid Ansari called it) by the 
followers of Ahmadinejad and the small cohort of clerics around Mesbah Yazdi, 
triggered criticism and accusations of ‘deviation’ from senior clerics with 
reformist as well as, increasingly, traditionalist political inclinations (Rahnema 
2011: 70 – 75). Mesbah Yazdi, too, increasingly became a direct target of clerical 
                                                 
169 Part-o Sokhan, 6 July 2005; 14 July 2005. 
170 See for example his comments on the spiritual resistance emerging in Palestine against Israel, 
26 October 2005, Official website of the Presidency of the IRI, http://www.president.ir/fa/2288.  
171 Ahmadinejad built a rail connection from the capital to Jamkaran when he was the mayor of 
Tehran. Mesbah Yazdi and Agha-Tehrani often expounded on the miraculous powers of the 
shrine and worked to elevate its status in the eyes of the pious folk. 
172 Emrooz, 29 September 2005; Etemaad-e Melli, 1 July 2008 
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criticism, as his position came to represent an attack against the hybrid regime in 
favour of absolute guardianship. 
However, as I noted above, these tensions were carefully managed 
between 2005 and 2009. Indeed the overall record of the neo-conservative and 
traditionalist dominated Seventh Majles displayed a marked loyalty to the 
authority of the Leader. Most vividly, in what Arjomand calls “an astounding feat 
of self-limitation” (2009: 174), the Majles in December 2008 undermined its own 
authority by giving up any theoretical right to oversee the financial and political 
activities of the Leader, the Guardian Council and the Expediency Council.173 
Ahmadinejad, too, frequently stressed his loyalty to the Leader, while the Leader 
strove to maintain a public image as above the fray of day-to-day politics. That 
image was to be undone after the presidential election in 2009, when the 
traditionalists and the neo-conservatives temporarily bridged their differences 
to counter what appeared to both factions a more imminent threat: the 
unexpected resurgence of the reformists.  
 
The 2009 presidential election and the loss of democratic legitimacy 
 
The presidential election of 12 June 2009 and its turbulent aftermath provided 
Iran with arguably its most critical socio-political juncture since the 1979 
revolution. The path taken at that juncture culminated in an unprecedented loss 
of legitimacy for the hybrid regime and the temporary collapse of the electoral 
process as the IRI’s flawed but relatively effective method of managing popular 
demands and factional rivalries. The election, in which former reformists were 
mobilised at a speed and efficiency that took most regime insiders by surprise, 
resulted in a proclaimed victory for the incumbent Mahmoud Ahmadinejad by a 
suspiciously wide margin in the first round. This led to allegations of extensive 
fraud, the largest mass demonstrations since the consolidation of the regime in 
1983, an open confrontation between the state and society and the eventual 
suppression of the reformist ‘Green Movement’ (Jonbesh-e Sabz) by the 
traditionalist/neo-conservative alliance. 
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 Several interrelated factors explain the widespread enthusiasm behind 
the Green Movement. Domestically, increasing economic hardship for the lower 
middle and working classes as a result of high inflation, ironically spurred by 
Ahmadinejad’s poorly managed redistributive policies, coupled with growing 
social restrictions and the loss of few civil liberties secured during the Khatami 
presidency, drove a new generation of young urban voters, especially women, 
into political activism.174 In their attempts to appeal to these voters, the two 
presidential candidates of the movement – former Prime Minister Mir Hossain 
Mousavi and former Majles speaker Mehdi Karroubi – demonstrated that they 
had learned from the reformists’ previous failures. 
 Mousavi and Karroubi built their political campaigns on a platform of 
“freedom, social justice and national sovereignty”.175 Moving away from the 
relatively abstract and discredited notion of ‘reform’ towards a more tangible 
and universal ‘rights’ discourse, both campaigns issued their human rights 
charter and pledged to push for the ratification of the UN Convention on the 
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (Nabavi 2012: 40; Sadeghi 2012). 
The more popular of the two candidates, Mousavi was able to unite the reformist 
base with the modernist right faction – a feat that had eluded Khatami – thanks 
to his personal relations with both Khatami and Rafsanjani. But the emphasis of 
his campaign on economic justice and the elimination of corruption revealed a 
conscious effort not to be identified strictly with the upper middle and middle 
classes – roughly associated with Rafsanjani and Khatami, respectively – and 
reach out to the lower middle and working classes. Mousavi’s own reputation as 
a long-time champion of socio-economic justice and able manager of the 
economy during the war with Iraq lent credibility to his message.  
 Geopolitically, the election of Barack Obama as the new US president in 
November 2008, and his expressed desire to reverse his predecessor’s 
belligerent policies in the region and especially towards Iran, created a sense 
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that a more moderate Iranian foreign policy rhetoric could help defuse military 
tensions over Iran’s nuclear programme and help restore its economic ties with 
the Gulf monarchies and the West.176 This appetite for reduced tensions, 
following a period of exceptional geopolitical tension under Ahmadinejad, 
appears to have contributed to the popular enthusiasm behind the Green 
Movement. It is important to remember, however, that both Mousavi and 
Karroubi consistently emphasised their firm support for Iran’s right to develop 
nuclear power. Alongside freedom and social justice, the two leaders highlighted 
the defence of national sovereignty as a key component of their platform, 
presenting the Green Movement as a continuation of the Constitutional 
Revolution, the movement for the nationalisation of the oil industry (1951 – 53) 
and the Islamic Revolution (Holliday 2011: 149; Dabashi 2011).  
 The lively and remarkably candid televised debates between the 
candidates before the election, a first in the country’s history, allowed the voters 
to see the major differences of opinion between the candidates – not only 
between the reformists and the neo-conservatives, but also within the security 
establishment, thanks to the heated debate between Ahmadinejad and former 
IRGC commander Mohsen Rezai. The debates generated a sense of genuine 
choice that would not transpire through political rallies and slogans alone. 
Finally, the extensive and highly effective use of the social media played a crucial 
role in the emergence of an organic grassroots political movement and popular 
mobilisation both before and after the election (Mottahedeh 2010; Cross 2010; 
Kamalipour 2010). 
 Convinced that they had the necessary popular support, the Green 
Movement’s strategy was to drive people out to vote for change and achieve a 
similarly high turnout as in the 1997 presidential election, which they presumed 
would secure victory with a margin wide enough to be too risky for the 
guardians to manipulate. Yet although the turnout on 12 June was indeed the 
highest in an Iranian election yet (85%), the following morning the Interior 
Ministry announced a landslide victory for Ahmadinejad. Claiming that the same 
ministry had informed him overnight that he had won and that Majles speaker 
Ali Larijani had even congratulated him on his victory, Mousavi disputed the 
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outcome and called it illegitimate.177 Karroubi and Rezai also challenged the 
result. Three days before the election, several reformist websites had published a 
letter, allegedly written by Mesbah Yazdi to the Interior Ministry staff, 
encouraging them to ensure his protégé’s victory, saying “for you, everything is 
permitted”.178 Shortly afterwards, Rafsanjani issued an open letter to Khamenei, 
calling on him to guarantee a fair election. Building on these earlier suspicions, 
various aspects of the announced outcome that seemed implausible convinced 
many Iranians that their vote had been stolen and drove them to the streets.179 
 The swift and heavy handed response by the IRGC and the Basij to the 
mass demonstrations, organised raids against Mousavi and Karroubi campaign 
offices and the arrest of prominent Green activists within twenty-four hours of 
the election, followed by televised confessions by activists and unknown 
protestors of their complicity in a western plot to overthrow the regime, 
suggested that the guardians were prepared for open confrontation. Even so, 
they could not have predicted the intensity of the demonstrations or control the 
flow of events during the highly volatile first week after the election. The same 
argument goes for Mousavi and Karroubi, who at times appeared to be following 
the masses rather than leading them, as the protests spread and the slogans 
transformed from challenging the election to challenging the regime in a matter 
of days. Notably, however, neither man backed down from their call for a fresh 
election, even when the clashes turned deadly and Khamenei intervened publicly 
on behalf of Ahmadinejad. Ultimately, open confrontation with the Leader led to 
a pervasive crackdown against the Green Movement, which was labelled by its 
opponents the “green path of sedition”, the imprisonment of thousands of its 
supporters, including the eventual home arrest of Mousavi and Karroubi, and the 
intense securitisation of the IRI regime, which was facing its most acute domestic 
legitimacy crisis since institutional consolidation. 
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 If we were to mark a single event as the critical turning point for the 
Green Movement as well as the fate of the IRI hybrid regime, it would be the 
Friday prayer sermon that the Leader delivered at the University of Tehran on 
19 June. During this widely anticipated sermon, Khamenei uncharacteristically 
stepped out of his public image as the arbiter of disputes and unequivocally 
endorsed Ahmadinejad, thus becoming a direct party to the conflict. Calling the 
election a “historic moment” that “put religious democracy on display for the 
whole world to see”, he declared that Ahmadinejad’s ideas were closer to his, 
accused foreign powers of being behind the unrest (“They thought that Iran is 
Georgia”), and warned opposition leaders of retribution for the “bloodshed and 
chaos” to come if they did not end the protests.180 
 The extent of the rupture among the regime’s top guardians became fully 
visible when Rafsanjani came out to defy Khamenei publicly in another Friday 
sermon on 17 July. Having become the primary target of Ahmadinejad’s attacks 
over the years, Rafsanjani had put his support behind Mousavi before the 
election. After 12 June, he met with senior clerics in Qom and reportedly called 
for a meeting of the Assembly of Experts; the only body with the power to 
remove the Leader. Two days after Khamenei’s Friday sermon, Rafsanjani’s 
daughter was arrested and sentenced to prison for spreading propaganda 
against the regime. Delivering his sermon against this backdrop, Rafsanjani 
spoke about “doubts” regarding the credibility of the election and the loss of 
trust in the country’s institutions, and frequently alluded to the Iranian and Shi’a 
concepts of just rule and popular legitimacy. “Legitimacy of the country comes 
from its people’s consent”, he stated and added that Khomeini had given the 
utmost importance to popular will. He made the case for the necessity to have 
both the Islamic and the republican pillars functioning side by side, and pleaded 
for the release of political prisoners.181 In return, the Leader stripped Rafsanjani 
of his role as a Friday prayer leader, and in March 2011 he was not re-elected as 
the head of the Assembly of Experts. Demonstrating the gravity of the fallout 
within the regime elite, this period also marked the end of the private meetings 
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that Khamenei and Rafsanjani held every Tuesday for years, even at the height of 
their personal rivalry (Eshraghi and Baji 2012). 
 Regardless of the actual scale of electoral manipulation, it is safe to argue 
that the 2009 presidential election and the consequent events resulted in the 
collapse of the electoral system in Iran, which failed in carrying out all three of its 
fundamental functions: managing popular participation in politics, socialising 
new generations into the IRI system and negotiating factional competition. 
Indeed, electoral politics not only failed to diffuse, but actually provoked existing 
tensions. The Leader’s direct involvement on one side of the divide effectively 
rendered the most powerful guardian complicit in this failure. I argued in 
Chapter 2 that the social perception of justice plays a governing role in ascribing 
legitimacy to regimes and governments, as well as to rebellions and revolutions 
in Iran. In this case, the profound sense of injustice shared by a significant 
portion of the population brought the democratic legitimacy of the IRI regime 
into doubt and justified rebellion against it.  
 
Leader – President rivalry after 2009 
 
Rafsanjani’s emasculation by the Leader and the suppression of the Green 
Movement left the traditionalist and neo-conservative factions to compete for 
political influence. Political contestation in the period after 2009 took place in an 
atmosphere characterised by exceptional social and institutional distrust and 
paranoia, compounded with growing regional tensions following the outbreak of 
the ‘Arab Spring’ revolutions and especially the Syrian civil war, as well as an 
acute economic crisis caused by both governmental mismanagement and a new 
round of international sanctions on Iran.182 In this environment, the underlying 
rivalry between the Leader and the president surfaced and morphed into a new 
power struggle played out mainly in the shape of byzantine palace intrigues.  
 Emboldened by his re-election and convinced of his popularity as well as, 
most likely, his divinely guided destiny, President Ahmadinejad set out to 
increase the institutional powers of his office, challenging in the process the 
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authority of the guardians as well as the Majles. As regards the latter, 
Ahmadinejad contradicted Khomeini’s earlier statements to claim that the 
presidency – and not the parliament – was “the most important branch of 
government”.183 His remarks drew criticism from traditionalist MPs. One of the 
fiercest opponents of Ahmadinejad, Ali Motahari, who is the brother-in-law of Ali 
Larijani, warned that “the parliament is still on top of affairs and has the 
authority to impeach the president and remove him from power.”184 In January 
2011, following a dispute over the appointment of a new governor for the central 
bank, Ahmadinejad wrote an open letter accusing the Majles, the judiciary and 
the Expediency Council of meddling in his administration’s affairs.185 The 
Expediency Council responded by instructing the president to perform his duties 
and stop imposing his personal interpretations of the law.186 
 The tension over the right to appoint and dismiss ministers, which had 
started in 2005 and grew in early 2008 when Ahmadinejad abruptly fired 
Mostafa Pourmohammadi, the interior minister imposed on him by the Leader, 
took a more open and destabilising turn after the presidential election. In July 
2009, Ahmadinejad fired two key cabinet members, who were also close to 
Khamenei: Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance Hossein Saffar Harandi and 
Minister of Intelligence Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejei. The president was 
particularly intent on enhancing his authority over the conduct of foreign and 
national security policies, both of which traditionally fell within the Leader’s 
‘reserved domains’. His appointment of personal confidants as special envoys for 
foreign affairs to work independently from the foreign ministry led Khamenei to 
declare that “parallel diplomacy is not acceptable”, while Foreign Minister 
Manouchehr Mottaki described the practice as “naïve” and “unwise”.187  
 In December 2010, in an open act of defiance, without consulting the 
Leader, Ahmadinejad fired Mottaki while the latter was on a foreign visit. The 
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move was condemned by the Kayhan newspaper as exceptionally insulting, but 
celebrated by pro-Ahmadinejad Rajanews website as “long overdue”.188 In April 
2011, the president forced the Minister of Intelligence Heydar Moslehi to resign. 
When the Leader promptly reinstated Moslehi, Ahmadinejad protested in the 
dramatic manner of not appearing in public or attending cabinet meetings for 
eleven days. This was the clearest sign yet of the growing crisis between the 
Leader and the president.  
 We should note that most of the criticisms by the traditionalists were 
directed not at the president personally, but rather at his aides and confidants; 
especially his most trusted advisor and the father of his daughter-in-law, 
Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei, whose close relationship with Ahmadinejad dated 
back to their years in the IRGC. By 2009, Mashaei had already made enemies 
among the traditionalists for his anti-clerical views, occasional praise for Iran’s 
pre-Islamic history and message of friendship to Israel. Immediately after the 
2009 election, Ahmadinejad’s appointment of Mashaei as his first vice president 
triggered a clerical backlash and a standoff that only ended when the Leader 
instructed the president to remove Mashaei from the post.189 Ahmadinejad 
obliged and subsequently made Mashaei his chief of staff. In September 2010, 
when the president was in New York to address the UN General Assembly, 
Mashaei stirred controversy by suggesting that the clergy should be removed 
from power in order to “re-establish a great civilisation without Arab-style 
clerics who have tainted and destroyed the country for the past 31 years” 
(Choksy 2010).190 At the same time, Hamid Baqai, a senior advisor to the 
president, likened Ahmadinejad to Cyrus the Great; a provocative comparison 
given the taboo surrounding the glorification of the country’s pre-Islamic past. 
 Such declarations may be interpreted both as expressions of genuine 
conviction among Ahmadinejad’s entourage in the president’s divinely ordained 
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authority, as well as their recognition of the political clergy’s diminishing 
popularity and the need to dissociate themselves from it by using an alternative 
discourse. Indeed from the outset, both Ahmadinejad and Mashaei’s image as 
modest, self-made men and regime outsiders stood in stark contrast with the 
exclusive personal networks of the IRI’s ruling clerical elite. But to portray the 
president’s circle as the secular nationalist antithesis of the clerical 
establishment would be misleading. As much as their ideological differences, the 
feud between the neo-conservatives and the traditionalists was a natural 
outcome of the successive purges that left the two groups without a common foe 
and fuelled an internecine rivalry that became toxic in an atmosphere of constant 
suspicion and the absence of public debate (Alavi 2011). 
 In any case, by 2011 the traditionalist guardians were channelling their 
full energy into eliminating what they called the “deviant current” (jarayan-e 
enherafi). A Kayhan editorial in May argued the president’s team was 
“contaminated” and had to be “quarantined”.191 Conservative clerics labelled the 
“deviant current” a foreign conspiracy and its members “infiltrators”.192 Showing 
that the security forces were not immune from factional divisions, but also 
leaving no doubt as to where the loyalty of the top brass lay, senior IRGC 
commanders swore oaths of allegiance to the Leader and the Basij carried out 
‘manoeuvres’ to defend the revolution against the “foreign-backed deviant 
current”.193 Onetime supporter of the president, Ayatollah Jannati announced 
during a Friday prayer sermon that the “perverted team is gradually being 
eliminated”.194 Most tellingly of the failure of the neo-conservative project, 
Mesbah Yazdi also publicly distanced himself from the group. Labelling Mashaei 
a freemason and likening him to Ali Mohammad Shirazi – the founder of Bab’ism, 
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which is viewed as heretical by the Shia clergy – Mesbah Yazdi accused 
Ahmadinejad’s advisors of “bewitching” the president.195  
 Between 2010 and 2013, in coordination with the judiciary, which is 
headed by Ali Larijani’s brother Sadeq, the Majles impeached nine of 
Ahmadinejad’s ministers. The president himself was also threatened with 
impeachment. In May 2011, dozens of people with close ties to Mashaei were 
arrested on charges of sorcery. In late 2011, the president had to fight allegations 
that his chief of staff was involved in the country’s biggest banking scandal, 
which involved USD 2.6 billion in illegally obtained credit from state banks, 
channelled to private companies to purchase state entities.196 As the president 
responded to accusations by threatening to reveal incriminating evidence 
against major regime figures, one MP to commented, “We do not need an enemy, 
when we have Ahmadinejad”.197 
 The power struggle also had a destabilising effect on Iran’s foreign 
relations, particularly on the nuclear issue. Faced with spiralling inflation and a 
budget deficit that forced his government to slash fuel and food subsidies and 
cash hand-outs for the poor – two key policies of his government – Ahmadinejad 
appeared more eager in his second term to negotiate an agreement with the 
P5+1 (the five permanent UN Security Council members and Germany) that 
could ease the tightening economic sanctions.198 Not trusting the president with 
the issue and unwilling to allow him a popular victory, his traditionalist rivals 
put up obstacles. When the government signed a nuclear swap deal with Turkey 
and Brazil in May 2010 (which was ultimately ignored by the West), Ali Larijani 
and his cousin, traditionalist MP Ahmad Tavakkoli, dismissed the agreement as 
misguided and foolish.199 In December 2011, in the midst of a behind-the-scenes 
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diplomatic exchange between the representatives of Obama and Ahmadinejad 
administrations, came the storming of the British embassy in Tehran, allegedly 
carried out by plainclothes Basij members acting on the orders of Ali Larijani, 
who is himself a former Guardsman (Parsi 2011). 
 Thus, as the Majles elections in March and May 2012 approached, not only 
were the battle lines drawn clearly, but also the neo-conservatives had already 
suffered significant setbacks. In this first major election that the regime had to 
conduct since the presidential poll in 2009 and which Khamenei declared “more 
sensitive than all others”, the traditionalists had two major objectives: to 
marginalise Ahmadinejad’s supporters in the Majles, while also creating an 
impression of popular support for the regime to restore its legitimacy.200 The 
traditionalists accused the ‘deviationists’ of secretly forming alliance with the 
‘seditionists’ to derail the elections, which the Intelligence Minister Moslehi 
called the most complex problem facing the established order (nezam).201 In fact, 
facing an ongoing crackdown and with their leaders banned from politics or in 
prison, the vast majority of the reformist groups did not participate in the 
election or run political campaigns, encouraging instead a boycott to emphasise 
the regime’s lost legitimacy.202 In contrast, the regime made a concerted effort to 
increase participation, making the case that a low turnout would lead to a 
military strike on Iran by the US or Israel. 
 The declared outcome clearly served the first of the traditionalists’ two 
goals. Whether it restored the regime some of its lost legitimacy remained an 
open question, in part due to the inability to rely on the veracity of the declared 
results, including the official turnout figure of 64%, which the state media 
declared a victory of the people (piroozi-ye mellat) and an expression of 
outpouring of support for the regime. The figure may have been exaggerated, 
given the reformist boycott; but it is unlikely to have been dramatically inflated. 
It is important to note that, unlike the presidential elections, legislative elections 
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in the IRI historically have been less about national issues and more about local, 
even personal issues – given the amount of competition among the large number 
of candidates running for office in 207 districts and 31 provinces. 
 What is less ambiguous is that the outcome was a clear victory for the 
Leader, whose loyal supporters claimed a majority of the 290 seats in the Majles. 
An important indicator of change was the large number of candidates from 
Mesbah Yazdi’s United Front (Jebhe Paydari) – a key source of backing for the 
president in 2005 and 2009 – who publicly distanced themselves from 
Ahmadinejad in 2012. His support base reduced to a small minority in the Majles, 
Ahmadinejad’s defeat was accentuated by stories such as the failure of his sister 
to get elected in her hometown.203 With the Majles now firmly in the Leader’s 
hand, Ahmadinejad was reduced to a lame duck president during his last year in 
office, although the open confrontation between the Leader and the president 
continued to escalate. Unable to run for a third term, he presented Mashaei as his 
preferred candidate for the June 2013 presidential election, which was – 
unsurprisingly – rejected by the Guardian Council. Much more unexpected was 
the rejection of Hashemi Rafsanjani’s application, which came as a vivid 
demonstration of the level of distrust among the top revolutionary elite and the 
extent to which Khamenei had succeeded in personalising his control over the 
institutions of the IRI. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
All three presidents of the post-1989 era clashed with and were ultimately 
defeated by the Leader, whose constitutional authority and personal influence 
grew considerably after 1989. At the same time, however, each presidency has 
come to represent a different set of dynamics and symbols in the history of the 
Islamic Republic. The Rafsanjani presidency symbolised the beginning of a 
fundamental economic and geopolitical transformation in Iran following the end 
                                                 
203 While the official media carried the story as proof of the president’s dwindling popularity, the 
reformist media and the western press questioned whether this amounted to a “sign of fraud”. 
“Ahmadinejad’s sister loses in Iran vote”, CNN International, 3 March 2012, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2012/03/03/world/meast/iran-parliamentary-elections/  
195 
 
of the war with Iraq, the death of the charismatic leader and the end of the Cold 
War. It also saw the intensification of factional rivalries and the expansion of 
elite politics into the popular realm. The Khatami presidency symbolised the 
intensifying conflict between the two pillars of the hybrid regime and confirmed 
the entry of the masses as an organised force into the IRI politics. The 
Ahmadinejad presidency was mired with social, economic, political and 
geopolitical tensions and confrontations from the beginning to the end. It was 
during this era that the IRI regime experienced its most acute domestic 
legitimacy crisis since its inception, and temporarily lost its hybrid character.  
 Even though Ahmadinejad was protected by Khamenei and the 
traditionalist guardians in the clash between the state and society after 12 June 
2009, it was also he who challenged the Leader more openly, consistently and 
audaciously than either Rafsanjani or Khatami to consolidate the powers of the 
executive office. In his attempt to transform the IRI from within, Khatami 
refrained from confrontation whenever it risked undoing the regime. Despite 
being systematically suppressed and marginalised, the reformist leadership 
remained a part of the IRI leadership elite. Sought by the traditionalist guardians 
as a loyal and populist response to the reformist challenge, Ahmadinejad’s anti-
clerical populism arguably proved to be more threatening and destabilising for 
the IRI elite and the clerical establishment as a whole, if only due to his dogged 
determination and refusal to compromise. As Chapter 7 will discuss further, it 
was the impact of the Ahmadinejad presidency and the growing legitimacy crisis 
surrounding the IRI regime that prompted a return to hybridity in 2013. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
THE FALL OF THE KEMALIST GUARDIANSHIP IN TURKEY 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The end of the Cold War and the wave of liberal triumphalism in the West 
ushered in a debate as to whether the end of modernity had finally arrived and 
the world was about to step into ‘post-modernity’ (Cooper 2000: 22). In the 
1990s and the early 2000s the proponents of ‘post-modernity’ held that the 
modern era in politics, symbolised by the sovereign nation-state, was giving way 
to a new age, where borders were becoming irrelevant, ideas and institutions 
globalised, and the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs increasingly 
blurred. Others pointed out, correctly, that even though its status as the 
uncontested sovereign actor of the international order was challenged by the 
diverse forces and consequences of globalisation, the obituary of the nation-state 
was being written prematurely (Axford 1995; Albrow 1996; Barber 2000; 
Bielskis 2005). 
Indeed, the ensuing period has resulted not so much in a clearly traceable 
transition from modernity into post-modernity, but rather a complex 
arrangement where the dynamics of globalisation undermine certain institutions 
and features of the nation-state, while strengthening others. Likewise, rather 
than an evolution of the international system towards a liberal global order, 
structured upon western-built supra-national institutions and maintained first 
and foremost by the politico-military might of the United States, the emerging 
structure is increasingly multipolar with alternative power centres made up of 
semi-integrated regional blocs or international alliances. 
As a middle power located at the intersection of various regional blocs 
that has been embedded in the western security establishment since the 
beginning of the Cold War and in the global economic market since the early 
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1980s, Turkey has been deeply exposed to and profoundly affected by the shifts 
in geopolitical and socio-economic dynamics and alliances in the post-Cold War 
era.204 This chapter looks into these dynamics as well as the key debates, actors 
and turning points for the Turkish hybrid system in the midst of the modernity 
vs. post-modernity debate.  
I point out that the ‘post-modern’ arrangement that the military-
bureaucratic guardians of the Kemalist regime attempted to install with their 
1997 intervention proved to be short lived. Coming to power through elections 
in 2002 and supported by a coalition of liberals and conservatives at home, and 
by both the US and the EU abroad, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) 
government gradually disassembled the institutional hegemony of the Kemalist 
guardians. The end of the hybrid regime was also facilitated by the divisions 
among the guardians as to the course of action to be taken in response to the 
changing status quo. These internal divisions and the fluidity of the political 
alliances that emerged in the late 1990s and early 2000s remind us once again 
that the two pillars of the hybrid regime are not monolithic entities and, 
correspondingly, the outcome of a transition from the hybrid system is not 
preordained. 
 
 
Turkey in the 1990s: Lost in Transition  
 
Illusions of post-modern guardianship: ‘the 28 February process’ 
 
Despite all the talk of post-modernity and the declaration of the end of history, 
the 1990s brought limited change to the institutional and geopolitical status quo 
in Turkey. While the end of the Cold War did cast NATO’s raison d’être in the 
absence of the Soviet Union, Turkey’s role in the alliance and the ‘special 
partnership’ between Ankara and the US into relative ambivalence, this did not 
have an immediate impact on policy decisions on either side. On the contrary, 
during much of the 1990s, the strategic ties between Turkey and the United 
States and its regional allies grew stronger. 
                                                 
204 For a definition and discussion of ‘middle powers’ see Jordaan (2003). 
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 Domestically, too, the system of Kemalist guardianship appeared firmly 
entrenched in the 1990s thanks to the constitutional framework put in place 
after the 1980 military coup, which expanded significantly the guardian state’s 
institutional control over civilian politics and civil society. But the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and the seeming demise of the left both at home and abroad meant 
that the guardians could no longer employ their Cold War-era threat rhetoric to 
justify their supra-political status. At the same time, Turkey’s transition into a 
free market economy, which had started in earnest in the early 1980s under the 
supervision of the military junta, made direct interventions in civilian politics 
costlier in macro-economic terms and therefore less desirable for an institution 
that valued its reputation in the eyes of the people (Koçer 2002). A post-modern 
era called for ‘post-modern guardianship’.  
 Post-modern guardianship, as envisioned by influential generals and 
bureaucrats of the era, embodied two basic characteristics: first, it was based on 
a significantly broadened threat perception formulated upon the ambiguous and 
sweeping description of national security as set by the 1983 law. Second, it 
focused on indirect ways of keeping society and politics in check, namely through 
the guardians’ civilian associates. The reformulation of security threats allowed 
the guardians to maintain an open-ended and extensive list of internal and 
external ‘enemies of the secular and unitary order’, and to frame and respond to 
Turkey’s complex and evolving socio-economic problems from a security-
minded perspective. Referred to as the “national security system” in a booklet 
published by the NSC General Secretariat in 1990, this approach further divorced 
the idea of the state from society, conceiving the former as an innately sacred 
entity that required protection from an inherently menacing (or at best, 
immature) population.205  
 The two national security threats that received prominent attention in the 
NSC meetings and the mainstream media throughout the 1990s were ethnic 
separatism (bölücülük) and religious ‘reactionism’ (irtica). The former has been 
used in particular as an all-encompassing term to refer to the conflict between 
the Turkish state and the militant Kurdistan Worker’s Party (Partiya Karkerên 
                                                 
205 The booklet is revealingly titled “The Concept and the Scope of the State”. See MGK (1990: 43 - 
44). 
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Kurdistan, PKK). This categorisation has effectively enabled the guardians to 
reduce a multi-faceted problem to the exclusive domain of security and 
geopolitics, downplaying its socio-economic, cultural and humanitarian roots 
and implications. Dealing with a complex issue under the heading of separatism 
emphasised its increasingly violent militant aspect, which was in turn used to 
justify the state’s heavy-handed policies and the continued implementation of 
emergency laws in the Kurdish provinces. İrtica, on the other hand, had long 
been a byword for political Islam in the Kemalist lexicon, and was also used in a 
sweeping fashion to cover all hues of political Islam.  
Although, as discussed in Chapter 3, both issues had their origins in the 
nationalisation, centralisation and secularisation of the state in the late 
Ottoman/early republican periods, the revival of both the Kurdish and Islamist 
challenges to the Kemalist regime were in large part a consequence of the 1980 
coup. It was the systematic torture and abuse of thousands of Kurdish political 
activists, most notoriously in the Diyarbakır prison, and the wholesale rejection 
of their cultural rights under the military junta that had popularised the Marxist 
guerrilla organisation PKK among Turkey’s Kurds, and legitimised it as the 
representative of Kurdish nationalist aspirations.206 Meanwhile, the rise of 
political Islam was precipitated by the junta’s policy of promoting a nationalist 
religious discourse loyal to state authority, known as the Turkish-Islamic 
synthesis, to counter the wide spectrum of leftist movements – an attempt that 
should be viewed in the context of the wider western strategy of recruiting 
Islamists against communists during the early 1980s.207  
During the 1980s and the 1990s, social and political movements that took 
Sunni Islam as an ideological reference grew in popularity and significance on 
the back of three factors. The first was the use of Islam as a unifying discourse by 
the state in the 1980s, accompanied by increased funding for religious education 
                                                 
206 In the years preceding the coup, the PKK, or ‘Apocular’ (i.e. the followers of Apo, the short 
name for the group’s founding leader Abdullah Öcalan) as they were better known at the time, 
were more focused on eliminating opponents (both armed and civilian) within the Kurdish 
political movement, with the alleged support of the Turkish intelligence agency (Milli İstihbarat 
Teşkilatı, MİT). See Mumcu (1993). 
207 Promoted chiefly by US President Jimmy Carter’s national security adviser Zbigniew 
Brezinski, these attempts included the US-Saudi-Pakistani support for the Afghan mujahedeen 
against the Soviet occupation or the Israeli help for the rise of Hamas in an attempt to divide and 
weaken the Palestinian nationalist movement. 
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in public schools and the expansion of state-run clerical institutions, known as 
İmam Hatip schools.208 With the support of the military, the ANAP governments 
of Prime Minister Turgut Özal (1983 – 1989) also oversaw a rapid increase in the 
number of mosques around the country.209 The second factor was the emergence 
of a new class of pious entrepreneurs in the Anatolian provinces as a result of the 
free market reforms, privatisation initiatives and economic incentives by ANAP 
and succeeding centre-right coalition governments in the 1980s and early 1990s. 
Finally, we have to mention the growing popular appeal of a moralistic rhetoric 
expounded by the Islamists in a period of sharp economic inequality and social 
injustice – also a consequence of the sudden disappearance of the state’s already 
meagre social welfare services in the neo-liberal reform era (Tuğal 2009). 
Led by experienced politician and engineering professor Necmettin 
Erbakan, the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, RP) took a sharp stance against socio-
economic injustice, state enforced secularism and Turkey’s western orientation 
in foreign policy. By the 1990s, Welfare had become a contender for government. 
Its effective grassroots organisation in the sprawling working class 
neighbourhoods of urban metropolises helped the party win the municipal 
governments of Istanbul and Ankara in the March 1994 local elections. An 
aspiring Welfare politician, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan first rose to prominence as the 
elected head of Istanbul’s metropolitan municipality during this period. In 
December 1995, the party came out on top in the general election with 22% of 
the vote, and went on to form Turkey’s first Islamist-led coalition government 
together with the centre-right True Path Party (Doğru Yol Partisi, DYP) in June 
1996. 
Convinced that their predecessors’ social engineering project had 
backfired and the rise of the Islamists now constituted a direct threat to the 
                                                 
208 Under military supervision, mandatory religion classes were introduced in elementary and 
high school levels, while at the same time new clerical schools were established. Originally 
founded as vocational schools to train religious personnel, their curricula were eventually 
expanded and restrictions on their students to enter university entrance exams were lifted. As a 
result, for pious Muslims, İmam Hatip schools became competitive alternatives to regular public 
high schools. The number of students enrolled in these institutions rose from 34,570 in 1974 to 
511,502 in 1997. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, a Welfare Party politician during the 1990s and the 
country’s future prime minister, is himself an İmam Hatip alum. See Çakır, Bozan and Talu 
(2004). 
209 As many as 1500 mosques were built every year in the 1980s. By 1988 there was a mosque 
for every 857 people (Kasaba 2008: 390).  
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secular regime, the senior cadre of the TSK decided that the Islamists had to 
go.210 However, as one prominent member of the NSC during those years put it, 
“this time the job has to be done by the unarmed forces” rather than the Armed 
Forces.211 The ‘unarmed forces’ consisted of the guardians’ civilian associates in 
politics,212 academia, judiciary, labour unions and other civil society groups, who 
in coordination with senior generals issued public warnings or organised 
demonstrations condemning Welfare’s anti-secular activities.213 Extensive 
coverage was devoted to such events in mainstream newspapers, whose 
editorial boards went as far as publishing fabricated news stories, some serviced 
directly by the military, in an effort to manipulate public opinion against the 
Islamist-led government.214 In the words of İsmet Berkan, the Ankara 
correspondent of the daily Radikal at the time:215 
 
Without the media [the operation] would not have 
succeeded. The media almost voluntarily became part of the 
psychological operation [against Welfare]. We were used 
and allowed ourselves to be used. We are all responsible for 
the 28 February process. 
 
The pressure on Erbakan’s government intensified in February 1997, 
when the army moved tanks across the streets of an Ankara suburb in an open 
reaction to a celebration in support of the Islamist resistance movements Hamas 
and Hizbullah organised by the local Welfare municipality. This was followed by 
                                                 
210 Speaking to journalists days before the 1997 intervention, Vice Admiral Güven Erkaya said, 
“extremist religious currents present a vital threat to the future of Turkey. İrtica has become a 
more urgent matter than the PKK. I voiced this opinion at the NSC, and will do so again. Turkey is 
not without its owners.” “Erbakan’ın MGK’daki zor anları”, Milliyet, 12 August 1997.  
211 The statement, again by Vice Admiral Erkaya, was reported by then editor-in-chief of Hürriyet 
newspaper, Ertuğrul Özkök in his column on 20 December 1996.  
212 Vice Admiral Erkaya on then President Süleyman Demirel’s role: “The attitude and the 
declarations of Mr. President gave confidence to the people. He emboldened the society. His role 
in strengthening civil society has been very significant. As Turkey has gone through a very tense 
period, the president has maintained a perfectly consistent line. He did not make concessions on 
the protection of secularism, democracy and Atatürkist thought.” “Erbakan’ın MGK’daki zor 
anları”, Milliyet, 12 August 1997. 
213 For the involvement of the five prominent civil society organisations (two labour unions, two 
merchant organisations and one employers’ union, known as the ‘Gang of Five’) in this process, 
see Baydur (2000).  
214 Between August 1996 and April 1997, the daily Milliyet ran 16 headlines, which reported a 
stern ‘warning’ to the government – six in the month of April alone. See section on the role of the 
media in the 1997 coup in TGNA (2012: 969 – 979). 
215 “Medya olmasaydı 28 Şubat olmazdı”, Yeni Şafak, 16 April 2012. 
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an ultimatum against the government issued by the military top brass during the 
NSC meeting on 28 February 1997.216 After three months of resistance and 
attempted negotiation, Erbakan finally dissolved the coalition government in 
June. In January 1998, the Constitutional Court dissolved Welfare for anti-secular 
activities and suspended its leading members from active politics.217 In the 
months that followed the NSC meeting, in what came to be known as the ‘28 
February process’, the guardians exerted pressure on the parliament to 
implement new education laws designed to roll back the influence of the İmam 
Hatip schools. The ban on wearing the Islamic headscarf in state universities was 
enforced for the first time, while a semi-official department established under 
the military chief of staff, known as the ‘Western Working Group’ (Batı Çalışma 
Grubu), was tasked with monitoring Islamist activities across state institutions, 
civil society organisations, universities and the media.218 
Asked whether the military’s ultimatum had meant a coup, General Erol 
Özkasnak, then secretary of the NSC, responded that coups were a thing of the 
past: “The military of the twenty-first century acts in accordance to the twenty-
first century.” But the ultimatum eventually went down in modern Turkish 
history as the ‘post-modern coup’, labelled thus by General Çevik Bir, the 
influential deputy head of the TSK. One of the chief architects of the intervention, 
General Bir also suggested that the military had merely carried out a “wheel 
balancing on democracy” (Korucu 2012). In an NSC meeting in January 1999, the 
newly promoted head of the TSK, General Hüseyin Kıvrıkoğlu, lectured Prime 
Minister Bülent Ecevit that “28 February is not over. […] If necessary, it will last a 
thousand years.”219 At the turn of the millennium, post-modern guardianship 
appeared firmly entrenched in Turkey. 
  
                                                 
216 “İşte tarihi değişiklikler”, Hürriyet, 4 November 1997.  
217 The decision was subsequently upheld by the European Court of Human Rights. Case of “Refah 
Partisi (Welfare Party) and Others vs. Turkey”, Grand Chamber ruling, 13 February 2003. 
218 “Military watchdog group monitors spreading fundamentalism”, Turkish Daily News, 14 June 
1997. 
219 “Kıvrıkoğlu'dan Ecevit'e: "28 Şubat daha bitmedi!"”, Habertürk, 28 February 2012. 
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Turkey’s lost decade: The beginning of the end? 
 
Contrary to Kıvrıkoğlu’s prediction, the political and institutional arrangement 
that followed the 1997 intervention was to be unravelled in little more than a 
decade, following the acceleration of Turkey’s EU accession process and the 
coming to power of the AKP in the early 2000s. Arguably, however, the process 
of unravelling had already begun in the 1990s, which was a decade of failures, 
frustrations and crises for many people in Turkey. This was a period of chronic 
macro-economic problems, characterised by volatile growth, frequent boom-
and-bust cycles, periodic balance of payments crises, run-away inflation and 
devaluations of the local currency, IMF-imposed austerity measures, high levels 
of unemployment and a widening income gap. Between 1991 and 2001, the 
country suffered four major economic crises. In the 2001 crisis, the lira 
collapsed, banks were bailed out, public debt reached three quarters of the GDP 
and the IMF was once again called upon for rescue (Görmez and Yiğit 2009). 
 This gloomy economic atmosphere was compounded by a political picture 
featuring weak coalition governments, political parties that appeared cut off 
from the public and embroiled in corruption scandals, state collusion in 
organised crime as well as widespread human rights abuses, especially in the 
state’s ‘dirty war’ against the PKK in the Kurdish provinces (Cizre-Sakallıoğlu 
and Yeldan 2000). 220 Marked by the military’s scorched earth campaigns, state-
sanctioned extra judicial murders of civilians and the TV images of fallen soldiers 
in coffins wrapped with Turkish flags, the conflict claimed over 40,000 lives and 
thousands of burnt down villages, and displaced millions of impoverished 
Kurdish citizens, forcing them settle into ghettos around major urban 
metropolises in western and southern Turkey, as well as large Kurdish cities 
such as Diyarbakır. 
The Kurdish conflict took a particularly violent turn following the 
successive deaths of a number of key public figures in 1993: in January, 
                                                 
220 In a particularly disturbing example of the level of corruption in politics, the two rival centre-
right parties of the 1990s, DYP and ANAP, struck a tacit deal in 1997 whereby both parties 
withdrew support for the parliamentary investigations into corruption allegations implicating 
their respective leaders. “Çiller ve Yılmaz’a aklama”, Sabah, 16 Ocak 1997; “Son 'durulama' da 
tamam”, Radikal, 12 April 1998. 
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prominent investigative journalist Uğur Mumcu was assassinated while probing 
the suspected links between the PKK and the Turkish intelligence. Adnan 
Kahveci, a liberal politician close to President Turgut Özal and a proponent of a 
negotiated solution to the Kurdish conflict, was killed in a car crash in February. 
Only two weeks later, General Eşref Bitlis, the reform-minded commander of the 
gendarmerie and NSC member, who had publicly criticised the security forces’ 
conduct in the Kurdish provinces, died in a mysterious plane crash. Finally, 
President Özal passed away in April 1993 of a heart attack, at a critical moment 
when he was negotiating a settlement with the PKK leadership against the 
wishes of senior members of the military-bureaucratic establishment. The 
counter-guerrilla has been suspected to be behind these untimely deaths.221 
 The extent of the collusion between politics, the security sector and 
organised crime fully came into public view with another car crash on 3 
November 1996. From the wreckage of a Mercedes that collided with a truck 
near the town of Susurluk in northwest Turkey emerged wounded a minister of 
parliament representing an influential Kurdish clan that collaborated with the 
state against the PKK, along with the bodies of a former deputy police chief and a 
ultra-nationalist mafia boss and assassin sought by the Interpol for drug 
trafficking and the murders of numerous Kurdish dissidents and businessmen. 
The group was said to have left a meeting with Mehmet Ağar, then interior 
minister and founder of the counter-terrorism unit within the police. The public 
inquiry and the court case that followed the ‘Susurluk scandal’ fell short of 
exposing the shadowy connections between the state and the criminal 
underworld. However, the scandal did trigger one of the first concerted civil 
society campaigns for justice and transparency in the post-1980 period in 
Turkey (Barham 1997).    
 A devastating earthquake hit the country’s industrialised northwest 
region in August 1999, killing by some estimates more than 30,000 people, 
causing extensive damage to its infrastructure and triggering a new economic 
                                                 
221 The Mumcu assassination was initially blamed on Iran, although no evidence was found. In 
June 2012, a report by the State Audit Board ruled the circumstances of O zal’s death suspicious 
and that his death may have been caused by poisoning. In September, a state prosecutor ordered 
his remains to be exhumed for investigation. “Late President O zal’s body to be exhumed”, 
Hürriyet Daily News, 18 September 2012. 
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crisis. Once again, civil society initiatives and non-governmental organisations 
took the leading role in conducting relief efforts. The state’s lack of preparation 
and disorganised response to a long anticipated disaster put its intent and 
competence to provide for the wellbeing of its citizens under further public 
doubt (Jalali 2002). The stock market crash of February 2001, which brought 
about bank bailouts amidst high level corruption scandals and the loss of life-
long savings of ordinary citizens, added to growing frustrations. For many people 
living in Turkey at the end of the 1990s, it seemed that the ‘circle of equity’ had 
broken down completely.  
 
 
 
Turkey in the 2000s: The EU accession process and the rise of 
the AKP 
 
Out of the turbulent 1990s, two processes emerged to make a profound impact 
on Turkey’s society and politics, and challenge the institutional hegemony of its 
guardians in the early 2000s: the European Union accession process and the rise 
of the Islamist-rooted Justice and Development Party as a popular and highly 
effective political movement.  
Turkey had been seeking European integration officially since the 1960s 
and applied for full membership of the European Community (the predecessor of 
the EU) in 1987. But it was the signing of a customs union in 1995 followed by 
Turkey’s formal admission by the European Commission as a candidate for full 
membership in 1999 that transformed a slow moving bureaucratic process into a 
tangible prospect that captured the public’s imagination and became the primary 
issue in the country’s political agenda. At the turn of the millennium, popular 
support in Turkey for full membership in the EU rose significantly, with an 
increasing number of Turkish citizens looking to European integration as a 
solution to chronic political and economic instabilities.222 The growing influence 
of Brussels in Turkey’s domestic politics as well as in its relationship with the 
                                                 
222 Public support for the EU membership in Turkey consistently came out above 50% in opinion 
polls during the early-to-mid 2000s, reaching a high with 67% in 2004. See EC (2005), 
Eurobarometer (2005).  
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West brought to the fore a new liberal reform agenda, gradually replacing the 
security-focused agenda of its US-centric western ties during and in the 
immediate aftermath of the Cold War.  
The EU accession process entailed the implementation of a wide range of 
social, economic and political liberalisation programmes by the candidate 
country within the framework of ‘harmonisation packages’, monitored closely by 
the European Commission. By the general election held in April 1999, all 
mainstream parties, including the far-right Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi 
Hareket Partisi, MHP) and the Islamist Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi, FP; the 
successor to the banned Welfare Party) had recognised the pursuit of the EU 
membership as a desired political objective. Until its dissolution in 2002, the 
unlikely coalition government that emerged from the 1999 election, made up of 
the centre-left Democratic Left Party (Demokratik Sol Parti, DSP), the nationalist 
MHP and the centre-right ANAP, put in place a number of key political 
reforms.223 These included 34 amendments to the 1982 Constitution, the 
drafting of a new civil code, revised anti-terrorism legislation, the abolishment of 
the death penalty, the easing of cultural restrictions on minorities and the 
permission to broadcast in languages other than Turkish (Müftüler Bac 2005). 
Partly as a consequence of the economic crisis, by mid-2002 the coalition 
government had collapsed, with an early election called for November. In that 
poll, voters punished all the major parties that had played a role in the crises and 
tribulations of the 1990s, leaving them below the 10% election threshold and 
therefore out of the parliament. The only two parties to pass the threshold were 
the CHP, with 19% of the vote, and the newly established AKP, which secured 
34%. Controlling 363 seats in the 550-seat parliament, the AKP went on to form 
Turkey’s first single-party government since Özal’s ANAP in 1987. However, 
representing only 53% of the overall vote due to the high election threshold, the 
2002 Assembly also exposed the underlying democratic deficit of the post-1980 
institutional arrangement. 
                                                 
223 The apprehension of the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan by Turkish intelligence agents in Nairobi 
in 1999 (in collaboration with the Israeli and American secret services) provided the DSP, then 
the junior coalition partner of ANAP, and the MHP with a popularity boost, propelling the two 
parties to first and second place in the general election respectively. The PKK ceasefire that 
followed the apprehension led to an extended period of lull in violence, creating a favourable 
political environment for political reform.  
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The core founders of the AKP consisted of a younger generation of 
Islamist politicians, who rose from among Welfare ranks but split from the 
senior leadership upon the formation of Virtue on ideological and practical 
grounds in the aftermath of the 1997 intervention.224 Labelled the ‘reformist 
wing’ of the Islamist party politics in the late 1990s, this group concluded that 
direct ideological confrontation with the military-bureaucratic establishment 
had, one the one hand, limited their movement’s popular appeal and, on the 
other hand, triggered a heavy-handed response from the guardians. Abandoning 
their predecessors’ intense anti-secularist rhetoric, they went on to emphasise a 
pragmatic service-based politics at home, focusing on economic growth, political 
stability, good governance and better provision of social services. At the same 
time, they sought to placate domestic and western suspicions that they would 
seek an anti-western foreign policy by underlining the party’s commitment to 
maintain and strengthen Turkey’s engagements with NATO and the EU.225  
In other words, by choosing ‘pragmatic conservatism’ over ‘ideological 
Islamism’, the founders of the AKP moved from the contested frontiers of the 
‘tolerated’ political space in Turkey, where Welfare had operated, to the fertile 
and ‘permissible’ grounds of centre-right politics, occupied in the past by popular 
parties such as the DP and ANAP. At a moment when the centre-right parties of 
the post-1980 coup era had been discredited and pushed out of parliamentary 
politics by the electorate, this timely shift provided the newly established AKP 
with a virtually uncontested political space and substantial electoral support. In 
particular, the party obtained the backing of three influential groups, which came 
to form an informal coalition in the early 2000s: the (above mentioned) 
emerging class of conservative Anatolian entrepreneurs, united and mobilised 
through Islamic fraternities and trust networks, the most influential of which is 
the Hizmet movement led by US-based Turkish cleric Fethullah Gu len;226 a small 
                                                 
224 See “Part I: The AKP’s history, ideology, social bases and organisation” in Hale and Özbudun 
(2010: 1 – 52). 
225 See the party’s 2002 election manifesto, AKP (2002). 
226 The Hizmet movement leads one of the two main branches of political Islam in Turkey, known 
as Nurculuk. This branch seeks to reconcile western modernity with Islam, encourages social and 
economic entrepreneurship over political activism and is sometimes referred to as the 
‘pragmatic’ alternative to Erbakan’s more ‘ideological’ Milli Görüş (National View) movement, 
from which Erdoğan and the AKP emerged. The rivalry between the two branches in the 1990s 
was such that Gülen actually supported the coup against Erbakan in 1997. The AKP’s departure 
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but vocal ‘liberal intelligentsia’, many members of which had belonged to leftist 
groups and movements in the 1960s and 70s;227 as well as populous yet 
politically disunited and less coherent pockets of pious Sunni Turks and Kurds.  
At the turn of the millennium, this informal alliance came to see military-
bureaucratic guardianship as the chief impediment to political and economic 
change in Turkey, and the pursuit of the EU membership as the way to 
overcoming it (Akkoyunlu, Nicolaidis and Öktem 2013: 17). While the 
conservative masses provided the AKP with the bulk of its electoral support, the 
Anatolian bourgeoisie constituted its financial backbone. At the same time, 
followers of the Hizmet movement who started to rise within the state 
bureaucracy, judiciary and the police in the 1990s and 2000s provided the AKP 
with strategic support and resources from within the very institutions over 
which the guardians wished to maintain their hegemony. The Gülenists 
succeeded in maintaining a quiet presence in key state institutions after the 1997 
intervention, when the Kemalist guardians set out to stem the movement’s 
growth through the Western Working Group, launched a court case against 
Gülen in abstentia in 2000, and issued a confidential NSC advisory in 2004 aimed 
at countering its politico-economic activities. (Berlinski 2012; Daloğlu 2013). 
Finally, the backing of the liberal intelligentsia helped the party build a 
less intimidating public image than Welfare in the eyes of non-pious citizens of 
Turkey. At home, the liberals strove to balance off the socially conservative 
impulses of the party’s core constituency by insisting on a reform agenda in line 
with the EU accession process.228 The intelligentsia also helped the governing 
party secure the support of the EU in its domestic struggle against the military-
                                                                                                                                            
from the ideological politics of Milli Görüş brought the party and Gülen’s Hizmet movement 
together in the early 2000s. See Ebaugh (2009), O zdalga (2003), Yavuz and Esposito (2003). 
227 Not all those associated with this group actually called themselves as liberals or saw 
themselves as part of an intelligentsia. They were collectively branded so by their leftist and 
Kemalist critics (and following the liberal-conservative split, also by the Islamists) who typically 
used the term in a derogatory manner to imply a bourgeois detachment from the people and a 
sense of materialistic opportunism. Needless to say, I use the term without such undertones. 
Rather, I find it both practical and also appropriate, as these scholars, journalists, artists and 
novelists became vocal supporters of the EU’s ‘liberal democratisation’ agenda in the early 2000s. 
228 One example is the debate over the criminalisation of adultery. The government floated the 
idea during 2005 but backtracked when faced with united resistance from the EU, the liberals 
and the Kemalists. In these early years, the AKP would often point to the institutional and 
political constraints imposed by the EU and the guardians to justify to their conservative 
constituents why they did not push a more religious social agenda. 
209 
 
bureaucratic guardians by defending the AKP’s reforms from a liberal 
democratic perspective abroad.  
It was not only with Brussels that the AKP built positive relations during 
its first term in government. The changing geopolitical conjuncture of the Middle 
East also brought the party in close strategic cooperation with Washington in the 
post-September 11 context. Neo-conservative strategists in the George W. Bush 
administration as well as influential foreign policy pundits in the US started to 
view and promote Turkey’s governing party as a ‘moderate Muslim antidote’ to 
radical Islamist movements, which the US administration had designated as the 
target of its self-styled ‘war on terror’ in the early 2000s. Popularly elected, pro-
western in geopolitical orientation and liberal in economic policy, Turkey’s 
‘moderate Islamists’ came to represent the ideal model to be supported against 
both radical Sunni movements like al-Qaeda and the revisionist anti-westernism 
of Iran.229 The US government endorsed this viewpoint explicitly within the 
framework of its ‘Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative’, a democracy 
promotion project adopted by the G8 at the Sea Island summit in June 2004.230 
Speaking at a NATO conference in Istanbul a few weeks later, President Bush 
described Turkey as a model “Muslim country, which embraces democracy, rule 
of law and freedom”.231  
Mindful of the Kemalist establishment’s suspicions of its Islamist roots 
and intentions, the AKP government insisted on being described as a 
‘conservative democratic’ party in a similar vein as Europe’s Christian 
democrats, instead of ‘moderate Islamists’. However, the party’s representation 
by the US foreign policy circles as a model to the wider region did resonate with 
its leading ideologues, especially with the vision of then foreign policy advisor 
(and future foreign minister) Ahmet Davutoğlu. As explained in his book 
Strategic Depth, Turkey in Davutoğlu’s vision had to become an ‘order setting 
agent’ at the centre of a wide geography spanning from the Balkans to the Middle 
                                                 
229 For example, describing Turkey as a “free society [...] which has always embraced religious 
pluralism” and its “moderate branch of […] Islam” as the “real Islam”, Thomas Friedman (2004) 
argued: “if we want to help moderates win the war of ideas within the Muslim world, we must 
help strengthen Turkey as a model of democracy, modernism, moderation and Islam all working 
together.” 
230 “Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative”, US Department of State Archive 2005 – 
2009, http://bmena.state.gov  
231 Quoted in Altunışık (2005: 46). Also see Bag cı and Kardaş (2004: 429 – 432). 
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East, drawn together by intensifying economic and diplomatic ties and a shared 
cultural (i.e. religious) and historical heritage, dating to the Ottoman Empire 
(Davutog lu 2001). Addressing the neo-conservative think tank American 
Enterprise Institute in January 2004, Prime Minister Erdog an echoed this vision 
in these words: 
 
Turkey in its region and especially in the Middle East will be 
a guide in overcoming instability, a driving force for 
economic development, and a reliable partner in ensuring 
security [...] I do not claim, of course, that Turkey’s 
experience is a model that can be implemented identically in 
all other Muslim societies. However, the Turkish experience 
does have a substance which can serve as a source of 
inspiration for other Muslim societies, other Muslim 
peoples.” (Yavuz 2006: Appendix 1, 337) 
 
In short, backed by the liberal–conservative alliance and a surging 
popular demand for the pursuit of the EU membership at home, and by Turkey’s 
two traditional western counterparts abroad, the Islamist-rooted governing 
party pressed on with the process of political and economic reform that had 
started in the aftermath of the 2001 financial crisis (Müftüler Bac 2005: 21). The 
momentum of the AKP’s EU-backed reforms was at its highest during the party’s 
first three years in government. Within weeks assuming office, in December 
2002, the AKP-dominated parliament passed two legal reform packages that 
operationalised reforms passed into law by the previous government, revised 
the penal code to eradicate systematic torture, and called for the retrial of all 
past cases decided in the SSCs. These courts were abolished altogether in May 
2004. Furthermore, in 2002, the government lifted the emergency laws that had 
been in place in the Kurdish provinces since 1987. In 2003, the parliament 
ratified two UN conventions, which Turkey had previously expressed 
reservations about, strengthening the protection of civil liberties and cultural 
rights (Müftüler Bac 2004: 25 – 27).232  
                                                 
232 There are the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. However, Turkey maintained some 
reservations to the latter convention, mainly regarding women’s and minorities’ socio-economic 
rights. 
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The most critical EU-backed initiative that aimed directly at the 
institutions of the guardian state was the restructuring of the powerful National 
Security Council. Between August and December 2003, the Turkish GNA passed 
laws that increased the number of civilian members of the Council, tipping the 
balance in the civilians’ favour for the first time. The AKP also successfully 
curtailed the NSC secretary general’s influence over the cabinet and the 
parliament. The first non-military secretary general of the NSC was appointed in 
August 2004. Writing on the eve of the first NSC reforms, Berkan (2003) argued: 
 
If we were to search for a ‘deep state’ in Turkey, without 
applying a positive or negative meaning to the term, until 
the day before yesterday this would be the NSC General 
Secretariat. […] Today this monopoly of information no 
longer exists. No longer can the NSC general secretary write 
to ministries and demand classified files, or send them 
instructions to do this or that. On its own, this is not a 
sufficient step to democratise Turkey, but it is a beginning. 
 
Other reforms aimed at rolling back the institutional powers of the 
guardians included the removal of the NSC representatives from the Turkish 
Radio Television Corporation, as well as the two monitoring agencies created by 
the 1982 Constitution: the Higher Council of Radio and Television and the 
Council of Higher Education. However, these agencies remained in place and 
continued to serve as the state’s controlling arm in media and universities under 
the civilian government. A judicial reform bill passed in 2003 removed the 
military courts’ ability to try civilians during peacetime.233 From 2005 onwards, 
civilians also acquired a greater influence over the drafting of the new NSPD, 
whose contents have nevertheless remained confidential. Finally, although there 
were initiatives to expand the parliament’s oversight capabilities over the 
economic activities of the TSK, their implementation has been problematic due 
to the persistence of a culture of secrecy within the military as well as a 
continued reluctance by politicians to scrutinise publicly what has been for 
decades a taboo subject.234 
                                                 
233 Amendments to Law No. 353, adopted on 7 August 2003. For details see Cizre (2006). 
234 The ‘Public Financial Management and Control Law’ (Law No. 5018, adopted on 10 December 
2003), was passed into law with the aim of expanding financial transparency of state institutions, 
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These political changes took place at the same time as Turkey’s economy 
became stabilised and inflation was tamed, mainly on the basis of the 
macroeconomic reforms put in place by the finance minister of the previous 
coalition government, Kemal Derviş, following the 2001 crisis.235 Buoyed by the 
global surge in liquidity in the 2000s, the country attracted unprecedented 
amounts of foreign direct investment and recovered consistent growth rates. 
Together with the most extensive privatisation scheme in Turkey’s history, 
which generated nearly as much capital during 2005 and 2006 as in the previous 
two decades, the incoming foreign direct investment allowed the government to 
stimulate the economy and support public projects to improve the country’s 
ailing housing, transportation and health infrastructure (OECD 2006; Karataş 
and Ercan 2008). Coming on the heels of a decade of socio-economic turbulence, 
the newfound stability and growth contributed to the popular image of the AKP 
as competent managers of the economy. 
As a consequence, the ruling party’s share of the vote increased 
consistently – first to 42% in the local elections held in 2004, and then to 46% in 
the early general election in June 2007. Under the AKP, Turkey also came closer 
to realising its European integration goals. A BBC commentary from May 2004 
suggested, “The list [of the government’s constitutional and legal reforms] is long 
and impressive. Little if any of this would have come about were it not for 
Turkey's obsession with EU entry. […] No one in the Turkish government is 
taking success for granted, but Turkey seems closer than ever to achieving its 
European ambitions.”236 In November 2004 the European Union responded to 
the government’s reform initiatives by launching full membership negotiations 
with Ankara.  
Alongside the political and institutional reforms, another important 
aspect of this period was the extent to which historical taboos of the state and 
society came to be discussed and challenged in remarkably candid and heated 
                                                                                                                                            
but its efficacy was curtailed by subsequent amendments. Similarly, a 2005 bill that would do 
away with the legal hurdles before the Court of Accounts in carrying out its oversight role into 
the budget and expenditures of the military passed into law after much delay in December 2010 
(Law No. 6085), and only after being watered down to keep the military’s financial autonomy 
largely intact. 
235 “The man Turks trust: Kemal Dervis”, Economist, 15 August 2002. 
236 “Turkey edges toward EU goal”, BBC News, 18 May 2004, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3723301.stm.  
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public discussions that took place in the media, academia and literature. The 
subjects ranged from deconstructing the official nationalist historiography of the 
republic and reassessing the demise of Anatolia’s non-Muslim communities and 
heritage in the course of the nation-building process, to examining the causes 
and consequences of military coups, the guardianship structure and the plight of 
various socio-economic, religious or ethnic groups suppressed and marginalised 
by the patriarchal state and society. This was an exceptional – and ultimately 
somewhat brief – period of political openness that was encouraged by the EU 
accession process, driven by the liberal intelligentsia, and carefully managed by a 
governing party that strove to strike a fine balance among the interest of its 
diverse supporters without overplaying its hand against the guardians.237 Thus, 
although Kemalist guardianship was still alive and strong during the first half of 
the 2000s, it was increasingly on the defensive and divided over how to respond 
to the growing domestic and international challenges to its authority. 
 
 
The guardians’ dilemma: Reform or resistance? 
 
Shifting attitudes within the guardian state: the rise of Eurasianism 
 
In the late 1990s, the military-bureaucratic guardians of the Kemalist regime 
appeared confident of their socio-political and institutional hegemony in the 
unfolding ‘post-modern age’. By the mid-2000s, this confidence had largely 
disappeared as the guardians faced unprecedented political and ideational 
challenges to their hegemonic position both at home and abroad. As a 
consequence, in the course of the decade, ‘post-modernity’ started featuring 
frequently and prominently among the guardians’ list of threats to the Kemalist 
order. In his inaugural address in August 2008, the new chief of the Turkish 
military, General Işık Koşaner, summarised what seemed to be the prevalent 
worldview within the TSK as such: 
   
                                                 
237 See Öktem (2011), and “Europeanisation and ‘the liberal moment’” in Akkoyunlu, Nicolaidis 
and Öktem (2013: 20 – 27).  
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The network of propaganda and influence made up of a 
post-modern class orchestrated by global powers and 
nested within the domestic media, certain academic and 
business circles and civil society organisations, is hard at 
work to weaken and dissolve our national unity, national 
values and national security parameters.238 
 
Koşaner’s reference to the ‘post-modern class’ can be interpreted a thinly 
veiled reference to the liberal intelligentsia’s collaboration with the conservative 
capitalists at home and with the US and the EU abroad to impose on Turkey a 
post-modern neo-liberal imperialist project that could only succeed by 
encouraging ethnic separatism and Islamist reactionism, and by side-lining the 
guardians of the secular and unitary nation-state.239 This interpretation suggests 
a remarkable turnaround in the dominant worldview subscribed to by the 
guardians within the span of a few years. Not only was it the previous generation 
of senior officers, in close cooperation with the now maligned global powers 
who, had encouraged the rise of political Islam at the same time as they forced 
open the country’s economy to global markets in the early 1980s. But it was 
more or less Koşaner’s generation, whose ultimatum to the Welfare-led 
government in February 1997 had included directives to maintain Turkey’s 
western geopolitical orientation, pursuit of the EU membership and the 
implementation of free market reforms.240 
Instead of being essentially an ideological transformation, then, this 
relatively sudden shift in attitudes towards westernisation and globalisation in 
the early 2000s primarily reflected a realisation on the part of the Kemalist 
guardians that they were losing the strategic backing of the West, which had 
supported the military’s guardianship role since the early years of the Cold War, 
to the liberal-conservative alliance. Welfare, with its openly hostile rhetoric 
towards the western security establishment and liberal economic system, 
                                                 
238 “Topluma müdahale”, Sabah, 31 August 2008. 
239 For the suggested connection between separatism, religious fundamentalism and post-
modernity, see the 2007 speech of Koşaner’s predecessor, General İlker Başbuğ. “Komutan 
postmoderne neden karşı?”, Radikal, 25 September 2007. 
240 According to the leaked text of the ultimatum, the guardians insisted: 
- “Turkey’s goal to become a full member of the EU must be maintained, without 
disregarding the negative attitude of some European countries on this matter.” 
- “Economic efforts to unite Turkey with the outside world, including privatisation 
schemes, must be intensified.” (“İşte tarihi değişiklikler”, Hürriyet, 4 November 1997). 
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presented a more straightforward challenge to the Kemalist establishment. The 
guardians could maintain their strategic relationship with the West, while 
opposing the Islamists as inherently opposed to Atatürk’s legacy of ‘entering 
contemporary civilisation’ (and thus justifying an intervention against them). 
The idea of an Islamist-led European integration project, on the other hand, 
presented the guardians with a difficult dilemma, pitting their geopolitical 
priorities against their ideological commitment to westernisation as well as 
sensitivity to their own public image: how to respond to a widely popular project 
of European integration and reform driven by a well-supported political party, 
when it threatens the guardians’ institutional hegemony? 
An outcome of this dilemma was the re-emergence of one of the key 
divisions within the Kemalist establishment that dated to İnönü’s decision to 
embed Turkey within the western security alliance in the early years of the Cold 
War: the division between those who emphasised geopolitical westernisation as 
the pursuit of the charismatic leader’s legacy of ‘entering contemporary 
civilisation’, versus those who interpreted this legacy primarily as an anti-
imperialist ideology that prioritised national sovereignty above all else. While in 
the course of the Cold War and during the 1990s, the former tendency 
outweighed the latter, at the turn of the millennium, with shifting geopolitical 
dynamics and alliances, the latter became resurgent among the military-
bureaucratic guardians and their supporters in civil society, media and academia. 
The resultant discourse came to be known as Ulusalcılık, which translates as 
nationalism, but with the use of the Turkish word for nation, ulus, instead of the 
Arabic millet, which is meant to emphasise an exclusively secular Turkish 
character. The geostrategic extension of this domestic discourse was Avrasyacılık 
(Eurasianism).241  
                                                 
241 Despite the extensive overlaps in shared ideas and people, Ulusalcılık and Avrasyacılık are not 
synonymous concepts. While an idea of national sovereignty lies at the core of both, not all those 
who define themselves as Ulusalcı necessarily subscribe to the Eurasianist geostrategic 
worldview. Indeed, a distrust and dislike of Khomeinist Iran and a fear of Russian imperialism 
limits the appeal of Eurasianism among secular nationalist Turks. Ulusalcılık displays a 
reactionary characteristic in its anti-western, anti-globalisation, anti-liberal, anti-Islamist and 
anti-Kurdish rhetoric, but does not necessarily embody a tangible geopolitical or socio-economic 
agenda of its own. In short, while nearly all Eurasianists could be classified as Ulusalcı, not all 
Ulusalcıs are Eurasianists. 
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As a geostrategic discourse, Kemalist Eurasianism brought together two 
otherwise distinct political groups, which had frequently clashed during the Cold 
War: various groups of socialists and secular nationalists, who shared an 
emerging platform of anti-imperialism, anti-westernism, economic nationalism 
and state-enforced secularism. As a general stance, the Eurasianists defended the 
preservation of the official Kemalist historiography, and regarded revisionist 
efforts to come to reassess the state’s role in past episodes of mass violence, 
especially against the Armenians and the Kurds, as a western imperialist ploy to 
weaken the nationalist regime. Subsequently, they viewed the reform agenda 
promoted by the western-backed liberal–conservative alliance as a threat 
against Turkey’s national sovereignty and the regime’s unitary and secular 
character.242 Increasingly convinced that Turkey’s geopolitical interests no 
longer lay with the United States and the western security establishment, and 
inspired in part by Russian geostrategist Alexander Dugin’s ideas on establishing 
a new Eurasian geopolitical space to counter the politico-economic hegemony of 
the West, the Turkish Eurasianists advocated strategic rapprochement with 
Russia, China and Iran.243 This, they argued, was in line with the true principles 
of Kemalism. As two academic proponents of this idea put it: 
 
We suggest that Kemalism, as it is understood by its 
adherents today, has never been synonymous with 
Westernisation, but rather with anti-Imperialism. Indeed, 
this has always been the main motivation behind the 
convergence of Kemalists with a segment of the Socialists 
and sections of the military elite in Turkey. The most recent 
and important outcome of this convergence is the current 
support of these groups for Eurasianism, an intellectual 
movement originally developed by Russian émigrés which 
rejected a Western-centric understanding and explaining of 
world history, geography and politics (Akçalı and Perinçek 
2009). 
 
  
                                                 
242 For a detailed content analysis of the leading Eurasianist publications, see Eren-Webb (2011). 
243 Translated to Turkish, Dugin’s works became popular among socialists and secular 
nationalists, and were reportedly included in the curricula in the War Academy. Dugin 
established the ‘International Eurasianist Movement’ in November 2003, of which the Turkish 
Worker’s Party (İşçi Partisi, IP) of Doğu Perinçek became an active member. “Emekli General 
Nejat Eslen: Demokrasi, Türkiye'nin öncelikli meselesi değil”, Zaman, 18 July 2008. 
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Two regional developments in 2003 and 2004 strengthened the appeal of 
Eurasianism among the Kemalist guardians: the occupation of Iraq by the US 
military in 2003 and the Annan Plan for the reunification of Cyprus in 2004. The 
former confirmed existing suspicions that the US had forsaken its strategic 
partnership with Turkey, found a new ally in Iraq’s Kurds and supported their 
regional aspirations for an independent state (Akçalı and Perinçek 2009: 559), 
following the GNA’s refusal to grant the American military the use of Turkey’s 
territory as a launching pad for the northern front.244 The proposal for Cypriot 
unification as advocated in the Annan Plan, on the other hand, was opposed by a 
number of senior figures within the Turkish military as well as by the nationalist 
leadership of the Turkish Cypriot community, led by Rauf Denktaş, as 
undermining Turkey’s strategic interests and insistence for a two-state solution 
on the island.245 With these developments in the backdrop, Dugin paid his first 
visit to Turkey in December 2003, delivering a lecture on Eurasianism at Istanbul 
University.  
Two further events organised in 2004 brought together the leading 
Eurasianists within the military, politics and the civil society: in September, a 
conference titled “Turkish, Russian, Chinese and Iranian relationships on the 
Eurasian axis” held at Istanbul University was chaired by Professor Nur Serter, 
who went on to become an MP from the CHP in 2007, and featured as keynote 
speakers, deputy chairman of the CHP Onur Öymen, retired General Tuncer 
Kılınç, the Worker’s Party chairman Doğu Perinçek, alongside the Iranian and 
Russian ambassadors to Turkey. In his address to the conference, Kılınç, who 
was known during his time as the NSC general secretary between 2001 and 2003 
as a proponent of Turkey’s shift away from the West, proposed a ‘Eurasian 
Union’, modelled after the EU and led by Turkey, Russia, China and Iran, to 
                                                 
244 See “A partnership at risk?”, Economist, 10 July 2003; “Rumsfeld Faults Turkey for Barring Use 
of Its Land in '03 to Open Northern Front in Iraq”, New York Times, 21 March 2005. For a detailed 
account of the internal politics of the Iraqi invasion in Turkey as observed by a veteran Ankara 
journalist, see Bila (2003). 
245 The plan, backed by the AKP government, the European Union and a majority of Turkish 
Cypriots, failed when put to referendum in April 2004, as the majority of Greek Cypriots, led by 
the nationalist government of Tassos Papadopoulos, voted against it. In 2005, Cyprus was 
admitted to the EU as a divided island. 
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counter the hegemonic ambitions of the US and to combat terrorism, ethnic 
separatism and other disputes in the region.246  
A second conference held in Ankara in December was jointly sponsored 
by Dugin’s International Eurasianist Movement, the Confederation of Turkish 
Trade Unions (Türkiye Işçi Sendikalari Konfederasyonu, Türk-İş), the Atatürkist 
Thought Association (Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği, ADD; a leading secular 
nationalist organisation) and the Ulusal Kanal (a TV-channel linked to Perinçek’s 
Worker’s Party). Dugin himself was in attendance, alongside former Turkish 
president Süleyman Demirel, retired former head of the gendarmerie General 
Şener Eruygur, as well as Kılınç and Perinçek, among others.247 These events 
provided the opposition to the AKP within the military-bureaucratic 
establishment and their allies in civil society and politics with a new geopolitical 
framework and a more coherent political agenda. 
 
 
Guardianship divided: Reform versus resistance 
 
During the first five years of the AKP government, the growing split within the 
guardian state between those who saw the ongoing process of change in Turkey 
as an inevitable product of the post-Cold War order and thought it wiser to adapt 
to it and those who rejected the change and resisted the loss of power became 
increasingly visible. As senior military officers, acting and retired, frequently 
(and uncharacteristically) contradicted each other in public and exchanged 
thinly veiled criticisms, the carefully maintained reputation of the military as a 
strictly hierarchical and disciplined institution was undermined. The senior 
command structure of the TSK reflected this split: at the highest echelon of 
                                                 
246 Speech titled “The Greater Middle East and the future and security of Eurasia”, Istanbul, 3 
September 2004. In an earlier speech to the War Academy in Istanbul on 7 March 2002, General 
Kılınç had argued, “Turkey has not seen the tiniest assistance from the European Union in 
matters concerning its national interests. On the contrary, the EU regards issues that concern 
Turkey’s interests in complete negativity, this is obvious. Russia is in isolation. I believe it would 
be in Turkey’s benefit to engage in a search that includes [Russia] and if possible Iran, without  
disregarding the US.” In 2007, Kılınç called for Turkey to pull out of NATO altogether. “Turkey 
and its army: Military manoeuvres”, Economist, 7 July 2007. 
247 Shortly after the conference Russian President Vladimir Putin paid a state visit to Turkey, 
while Dugin travelled to the Turkish-controlled North Cyprus to express support for Denktaş and 
the nationalists opposed to the UN and EU policies on the island (Akçalı and Perinçek 2009: 562). 
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power was a group of officers that first became known as activist supporters of 
the 1960 coup while still students at the War Academy (Harbiye) and many of 
whom went on to play prominent roles in the military’s subsequent 
interventions. Many of the senior officers of the 1990s, such as generals Bir and 
Kılınç, former gendarmerie commander and intelligence chief Teoman Koman, 
and the former TSK chief Hakkı Karadayı (1994 -98) belonged to this group.  
With the notable exception of the chief of staff between 2002 and 2006, 
these ‘activist’ officers dominated the senior command of the TSK in the early 
2000s. These included three commanders of the First Army, generals Çetin 
Doğan (2001 – 2003; also the director of the West Working Group after the 1997 
coup), Yaşar Büyükanıt (2003 – 2004) and Hurşit Tolon (2004 – 2005). Generals 
Eruygur and Tolon were known as the leading proponents of the 
Ulusalcı/Eurasianist camp. Following their retirement in 2004, Tolon and 
Eruygur, who assumed the leadership of the ADD, continued their active 
opposition to the AKP government. Although not a part of this group, General 
İbrahim Fırtına and Admiral Özden Örnek, the air force and navy chiefs between 
2003 and 2005, were also closer to the Eurasianists due to their discomfort with 
the ruling party. These officers did not hide their displeasure with General Hilmi 
Özkök, the chief of staff of the TSK between 2002 and 2006, who did not belong 
to the ‘activist’ group, opposed Eurasianism as a geopolitical blueprint for 
Turkey and opted for reform rather than resistance, thus often being labelled as 
an American lackey and a ‘closet Islamist’ by his critics.248  
In many ways, Özkök was a typical Turkish general, sharing the same 
view of society and threat perception as his fellow officers: his speeches often 
included declarations of vigilance against ethnic separatism and religious 
reactionism.249 However, he was also of the view that the Cold War-era 
guardianship role of the TSK could no longer be sustained in the post-Cold War 
environment and the military could no longer afford to appear anti-democratic. 
                                                 
248 Internal complaints about Özkök were typically aired through deliberately leaked reports and 
anonymous criticisms, often published by Mustafa Balbay, a columnist for the secular nationalist 
daily Cumhuriyet. These leaks would then be officially denied by the TSK. Berkan noted at the 
time: “As journalists, we know when such reports emerge that they will be denied, but that they 
also represent the views of a particular group [inside the military]. In other words, the reports 
are both false and true.” (2004) 
249 See speeches commemorating the ‘Victory Day’ celebrations, 30 August 2002 and the death of 
Atatürk, 10 November 2002. 
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In a notable departure from common practice, under Özkök’s leadership, the TSK 
refrained from declaring an official stance on some of the most pressing issues of 
the day – including the parliamentary bill on the use of Turkish territory by the 
US forces ahead of the Iraqi invasion, the Annan Plan referendum on Cyprus and 
the European Union reforms – thereby allowing the elected government to lead 
the public debate on these matters. To a question about why the military had 
remained silent on the failed bill on Iraq, which most of the senior staff – 
including himself – had privately supported, Özkök replied in a way that defied 
the traditional notion of guardianship: “We, the soldiers, do not consider 
ourselves the most knowledgeable in every issue. Had we made a statement with 
only the security dimension in mind, we could have misled the public.”250 When 
criticised for his leniency on the governing party, he responded: “I am a 
democrat, is that a crime?”251 
Following Özkök’s retirement in 2006, the restraint he imposed on the 
military’s political activism waned. His successor, General Büyükanıt brought 
political activism back to the fore and took a tough stance against the governing 
party and the liberal-conservative coalition. In March 2007, the weekly political 
journal Nokta published a classified military document listing scores of Turkish 
journalists according to their ‘levels of loyalty’ to the Kemalist regime.252 The 
same journal then went on to publish a leaked diary that allegedly belonged to 
Admiral Örnek, detailing two advanced coup plans against the AKP government 
in 2004, which were aborted when discovered by Özkök.253 Shortly afterwards, 
the offices of Nokta were raided by the police upon the directives of the military 
prosecutor. The magazine was shut down while its editor-in-chief and lead 
reporter were sued for “insulting and denigrating Turkishness, the republic and 
the institutions of the state”. The charges were based on the ambiguously 
worded Article 301 of the Penal Code, which allowed nationalist lawyers and 
                                                 
250 Statement made on 5 March 2003. “İz bıraktı”, Milliyet, 28 August 2006. In 2012, Özkök 
revealed that alongside his own junior staff, he also had to resist demands from the Bush 
administration to put pressure on the Turkish parliament for the passage of the bill. “ABD 1 Mart 
tezkeresinde baskı yapmamı istedi!”, Milliyet, 4 August 2012. 
251 “İz bıraktı”, Milliyet, 28 August 2006. 
252 “Askerin medya notları”, Radikal, 8 March 2007. 
253 “İçinden iki darbe girişimi geçen günlük”, Radikal, 29 March 2007; “Gen. Eruygur: fervent coup 
enthusiast”, Today’s Zaman, 4 July 2008. Örnek claimed the report was a forgery, but there was 
no official denial from the TSK. 
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prosecutors to open a barrage of court cases against members of the liberal 
intelligentsia whom they considered unpatriotic.254 On the eve of a crucial 
presidential election, the government appeared reluctant to challenge the 
guardians directly. 
2007 proved to be a critical year for the hybrid regime in Turkey. The 
central issue was the parliamentary election of President Ahmet Necdet Sezer’s 
successor. As the former chief of the Constitutional Court and a staunch Kemalist, 
Sezer had frequently resorted to his veto power to block draft laws passed by the 
AKP-dominated GNA and often served as a break on the government’s reform 
attempts. Alongside its powers over the parliament (which were admittedly 
limited: for instance, the president could not veto the same bill twice) and ability 
to appoint key members of the bureaucracy and high judiciary, the presidency 
long carried a symbolic importance as a ‘stronghold’ of Kemalist guardianship. 
Therefore the government’s nomination of then Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül, 
the prominent founding member of the AKP and a politician with a long history 
in political Islam, against the military’s wishes, constituted a direct affront to the 
institutional and ideological hegemony of the guardians. The Kemalist guardians 
and their civilian supporters attempted to resist an ‘Islamist takeover’ of the 
presidency in three interconnected ways: obstruction of the parliamentary 
process supported by the Constitutional Court, mass demonstrations and a 
military ultimatum.  
On 27 April, MPs from the opposition CHP boycotted the first round of 
voting and appealed to the Constitutional Court to annul the outcome (in which 
Gül had fallen ten votes short of a straight victory, taking the election to a second 
round) on the grounds that the parliament had failed to reach the necessary two-
thirds quorum. Following the vote at midnight, a statement appeared on the 
official website of the TSK, expressing "grave concern” over “recent debates 
about secularism surrounding the presidential election process”. The statement 
reasserted the military’s guardianship role as “the absolute defender of 
secularism” and emphasised its “legal duty” to take the necessary action to 
                                                 
254 They were eventually acquitted of the charges. Other high profile figures taken to court under 
article 301 during the mid-2000s include novelist Orhan Pamuk, academic Murat Belge and 
Turkish-Armenian journalist Hrant Dink. 
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protect the “fundamental values” of the republic.255 Senior CHP figures and 
prominent Eurasianists praised what was an ultimatum to the government, 
which has been commonly referred to as the ‘e-memorandum’.256 While these 
developments took place, mass demonstrations against Gül’s candidacy were 
held in major urban centres throughout April and May. These were co-organised 
by the ADD and the secularist ‘Association in Support of Contemporary Living’ 
(Çağdaş Yaşamı Destekleme Vakfı, ÇYD). Some of the popular slogans from these 
rallies included: “Neither the US, nor the EU, fully sovereign Turkey”, “We do not 
want an Imam for president”, “We are Mustafa Kemal’s soldiers”, as well as the 
less audible “Neither sharia, nor coup d’état; we demand a fully democratic 
Turkey”, suggesting that not all demonstrators were in favour of a military 
intervention.257 
The government’s immediate response to the e-memorandum was one of 
caution, but also – unlike Welfare in 1997 – a refusal to back down.258 This 
refusal grew more resolute as it became apparent that, for the first time in its 
long history of interventions, the guardians had managed to secure neither 
enough public support nor the backing of the West: on 28 April, the EU 
commissioner for enlargement, Olli Rehn, cautioned the military to respect 
democratic values and processes.259 The official US response was rather mixed 
and muted, yet on balance unsupportive of the generals’ move.260 In May, shortly 
after the Constitutional Court announced the annulment of the first round of the 
vote in line with the opposition’s appeal, the government withdrew Gül’s 
candidacy and called for an early general election. 
                                                 
255 “Excerpts of Turkish army statement”, BBC News, 28 April 2007, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/6602775.stm.  
256 CHP deputy chairman Onur Öymen praised the statement, adding that his party shared the 
TSK’s concerns on secularism. Addressing a rally the following day, the ADD vice president Nur 
Serter said: “Long live the Turkish army! On 27 April, the Turkish army heard our voice, 
supported our voice and supported democracy. […] It supported the true will of the Turkish 
Republic.” See “CHP Genel Başkan Yardımcısı: Dayatmayla cumhurbaşkanı seçmek istiyorlar”, 
Hürriyet, 28 April 2007; “Prof. Nur Serter: Ordumuz 27 Nisan’da demokrasiye sahip çıktı”, 
Hürriyet, 30 April 2007. 
257 “One million Turks rally against government”, Reuters, 29 April 2007. 
258 For the full text of the AKP spokesman’s response: “Cemil Çiçek’in açıklamasının tam metni”, 
NTVMSNC, 28 April 2007. 
259 “Turkish army statement sparks EU concern”, EUobserver, 30 April 2007, 
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The AKP won the general election held in July 2007 with a wider than 
predicted margin, increasing its share of the vote by 12% from 2002 (but losing 
22 seats based on proportional distribution, as the new parliament also featured 
71 new MPs from the MHP and 26 mostly Kurdish independents). While the 
CHP’s vote remained static, the party lost 66 seats in total. The rise in the AKP’s 
support did not only come as a verdict on its five-year record, but also as an 
expression of public approval of its stance on the presidential election – at least 
this is how the governing party and its supporters interpreted and framed the 
outcome. Buoyed by the victory, the government re-nominated Gül as its 
candidate for the presidency, and with the participation and partial backing of 
the MHP delegates, succeeded in getting him elected as Turkey’s first Islamist-
rooted president in August 2007. The successive election defeats came as a blow 
to the guardian state and its Ulusalcı/Eurasianist wing. Marking the historical 
significance of Gül’s election, Ertuğrul Özkök, then editor of the daily Hürriyet, 
declared him “the first president of the second republic” (2007). 
One final act of resistance from the guardians came the following year, 
when Abdurrahman Yalçınkaya, the chief state prosecutor, brought charges 
against the ruling party on the grounds of engaging in anti-secular activities, 
demanding its closure and a ban from politics on its senior members. As in the 
case of the e-memorandum, the CHP expressed support for the chief prosecutor’s 
request, with its leader Deniz Baykal admitting that “the judiciary is all we have 
left” (Kürkçü 2008). On 31 July 2008, the Constitutional Court ruled, with five 
votes to six, against the chief prosecutor’s demands.261 The ruling displayed the 
existence of similar divisions within the high judiciary regarding resistance and 
reform as within the military. The court did find the AKP guilty of damaging 
secularism, but decided to impose a monetary fine instead of closure; a much 
lighter punishment, apparently produced in part as a result of some of the 
judges’ reluctance to upset Turkey’s delicate political stability and macro-
economic balance – especially given the fact that the AKP enjoyed larger popular 
support than its outlawed predecessors, Welfare and Virtue. Having previously 
expressed concern over the case, the European Union and the financial markets, 
                                                 
261 Although a simple majority of the judges voted in favour of closure, this was one vote less than 
the necessary qualified majority.  
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both of which evolved into independent pressure mechanisms that decision 
makers in Turkey have found difficult to ignore, reacted positively to the 
ruling.262  
Also noteworthy was the influence of Chief Justice Haşim Kılıç on the 
panel. Kılıç was a conservative judge who was appointed by then President Özal 
to the Constitutional Court in 1990. President Gül appointed him to the head of 
this court in October 2007. Between 1990 and 2009 Kılıç voted on 18 closure 
cases, in 14 of which he supported closure. All of these 14 parties were of leftist 
and/or Kurdish political orientation. Three of the four cases where he had voted 
against closure were those of the Welfare, the Virtue and, in 2008, the AKP (Çelik 
2013). On the AKP case, he was the only judge on the panel to vote both against 
closure and monetary fine. The presence of Kılıç at the head of the Constitutional 
Court at such a critical moment demonstrated the lasting impact on state 
institutions of the post-1980 reorientation of Turkey in an economically liberal 
and politically conservative direction, first under the military junta and then 
under the political leadership of Turgut Özal. 
The various domestic and international challenges against the guardians’ 
institutional and socio-political authority between 2002 and 2008 were 
markedly steeper than those it was faced with during the 1990s: as the main 
vehicle of these challenges, the ruling AKP was not only more popular at home 
than its Islamist predecessors, but it had also managed to win over the backing of 
Turkey’s western partners, the traditional allies of the military-bureaucratic 
establishment. Faced with this predicament, the guardian state appeared 
increasingly and visibly divided. The presence of two individuals that erred on 
the side of reform rather than resistance (namely, General Özkök and Chief 
Justice Kılıç) at the helm of the two key guardianship institutions at these critical 
junctures played a decisive role in favour of the elected government and 
contributed to the eventual collapse of the hybrid regime. 
  
                                                 
262 “Rehn warns Turkey on closure case against ruling party”, Hürriyet Daily News, 29 March 
2008; “AKP case depresses Istanbul stock market”, Financial Times, 1 April 2008; “Financial 
markets welcome Turkish court's decision not to close AKP”, Hürriyet Daily News, 1 August 2008. 
225 
 
Resistance suppressed: The fall of the hybrid regime 
 
Having survived two coup plans in the early 2000s, a military ultimatum in 2007 
and a closure case in 2008, the governing party moved swiftly to take its fate into 
its own hand. Between 2008 and 2011, as the AKP went on to wrest control of 
the remaining institutions of the state, the hybrid structure of the Kemalist 
regime collapsed. The mechanisms through which resistance within the military-
bureaucratic establishment was suppressed included two high profile court 
cases handled by Heavy Penal Courts against the Ulusalcı/Eurasianist camp and a 
far-reaching restructuring of the judicial system.263 Equally significant was the 
role of the media during this period in challenging the military guardians’ 
sacrosanct popular image and untarnished reputation. 
 
 
The court cases: Ergenekon and Balyoz 
 
Following the Constitutional Court’s ruling, the governing party put its weight 
behind a criminal investigation that had started the previous year into a 
suspected ‘clandestine ultra-nationalist network’ embedded within the security 
establishment, civil society and the criminal underworld. Named after the 
mythical place of origin of the Turkic people, prosecutors claimed that the so-
called ‘Ergenekon’ terror organisation had been planning political assassinations, 
bomb attacks in public places, organised riots and mass demonstrations to create 
an atmosphere of socio-political instability that would justify a military takeover; 
methods all too reminiscent of the psychological warfare tactics employed by the 
TSK’s Special Warfare Department in advance of coups d’état.  
Launched following the discovery of a hidden cache of arms and explosives 
linked to two retired officers in June 2007, the Ergenekon investigation was 
eventually merged with other ongoing criminal cases, including bombing of the 
secularist daily Cumhuriyet and the fatal attack targeting the Council of State 
(Danıştay) following a ruling upholding the headscarf ban in public offices in 
                                                 
263 Established in June 2005, the Heavy Penal Courts (also known as Specially Authorised Courts, 
Özel Yetkili Mahkemeler) dealt exclusively with organised crime and terrorism cases. The 
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2006.264 Prosecutors also suggested links between the network and a series of 
assassinations targeting non-Muslims, including the murders of a Greek 
Orthodox priest and three Protestant missionaries in 2006, as well as Turkish 
Armenian journalist Hrant Dink in January 2007, whose death had triggered 
mass demonstrations against the culture of impunity and xenophobic 
nationalism within the state.265  The first indictment in July 2008 implicated 86 
people with conspiring against the government, including several retired officers 
and well-known Ulusalcı/Eurasianist public figures such as the Worker’s Party 
chairman Doğu Perinçek, ultra-nationalist lawyer Kemal Kerinçsiz, journalist 
İlhan Selçuk and former president of Istanbul University Kemal Alemdaroğlu.  
Coinciding with the highly anticipated final days of the closure case, the 
timing of the indictment revealed the intensity of the power struggle during the 
summer of 2008 within the state bureaucracy between the government and 
followers of the Gülen’s Hizmet movement on one side and the 
Ulusalcı/Eurasianist guardians on the other. But it was the second and the third 
indictments, accepted in March and August 2009, that expanded the scope of the 
trial significantly and covered, among other allegations, the aborted coup plans 
of 2003 and 2004. These indictments followed the detainment and arrest of 
retired generals, including Eruygur, Kılınç and Tolon, along with academics, 
journalists and civil society activists, increasing the total number of suspects in 
the case to nearly 200.266 
From its inception, the Ergenekon trial exposed and indeed hastened the 
ongoing polarisation of Turkey’s society into two seemingly irreconcilable 
political camps. The secular nationalist opponents of the AKP immediately 
declared the investigation politically motivated and the evidence fabricated, 
while members of the ruling party and many of its staunch supporters in the 
media and civil society deliberately and categorically ignored the presumed 
innocence of the defendants until proven guilty. In the ensuing race to win over 
                                                 
264 “Ergenekon ile Danıştay davaları birleştirildi”, Sabah, 4 August 2009. 
265 “Zirve, Hrant ve Santoro Ergenekon işi”, Aksiyon, 22 October 2012. Only one of these cases, the 
murder of three Protestant missionaries in the eastern city of Malatya, was formally linked with 
the Ergenekon investigation. 
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gözaltında”, Hürriyet, 2 July 2008. 
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public opinion, Prime Minister Erdoğan declared himself as the unofficial 
‘prosecutor’ of the case, in response to which the CHP leader Deniz Baykal 
labelled himself as the defendants’ lawyer. Although eventually blurred by the 
rising level of political manipulation, for many ordinary Turks and Kurds, the 
investigations at this early stage appeared as an unprecedented and historic 
opportunity to push back the uncontrolled powers of the guardian state, which 
had become especially overbearing since the 1980 coup, and expose and cleanse 
the state of its extra-legal criminal elements, which played a role in some of the 
darkest chapters of Turkey’s recent history, from the Susurluk incident to the 
systematic human rights abuses of the 1990s; i.e. a belated ‘Operation Gladio’. 
In early 2010, a separate investigation was launched into reports of another 
alleged plan to topple the government, referred to as operation ‘Balyoz’ (or 
Sledgehammer).267 The plan’s details, involving the bombing of historical 
mosques in Istanbul and provoking a conflict with Greece on the Aegean Sea, 
which were allegedly discussed during a First Army staff seminar in March 
2003.268 Between early 2010 and late 2011 a total of 365 suspects were charged 
with conspiring against the government. All (except one) of the suspects were 
retired or serving officers who had taken part in the seminar or were believed to 
have been informed of its contents. Among the detainees were General Çetin 
Doğan, the chief of the First Army at the time of the seminar and the prime 
suspect in the case, as well as retired General Fırtına and Admiral Örnek, the 
author of the ‘coup diaries’ published by Nokta in 2007. Like the Ergenekon case, 
the Balyoz case was also handled by a Heavy Penal Court as a ‘terrorism’ trial.  
The newspaper that publicised most of these allegations played a key role in 
revealing the incriminating evidence that formed the backbone of the Ergenekon 
and Balyoz indictments. Founded after the closure of Nokta in 2007, and 
featuring a list of prominent journalists and columnists from the left-liberal 
intelligentsia, the daily Taraf quickly became the source of some of the most 
unreserved criticisms of the military’s non-democratic guardianship role.269 It 
                                                 
267 “Darbenin adı Balyoz”, Taraf, 20 January 2010. 
268 The military acknowledged that such discussions took place during the seminar, but insisted 
that they were part of a routine ‘war scenario’ and did not constitute a coup plan. 
269 Some of the prominent names were editor-in-chief Ahmet Altan, Murat Belge, journalist 
Yasemin Çongar and former chief editor of Nokta, Alper Görmüş. 
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was to this newspaper, and particularly to one of its reporters, that sources 
inside the police force, state bureaucracy and military, who were close to the 
government and the Hizmet movement, or simply opposed to the Eurasianist 
faction’s influence among the guardians, started leaking classified documents 
about the secretive internal world of the TSK. These leaks included not only 
allegations of anti-government activism, but also gross misconduct, inefficiency 
and oversight, leading in some instances to the deaths of military personnel.270 
Almost single-handedly, Taraf’s reporting challenged the TSK’s long established 
reputation as Turkey’s most successful, patriotic and professional institution.271 
The guardians and the secularist opposition accused Taraf’s reporters and 
columnists of being funded by the liberal Soros foundation and the Gülen 
network and launched numerous court cases against them.272 
In July 2011, the entire military senior command, led by the Chief of the 
General Staff Işık Koşaner, resigned in protest over the sheer number and the 
lengthy incarceration of the members of the TSK. In a written statement, Koşaner 
highlighted the general staff’s inability to protect the military personnel in the 
face of what he described as an unlawful and politically motivated legal 
process.273 This was indeed no less than a remarkable admission of defeat by the 
country’s once powerful military guardians, which came shortly after a senior 
member of the CHP had expressed disappointment with the generals’ failure to 
defend the interests of the Kemalist regime: “We thought they were soldiers,” 
deputy chairman Süheyl Batum said in a speech delivered at an ADD meeting, 
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“but turns out [the military] was a paper tiger. Turns out the US simply carved a 
hole in it. They were able to fell that gigantic tree within seconds.”274  
Another previously unthinkable development took place in January 2012, 
when a former military chief of staff, General İlker Başbuğ (2008 – 2010), was 
arrested on charges of “forming and leading a terrorist organisation” in 
conjunction with the Ergenekon trial. The primary accusation against Başbuğ 
was his knowledge of another confidential plan, the so-called “Action Plan to 
Combat Reaction”, drawn up by a serving colonel in April 2009 with an aim to 
manipulate public opinion against the AKP government and the Hizmet 
movement.275 In September 2012, amidst clashes between the police and anti-
government protestors outside the high security courthouse, the judges in the 
Balyoz trial found 322 of the suspects guilty of the charges and delivered prison 
sentences between five and 20 years.276 Similar dramatic scenes unfolded in 
August 2013, when the same court reached a verdict in the Ergenekon trial, 
sentencing 275 suspects to prison. Başbuğ, Eruygur and Tolon were given life 
sentences.  
 
 
The constitutional referendum of September 2010 
 
Contemporaneous with the Ergenekon and Balyoz trials, the AKP government 
presented to the parliament a constitutional reform package, which was put to 
national referendum on 12 September 2010. The package contained a wide 
range of amendments to the 1982 Constitution, including improvements in the 
protection of individual privacy, freedom of speech and various social, economic 
and labour rights in line with the European Union requirements. By scheduling 
the referendum to coincide with the thirtieth anniversary of the 1980 coup, the 
government aimed to present it as a vote between the old ‘authoritarian’ Turkey 
and the new ‘democratic’ one. Indeed, one of the proposed amendments was to 
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scrap the provisional Article 15 of the 1982 Constitution, which granted legal 
immunity to the perpetrators of past coups. The day after the reform package 
was approved by 58% of the voters in the referendum, state prosecutors 
launched an investigation against the aging leaders of the 1980 coup, former 
generals Kenan Evren and Tahsin Şahinkaya, with a formal indictment brought 
against the duo in January 2012.277 This was followed by the arrests of 31 people 
as part of an investigation into the ‘post-modern’ coup of 1997. Among them was 
General Bir, the mastermind of the intervention.278 
The constitutional amendments enabled a further shift in the civil-
military balance in the civilian government’s favour, especially in the field of the 
judiciary. The changes restricted the military courts’ ability to try civilians, while 
expanding the civilian courts’ remit in trying military personnel in cases 
involving crimes against the state, including coup plotting; an amendment with 
direct impact on the Ergenekon and Balyoz trials. Another amendment granted 
former officers dismissed from the TSK by the Supreme Military Council (Yüksek 
Askeri Şura, YAŞ) the right to appeal, opening the way for those who were 
expelled from the military on suspicions of ‘anti-secular tendencies’ after 1997 to 
resume their duties.279 
The package provoked controversy mainly over its proposals to 
restructure the civilian judiciary. The proposed amendments were intended to 
open up what constitutional law expert Ergun Özbudun labelled the “Kemalist 
juristocracy”, i.e. the system of close-circuit recruitment and appointment of 
judges and prosecutors by and within an exclusive class of secular nationalist 
guardians that have dominated the judiciary and the bureaucracy (2011: 32; 
Shambayati and Kirdiş 2009; Ergil 2010). The government’s proposal to break 
this system included granting greater authority to the president and the 
parliament in the appointment of judges and prosecutors. In other words, while 
the proposed changes sought to end the Kemalist guardians’ influence over the 
courts, the increased powers of the legislative and the executive branches over 
                                                 
277 “Turkey 1980 coup leader Kenan Evren goes on trial”, Guardian, 4 April 2012. 
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the judiciary risked undermining the democratic separation of powers in a non-
hybrid setting. The critics of these proposals argued that they would merely 
replace one class of politicised judges and prosecutors with another and allow 
single-party governments to pack the courts with their own supporters (Yeğinsu 
2010; Kalaycıoğlu 2012). 
The restructuring that followed the 2010 referendum brought to an end 
the Kemalists’ decades-long hegemony over the judiciary, while the high profile 
trials enabled the government to establish its authority over the military. 
Whereas the TSK’s traditionally sacrosanct image as the selfless servants of the 
nation came under increasing scrutiny in the course of this process, the AKP’s 
growing popularity was reconfirmed when it won a third consecutive general 
election victory in June 2011, securing one out of every two votes cast. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
At the turn of the millennium, more than a decade of political and economic 
instability in Turkey led to growing popular expectations for change, which 
became manifest in the surging public support for the European Union 
membership. New dynamics also spawned new political alliances, namely, the 
liberal-conservative coalition that supported the EU-driven politico-economic 
reform process and the leftist-secular nationalist coalition that resisted it. At the 
same time, in a historic re-alignment of geopolitical interests, the West shifted its 
support from the Kemalist guardians to the liberal-conservative coalition led by 
the AKP. With the domestic support of an increasing portion of the electorate, the 
liberal intelligentsia and a new class of conservative entrepreneurs and 
bureaucrats with links to the Hizmet movement, the AKP successfully challenged 
the institutional hegemony of the military-bureaucratic guardians. 
 The guardians’ defeat came about gradually, through the course of three 
general elections, the EU-backed institutional reforms between 2003 and 2005, 
the presidential election of 2007, the Ergenekon and Balyoz cases starting in 
2008, and the presidential and constitutional referenda of 2007 and 2010, 
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respectively. Of crucial importance to the outcome of this power struggle were 
the divisions among the guardians as regards the course of action to be taken in 
response to the changing status quo. These internal disagreements, which 
reflected the general division within society between reform and resistance, split 
open the institutions of guardianship, ultimately benefitting the liberal-
conservative alliance. 
 While reviewing this process of change in Turkey, it is important to resist 
the temptation to reduce a complex process to a binary struggle between forces 
of authoritarianism and democracy, or between good and evil, as rival political 
camps in and outside of Turkey so persistently do. As I noted in Chapter 1, these 
pillars are not monolithic and a victory of the democratic pillar over the 
guardians does not guarantee improvements in civil liberties and 
competitiveness. Indeed, the tentative outcome of the ongoing process that has 
led to the collapse of the hybrid regime in Turkey has also been complex and yet 
at the same time thoroughly alarming from the perspective of substantial 
democracy. This will be the subject of the second half of Chapter 7.  
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CHAPTER 7 
 
BEYOND AND BACK TO THE HYBRID REGIME  
 
 
Introduction 
 
In Chapter 1, I re-defined hybrid regime as an institutional arrangement in which 
sovereignty is divided between a guardianship pillar and a democratic pillar. For 
a system to be hybrid, this duality needs to be in place and both pillars need to 
possess practical autonomy and authority; in other words, they should not be 
merely ceremonial. I also suggested that when one of these pillars disappears or 
loses its practical autonomy and authority, the system no longer becomes hybrid 
(hypothesis four). But a transition into democracy is not guaranteed even if the 
electoral pillar triumphs over the guardianship pillar, just as a return to 
hybridity in either case cannot be ruled out if the post-hybrid institutional 
arrangement cannot be sustained and consolidated (hypothesis five). With these 
points in mind, this chapter will build on the argument that both regimes had 
lost their hybrid character in the late 2000s, identify their post-hybrid nature 
and question the evidence for (or the likelihood of) a return to hybridity. 
I argue that in Iran while Khamenei’s institutional control over the regime 
has expanded, the legitimacy crisis surrounding his patrimonial authority put the 
regime’s and his guardians’ security into greater jeopardy. What may have saved 
both, and also revived the hybrid system, was the election of Hassan Rouhani in 
June 2013. In Turkey, the collapse of the hybrid system came about with the 
defeat of the Kemalist guardians by the liberal-conservative alliance led by the 
AKP and supported by the West. The triumph of the electoral pillar, however, has 
not resulted in a transition to consolidated democracy. Instead, as they took 
control of the institutions once held by the guardians, Turkey’s civilian leaders 
assumed a paternalistic state discourse reminiscent of their Kemalist 
predecessors and subscribed to a minimalistic notion of democracy. 
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The fall and the revival of the Iranian hybrid regime 
 
The Leader and ‘the perils of presidentialism’ 
 
In the Islamic Republic of Iran, the expansion of guardians’ autonomy and 
authority at the expense of the republican pillar has taken place gradually and as 
two intertwined processes, one formal and the other informal. The formal 
process consists of the constitutional amendments of 1989 canonising and 
expanding the ambiguously defined role and unwritten powers of the faqih, 
which had hitherto relied on Khomeini’s charismatic authority, the 1991 
expansion of the Guardian Council’s authority to supervise elections and to vet 
and qualify candidates, as well as the Majles decision in 2008 exempting the 
faqih from any parliamentary oversight. The informal process accompanying this 
formal accumulation of power includes the expansion of the Leader’s personal 
grip over major political institutions – both Islamic and republican – through his 
representatives, his control over the bonyads, the growing economic prominence 
of the IRGC, and the guardians’ extensive manipulation of the electoral process 
by methods that go beyond their formal prerogatives. 
 As Chapter 5 on Iran demonstrated, the weakening of the republican 
institutions by the guardians, particularly by the Leader’s efforts to maximise his 
influence over both pillars, took place simultaneously on the personal and 
factional levels, which cut across the two pillars of the Iranian hybrid regime. The 
suppression and/or marginalisation of three of the IRI’s four main factions (the 
modernist right, the reformists and the neo-conservatives) took a particularly 
intense turn in the aftermath of the 2009 presidential election. With the defeat of 
President Ahmadinejad’s neo-conservative supporters in the 2012 Majles 
elections, Khamenei’s personal grip over the regime’s institutional architecture 
appeared almost complete – save for the one office that consistently challenged 
the Leader’s political and ideological authority: the presidency.  
Consequently, the Leader’s suggestion in late 2011 to eliminate the post 
of the president altogether and have the Majles select a prime minister was 
reflective of the threat posed by an executive office that was deemed too 
autonomous from the guardians, in inherent rivalry with the Islamic pillar and, 
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crucially, able to cater to the enduring popular demand for charismatic 
leadership that could defy the institutional authority of the Leader.280 The 
proposal also demonstrated the traditionalists’ discomfort with holding 
presidential elections, especially after the experience of 2009. In July 2012, a 
Majles group was tasked by the Leader to assess the feasibility of switching from 
a presidential to a parliamentary system. The group’s conclusions were not made 
public. However, the fact that the traditionalists did not pursue the matter 
beyond this point suggests that they found the socio-political conditions at the 
time unfavourable for such a transition.  
In theory, a transition into a parliament-centred republican pillar would 
mitigate the threat posed by a popular charismatic president to the guardians. It 
would open the way for the emergence of coalition governments that would be 
easier to manipulate than a cohesive single-faction presidency – as for instance 
was the case in Turkey during the 1990s. In sum, it would protect the guardians 
from “the perils of presidentialism” and allow the Leader to maintain a grip over 
the political system without having so much to engage in open confrontation 
with elected officials (Linz 1990). The fact that this idea was flaunted but not 
pursued attests to two important points: first, while the Leader’s institutional 
authority has grown consistently and become extensive, in practice it has not 
become absolute even after 2009. Secondly, while some guardians (such as 
Mesbah Yazdi) openly supported the absolute control of vali-ye faqih over the 
entire political system, having taken part in the 1979 revolution, many were also 
aware of the inherent risks and insecurity of such domination and see some 
degree of democratic legitimacy as necessary for the regime’s survival. As one 
observer noted at the time, “if such a change materializes, the Islamic Republic’s 
political system will come to more closely resemble the regime it toppled in 
1979.” (Alem 2012) 
Even without a transition to a parliamentary system, however, numerous 
critics have compared Khamenei’s position to that of the Pahlavi shahs. Kadivar 
described it as monarchy (saltanat) in the mid-2000s. After the 2009 election, 
Ata’ollah Mohajerani suggested that the Leader had replaced the Islamic 
                                                 
280 “Parliamentary system could be more efficient: Iran's Parliament Speaker” Payvand, 22 
October 2011, http://payvand.com/news/11/oct/1237.html  
236 
 
Republic with an Islamic government, thereby bringing to an end the era of 
republicanism in Iran (Arjomand 2009: 21). In July 2009, Grand Ayatollah 
Montazeri issued a series of fatwas declaring velayat-e faqih illegitimate and 
unjust in the absence of “proper and free popular elections”.281 In a joint 
statement issued on the anniversary of the IRI’s founding in February 2011, 
Mousavi and Karroubi described the political system as “monarchism without 
hereditary rule”.282 Arjomand described the post-2009 arrangement in Iran as 
clerical monarchism with a neo-patrimonial feature:  
 
The IRI is now critically dependent on decisions made by 
one man, the Leader, and is for that reason of a comparable 
degree of fragility to the neo-patrimonial regime of the Shah 
in the latter part of the 1970s, obvious differences between 
the two notwithstanding (2009: 191). 
 
As I laid out in Chapter 2, both Iranian revolutions of the twentieth 
century targeted rulers who were in control of a patrimonial state apparatus, but 
whose popular base had diminished due to widening social perceptions of unjust 
and inept rule. Historically, popular support has proven at least as important as 
institutional power for the security and stability of a regime or ruler in Iran. By 
the end of Ahmadinejad’s second term, the formal political space had shrunk so 
much that it accommodated little more than the Leader’s loyal followers within 
the two pillars, alongside those within the state bureaucracy, bonyads, the 
clerical establishment and the IRGC, who either benefited from his extensive 
patronage or were not openly engaged in factional rivalries. Perhaps the clearest 
expression of this new status quo was the disqualification of Rafsanjani, one of 
the regime’s founding fathers and key players, from the presidential race in 
2013. Rafsanjani’s disqualification prompted outspoken conservative Majles 
deputy Ali Motahari to complain publicly to the Leader that were Khomeini still 
alive, he would also be disqualified by the Guardian Council.283 Ayatollah 
Khomeini’s daughter, Zahra Mostafavi, wrote an open letter to Khamenei, 
                                                 
281 “Fatwa-ye_Ayatollah_Al’azami_Montazeri,” Razesabz, 31 August 2009, 
 http://www.rahesabz.net/story/983/  
282 “Iran protests see reinvigorated activists take to the streets in thousands”, Guardian, 14 
February 2011. 
283 “Name-ye Ali Motahari be Rahbar-e Enqelab derbare redselahiyat-e Hashemi”, Official website 
of Ali Motahari, 13 May 2013, http://alimotahari.ir/latest-news/1194. 
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protesting the decision.284 It appeared that by significantly personalising power 
in the IRI, the Leader had tied his fate to that of the regime – and the regime’s 
fate to his.285 
Furthermore, despite his increasingly bitter feud with the president, 
having supported him in the 2005 and – more importantly – 2009 elections, it 
was difficult for the Leader to simply disassociate himself from the state of 
affairs in the country under Ahmadinejad’s administration. Iran faced a dire 
socio-economic situation during Ahmadinejad’s second term, caused both by 
governmental mismanagement and the tightening international sanctions regime 
introduced after 2010. In 2012 oil production fell to a 25-year-low and oil 
exports dropped by nearly 40% on the previous year; the lowest level since 
1986.286 Banking sanctions blocked international money transfers to and from 
Iran and forced the government and private traders to engage in barter through 
third parties (Göksel 2012). The impact of the crisis was felt throughout the 
country, as the purchasing power of the Iranian currency dropped 75% between 
2005 and 2013. By October 2012, the rial had lost 80% of its value on the 
previous year. By the end of the Iranian year in March 2013 inflation had 
climbed to 40% and the GDP had contracted by 6%. There were widespread 
reports of food and medicine shortages.287 Finally, Ahmadinejad’s poorly 
managed redistributionist policies came with a cost as he left the government in 
USD 67 billion in debt, despite receiving USD 600 billion in oil revenues, the 
highest in the IRI history, during his eight-year tenure.288 
Complementing Iran’s economic hardships was the increasingly volatile 
geopolitical atmosphere in Middle East following the outbreak of the ‘Arab 
Spring’ uprisings. The regime’s early attempts to present the uprisings across the 
                                                 
284 “Name-ye mohem-e doktor Zehra Mostafavi ferzand-e hazrat-e Imam Khomeini (s) be maqam-
e moazzam-e rahbar”, Jamaran, 22 May 2013, http://www.jamaran.ir/fa/NewsContent-
id_26621.aspx. 
285 In the words of Nooshabeh Amiri, “when Khamenei falls, so will the regime”. “Ba Khamenei 
nezam ‘esqat’ mishavad”, Rooz Online, 7 February 2011, 
http://www.roozonline.com/english/news3/newsitem/archive/2011/february/07/article/-
e892d9d020.html  
286 “Sanctions Cut Iran's Oil Exports to 26-Year Low”, Wall Street Journal, 29 April 2013; “Iran oil 
output heads to 25-year low”, Financial Times, 4 June 2013. 
287 “Iran unable to get life-saving drugs due to international sanctions”, Guardian, 3 January 2013. 
288 “Eraeh-ye_gozarash-e_a’malkard-e_100_rooz-e_aval-e_dowlat-e_yazdahom_be_mardom”, 
Official website of President Hassan Rouhani, 26 November 2013, 
http://www.rouhani.ir/event.php?event_id=198  
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Middle East as an ‘Islamic Awakening’, inspired by Iran’s own 1979 revolution 
were gradually abandoned as it became clear that Sunni Islamist movements that 
replaced Tunisia and Egypt’s pro-West secular dictators preferred to emulate the 
geopolitical pragmatism of Turkey’s AKP rather than the anti-imperialism of the 
IRI. Tensions between Iran and the Gulf Arab monarchies, particularly Saudi 
Arabia, which were already high before 2011, turned into open rivalry as the 
Saudi military crushed the Shia uprising in Sunni-ruled Bahrain.289 More 
alarmingly, sponsored by Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, and backed by the 
West, a wide array of mainly Sunni movements defied Iran’s main strategic ally 
in the region, the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria (Zibakalam 2011). The 
uprising that started in Syria in March 2011 gradually evolved into a violent civil 
war fought along the Sunni-Shia fault line and became the centre stage of a 
geopolitical power struggle drawing in regional and global players. It was in this 
volatile geopolitical environment and amidst heightened Israeli threats of a 
military strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities that the new sanctions regime came 
into effect.  
In short, as the 2013 presidential election approached, the Leader found 
himself in an institutionally powerful but strategically weakened position, facing 
a severe economic crisis and a popular legitimacy deficit at home and an 
increasingly hostile and unstable geopolitical environment abroad. The fact that 
in the third presidential debate held on 5 June, all of the candidates who were 
approved by the GC condemned Ahmadinejad’s economic and foreign policies, 
criticised the state of affairs in the IRI and in varying degrees supported a move 
away from international confrontation came as evidence of a system-wide 
recognition of the crisis that had engulfed the regime. This crisis and the Leader’s 
predicament are crucial to explaining Hassan Rouhani’s unexpected victory on 
15 June 2013. 
 
  
                                                 
289 “"Cut off head of snake" Saudis told U.S. on Iran”, Reuters, 29 November 2010. 
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The election of Hassan Rouhani and return to hybridity 
 
A mere four days before the presidential election, a first-round victory by Hassan 
Rouhani would come as a surprise to most Iranians, outside observers as well as 
many regime insiders, including the Leader himself. Yet Rouhani managed to 
secure just over 50% of the vote and win the race in the first round, avoiding a 
run off. The official participation rate of 73% did not suggest considerable voter 
apathy, such as in 2005. Unlike in 2009, there were no protests or widespread 
claims of vote rigging (on the contrary, the dominant scene was that of street 
celebrations by Rouhani supporters in major cities across the country). The 
outcome was quickly endorsed by the GC and the Leader, as well as sidelined 
opposition figures, such as Rafsanjani and Khatami.  
At the risk of passing judgement on developments that might be too 
recent for the thesis to engage in academically, I will argue that the 2013 election 
marks a return to hybridity in the IRI, due to the widespread acceptance of its 
largely unpredicted outcome and its subsequent role in drawing the modernists 
and some reformists back into the regime’s formal political space. In turn, this 
argument strengthens the observation made in Chapter 4 and discussed in 
Chapter 5 that the political space in the IRI consists not only of the regime’s 
formal institutional structures but also of informal, personality-based factional 
networks. Political contestation continued mainly at this informal level even as 
formal competition was highly restricted from 2009 onwards. In other words, 
the power struggle in the period between mid-2009 and mid-2013 occurred as 
intra-elite competition in an insecure authoritarian setting where the electoral 
institutions were stifled but not formally disassembled, therefore facilitating a 
return to institutional hybridity under changing socio-economic and geopolitical 
conditions. 
An academic, diplomat and cleric, Hassan Rouhani was little unknown by 
the electorate, given his bureaucratic and technocratic career within the Islamic 
Republic. He was very much an establishment insider, having held numerous 
strategic posts since the regime’s inception. He was a commander in the war 
with Iraq, serving as the head of Khatam al-Anbiya, the engineering arm of the 
IRGC, as well as the air force. A five-time Majles deputy, a member of the 
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Expediency Council from 1991 and the Assembly of Experts from 1998, he was 
also the secretary of the Supreme National Security Council from 1989 until 
2005, national security advisor to presidents Rafsanjani and Khatami, as well as 
Khatami’s chief nuclear negotiator between 2003 and 2005. Often described as a 
centrist, Rouhani has not been formally associated with any of the IRI’s main 
political factions. However, partly due to his close personal relationship with 
Rafsanjani, he has been viewed with distrust among some reformists and 
traditionalists and mostly disliked by the neo-conservatives. Even so, the fact 
that he never played an overtly political role meant that he had not become the 
target of sustained political attention – either positive or negative – until a week 
before the election. Ehteshami describes him as an “establishment rebel who has 
a mind of his own in socio-political and foreign policies, and does not blindly tow 
regime lines.”290 His public criticism in 2006 of Mesbah Yazdi’s argument that 
legitimate authority can only be divinely obtained can be seen as a philosophical 
defence of the hybrid regime:291 
 
Everyday some people juxtapose national sovereignty 
(hakimiyet-e melli) against religious sovereignty (hakimiyat-
e dini). National sovereignty is inseparable from religious 
sovereignty. […] Can we say that the government of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran is not democratic? Ours is a 
‘religious democracy’ (mardomsalari dini). Can we say that 
the people’s votes are purely ceremonial? It was the will of 
the Imam [Khomeini] that votes should matter. 
 
Rouhani was not the Leader’s preferred candidate; that person was Saeed 
Jalili, whose campaign stirred little public enthusiasm. However, like the seven 
other candidates who were ultimately approved by the GC, he was not perceived 
as a potential threat to the Leader or the regime either. This was an election 
designed to be safe for the Leader.292 Rouhani was also not a front-runner until 
three days before the election, when both Rafsanjani and Khatami publicly 
endorsed him. With the withdrawal of Mohammad Reza Aref, the only reformist 
candidate on the list, Rouhani suddenly turned into the preferred candidate of 
                                                 
290 Lecture at the London School of Economics, 27 November 2013. 
291 Entekhab, 14 March 2006. 
292 The other candidates besides Rouhani and Jalili were Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf, Gholam-Ali 
Haddad-Adel, Ali Akbar Velayati, Mohsen Rezaei, Mohammad Gharazi and Mohammad Reza Aref. 
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the modernist right, the reformists and other critics of the Leader and the status 
quo, against five conservative establishment figures. Khatami toured the country 
on behalf of Rouhani in an attempt to energise the reformist base, where there 
was an ongoing debate about boycotting the election. For example, Mostafa 
Tajzadeh, a prominent reformist politician jailed after 2009, called for a boycott 
following Rafsanjani’s disqualification, by which, he claimed, the regime had 
displayed its incompetence and admitted Rafsanjani’s popularity among the 
people.293 Tajzadeh withdrew his call once Rafsanjani expressed his open 
support for Rouhani.  
Rafsanjani’s predicament after 2009 was the mirror opposite of 
Khamenei’s: at the same time as he was being marginalised institutionally, 
Rafsanjani’s popularity surged based on the perception that he was sacrificing 
his position to defend a just cause. Increasingly before the election, he became 
portrayed as the only person capable of standing up to the Leader and managing 
economic and political normalisation, as he did after the Iraq war.294 While his 
disqualification was clearly meant to prevent his return to power, in effect it 
added to his popularity, casting him as the victim of a personal vendetta, while 
painting the regime (and the Leader) weak and insecure. Arguably, Khamenei 
could have stemmed this trend by reversing the GC’s decision and allowing 
Rafsanjani to run, therefore appearing magnanimous and in touch with public 
opinion, but the Leader was evidentially more willing to contend with public 
disapproval than facing the prospect of another Rafsanjani presidency. In the 
end, more than anyone else, it was Rafsanjani’s support that revived Rouhani’s 
campaign in the final hour. As a result, his victory was very much a victory for 
Rafsanjani as well (Karami 2013). 
We should underline the importance of Rafsanjani and Khatami’s public 
endorsement in turning around the fortunes of the Rouhani campaign and 
                                                 
293 “Tajzadeh: Agher_Rahbari_khodsarihaye_Jannati_ra_mehar_nakonad_mesool-e_mostaqim-
e_entekhabat_rasool_khahad_bood” Norooz News, 7 May 2013, 
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changing the election’s dynamic almost overnight. The fact that the two sidelined 
former presidents were able to generate considerable public excitement in a 
matter of days and prevail over the traditionalist guardians’ will to impose their 
chosen candidate on the system attested to the two men’s continued significance 
as providers of popular legitimacy to the IRI system. At the same time, however, 
it also showed their continued loyalty to and dependence on this system. It 
would be misleading to assume, in other words, that Rafsanjani and Khatami 
only put their weight behind Rouhani to defy the Leader; as regime insiders their 
fate was also tied to that of the system. In short, this episode demonstrated 
Khamenei and the traditionalists could only marginalise the two leaders at the 
expense of crucial popular legitimacy for the regime, in which Rafsanjani and 
Khatami also remain deeply invested. Last but not the least, the unexpected level 
of support Rouhani received from small towns and the urban working class 
suggested that the traditionalists’ were losing their grip over their core support 
base, presumably as a result of the growing economic instability in the country. 
These observations help explain why the Leader and the traditionalist 
guardians may have favoured a return to hybridity instead of manipulating the 
outcome of the poll. Given the precarious state of its domestic legitimacy and 
geopolitical position, it would be safe to suggest that the regime was not willing 
to risk another wave of mass demonstrations four years after the 2009 protests. 
We should also note, however, that a Rouhani presidency did not necessarily 
mean a defeat for the Leader, even if it was a victory for Rafsanjani. Rouhani was 
not a reformist and, unlike Khatami and the ideologues of the reform movement, 
he did not make promises that would challenge the Leader’s institutional 
authority.295 The return of the presidency to a cleric would bring an end to the 
anti-clerical tide that peaked during the Ahmadinejad era. Furthermore, as a 
centrist and establishment insider, Rouhani would be aware of the delicate 
power dynamics amongst the IRI elite and could be expected to thread a careful 
balance. 
                                                 
295 Attempting to mitigate the distrust among the reformists towards Rouhani, Khatami 
consistently strove to reconcile reform with Rouhani’s discourse of moderation. Following the 
election he said, “We preferred for the reformist discourse to win even if reformists themselves 
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Finally, Rouhani’s emphasis on ‘moderation’ (etedal) and experience as 
chief nuclear negotiator could relieve the regime of some of the economic and 
geopolitical pressures, while a return to institutional hybridity could help it 
regain some of the popular legitimacy lost in previous years. His platform of 
‘prudence and hope’ (tadbir va omid) symbolised a rejection of Ahmadinejad’s 
confrontational socio-economic and foreign policies.296 Overall, a degree of socio-
political, economic and international normalisation appeared necessary for the 
IRI – and the Leader – to overcome the various interconnected crises 
surrounding it. And if a Rouhani presidency meant the return of the modernists 
and reformists to the formal political space, the Leader could still resort to his 
extensive patronage over the regime’s key institutions to contend with rising 
factional challenges in due course, as he did successfully during the previous 
three presidencies. 
The first months of the Rouhani presidency demonstrated that the regime 
elite was indeed deeply engaged in such strategic calculations and adjustments 
to the changing status quo. The new president put together a cabinet of 
‘moderates’ that featured traditionalists, modernists and reformists, many of 
whom were known for their experience in government and technical expertise 
rather than overt factional affiliations. While the traditionalist dominated Majles 
rejected three of Rouhani’s ministerial nominations for being too close to the 
Green Movement, it did approve Khatami-era officials Bijan Namdar Zanganeh as 
oil minister, Massoumeh Ebtekar as vice president and Mohammad Javad Zarif as 
foreign minister. The key ministries of intelligence, interior and justice were 
given to traditionalists. In particular, the appointment as justice minister of 
Mostafa Pourmohammadi, whom Ahmadinejad had sacked in 2009, 
demonstrated that the new president was not interested in confronting the 
Leader over presidential appointees as his successor had done.297  
One of Rouhani’s earliest initiatives was to re-engage with the P5+1 group 
of countries to work towards a negotiated settlement of the nuclear issue. This 
                                                 
296 Consequently, his administration has been dubbed “the government of moderation and hope”.  
297 The appointment was also condemned by human rights organisations. Having served as a 
prosecutor in revolutionary courts and as deputy intelligence minister, Pourmohammadi has 
been implicated in the execution of thousands of political dissidents in the late 1980s. (HRW 
2013). 
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happened with the explicit blessing of the Leader, who declared in June that 
solving the nuclear issue would be “simple and easy” if western countries put 
aside “their stubbornness”,298 and in September, described the government as a 
champion wrestler that needed to show “heroic flexibility” without forgetting 
“who the opponent is”.299 Testifying both the pragmatism of Khamenei’s decision 
as well as the regime’s difficult geopolitical predicament, Mohammad Ali Jafari, 
the head of the IRGC, likened this statement to Khomeini’s expression of 
“drinking from the poisoned chalice” as he agreed to the ceasefire that ended the 
war with Iraq in 1988.300 
 On 28 September 2013, shortly after they addressed the UN General 
Assembly in New York, the US and Iranian presidents held a phone conversation, 
the highest-level contact between the two countries since the Iranian revolution. 
On 24 November, Iran and the P5+1 countries reached a deal over the nuclear 
issue, whereby Iran agreed to stop uranium enrichment above 5% and be subject 
to stricter international inspections in exchange for limited sanctions relief. The 
deal, which the US and Iranian governments described as a historic 
breakthrough, marked a notable change in the nature of bilateral relations and a 
turn away from the Ahmadinejad and Bush era policy of ideological 
confrontation. The mainstream public reaction to the deal in Iran appeared to be 
one of widespread approval and cautious optimism regarding the country’s 
economic future, reflected in the sudden rise in the Tehran Stock Exchange.301  
Coming against vocal opposition from Israel, Saudi Arabia as well as neo-
conservative Republicans in the US Congress and Senate, the nuclear deal can 
also be seen as a manifestation of the fast changing status quo in Syria. As the 
regime of Bashar al-Assad managed to hold on to power and al-Qaeda affiliated 
Sunni jihadist groups became increasingly dominant within Syria’s fractured 
opposition, the West started reassessing its strategy of supporting the opposition 
and calling for regime change. In September the Obama administration defied 
pressure from Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Israel, and abandoned its threat to 
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intervene in Syria militarily after the regime in Damascus was accused of using 
chemical weapons, and instead struck a ‘last-minute’ agreement with Russia and 
the Syrian regime for the supervised destruction of its chemical arsenal. In 
October, EU foreign ministers called to end military support for the Syrian 
opposition. A delegation representing the Assad government was invited to the 
second international conference on Syria in Geneva in January 2014. 
The nuclear deal, in other words, signalled a tentative improvement in 
Iran’s geopolitical and economic fortunes. As such, it can be said to have 
bolstered the popularity and legitimacy of the government of Hassan Rouhani, 
reflected in the confident manner by which the president provided an account of 
his first 100 days in office to the Iranian people. We can argue that Rouhani’s 
success has benefited the popular image of his principal supporters, Rafsanjani 
and Khatami as well. Although tentative and fragile, the easing of economic and 
geopolitical tensions also enhances the regime’s credibility and legitimacy, as the 
Rouhani government represents the ‘moderate’ and centrist face of the clerical-
led Islamic republican system. We can argue that this secures the position of the 
Leader for the foreseeable future.  
What happens to Iran after Khamenei’s eventual demise remains an open 
question. This is also the question concerning the fate of the hybrid regime. That 
being said, as I concluded this thesis, it appeared that the IRI hybrid regime was 
once again firmly in place, together with its main institutions, leading actors as 
well as its embedded personal, factional and institutional rivalries.302 Finding its 
balance after swinging out of hybridity, it had demonstrated its resilience.  
                                                 
302 Factional rivalries gradually came to the fore and ideological battle lines re-emerged in the 
months following Rouhani’s election:  
- In August, a website linked to the IRGC published a four-point ideological plan for the 
organisation and its student body to pursue during the next four years. These included protecting 
the ideological boundaries of the revolution and consolidating people’s relationship with the 
Islamic system; resisting ‘deviation’; fighting materialism; and serving the system rather than any 
faction or administration.  
“Chahar naqsh-e Sepah va jonbash-e daneshjooyi dar 4 sal-e ayendeh” Ya Lesarat al-Hossein, 20 
August 2013, http://www.yalasarat.com/vdcjhaem.uqeavzsffu.html. 
- In October, reformist Bahar newspaper was banned by the regime’s press monitoring agency 
for publishing an article considered an insult to Islam. 
- In October, the traditionalist Majles threatened_Oil_Minister_Bijan Zangeneh and Economics 
Minister Ali Teyebnia with impeachment. Foreign Minister Zarif was summoned to the Majles in 
December to account for his comments that the United States can “wipe out Iran’s defense 
systems with just one bomb” with several traditionalist MPs calling for his resignation. 
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Change and continuity in post-Kemalist Turkey 
 
The unravelling of the liberal-conservative alliance 
 
Unlike in Iran, the power struggle between the two pillars of the Turkish hybrid 
regime resulted in a victory for the representatives of the electoral pillar. Yet as 
the following pages will demonstrate, the victory of the elected civilians did not 
result in the consolidation of substantial democracy in Turkey. On the contrary, 
the system of Kemalist guardianship gave way to an intense religious populism 
driven by the charismatic leadership of Prime Minister Erdoğan in a highly 
insecure political and geostrategic atmosphere and a minimally democratic 
setting. 
In June 2013, while there were scenes of celebration on the streets of 
Tehran following President Rouhani’s election, the largest anti-government 
demonstrations in decades were taking place on the streets of Istanbul, Ankara 
and dozens of other cities around Turkey. The protests, which had sparked over 
the government’s decision to convert Gezi Park, a public green space in Istanbul’s 
Taksim Square, into a shopping mall, had brought together a large mix of 
disparate and previously antagonistic groups, united in their opposition to the 
AKP government. These included liberals, social democrats, communists, secular 
nationalists, Alevis, Kurds, LGBT activists, environmentalists and ‘anti-capitalist 
Muslims’, alongside a notable number politically unaffiliated students and young 
middle-class professionals (KONDA 2013). Despite the notable presence of 
Ulusalcı groups among the protestors, the Gezi protests stood out from the 
republican rallies of 2007 with their diverse, spontaneous and overwhelmingly 
civilian character. Pacified through the court cases, the military was not able to 
manipulate, capitalise or hijack the protests as in the past, allowing them to 
                                                                                                                                            
- In late December, Mesbah Yazdi declared ‘moderation’ to be a threat to Islam similar to 
reformism and said they would intervene “if we feel that … the beliefs and values of Islam, are 
exposed to danger”. Interview, 9 Day, 21 December 2013. 
- Ahmad Jannati, head of the Guardian Council, said that even if the guardians of the regime were 
in a minority in society, they had a duty to protect the Islamic order. “Debir-e Shoraye Negahban: 
Hatti agher dar egheliyat bashim boyad nezam ra hafz konim”, BBC Persian, 24 December 2013, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/iran/2013/12/131224_l39_jannati_minority_regime.shtml  
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maintain and cultivate a distinctly civilian character and relatively pluralistic 
message, without wittingly or unwittingly legitimising a military intervention. 
The protests were an outburst of accumulated reaction to three 
interrelated dynamics: the AKP’s construction-driven economic growth strategy, 
the rise of a new patriarchal state discourse explicitly based on a conservative 
interpretation of Sunni social morality, and the gradual suppression of civil 
liberties in conjunction with the personalisation of power in the hands of a 
popular and charismatic leader. For Prime Minister Erdoğan and his supporters, 
who looked at politics increasingly through the prism of conspiracies, in part due 
to their past experience of facing non-democratic interventions, the protests 
were part of a western-backed plot to prevent Turkey’s rise as a powerful 
Muslim nation under the AKP, similar to the republican rallies of 2007 (Öktem 
and Akkoyunlu 2013). Hence, instead of addressing the protestors’ grievances, 
the government resorted to crushing them by force, resulting in thousands of 
injuries, several deaths and further socio-political polarisation (Amnesty 
International 2013). 
 The Gezi protests took many observers who saw Turkey as a ‘success 
story’ by surprise. Neither the scale of the demonstrations nor the government’s 
heavy handed reaction and recourse to what appeared to be fantastic conspiracy 
theories appeared to fit the narrative of a country that had taken steps towards 
resolving its internal divisions, consolidated its democracy and achieved 
economic stability under the leadership of its popularly elected ‘moderate 
Islamist’ government.303 As I noted earlier in this chapter, this narrative had 
become popular in the Middle East, especially amongst the ascendant Sunni 
movements in post-revolutionary Arab countries that looked to the AKP as an 
effective governance model (Sallam 2013).304 Finally, as I noted previously, 
                                                 
303 Notoriously, Yiğit Bulut, a journalist whom Erdoğan appointed as advisor during the protests, 
claimed that foreign powers were trying to kill the prime minister through ‘telekinesis’. 
304 Two surveys found that Turkey’s popularity was on the rise before and in the immediate 
aftermath of the Arab uprisings in the Middle East. See Aragall, Padilla and Pont (2012) and 
Akgün and Senyücel-Gündoğar (2012). 
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western foreign policy strategists periodically promoted the idea of a ‘Turkish 
model’ for the Middle East, mainly on the basis of geopolitical expediency.305 
 The root causes of these protests, and the government’s respond to them 
– which collectively signalled the beginning of an acute socio-political crisis in 
post-Kemalist Turkey – should be analysed in the context of changing power 
dynamics and geopolitical alliances in and around the country from mid-to-late 
2000s onwards. Already by the mid-2000s, the factors that had brought about 
the liberal-conservative alliance and propelled the AKP to implement political 
reforms in line with the EU accession process had started to disappear. Two 
external developments were influential in reintroducing a governmental 
discourse of securitisation and confrontation, challenging the discourse of 
democratisation and reconciliation that had characterised the early 2000s: the 
resumption of hostilities between the Turkish military and the PKK following the 
latter’s termination of a five-year ceasefire in June 2004, and the gradual loss of 
momentum in Turkey’s EU accession process. 
 The resumption of the conflict was partly triggered by the US occupation 
of Iraq, which provided renewed momentum for Kurdish independence and 
increased manoeuvring capability for the PKK along the Turkish-Iraqi border. 
The downturn in the Turkish – EU relations, on the other hand, was a 
consequence of the popular backlash inside Europe against the process of 
enlargement and ‘Brusselsisation’ of the EU. Together with the rise of 
Islamophobia in the post-September 11 setting in a number of European 
countries with significant Muslim immigrant communities, public attitudes 
towards Turkey’s accession assumed an increasingly hostile and xenophobic 
character. The French and Dutch rejections of the Lisbon Treaty in 2004 and the 
election of ‘Turcosceptic’ politicians, Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy, in 
Germany and France were institutional reflections of this backlash. These twin 
processes fuelled, and were in return fuelled by, a sense of frustrated 
nationalism within Turkey, ultimately contributing both to the confrontational 
style of politics at home and the cooling of relations between Turkey and the EU. 
                                                 
305 This recurrent presentation of Turkey by the US and UK foreign policy strategists as a model 
for its wider region is discussed in “The United States and the logic of strategy”, Akkoyunlu, 
Nicolaidis and Öktem (2013: 44 – 51). 
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Furthermore, the defeat of the military-bureaucratic guardians removed 
the common foe that had united the liberals and the conservatives, exposing 
their clashing visions over issues such as defining the nature and the limits of 
state authority, the boundaries of free speech or the role of women in society. 
With the waning of the EU as an external pressure mechanism for domestic 
reform and the provider of a democratisation framework, the liberals found it 
increasingly difficult to influence the contents and the direction of change. Less 
bound by the external anchor of the EU and the internal pressure of the guardian 
state, and more confident in their control of the institutions once dominated by 
the Kemalist guardians, the AKP officials’ rhetoric and policies started to 
resemble, following their second general election victory in 2007, but especially 
after the third one in 2011, a socially conservative version of their patriarchal 
predecessors. 
Evidence of this return to illiberal patriarchy included growing 
intolerance of public criticism of the government,306 a controversial internet law 
designed to control cyberspace by blocking websites that the state deemed to be 
socially, morally or politically corrosive, and a 2006 revision to the Anti-
Terrorism Legislation that significantly broadened the definition of terrorism.307 
It was based on this legislation that thousands of journalists, editors, academics, 
small publishers, student activists and local politicians – mostly of leftist political 
orientation and/or Kurdish background, or with alleged links to the ‘Ergenekon’ 
network – were arrested on contentious charges of terrorism. Between early 
2009, shortly after the Constitutional Court’s decision to outlaw the pro-Kurdish 
Democratic Society Party (Demokratik Toplum Partisi, DTP), and late 2011, over 
2,000 people, including some 250 elected politicians and mayors, alongside well-
known academics, publishers and human rights activists, were arrested in a case 
against the suspected civilian wing of the PKK.308 
                                                 
306 This led to a rising number of court cases launched against dissident journalists and a culture 
of self-censorship in the editorial boards of media conglomerates and independent news outlets 
(EC 2011: 6, 25 – 26). “Survey reveals that Turkish journalists recognize media censorship”, 
Hürriyet Daily News, 8 October 2011. 
307 Law No. 5532, adopted on 29 June 2006. 
308 “KCK Arrests Deepen Freedom of Expression Concerns”, Bianet English, 16 November 2011, 
http://www.bianet.org/english/freedom-of-expression/134065-kck-arrests-deepen-freedom-
of-expression-concerns.  
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The Anti-Terrorism Legislation rolled back the EU-backed police reforms 
of 2004 by expanding the authority of the police force, providing officers with 
enhanced legal impunity and, for the first time, arming special police units with 
military-grade weapons. A direct consequence of this revision was the 
increasingly commonplace use of excessive force against peaceful demonstrators 
and the ill treatment of detainees (in some cases resulting in deaths); a process 
that reached a climax during the 2013 protests (HRW 2008). The authoritarian 
spirit of this legislation, which harks back at the ‘dirty war’ of the 1990s, was 
captured by the AKP’s interior minister, İdris Naim Şahin, in a 2011 speech in 
which he suggested that terrorism was not an act limited to armed militants, but 
that “poets, painters, singers, satirists and academics can also be terrorists”.309 
This was the first year that Turkey topped the list of countries with most 
journalists in jail, surpassing both China and Iran; a title that it maintained in 
2012 and 2013.310 
Dominated by religious nationalist political views since the 1980s, the 
police force came to resemble the armed extension of the ruling party, used 
primarily in imposing its will on state and society. The government regarded the 
police, which is organised under the Interior Ministry, as a domestic counter 
balance against the military. In 2009, Erdoğan called the police “the guarantors 
of the regime”, a description with conspicuous resemblance to the military’s 
guardianship role.311 As noted earlier, the intelligence arm of the police played a 
key role in unearthing documents that were at the centre of the Ergenekon and 
Balyoz trials. As such, parallel to the ‘demilitarisation’ of the state was the 
process of ‘militarisation’ of the police force, with the latter’s budget rising 
consistently during a decade of AKP government (Gönen, Berksoy, Başer and 
Uçum 2014). The only other institution besides the police whose expenditures 
increased at similarly steep rates was the Presidency of Religious Affairs 
(Diyanet), which played a prominent role in promoting the ruling party’s 
                                                 
309 “İçişleri Bakanı'ndan yeni terör tarifleri”, Radikal, 26 December 2011. 
310 CPJ condemns journalist arrests in Turkey’, Committee to Protect Journalists Worldwide, 22 
December 2011; “Turkey--world's top press jailer once more”, Committee to Protect Journalists 
Worldwide, 18 December 2013. 
311 “’Rejimin güvencesi polis’ sözleri tartışma çıkardı”, Hürriyet, 29 June 2009. 
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religiously defined worldview both at home, and increasingly, on a global scale 
(Atalay 2013). 
Such developments notwithstanding, there were still numerous avenues 
of cooperation for the liberals and the conservatives between 2007 and 2011. 
The unfinished struggle against military-bureaucratic guardianship was one of 
them and both groups put their support behind Gül’s presidential nomination in 
2007 as well as the Ergenekon and Balyoz trials. Prominent members of the 
liberal intelligentsia also came out in support of the proposed reforms in the 
constitutional referendum of September 2010, seeing it as a necessary step 
towards a new civilian made democratic constitution, which the ruling party 
promised in 2007 but has not delivered since (Aktar 2010; Bâli 2010). 
Another area of cooperation was the implementation of Foreign Minister 
Davutoğlu’s ‘zero problems with neighbours’ policy, which the Turkish foreign 
ministry pursued energetically and with a degree of success during this period 
(Kadıoğlu, Öktem and Karlı 2012). In the framework of this policy, the AKP 
government sought to act as a mediator in regional conflicts such as between 
Israel and Syria, Iran and the West or between rival Palestinian factions. 
Prioritising trade, energy and security cooperation in bilateral relations, Ankara 
strengthened its previously troubled ties with its neighbours, including Greece, 
Russia, Syria, Iraq and Iran. Increased border stability, in turn, encouraged the 
government to launch a number of bold reform initiatives in 2009. Known as the 
Kurdish, Alevi and Armenian ‘openings’, these were aimed at, respectively, 
establishing direct talks with the PKK leadership to negotiate a permanent 
settlement, addressing the historic grievances of the country’s largest religious 
minority, and opening borders and re-establishing diplomatic ties with the 
Republic of Armenia (ICG 2009; Ulusoy 2010).312 Despite some encouraging 
early progress all three initiatives had collapsed by 2011, largely due to 
mismanaged popular expectations, communication failures, personality clashes 
as well as, ultimately, a fear of entrenched nationalist (or in the case of the Alevi 
initiative, sectarian) backlash by the involved parties during an election year.  
The fact that the AKP could still launch such reform initiatives while also 
display visibly authoritarian tendencies demonstrates the existence of competing 
                                                 
312 “Turkey and the Kurds: Peace Time?”¸ Economist, 27 August 2009. 
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socio-political visions and strategies inside the governing party before 2011, 
giving it a somewhat schizophrenic, nonetheless relatively pluralistic character. 
The failure of these initiatives brought this pluralism to an end. At the same time, 
the defeat of the Kemalist guardians, the ruling party’s third election victory in 
June 2011 on the back of strong economic growth at a time of deepening 
economic crisis in the West, and the rise of the ‘Turkish model’ in the early phase 
of the Arab uprisings convinced Prime Minister Erdoğan that he had the power, 
the popular support, as well as the historic opportunity to singlehandedly realise 
his ambitious vision of remaking Turkey and the Middle East. 
 
Enduring patriarchy and the rise of the ‘Erdoğan cult’  
 
The post-2011 election period in Turkey was one in which the governing party’s 
domestic and foreign politics became truly enmeshed, with Turkey’s active 
engagement in the power struggles beyond its borders exacerbating social and 
ethnic tensions at home, and domestic tensions fuelling a more confrontational 
foreign policy abroad. This period also saw a rapid personalisation of power by 
Prime Minister Erdoğan, who announced his plan to replace Turkey’s 
parliamentary system with a presidential one and become Turkey’s first directly 
elected president in 2014. Declaring the institutional separation of powers as the 
“main obstacle” to political expediency, Erdoğan and his advisors appealed for a 
‘super presidency’ equipped with the power to dissolve the parliament, govern 
through executive decrees and appoint senior judges and bureaucrats without 
parliamentary approval.313 
As part of this endeavour, Erdoğan personally vetted his party’s list of 
candidates for the 2011 election, leaving out liberal-leaning and independent-
minded figures as well as those with close ties to President Gül, who was 
increasingly seen as a potential rival in a future presidential race. Surrounded by 
loyalists who owed their political status to him, a personality cult started to form 
around the prime minister that gradually alienated him from his increasingly 
disillusioned former allies as well as some of his long-time comrades. Party 
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members across the country started referring to him formally as ‘The Great 
Master’ (Büyük Usta) – a reference that Erdoğan and the AKP adopted during the 
2011 campaign. Much more controversially for the less fervent Muslims, in what 
is a clear act of blasphemy for Islam, some of his sycophantic associates in the 
party started attributing divine qualities to their ‘prophet-like’ leader.314 
At the same time, in another example of the polarised and caricaturised 
social interpretations of history, both Erdoğan’s adoring supporters and 
passionate opponents likened him to a modern-day Ottoman sultan – the former 
to depict him as a warrior-like champion of Islam and Turkish nationalism in the 
spirit of Mehmed the Conqueror, and the latter to brand him a fanatical, 
backward despot; the antithesis of Atatürk.315 Indeed, with the addition of 
Abdullah Öcalan, the incarcerated charismatic leader of the Kurdish nationalist 
movement, who started playing a visible public role in the intermittent 
negotiations between the state and the Kurds since 2009, politics in the post-
2011 election Turkey increasingly came under the shadow of three charismatic 
figures – two alive and one ‘immortal’. This was not an environment conducive 
for the consolidation of substantive democracy. 
The interwoven nature of foreign and domestic politics, and the emerging 
pyramid-like architecture of power placing Erdoğan at the centre of the party, 
the party at the centre of Turkey and Turkey at the centre of a vast Islamic realm 
corresponding to the former territories of the Ottoman Empire, were vividly 
portrayed in the speech the prime minister delivered on the night of his election 
                                                 
314 Some memorable public statements by the prime minister’s followers include: 
- “To us, our prime minister is a second prophet”, İsmail Hakkı Eser, AKP chair for Aydın 
province, 3 February 2010.  
- “Even touching our prime minister is an act of worship”, AKP MP Hüseyin Şahin, 21 July 2011.  
- “I swear to God that Erdoğan is the indefinite and eternal leader of Turkey”, AKP Deputy 
Chairman Süleyman Soylu, 3 February 2013.  
- “Rize, Istanbul and Siirt are sacred places” EU Affairs Minister and Chief Negotiator Egemen 
Bağış, 10 February 2013, in reference to the paternal hometowns and birthplaces of the PM and 
his wife.  
- “I recognise Erdoğan as a righteous caliph and pay him homage”, Twitter message by journalist 
Atılgan Bayar, 23 August 2013.  
- “[Erdoğan] is a world leader that possesses all the attributes of Allah”, AKP MP Fevai Arslan, 16 
January 2014. 
315 A large banner reading “Last Ottoman sultan, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan the First” was unfurled 
during a public ceremony attended by the prime minister in Istanbul in March 2009. 
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victory in June 2011.316 “Believe me,” Erdoğan said, addressing thousands of 
supporters from the balcony of the AKP headquarters in Ankara: 
   
Sarajevo won today as much as Istanbul, Beirut won as 
much as Izmir, Damascus won as much as Ankara, Ramallah, 
Nablus, Jenin, the West Bank, Jerusalem won as much as 
Diyarbakir.   
 
Erdoğan envisioned a post-Kemalist Turkey that would lead the new 
Middle East, where popular Islamist movements like Tunisia’s an-Nahda and 
Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood were replacing secular military dictatorships one 
after another. The expectation that Syria would soon follow the North African 
examples of regime change led the AKP government to decisively burn the 
bridges it had built with the government of Bashar al-Assad in previous years 
and become one of the foremost supporters of the opposition movement in this 
country. This commitment, in turn, brought Davutoğlu’s ‘zero problems with 
neighbours’ policy to an end, as it cast Turkey on the side of an emerging 
western-backed Sunni alliance against the Syrian government and its principal 
supporters: Russia and the ‘Shia axis’ consisting of Iran, Iraq’s al-Maliki 
government and Lebanon’s Hizbullah. 
Embodied in the slogan “Great Nation, Great Power, Target 2023” adopted 
at the party’s general congress in September 2012, the AKP’s domestic agenda 
for the coming decade, during which it aimed to build the new Turkey, included 
an ambitious economic growth plan and an openly articulated social engineering 
project. In its attempt to display the new Turkey’s defining characteristics and 
transform it into one of the world’s largest economies by the hundredth 
anniversary of the republic’s founding, the government unveiled a series of 
spectacular construction projects.317 These included building the world’s largest 
mosque on Istanbul’s highest hilltop, digging an artificial canal parallel to the 
Bosphorus Strait and spanning a third bridge over it to connect with a new 150-
million-passenger capacity airport.318 To address the country’s chronic energy 
                                                 
316 “Mandate for a new Turkish era”, New York Times, 15 June 2011. 
317 See ‘Hedef 2023’ in the official website of the AKP, http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/hedefler  
318 “PM Erdoğan unveils long-awaited ‘crazy project’ as Kanal İstanbul”, Today’s Zaman, 27 April 
2011; “PM announces construction of giant mosque in Istanbul”, Hürriyet Daily News, 31 May 
2012. 
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dependence, the government pressed with the construction of new hydroelectric 
dams and announced plans to build two nuclear power plants. Finally, reflecting 
the AKP’s construction-based neo-liberal growth strategy, a vast number of 
urban regeneration and gentrification projects, carried out by private 
contractors close to the government and advertised intensely in the Middle East 
to attract Gulf Arab capital, started changing the landscape of Turkey’s cities 
dramatically.319 
The top-down imposition of these plans by the government and their 
overlooked environmental and socio-economic implications generated a 
corresponding public reaction. Opponents of the government’s plans pointed out 
that the artificial canal, the third bridge and the new airport threatened to 
destroy Istanbul’s last remaining forest area by opening it to urban 
development.320 They protested hydroelectric dams that submerged entire 
towns, historical sites and sensitive ecosystems, and the nuclear plants, which 
were planned to be built on an earthquake prone geography.321 Finally, urban 
regeneration projects frequently triggered smaller scale protests, as they 
displaced lower income communities en masse to the city’s uninhabited 
outskirts, while also privatising public spaces, such as the Gezi Park in Taksim 
Square, at an alarming rate (Karaman 2013). 
At the same time, following the prime minister’s explicitly stated desire to 
“raise a religious youth”, the AKP forced a new education bill through the GNA 
that increased the number of İmam Hatip schools and added new religion 
courses to public school curricula.322 This was accompanied by limitations on 
what the government viewed as immoral behaviour, such as tightening curbs on 
alcohol sales and consumption, a new legislation restricting abortions or the 
prime minister’s suggestion to ban mixed-sex private student housing. RTÜK, the 
state’s media regulatory agency founded by the 1980 junta, carried out an 
intensive campaign of censorship to eradicate immorality on TV. Finally, thanks 
to the rising number of religiously conservative public prosecutors, courts that 
                                                 
319 “Turkey in push to attract Arab investors”, Financial Times, 30 September 2012 
320 “İstanbul's new bridge, highway, canal threaten city's northern forests”, Today’s Zaman, 11 
August 2013. 
321 “Turkish dam threatens town that dates back to the bronze age”, Guardian, 20 May 2011. 
322 ‘‘Religious youth’’, Today’s Zaman, 12 February 2012; “Turkey passes school reform law critics 
view as Islamic”, Reuters, 30 March 2012. 
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once frequently handled cases of those charged with insulting Atatürk or 
Turkishness, gradually became preoccupied with the cases of those charged with 
insulting Islam or the Prophet.323 Altogether, these initiatives constituted the 
launch of a state-driven social engineering project that was in many ways a 
religious-conservative reproduction of the Kemalist guardians’ attempts to 
impose a strictly secular and Turkish national identity on a multi-ethnic and 
multicultural population. 
These moves were meant to please and consolidate the AKP’s core 
conservative base, at which they succeeded. But they also increasingly alienated 
non-religious citizens or religious minorities, gradually pitting various 
opponents of the government against its passionate supporters. In an 
environment where legislation was forced through the parliament without 
meaningful dialogue with the opposition parties or civil society organisations, 
and mega infrastructure projects were developed and tendered without due 
public consultation to a small number of contractors with personal links to the 
government, anti-government demonstrations – and heavy handed police 
response – became the norm. A day before the outbreak of the Gezi protests, 
Chief Justice Kılıç, who had opposed the closure case against the AKP in 2008, 
warned the government from a liberal democratic standpoint:324 
 
Human rights violations caused by state interference in the 
private lifestyle of the public have created incurable wounds 
to human dignity. Our political and social history is full of 
traces of interferences in certain segments of the public that 
were based on meaningless and imagined ideas. Adding a 
new wave of similar actions would further exhaust an 
already exhausted public conscience. 
 
The divorce between the liberals and the conservatives was finalised in 
these circumstances, with many of the prime minister’s liberal former 
supporters turning into his most outspoken critics. The most telling sign of this 
                                                 
323 Notoriously, pianist Fazıl Say was sentenced to 10 months in prison for tweeting a poem by 
eleventh century Persian philosopher Omar Khayyam judged to be denigrating religion. Some 
people, like the Turkish-Armenian writer and etymologist Sevan Nişanyan, were tried and 
sentenced under both the old order – for “insulting Turkishness” – and the new order, for 
“insulting the prophet”. See Barsoumian (2013). 
324 “Top judge says interference in lifestyle hurts public conscience”, Today’s Zaman, 30 May 
2013. 
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separation was the fallout between the prime minister and Ahmet Altan, the 
former editor-in-chief of Taraf daily, who was sentenced to 11 months in prison 
for insulting Erdoğan. The chairman of the AKP, Aziz Babuşcu, did not mince his 
words as he declared the end of this alliance: 
  
Those who were our stakeholders during the past decade 
will not be our stakeholders in the coming decade. […] The 
liberals, for instance, were our stakeholders during this 
process. But the future is the era of construction. And this 
construction era will not be as [the liberals] wish. Hence, 
they will no longer be with us. […] The Turkey that we will 
construct, the future that we will bring about, is not going to 
be a future that they will be able to accept.325 
 
Framing any opposition to his will and overt criticism of his government’s 
policies as an affront against ‘the national will’ (milli irade) that emerged from 
the elections, Prime Minister Erdoğan angrily labelled anti-government 
demonstrators as “looters and marauders”.326 Thus, in a strictly 
minimalist/procedural application of the term, democracy became associated 
exclusively with the ballot box in post-Kemalist Turkey. Based on this 
observation, we can suggest that the transformation from Kemalist to post-
Kemalist Turkey was essentially a transition from the institutional oversight of 
politics by a secular nationalist minority in a hybrid framework towards the rule 
of a religious nationalist ‘relative-majority’ driven by a patriarchal leader in a 
minimally democratic setting.327  
                                                 
325 “AK Partili Babuşcu'dan ilginç değerlendirme”, CNN Turk, 31 March 2013, 
http://www.cnnturk.com/2013/turkiye/03/31/ak.partili.babuscudan.ilginc.degerlendirme/702
371.0/.  
326 Erdoğan dismissed Gezi Park demostrators as “marginal groups”, “looters and marauders” and 
“piteous rodents” who resorted to violence because they could not win at the ballot box and had 
no respect for the national will. In contrast, President Gül commented at the height of the 
protests “democracy is not just about elections” and “if there are objections, there is nothing 
more natural than voicing them.”  
“Başbakan'dan Son Dakika: ‘Terörist Holiganlar’”, Bianet, 30 October 2012, 
http://www.bianet.org/bianet/siyaset/141732-basbakan-dan-son-dakika-terorist-holiganlar; 
“PM Erdoğan likens Gezi protesters to ‘piteous rodents'”, Today’s Zaman, 24 July 2013; 
“Democracy is not just about elections, says Turkish President”, Hürriyet Daily News, 3 June 2013. 
327 The suggestion that the AKP commands the support of an absolute majority of voters in 
Turkey is misleading. We should note that the 58% and 50% support that the AKP received at the 
2010 constitutional referendum and the 2011 general election respectively, which Erdoğan 
frequently emphasises to justify his ‘national will’ argument, was composed of diverse interest 
groups, some of which have been in clear opposition to his post-2011 policies as these were 
almost exclusively catered to the party’s core conservative Sunni supporters. Therefore, it would 
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Equally important as defining the change is to determine that which has 
not changed. What appears to have survived in Turkey at least since the final 
centuries of the Ottoman Empire, through decades of Kemalist guardianship and 
into post-Kemalist era is the self-legitimising philosophy of patriarchal authority 
that considers the state a mechanism of social coercion, transformation and 
control, the historical roots of which I discussed in Chapter 2. In other words, 
political change in Turkey in the 2000s appears to have basically entailed the 
replacement of the old guard with a new one, not unlike the transfer of 
patriarchal authority from the Ottoman sultans to the westernised bureaucrats 
and officers at the turn of the twentieth century, without a fundamental 
evolution in the philosophy of government. 
The enduring culture of guardianship in post-Kemalist Turkey – i.e. the 
continued lack of public accountability of groups and individuals within the state 
that act above the law and society in the name of the state and society – becomes 
visible when one reviews the critical court cases concluded during the AKP’s 
third term. The internationally followed trial of journalist Hrant Dink ended in 
January 2012 after five years of bureaucratic delays, covered up evidence and 
disappearing witnesses, with a verdict that left senior bureaucrats and police 
officers implicated in the assassination untouched and, eventually, promoted.328 
In March, citing a time limit and without handing out any sentence to the 
suspects, the court threw out the slow moving case of the 33 mostly Alevi poets, 
writers and intellectuals who were killed by a mob led by prominent Sunni 
Islamists in 1993.329  
At the same time, allegations of political interference and legal 
inconsistencies in the Ergenekon and Balyoz cases dashed initial hopes that 
these investigations would expose and cleanse the state of its criminal ‘deeper’ 
elements.330 Instead of bringing to justice unlawful acts committed under the 
                                                                                                                                            
be more appropriate to speak of a ‘relative majority’, i.e. the electoral support that allowed the 
AKP to form a single-party government since 2002. 
328 “Turkey fails to deliver justice for murdered Armenian journalist as trial ends”, Amnesty 
International, 16 January 2012. 
329 “Sivas massacre case dropped due to statute of limitations”, Hürriyet Daily News, 13 March 
2012 
330 In 2012, when specially authorised prosecutors attempted to question the chief of the 
National Intelligence Agency (Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı, MİT) Hakan Fidan, for his confidential 
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guise of a particular idea – Ulusalcılık/Eurasianism – the prosecutors effectively 
criminalised the idea itself and targeted their advocates. The arrests of two 
respected journalists, Ahmet Şık and Nedim Şener, further discredited the trials 
and bolstered the impression that they had become a tool that the ruling party 
and its supporters were using to marginalise their political opponents.331 Şık was 
a member of the Nokta team that had published the ‘coup diaries’ in 2007 and 
was working on a book manuscript investigating the Gülen network’s influence 
inside the police force, while Şener’s award-winning reporting implicated senior 
police officers in the Dink murder.332 
Finally, despite the widening scope of the indictments and the sheer 
number of suspects, the investigations failed to expose the role of security sector 
actors and the ‘counter-guerrilla’ in the political scandals and human rights 
violations in Turkey’s recent history, especially in the context of the Kurdish war 
of the 1990s. On 28 December 2011, an aerial bombardment by Turkish jets 
killed 34 Kurdish civilians, apparently mistaken for PKK militants, near the 
village of Roboski along the Iraqi border. The government’s reluctance to 
conduct a transparent public investigation and the military prosecutor’s eventual 
dismissal of the case in January 2014 can be seen as evidence of the ongoing 
culture of legal impunity both within the TSK and the state in general.333 
 
The intra-Islamist split and crisis in post-Kemalist Turkey 
 
2012 and 2013 proved to be increasingly testing years for ‘the Great Master’ and 
his AKP. The violent sectarian dynamic of the Syrian conflict, which the Turkish 
government once hoped to manipulate, destabilised Turkey with a bulging 
refugee influx, growing tensions between Turkey’s own Sunni and the Alevi 
communities, and deteriorating diplomatic and economic relations with its 
                                                                                                                                            
contacts with PKK leaders in Oslo during the Kurdish ‘opening’ in 2009, the AKP government 
abolished these courts as well, except for the Ergenekon and Balyoz trials. 
331 See chapter on Turkey in HRW (2013: 487 – 493).  
332 “Arrest of Turkish reporters raises doubts over Ergenekon case, Index on Censorship, 11 March 
2011.  
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southern and eastern neighbours.334 Turkey also faced simultaneous security 
threats from the Syrian military, jihadist groups and a renewed Kurdish drive for 
autonomy along its border with Syria. The twin explosions in the border town of 
Reyhanlı on 11 May 2013, killing 51 people, was the worst single terror attack in 
Turkey’s history and the government’s rushed attempt to impose a media 
blackout on the incident demonstrated the scale of the crisis (Akkoyunlu 2013).  
More people died in clashes between the PKK and the security forces 
between mid-2011 and late 2012 than in the previous decade (ICG 2012). In 
early 2013, the two sides agreed on a ceasefire and launched renewed 
negotiations for a settlement based on an implicit peace for power bargain, 
whereby the government would grant the Kurds’ some of their cultural and 
political rights in return for Kurdish support for Erdoğan’s presidential 
ambitions. To this end, in March 2013, the PKK announced laying arms and 
withdrawing its militants from Turkey. However, beset by long-standing distrust, 
the negotiations were also affected by the growing socio-political instability after 
June 2013. In September, the PKK halted the withdrawal process, citing the 
government’s failure to fulfill previously agreed-upon confidence building 
measures. 
The government’s heavy handed response to the Gezi protests and 
Erdoğan’s repeated public accusations of western complicity in them seriously 
strained the AKP government’s alliance with – and the prime minister’s 
reputation amongst – Turkey’s western allies.335 In July 2013, the military coup 
against Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood-led elected government deprived the AKP 
of a key ally in the ‘new’ Middle East. The Turkish government’s frustration at 
the muted western response to the coup and the Obama administration’s 
reluctance to intervene military in Syria was reflected in the phrase “precious 
loneliness”, coined by Erdoğan’s chief foreign policy adviser Ibrahim Kalın, to 
describe Turkey’s increasingly unfavourable but supposedly noble geopolitical 
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predicament. In a poignant sign of the shifting dynamics in the region, Egypt’s 
military government expelled the Turkish ambassador from Cairo and 
downgraded ties with Ankara hours before Iran and the P5+1 countries signed 
the nuclear agreement in Geneva. 
Arguably the most critical development concerning Turkey’s political and 
institutional future took place against this backdrop in the final days of 2013. 
This is the very public falling out of the followers of Prime Minister Erdoğan and 
Fethullah Gülen’s Hizmet movement. As I noted in the previous chapter, the 
rivalry between the two strands of political Islam – the ‘pragmatic strand’ 
associated with Hizmet and the ‘ideological strand’ represented by Welfare – 
during the 1990s was such that Fethullah Gülen had supported the military coup 
against Welfare in 1997. It was only after the military guardians subsequently 
turned against Gülen and when Erdoğan, Gül and other young Islamists declared 
their departure from ideological politics that the AKP and Hizmet entered into an 
alliance against the Kemalists in the 2000s. Now, similar to the liberal-
conservative divorce, with the disappearance of their common foe, their 
competing worldviews and agendas resurfaced. 
Underlying the intra-Islamist divide lay Erdoğan’s ambitious drive for 
personal power, the perception among the pragmatists that he has returned to 
his ideological roots, and the geopolitical implications of this suspected return 
(Akyol 2014). Himself based in the US since 2000, Gülen’s movement has long 
advocated close ties with the West, especially the United States and including 
Israel. Erdoğan’s increasingly sharp public denunciations of Israel, accusations of 
the West for supporting the Gezi protests, his statements – widely dismissed as a 
joke at first – in support of joining the Shanghai Cooperation Council, which is led 
by Russia and China, instead of the EU, and his government’s negotiations with 
China for missile procurement despite NATO’s opposition manifestly 
contradicted Hizmet’s worldview and geopolitical priorities.336 Gülen publicly 
criticised Erdoğan and the AKP government for the first time during the 
international crisis following the deadly raid by Israeli commandoes of a 
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Turkish-led aid flotilla headed to Gaza in May 2010.337 During the Gezi protests, 
leading Hizmet newspapers Zaman and Today’s Zaman openly and sharply 
criticised government officials, including Erdoğan. 
The split turned into open battle in late 2013, after a move by the 
government to shut down private preparatory schools (dershane), which serve 
as a major financial resource and recruitment base for Hizmet in Turkey.338 In a 
seeming retaliation, on 17 December, a large-scale corruption investigation was 
launched against the AKP government, implicating senior ministers, their sons 
and influential businesspeople close to the prime minister with allegations of 
bribery, money laundering and illegal provision of building permits and public 
contracts. The operation was led by prosecutors and members of the police close 
to the Hizmet movement, such as Zekeriya Öz, who was also the chief prosecutor 
of the Ergenekon trial. Reminiscent of the Kemalist critics of these trials, Erdoğan 
labelled the corruption operation a “bureaucratic coup” against the government, 
and accused Fethullah Gülen of building a “parallel state” inside the judiciary and 
the police force.339 He also accused “some foreign ambassadors” for being behind 
the investigation and threatened them with expulsion.340 
The conflict escalated quickly to involve a major cabinet reshuffle and 
resignations of the implicated ministers and dissident MPs from the ruling party. 
In an attempt to block a second indictment that implicated other senior AKP 
figures, including Erdoğan’s own family, the government purged hundreds of 
senior police officers and prosecutors thought to be sympathisers of Hizmet. In 
response to the purges, secret recordings of incriminating phone conversations 
allegedly between Erdoğan and his close entourage were leaked to the 
internet.341 In an apparent move to win the support of the Kemalists, a senior 
aide to the prime minister declared that the Ergenekon and Balyoz trials had 
been a plot set up by the “parallel state” against “our nation’s military”. As I was 
concluding this thesis, the government was also engaged in backdoor 
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negotiations with the secularist opposition for a possible retrial of the generals 
found guilty in the Ergenekon and Balyoz cases.342 In this atmosphere of 
sustained political instability, the lira depreciated sharply, forcing the Central 
Bank to intervene by radically increasing interest rates.343 
As Turkey entered a year featuring at least two elections – local elections 
in the spring and the first direct presidential election scheduled for autumn – the 
outcome of the ‘Islamist fratricide’ and its impact on the country’s political future 
and institutional architecture appeared difficult to fathom. A victory for Erdoğan 
would almost certainly render his rule even more paranoid and lead to a swift 
decline into robust dictatorship. Indeed, two pieces of legislation forced through 
the GNA in February 2014 to block the indictments and the leaks, which tighten 
the executive’s control over the judiciary and the internet, and a draft bill 
granting sweeping powers and immunities to the government-controlled 
intelligence agency, herald the arrival of this dictatorship. On the other hand, 
Erdoğan’s defeat, especially if it comes through non-democratic means, would 
lead to an altogether different case of political uncertainty and economic 
insecurity, in the course of which growing portions of the populace could favour 
a return to hybridity for the sake of stability. This could be under a new set of 
guardians, such as Fethullah Gülen’s wealthy, opaque and highly influential US-
based Islamic fraternity, or even the old national ones. At the beginning of 2014, 
the return of the military to the political scene, especially in the case of a 
prolonged institutional crisis and a retrial in the Ergenekon and Balyoz cases, 
could not be ruled out as a possibility. 
In the midst of the government’s strained ties with the West and growing 
economic instability, the battle between Erdoğan and Gülen risked unravelling 
the Islamists’ control of post-Kemalist Turkey, just as a split inside the military-
bureaucratic establishment under comparable geopolitical and economic 
conditions had brought an end to the Kemalist guardianship. However, 
regardless of the outcome of this power struggle, the prospects for substantial 
democratisation in Turkey looked grim, given the enduring culture of patriarchal 
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authority and the extent of the damage this latest process has inflicted on the 
already tenuous rational-legal foundations of Turkey’s state institutions. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The dynamics and outcomes of post-hybridity in Iran and Turkey appear to 
support the two hypotheses concerning transformations from hybrid regimes, 
which I outlined in Chapter 1. Both cases serve as examples for the possibility of 
a return to hybridity in the event of a prolonged socio-political crisis or 
institutional instability in a post-hybrid setting. In the event of post-2009 Iran, it 
was the traditionalist guardians who deliberately worked to revive the IRI’s 
republican pillar, having discovered the risks and the difficulty of controlling the 
state and society in the absence of popular support and legitimacy. If Turkey 
returns to hybridity, which was within the realm of possibility at the beginning of 
2014, this would not be a deliberate move but rather as a result of an internal 
feud among the two strands of political Islam, which claimed control of the state 
following the fall of the Kemalist guardians.  
What the Turkish case demonstrates vividly is that the victory of the 
electoral pillar over the guardianship pillar does not guarantee the consolidation 
of substantial democracy in a post-hybrid setting. Indeed, the prevalence of state 
patriarchy under Turkey’s elected Islamist government suggests that political 
culture may be harder to change than institutions and political actors. In the 
Conclusion that follows, I will engage in a comparative analysis of the Iranian and 
Turkish experiences of hybridity and question the significance of the 
observations made throughout this thesis for the study of hybrid regimes. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
Having discussed the processes of formation, consolidation and 
institutionalisation of the Iranian and Turkish hybrid regimes in Chapters 2 to 4, 
and the core dynamics, major debates and key actors that have influenced the 
critical turning points for the two regimes in the 1990s and the 2000s in 
Chapters 5 to 7, I will conclude with a comparative analysis of the two cases 
based on the three concentric spheres of change (structural dynamics, 
institutions and human agency), which I outlined in the Introduction to the 
thesis. What have we learned about the nature and dynamics of socio-political 
and institutional change in Iran and Turkey by studying these within the 
framework of hybridity and in light of the five hypotheses I put forth in Chapter 
1? At the same time, how do these cases help us answer the general questions I 
put forth about hybrid regimes in the Introduction? Finally, where do 
guardianship and hybrid regimes fit within the evolving constellation of political 
systems in the twenty-first century? 
 
 
Reviewing the Khomeinist and Kemalist hybrid regimes 
 
As I noted throughout the thesis, the underlying similarity between the Iranian 
and Turkish republics is (or was, before the fall of Kemalist guardianship in 
Turkey) the existence of a dualistic arrangement whereby institutions of 
guardianship are placed above and exert limitations on the political authority of 
electoral institutions. Preserving the ideological legacy of the charismatic 
founding fathers is the self-assigned and proclaimed role of the guardians in both 
regimes. Despite this role, we notice a lack of ideological consistency within 
the Iranian and Turkish guardianship institutions over time and amongst 
different factions. In any given period, we come across multiple and conflicting 
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interpretations of Kemalism and Khomeinism propagated by different factional 
groups and generations.  
 This ideological inconsistency is more immediately observable in the IRI, 
where factional divisions are publicly acknowledged and institutionalised, than 
in Turkey. One could suggest that this is in part due to the decentralised and 
relatively pluralistic structure of the Shia clergy, which forms the basis of 
guardianship in the IRI, as opposed to the more exclusive and hierarchically 
organised military in Turkey. As I explained in Chapter 4, rival interpretations of 
Shi’a jurisprudence, alongside the varying prioritisation of the revolution’s key 
promises for the diverse groups that took part in it, lie at the root of factional 
divisions in Iran. Albeit less publicly visible, divisions within the republican elite 
in Turkey have also had a decisive impact on the evolution of the regime’s hybrid 
character from the outset. The earliest and the most persistent division was that 
between the statist officers and bureaucrats on the one hand and the 
economically liberal, socially conservative entrepreneurs and landowners on the 
other. While the former group consolidated its institutional authority over the 
state with the 1960 coup, internal rivalries continued to impact the military-
bureaucratic establishment in the following decades.  
 The fact that of the four successful interventions carried out by the 
Turkish military between 1960 and 1997, two were against right-wing 
governments (1960 and 97) while the other two targeted primarily the wide 
spectrum of leftist movements (1971 and 80) demonstrates the extent of the 
ideological fluctuation and contestation amongst guardians over time. The free 
market reforms and the ‘Turkish-Islamic synthesis’ imposed by the 1980 junta 
stand in stark contrast both with the secular statist worldview of the 1960 junta 
and the secularist agenda of the perpetrators of the 1997 intervention; yet each 
were carried out under the pretext of safeguarding ‘Atatürk’s principles and 
revolution’. Internal rivalries also dominated the TSK at various critical 
junctures: it was a group of junior officers who broke from the chain of command 
that carried out the 1960 coup. The 1971 intervention was a right-wing coup in 
response to a failed attempt by leftist officers three days previously. Finally, as I 
discussed in Chapter 6, the division within the military-bureaucratic guardians 
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during the 2000s proved instrumental in allowing the AKP to push through 
reforms that dismantled the Kemalist guardianship. 
Rather than being first and foremost the embodiment of a well-defined 
and fixed ideological worldview, then, guardianship should be understood 
primarily as a mechanism through which one political group endeavours to 
impose its will over others and ultimately over the whole society. The guardian 
state, in other words, is an instrument of power preservation and imposition in 
the service of an ideology, whose name (i.e. Kemalism, Khomeinism) stays fixed 
but precepts and priorities are frequently reinterpreted on the basis of the 
evolving worldviews and selective memories of competing elite groups, and the 
changing power relations amongst them, in conjunction with the wider shifts in 
socio-economic and geopolitical dynamics.  
 What we can say in terms of philosophical consistency for all the different 
factions that have vied to take charge of the institutions of guardianship in both 
cases is a distrust of majority rule – the defining characteristic of guardianship 
everywhere. As an instrument of power, guardianship allows for socio-political 
minority groups that are unlikely to win in competitive elections to maintain 
disproportionate influence over the entire body politic. The realisation that they 
stand to lose from ‘unguarded’ electoral politics prompts these groups to focus 
their energies on maintaining their grip over the institutions of guardianship and 
strengthening them against electoral institutions. Yet the more they rely on the 
guardianship institutions, the more deeply their minority status and 
apprehension of the masses become entrenched. It was the successive election 
defeats of the CHP during the 1950s that drove the Kemalists to establish a new 
guardianship structure through a series of coups d’état. Likewise, the sweeping 
victories secured by the reformists in the 1997 presidential and 2000 Majles 
elections in Iran provoked the traditionalist guardians to manipulate elections 
more rigorously and openly in the future, culminating in the mass protests after 
the 2009 election. 
These examples also remind us of the continually fluctuating 
boundaries between the two pillars of the hybrid regimes. A casual observer 
looking at the two countries in the late 1990s would conclude that while the 
space for electoral politics was expanding in Iran, following the landslide victory 
268 
 
of Khatami against the will of the traditionalist guardians, this space was 
shrinking in Turkey, where the military had toppled yet another democratically 
elected government. Revisiting them a decade later and seeing Iran after its 
contested 2009 election and Turkey in the midst of the Ergenekon and Balyoz 
cases, the judicial reform process and the AKP’s third election victory, the 
observer would likely reach the opposite conclusion. 
 These fluctuating boundaries notwithstanding, we also observe in both 
regimes a long-term trend through which the guardians gradually expand 
their institutional and constitutional jurisdiction. Despite deepening and 
intensifying the feud between the two factions of the republican elite by 
executing the three most senior and popular members of the Demokrat Parti 
government, the 1960 coup in Turkey actually put in place a relatively benign 
system of guardianship. The main aim of the 1961 Constitution was to prevent 
the accumulation of power in the hands of the executive by introducing a bi-
cameral legislative system, strengthening the judiciary and institutionalising the 
military’s guardianship role through the NSC. It also provided greater protection 
for civil rights and liberties than any past or future constitution. These rights 
were systematically curtailed and the military’s guardianship role intensified 
with subsequent interventions. The political and institutional arrangement that 
the 1982 Constitution put in place was a highly authoritarian one that sought to 
increase the state’s control over society and discourage independent thinking 
and political activism by securitising the political space, promoting a culture of 
mass consumerism and propagating loyalty to the state’s patriarchal authority. 
In Iran, the expansion and legalisation of the Leader’s powers with the 
1989 Constitution, the 1991 re-interpretation of the Guardian Council’s 
authorities and the 2008 Majles decision exempting the Leader from any 
theoretical parliamentary oversight are among key moments of the growth of the 
guardians’ formal authority. Parallel to this formal accumulation of power is the 
informal process that includes the expansion of the Leader’s grip over major 
state institutions through his personal representatives, his control over the 
bonyads, the growing politico-economic weight of the IRGC as well as the 
guardians’ above-mentioned manipulation of the electoral process by methods 
that exceed their formal authority. In both cases, the predominant tendency of 
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those who held unaccountable power has been to maximise it – not to relinquish 
or share it with others. 
Yet despite this tendency, the guardians in both countries have shied 
away from continuous direct rule without popular legitimacy, even at the peak 
of their institutional authority. If one of the lessons of the Khatami era for the 
traditionalist guardians in Iran was to tighten the controls over electoral 
institutions and search for a presidential candidate who would be loyal to the 
Leader, the other was the need for the traditionalists to be able to compete in 
popular politics. This, for instance, led Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, a firm believer in 
absolute guardianship who dismisses entirely the people’s role in legitimising 
political authority, to support and encourage the rise of the neo-conservatives as 
a populist antidote to the reformists. Likewise, the popular legitimacy crisis that 
engulfed the regime after the 2009 election eventually led Khamenei and the 
traditionalist guardians to restore the republican pillar of the regime and 
tolerate the re-entry of Rafsanjani and Khatami into the political arena in the 
2013 presidential election for the sake of the regime’s stability and the 
guardians’ own security. 
In Turkey, the decision to return power to civilian governments after 
every intervention attests to the military guardians’ reluctance to rule directly.  
The Kemalist guardians found it more effective and beneficial to manage the 
country’s affairs behind the stage, while allowing elected politicians to bear the 
burden of public opinion, which helps explain the longevity of the Turkish hybrid 
regime. Although some guardians may view elections and elected officials as 
inconveniences that they have to contend with and, when possible, emasculate, 
the republican pillar is also a key source of legitimacy for the regime that the 
guardians cannot easily do without.  
Competitive elections, in particular, are the sine qua non of hybrid 
regimes. In Turkey, widespread and longstanding public confidence in the 
process and declared outcome of elections – i.e. the overwhelming belief that 
voting will take place regularly and free of systemic manipulation – has provided 
legitimacy and stability to the political system in Turkey. In numerous episodes 
of political crisis and institutional rivalry, elections were used to resolve 
deadlocks and deflate socio-political tensions, a recent example being the row 
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over Abdullah Gül’s presidential candidacy in 2007. The assumption that they 
would eventually get a chance to express their views through the ballot box may 
have rendered the people more patient vis-à-vis military interventions as well, 
since the electorate regularly defied the generals’ declared preferences in 
elections following periods of direct military rule.  
The Kemalist guardians toppled elected governments, created electoral 
hurdles to bar the entry of unwanted political parties into the GNA, and 
frequently shut down parties and banned politicians. That being said, from 1950 
onwards, the military-bureaucratic guardians respected the sanctity of the ballot 
box, even when popular political movements that emerged from it jeopardised 
the institutional supremacy of Kemalist guardians. Conversely, it was their 
victory in seven successive elections – three general, two local and two referenda 
– between 2002 and 2011 that gradually solidified the AKP’s claim to be the sole 
representative of the ‘nation’s will’ not only in their fight against the guardians, 
but also – much more problematically – in a post-hybrid setting against any 
popular opposition against the party’s and the prime minister’s policies and 
worldview. While elections are the minimum requirement of democracies (and 
of democratic pillars in hybrid regimes), post-Kemalist Turkey stands as a good 
example of the shortcomings of a minimalistic/procedural interpretation of 
democracy that focuses solely on the process and the outcome of elections. 
The level of public trust in the integrity of elections has been arguably 
lower in Iran, where the guardians have restricted participation since the 
establishment of the IRI and there has been a growing perception of 
manipulation of the vote at least since the Majles election in 2000. Even so, the 
belief that elections can affect factional power dynamics has persistently driven 
the Iranian people to vote on election days. For its turn, the regime elite has used 
elections as an effective mechanism of managing popular participation in 
politics, socialising the youth into the IRI system as well as negotiating factional 
rivalries. The key function of elections in holding together the IRI system became 
manifest in 2009, when the perception of massive fraud led to a major clash 
between the state and society that threatened the very fabric of the political 
system, and again in 2013, when the traditionalist guardians allowed for an 
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apparently fraud-free election to take place at the risk of a victory for the 
traditionalists’ two pragmatist and reformist rivals. 
The guardians’ concern for popular legitimacy and their desire to operate 
within a hybrid institutional structure rather than a system of direct rule also 
remind us of the existence of an organic bond that exists between the 
guardians and the society from which they emerge. Despite their distrust of 
mass politics, in other words, guardians are not intrinsically alien products that 
are imposed on society from outside. On the contrary, with their authority based 
on their institutional role in the popular movements that gave birth to the two 
republics as well as on their claim to the charismatic legitimacy of the founding 
fathers, the guardians take strength from the enduring predilection for 
patriarchal authority among sections of the Iranian and Turkish society. This 
predilection both predates and, as is seen in the case of post-Kemalist Turkey, 
can outdate hybrid regimes. 
In Iran, patriarchal authority remains highly personalised. This is 
reflected in the factional organisation of politics, which is relatively informal and 
reliant on individual leadership and intra-elite networks. Politics in the IRI is 
driven by personalities as much as by ideas, and more than by organisations and 
institutions. The institutional architecture of the hybrid regime, namely the 
rivalry between the Leader and an elected president who can embody the 
enduring popular demand for a champion of the people’s rights, also reflects the 
historical “dialectic of state and society” that I discussed in Chapter 2. In contrast, 
in the same chapter, I emphasised the hierarchically unified conceptualisation of 
state and society in Turkey. The dominant symbols of patriarchal authority here 
have been the state, the fatherland and the nation (also, re-emerging with the 
AKP, Islam); notions that the Kemalist guardians, their late Ottoman 
predecessors and their Islamist successors have all claimed to serve. While 
authority has been bureaucratised to a significant degree in Turkey when 
compared to Iran – as evidenced by the prominence of organised party 
structures in politics and the guardianship of institutions rather than individuals 
– we can speak of a popular penchant for charismatic leadership here as well. 
Indeed, Turkey does not seem to have devised a third alternative between the 
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institutionalised elite guardianship and populist charismatic leadership, 
represented most recently by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. 
That said, in both countries, urban-based and youth-driven popular 
movements that defy the arbitrary use of state power by appointed or elected 
patriarchs symbolise the persistent demand for accountable and pluralistic 
government. In Iran, the century-long quest for institutionalising a fully 
accountable, popularly sanctioned, rule-of-law based constitutional system is 
ongoing despite frequent setbacks and suppressions. In Turkey, both the 
demonstrations following the assassination of Hrant Dink in 2007 and the Gezi 
demonstrations of 2013 were driven by similar popular demands. Whether or 
not these spontaneous grassroots movements can give rise to organised and 
ideologically coherent political mechanisms, without compromising on their 
pluralistic and civilian character, will determine the extent to which patriarchal 
authority can be challenged in Iran and Turkey in the years to come. 
 
 
Explaining divergent outcomes of change 
  
A question that arises from a comparison of the processes of change in the 
Iranian and Turkish hybrid regimes since the late 1990s concerns the divergent 
end result of these processes. Iran from 1997 and Turkey from 2002 saw the 
election of popular governments that confronted the authority of the guardians. 
In Iran, the traditionalist guardians were able to obstruct and ultimately 
suppress both the reform movement led by Khatami and the more unexpected 
challenge by the Ahmadinejad government, albeit at the expense of the regime’s 
democratic legitimacy and stability. In Turkey, the AKP government was able to 
overcome the guardians’ resistance and ultimately dismantle the system of 
military-bureaucratic guardianship. How did the guardians persevere in Iran and 
succumb in Turkey, and what could these divergent outcomes tell us about the 
dynamics of change in hybrid regimes? 
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Structure: The role of geopolitics 
 
There is a case to be made that the geopolitical rivalry between the IRI and the 
West (particularly the United States) has actually strengthened the Islamic pillar 
of the hybrid regime and provided it with added legitimacy at the expense of the 
republican pillar in at least two ways. First, the diversion from politico-economic 
reliance on the West, and the subsequent diversification of Iran’s strategic and 
economic alliances, has rendered the regime more resilient in the face of 
sustained western pressure for regime change. Here, Iran’s natural resource 
wealth needs to be noted. While on the whole oil has been a destabilising factor 
for Iran, its role in sustaining the IRI’s economy and providing alternative trade 
partners in spite of western-backed sanctions cannot be ignored. The 
prominence of the energy sector in the national economy has allowed for the 
state (and guardianship institutions like the IRGC) to remain the dominant 
player in the economy and, by extension, politics. 
Secondly, the existence of sustained ideological confrontation with the 
West has bolstered the regime’s anti-imperialist and anti-western character, 
often at the expense of civil liberties and the rule of law. As such, from Rafsanjani 
to Khatami, leaders who advocated a normalisation of relations between Iran 
and the West often found themselves treading a precarious line, exposing 
themselves to criticism from the traditionalist guardians of jeopardising the IRI’s 
sovereignty or, worse, collaborating with the enemy. Similarly, the reformist 
discourse of strengthening civil society and the rule of law was readily portrayed 
by the traditionalists as manifestation of ‘western cultural invasion’, which 
needed to be eradicated. Indeed, the reformists had to fight an uphill battle to 
frame their agenda as not western-inspired or liberal, but authentic to the 
Iranian revolution and true to the charismatic leader’s legacy.  
In contrast, the two basic tenets of Kemalism – national sovereignty and 
cultural westernisation – pulled the regime in opposite directions and created an 
internal tension among the guardians as to which had to be prioritised. Turkey’s 
membership in NATO in 1952 was not so much driven by cultural concerns, but 
by geostrategic pragmatism and the historically-rooted fear of Russian 
expansionism. Nonetheless, it did cost the Turkish republic its sovereignty to the 
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extent that Turkey’s domestic socio-political trajectory and foreign relations had 
to be in tandem with the expectations of the western security establishment. As 
the Turkish military became firmly embedded within the NATO structure, the 
TSK also came to rely on the extensive support provided by the western security 
establishment to maintain its supra-political position. Every successful 
intervention by the military guardians in politics had to be backed or approved 
by the western security establishment. The transfer of this support from the 
military to the liberal-conservative coalition in the early 2000s, in the framework 
of the European Union’s liberal democratisation agenda and the US promotion of 
the AKP as a ‘moderate Islamist’ model as part of its ‘war on terror’, has been 
crucial to the process of dismantling the system of Kemalist guardianship.  
In contrast to the Iranian reformists, the elected officials in Turkey had 
the advantage of both geopolitics and discourse. Not only were the guardians 
deprived of the West’s institutional support during the 2000s, but also, due to 
resource-poor Turkey’s extensive integration into international markets and 
reliance on foreign direct investment, they were unable to intervene as directly 
and openly in the political process as their predecessors or Iranian counterparts 
could. The liberal-conservative coalition was able to promote the AKP’s reform 
agenda by persuasively arguing for macro-economic stability and growth, 
Europeanisation and democratisation; goals to which the military guardians 
themselves had, until recently, paid lip service. These attracted more popular 
support than the discourse of national sovereignty that the Ulusalcı/Eurasianist 
opposition championed in the 2000s. 
 
Institutions: Constitutional sanction, mission and division of powers 
 
Another important difference that explains the divergent outcomes of the reform 
attempts in Iran and Turkey in the 2000s concerns the constitutional sanction of 
guardianship in the two countries. As I discussed in detail in Chapter 4, the 
system of Islamic guardianship of the Iranian state and society has been laid out 
and enshrined explicitly in the IRI’s constitutions on the basis of Ayatollah 
Khomeini’s velayat-e faqih theory. The powers and responsibilities of every 
major institution of the Islamic pillar, namely, the Office of the Leader, the 
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Guardian Council, the Expediency Council and the IRGC, were laid out in the IRI’s 
first constitution, which was prepared under the leadership of Khomeini and 
presented to popular vote in 1979. Although critical changes to the Leader’s and 
the Guardian Council’s powers were made in 1989 and 1991, the foundational 
legitimacy of these institutions as direct products of the Iranian revolution 
remained intact. This explicit and powerful constitutional, charismatic and 
revolutionary confirmation in turn allowed the guardians to exert their authority 
openly and forcefully, when challenged both by the reformists and the neo-
conservatives – by impeaching ministers or influencing their appointment, 
disqualifying candidates, blocking legislation as well as using force to intimidate 
or suppress popular dissent. 
 In contrast, the guardianship role of the Turkish military was based on 
tenuous legal and ideological bases from the outset. Although the institutions 
established as a result of coups, such as the NSC, the RTÜK or the YÖK, are 
constitutionally recognised, there is no direct reference to the military’s 
guardianship role in any of Turkey’s constitutions. The legal context with which 
the military attempted to justify its interventions was based on Article 35 of the 
TSK’s Internal Service Law, which was itself a product of the 1960 coup. 
Furthermore, despite Atatürk’s designation of the Turkish military as the guide 
and guardian of the young republic, the hybrid institutional architecture that 
emerged after 1960 was not designed personally by the charismatic leader. As I 
noted in Chapter 4, Atatürk even forbade serving officers from active 
engagement in politics (whereas Khomeini openly encouraged the clergy to be 
politically active).  
Lacking a clear mandate from the charismatic leader and an explicit 
constitutional backing, the hybrid system that emerged in Turkey as a result of 
the successive military coups needed constant historical, social, religious and 
geopolitical justification. These also forced the guardians to assume a less visible 
role than their Iranian counterparts: compare the systemic attempts to hide the 
existence of an internal mechanism of socio-political coercion (i.e. the counter-
guerilla) in Turkey against the publicly acknowledged and institutionalised 
nature of this mechanism in Iran (i.e. the IRGC, the Basij and the Hezbollahi 
vigilante groups). 
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While Turkey’s position as a frontier country along the East/West axis 
during the Cold War provided the Kemalist guardians with a long-term 
geopolitical raison d'être, the end of the Cold War gradually made the Turkish 
guardians more vulnerable to changes in the public opinion. In the 2000s, the 
AKP politicians successfully framed and legitimised their reform agenda as 
targeting the system of coups d’état established after 1960, rather than the 
Kemalist revolution of the 1920s and 30s, even though this was where most 
religious citizens’ grievances actually lay. The government’s presentation of the 
12 September 2010 referendum as score settling with the 1980 coup was a 
particular case in point. In contrast, the debate over reform in the IRI has been 
directly and inseparably linked to the ideological and institutional legacy of the 
1979 revolution and Khomeini’s political teachings. 
This difference is rooted in the original mission of guardianship as set by 
the two charismatic leaders. Despite the numerous practical changes to the 
political system during and after his lifetime, Khomeini’s velayat-e faqih system 
was formulated as a theoretical final product. Steeped in esoteric Sufi mysticism, 
Khomeini believed that human beings could reach perfection (ensan-e kamel) 
and achieve wisdom (erfan) through correct and rigorous teaching of Islamic 
jurisprudence and morals. But he did not expect all human beings to reach this 
higher state; nor did he believe this was necessary. Consequently, a group of 
learned scholars, the mojtahed, were tasked permanently with steering the 
Islamic community in the right direction. Khomeini did not designate a point in 
time where the society was expected to reach a level of perfection that would 
render the velayat-e faqih system obsolete, as, for example, the socialist 
‘vanguard party’ was expected to disappear once communism arrived. 
In contrast, Atatürk did not envision guardianship to be a permanent 
fixture on Turkey’s socio-political life. Like Lenin’s vanguard party, the guardians 
of the Kemalist revolution, which were organised under the CHP and the 
military, were expected to work tirelessly to educate the masses on the basis of 
the secular, nationalist and westernising principles of the new republic. It was 
presumed (although not explicitly mandated) that once this mass education 
campaign succeeded at an undetermined point in the future, the people would be 
able to govern themselves without the need for guardians. As I noted in Chapter 
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4, many in the military-bureaucratic wing of the CHP saw President İnönü’s 
decision to switch to a multiparty system in the late 1940s as a premature move 
and a potentially fatal blow to the Kemalist revolution. During the one decade of 
the DP government and in the course of the 1960 coup, these critics became 
convinced that henceforth the revolution had to be protected and continued 
through the indirect guardianship of the military and the bureaucracy.  
As the TSK’s guardianship role assumed a permanent shape, so did the 
guardians’ claim that the people were still too immature to be trusted. Over the 
following decades, this claim drew criticism from those who argued, increasingly 
convincingly, that it was precisely the military’s patriarchal presence that had 
inhibited Turkey’s democratic development. The liberal democratic critique of 
Kemalist guardianship was eventually built on this counter-argument. 
 
Human Agency: The impact of leadership 
 
In conjunction with structural and institutional factors, human agency has also 
had significant impact during critical political junctures. A key contrast appears 
to be the persistence and determination displayed by the leaders of the two 
countries’ reform movements. In discussing the reformist attempts to strengthen 
the republican pillar and define the limits of the guardians’ authority, I noted that 
Khatami repeatedly retreated from open confrontation with his traditionalist 
rivals. Khatami’s role in the defeat of the reform movement – i.e. his reluctance to 
defy the guardians at critical moments, out of a fear of civil strife or the 
institutional collapse of the hybrid regime – should not be exaggerated. Certainly, 
his failure to institutionalise an effective party structure to organise and lead 
civil society, the reformists’ failure to emphasise social justice as part of their 
political discourse and the traditionalists’ recourse to systemic violence to 
suppress the movement were also influential in the reformist defeat.  
That being said, when one considers the dogged determination with 
which Ahmadinejad defended the prerogatives of his office against the Leader’s 
interventions, leading to confrontations that threatened the Islamic pillar and the 
IRI establishment more openly than the reformist challenge, it becomes difficult 
to discount the argument that more steadfast leadership by Khatami at critical 
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junctures could have delivered strategic victories to the reform movement, 
which after all enjoyed a wider and more politically active proven support base 
than the neo-conservatives. Unlike Ahmadinejad, Khatami’s instinct to preserve 
the hybrid regime kept him from picking risky fights with the guardians. 
Ultimately, it was the traditionalist guardians who presented a united and 
determined front against the reformist challenge, after a brief period of discord 
and confusion following Khatami’s landslide victory in 1997. Likewise, had 
Ahmadinejad not owed his rise to the guardians whom he eventually turned 
against and, more importantly, had he the support of a wider and more 
politically active popular base, the traditionalists would have found it more 
difficult to fend off his attacks against the clerical establishment. 
In comparison, the Turkish reformists, who had popular, institutional and 
geopolitical backing, stood their ground during moments of heightened tension 
with the guardians. The AKP government’s persistence to nominate Abdullah Gül 
as its presidential candidate in 2007, despite the Constitutional Court’s attempt 
to block the vote, the secularist mass rallies and the military’s ‘e-memorandum’, 
stands out as a particularly fateful decision.  Coming at a moment when neither 
side had yet managed to establish its authority over the other, the AKP’s risky 
strategy to call for early general election paid off, as it emerged victorious from 
the ballot box and went on to have the reconvened GNA elect Gül as president. It 
was this victory over the guardians that tilted the balance of powers in the AKP’s 
favour for the first time.  
But the AKP government still may not have triumphed over the guardians 
was it not for the divisions amongst senior generals and judges. Here, I 
emphasise General Özkök’s role in blocking two advanced coup plans by his 
senior staff in 2003 and 2004 and Chief Justice Kılıç’s stance in opposition to the 
closure case against the AKP in 2008. In this respect, the divisions among the 
Turkish guardians stand in contrast to the hierarchical unity of the traditionalists 
in Iran under Khamenei. Of course, these fissures did not occur by chance. I 
already noted the existence of internal rivalries in the TSK, which surfaced in the 
1960 and 1971 coups. Divisions became intensified in the 2000s when the 
guardians were forced to choose between reform and resistance. Meanwhile, the 
presence of a conservative judge at the top of the Turkish high judiciary at this 
279 
 
critical juncture was in part a long-term consequence of the promotion of 
conservative nationalist bureaucrats by the military junta and the centre-right 
ANAP government in the 1980s.  
In both cases, structural and institutional factors informed and influenced 
key actor choices: both the determined stance of the elected officials and the 
divided nature of the guardians reflect an awareness of the uneven geopolitical 
playing field as well as the tenuous legal/ideological ground on which they stood. 
In Iran, the opposite was the case: favoured neither by geopolitical dynamics nor 
the constitutional division of powers, elected contenders of power were 
ultimately overcome by the dogged resistance of guardians, who had a tighter 
control over key political institutions and the economy.  
 
 
General conclusions about political change in hybrid regimes 
 
As we have seen, the divergent outcomes of the processes of change in Iran and 
Turkey were not only products of the differences in the institutional 
architectures of the two regimes, but also of particular structural factors and 
human agency. With so much resting on historical contingency, political culture, 
geopolitical factors and specific actor choices at critical junctures, it is both 
difficult and risky to generalise about the dynamics of political change in hybrid 
regimes. Without succumbing to such broad generalisations, then, what we can 
infer from the analysis of the two cases about the nature and the dynamics of 
change in hybrid regimes?  
 At the beginning of this thesis I questioned the nature of the relationship 
between guardianship and democracy in hybrid regimes and asked how these 
regimes reconciled the divided sovereignty between the demos and the aristos? 
As we have seen in the Iranian and Turkish cases, the guardians seek to 
legitimise their authority on the basis of tradition, their perceived role in the 
popular founding episodes of the republics, as well as by claiming the legacy of 
charismatic founding fathers. The culture of guardianship tends to be rooted in 
the existing societal justifications of patriarchal authority, be they expressed in 
the shape of state reverence or popular demand for charismatic leader figures.  
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Initially driven by the ambition to transform society from above, 
guardians in revolutionary polities suspend democratic promises, processes and 
institutions in part or in full. Over time, as the guardians’ social engineering 
projects face resistance and suffer setbacks, guardianship tends to be entrenched 
as a power preservation mechanism at the same time as societal demands for 
popular representation grow. At this point, guardians increasingly resort to 
invoking a domestic and geopolitical threat perception to justify their continued 
role in politics. The ensuing process of competing, negotiating and bargaining for 
power between the aristos and the representatives of the demos represents the 
core dynamics of hybrid regimes. 
A detailed analysis of the Iranian and Turkish cases supports my second 
hypothesis in Chapter 1 that the relationship between the two pillars of the 
hybrid regime is essentially one of conflict, making these regimes prone to 
periodic crises. Fluctuating boundaries of autonomy between the two pillars are 
signs of constant negotiation and redefinition of powers that lead to conflict and 
occasional political crises. Regular clashes between the Leader and the president, 
the Guardian Council and the Majles in Iran and periodic military interventions 
in Turkey are examples of the system’s inherently conflicted nature. This is not 
to assume, as many contributors to the democratisation literature have done, 
that hybrid regimes are necessarily unstable short-term entities. On the contrary, 
the combination of authoritarian and democratic tools of governance and 
legitimation do seem to provide these regimes with a level of flexibility and 
resilience in the face of frequent systemic crises.  
For the guardians, in particular, the existence of a democratic pillar grants 
the regime a degree of popular legitimacy that would be absent in a non-
democratic setting. In non-democratic forms of government, once civic unrest 
breaks out it is more likely to target the regime’s core institutional structures. In 
contrast, where there is some belief in the democratic legitimacy of a system, 
regime change tends to be a less widely and immediately desired goal for 
opposition groups. As such, while often driven with a power maximising instinct 
within the system, the guardians also have a vested interest in preserving the 
hybrid system. In this sense, the Iranian protests of 2009 and the Turkish 
protests of 2013 should be distinguished from the Arab uprisings of 2011 or, for 
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that matter, the Iranian revolution of 1979. The overwhelming demand in the 
first two cases was internal reform instead of revolution. That being said, 
popular perceptions of legitimacy can alter quickly and dramatically during the 
course of protests, as was the case in Iran in 2009 and, to a lesser extent, in 
Turkey in 2013. The perceived loss of the IRI’s democratic credibility after the 
presidential election in 2009 led to increasingly vocal calls for regime change, 
which the guardians suppressed by force. Their move to re-establish this 
credibility with the 2013 election can be interpreted as a pre-emptive move to 
mitigate the risk of a more intensive popular backlash targeting the regime 
directly in the future. 
Ultimately, the existence of two inimical sources of legitimation presents 
fertile ground for systemic tension. In turn, heightened and prolonged tensions 
can result in the collapse of one of the two pillars of the hybrid regime. Such a 
collapse is not a foregone conclusion as hybrid regimes are not, by definition, 
regimes in transition. However, given their built-in tension, the possibility of 
systemic change cannot be ruled out. Even less pre-ordained is the direction of 
change following transitions from hybridity. In conjunction with my argument 
above on the guardians’ interest in maintaining hybridity, the example of Iran 
has demonstrated the possibility of a return to the hybrid regime following a 
period of authoritarian government, when the guardians conclude that direct 
rule is too risky and costly. A return to hybridity is also possible when elected 
officials prevail over guardians, especially if democratic institutions are not 
consolidated and/or there is widespread perception that elected officials are 
incompetent/unfit to govern. At the time of writing, this scenario could not be 
ruled out in Turkey, where elected politicians successfully dismantled the system 
of Kemalist guardianship during the 2000s but were unable to institutionalise a 
stable democratic system. Yet a more imminent scenario was the transition of 
Turkey from hybridity towards an authoritarian system in a minimally 
democratic setting under a leader-driven populist government that combined 
neo-liberal economic policies, charisma-driven state patriarchy and a 
conservative social engineering project. 
The Turkish case clearly demonstrates that meeting the 
minimalistic/procedural requirement of democracy is not sufficient to label a 
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post-hybrid regime as democratising, if only for the fact that hybrid regimes also 
meet this minimum requirement of conducting competitive elections. More than 
a restructuring of institutions or a changeover of political elites, substantial 
democratisation necessitates an evolution in dominant socio-political attitudes 
towards a consensus view that considers government an open-ended and self-
reproducing process of public reasoning, discussion and deliberation. 
 
 
Thinking about guardianship and hybrid regimes in the twenty-
first century 
 
At the end of Dahl’s Socratic dialogue between representatives of the aristos and 
the demos¸ the latter admits that guardianship has been a powerful vision 
throughout history and is likely to remain so in the future. “If democracy were to 
decline and disappear from human history in the centuries to come,” the 
advocate of democracy speculates, “I think its place would be taken by 
hierarchical regimes claiming to be legitimate because they were governed by 
guardians of virtue and knowledge.” (1989: 64). While democracy is unlikely to 
disappear as perhaps the most theoretically and practically compelling system of 
government in the foreseeable future, few can claim today that its most 
rigorously promoted version – the Anglo-Saxon liberal representative democracy 
– embodies the undisputed and ubiquitous vision for all humankind in the 
century to come.  
Challenged both by its own internal socio-economic excesses, tensions 
and crises, and marred by its association with imperialism, the Anglo-Saxon 
liberal democratic idea has failed to live up to the claim that it is the system for 
‘the end of history’. Thus, as we move further away from the unipolar era of the 
1990s, and from the problematic cultural, ideological and teleological 
assumptions of the third wave democratisation literature this era has produced, 
we are confronted with a diverse and evolving constellation of political systems 
and experiments, both national and supra-national, democratic and non-
democratic. What place do direct guardianship and hybrid systems have in this 
constellation? 
283 
 
 Direct (or absolute) guardianship, in its traditional or revolutionary 
forms, does not seem to be a feasible or attractive political model in the twenty-
first century. As our two case studies have demonstrated, at the centre of the 
modern idea of guardianship is the preservation of state authority and the state’s 
hegemonic role in controlling and shaping socio-economic life of a people within 
fixed borders. As the dynamics of globalisation and the emergence of supra-
national politico-economic entities challenge these borders and the sovereign 
status of nation-states, state-dependent guardians tend to find it more difficult to 
maintain a hegemonic position over politics and society. Indeed, most of the 
world’s existing monarchies today are either constitutional democracies, where 
royal families serve a purely ceremonial function, or hybrid regimes that 
combine traditional authority of the monarchs with varying degrees of 
constitutional government and electoral institutions. Virtually all the exceptions 
are the less populous resource rich ‘rentier’ states, such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar or 
Brunei. 
Facing a mix of popular unrest, external economic pressures and/or 
military intervention, military dictatorships from North Africa to Southeast Asia 
have either collapsed (Libya, Tunisia, Egypt), succumbed to civil war (Syria) or 
were forced to introduce a set of liberalising reforms (Burma). Communist one-
party governments of China, Vietnam, and, to a lesser extent, Cuba, all of which 
enjoy varying degrees of popular support, too, are gradually opening up to 
international markets under pressures of financial globalisation. Finally, the 
Arab uprisings have revealed the underlying popular legitimacy gap in some of 
the wealthiest Gulf Arab monarchies that were long assumed to be highly stable.  
 We should be careful not to mistake these reforms and ruptures as signs 
of another wave of global democratisation or even a proliferation in hybrid 
regimes. In fact, many of these cases demonstrate that economic liberalism does 
not necessarily bring about political liberalisation. On the contrary, from China to 
Turkey, symptoms of ‘neo-liberal authoritarianism’ are becoming increasingly 
prevalent across all regime types and geographies. Neo-liberal authoritarianism 
implies an arrangement where national governments prioritise the interests of 
their domestic and international private supporters over the interests of the 
public. ‘Symptoms’ include high levels of collusion between politics, the private 
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sector, the media and the judiciary, and the proliferation of militarised law 
enforcement units specially trained to pacify frequent public demonstrations. 
This is a particularly complex crisis for modern democracies as these non-
democratic features are typically built through democratic processes – one 
example being post-Kemalist Turkey.  
Let me note at this point that while a hybrid regime can display neo-
liberal authoritarian characteristics, not all regimes that do are hybrid. Following 
my discussion in Chapter 1 of Gilbert and Mohseni’s three dimensions of 
hybridity, issues of civil liberties and competitiveness primarily inform us about 
the level or quality of democracy – i.e. whether and how institutions serve their 
purported functions – and not necessarily about the existence of formal 
institutions of guardianship alongside electoral institutions. 
 Even if on the whole it appears more difficult for self-declared guardians 
to maintain monopoly control over the fate of entire nations, this is not to 
suggest that guardianship is disappearing “as a powerful vision and the strongest 
competitor to the democratic vision” in the twenty-first century (Dahl 1989: 64). 
Rather, it is becoming more subtle and more frequently observable in hybrid 
arrangements alongside democratic institutions or within democratic systems in 
the shape of ‘quasi-guardianship’ institutions. Recent crises of authoritarianism 
in the Middle East and democracy in the West remind us of the enduring 
relevance of guardianship and hybrid regimes in the twenty-first century. In the 
Middle East, Egypt appears to be evolving into Turkish-style hybridity, where 
power will be contested between the military and civilians in the years to come. 
In Europe, especially in countries such as Italy and Greece, crises of crony 
capitalism and the failures and scandals associated with democratic politics have 
led to the emergence of both the politics of mass discontent and government by 
technocrats.  
Consequently, there is ample room for further research both into the 
political dynamics of hybrid regimes and into determining the impact of quasi- or 
supra-guardianship institutions on the ‘quality’ of modern democracies. Is not 
the European Union essentially a ‘supra-guardianship’ institution? What role do 
quasi-guardianship institutions – such as the British civil service, the US 
Supreme Court or ‘independent’ central banks – play in curbing the populist 
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tendencies of modern representative democracies, protecting civil liberties and 
the rules of competition, and at what cost for democratic legitimacy? These 
questions inevitably entail an ongoing discussion of the dynamics of interaction 
and legitimation between popular and elite rule; a discussion that I have 
endeavoured to contribute to with this thesis. 
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